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SURVEY

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100th issue

The Future of East-West Relations

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East And West: 1955-1977
An Introspective Survey

Leopold Labedz

IN this special anniversary issue of *Survey*, which, with two exceptions, consists solely of articles by previous contributors, we have asked some of them to reflect on the future of East-West relations. Their texts are, we think, a good example of *Survey* writings during the entire 22 years of its existence as a forum for analysis of and debate on East-West problems. Ideally, our aim has always been to publish well-informed studies that avoid the specialized jargon so frequently used by the experts. As in the past, the essays in this issue cover not only a variety of topics, but also a spectrum of attitudes and opinions forcefully expressed. Controversial issues inevitably result in clashes of ideas; in *Survey* they are confined within our contributors' common concern for civilized values and human rights, as well as their attachment to the ideals of freedom. As *The Times* once put it: "*Survey's* contributors are students of Russian affairs whose connecting link is that they believe in liberty."

THE anniversary prompts some reflections on a period of contemporary history, between the death of Stalin and the death of Mao, which was the subject of most studies in the columns of *Survey* and which of course unfolded without any concern for the editorial convenience of a quarterly magazine trying to discern trends and put events into a historical perspective. We published a number of studies on past developments in which historical material, often new, had a bearing on present problems. Looking through old volumes of *Survey*, one also notices that, while it was not futurological in its orientation, it endeavoured to throw light on phenomena which were particularly relevant to later developments and to draw early attention to their significance. We began to describe the attempts to "destalinize" the Soviet cultural scene well before the 20th congress of the CPSU. We covered in detail the ferment of ideas which led to the Polish October and Hungarian revolution of 1956. We devoted a special issue of *Survey* to "revisionism" which played such an important role in the break-up of Communist unity. We also published a special issue on "polycentrism," popularizing the two terms in the context of the evolution of communism long before they became part of the general political vocabulary. We drew attention editorially to the Sino-Soviet differences four years before the dispute came to the surface in 1963. We took an early interest in the intellectual and literary dissent in the Soviet Union. We were the first to publish in English Tertz-Sinyavsky ("On Socialist Realism") and Andrei Amalrik ("Will the Soviet Union survive until 1984?"). Both, now in the West, contributed to the present anniversary

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issue. Among our various "firsts," we printed a number of texts by Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov, Nadezhda Mandelstam and other Soviet and East European authors, some of whom sent them to us from their respective countries. Many of the interesting *samizdat* texts that we published dealt with the Soviet human rights movement and its persecuted members: Grigorenko, Bukovsky, Moroz, Dzhemilev. We devoted a special issue to the intellectual ferment in Czechoslovakia two years before the Prague Spring. Many Czechoslovak contributors to this issue are now in the West, but we still carry articles from Prague, only now unfortunately again under pseudonyms (Vaclav Havel's "Letter to Dr. Gustav Husak" in *Survey*, No. 96 was an exception). In 1958 we published an article by Ernest Gellner on the Communist philosopher, Ernst Kolman, pointing to his unorthodox views. In 1976, at the age of 84, he renounced his long-held beliefs and chose exile in Sweden after a lifetime of Party service dating from the days of Lenin (whom he knew personally). We also published in the same 1958 issue of *Survey* the first Western article on the brilliant young Polish philosopher, Leszek Kolakowski, the spiritual leader of the Polish "revisionists" in the heady days of the Polish October in 1956. Kolakowski, who was expelled from Warsaw University in 1968, is now at Oxford and his contribution to the current issue follows his other articles in *Survey*. The summary of the book by a Soviet historian, Alexander Nekrich, *22 June 1941*, which created a sensation in the Soviet Union by depicting Stalin's responsibility for the Soviet unpreparedness in the face of the Nazi attack, appeared in 1965 in *Survey* (shortly after its publication in Moscow), together with a transcript of a debate at a meeting of Soviet historians organized for the purpose of criticizing him. Today, Alexander Nekrich, who recently arrived in the West, appears in our jubilee issue with a fascinating account of the arrest in the last period of Stalin's life of the former Soviet ambassador to Britain, Ivan Maisky, apparently a move in the preparation of a trial of Molotov. There is no doubt about the authenticity of this story, quite unknown in the West, coming as it does from a historian who was a personal assistant of Maisky himself.

WHILE we were always trying to provide new material and information, our over-all focus remained a systematic analysis of current East-West problems. We have published studies and special issues on every East European country; on Soviet science, literature, religion, and economics; on the 22nd and the 24th congresses of the CPSU; on contemporary Marxism; on relations between nationalism and communism in communist and non-communist countries. We devoted two issues of *Survey* to the balance sheet of the Soviet revolution on its 50th anniversary. We dealt with many other political, cultural and socio-economic problems of the communist countries. We repeatedly returned to the topics of utopia and revolution, intelligentsia and post-industrial society, totalitarianism and general ideological trends.

When dealing with all these subjects we left no doubt about our own

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principles and no ambiguity about the premises of our analyses. But ours was not a position of ideological fanaticism: we have always tried to distinguish diagnosis from evaluation. To give one instance: some time after the tragedy of the Hungarian revolution in the special issue on "Hungary—Five Years After," we called attention to the relatively mild policy of Kadar. This diagnosis—subsequently quoted approvingly in *The Times*' editorial—has been confirmed in the following decade and a half. I believe that a perusal of the old volumes of *Survey* would sustain the impression of its factual objectivity.

Indeed, we were very much preoccupied by questions of methodology and of circumstances that may obstruct the analyst's vision and the journalist's access to information. We published a special issue of *Survey* ("Soviet Union in the Western Mirror") devoted to the problem of ideological blinkers affecting the understanding of Soviet affairs, and another one ("Moscow Correspondent—A Symposium") about the conditions in which they were reported by Western journalists, who described them from their own experience in different periods of Soviet history. Our previous anniversary issue—No. 50—analysed "The State of Soviet Studies" in different countries. The range of subjects falling within the purview of *Survey* has been of interest to academic institutions, to the press and to the intelligent general reader; its coverage of them has often been referred to in journals and has formed the basis of a great number of books.

WITH the passage of time the scope of *Survey* widened still further. It expanded its coverage of current issues, including an analysis of the New Left in the sixties and of foreign policy and *détente* in the seventies.

There were three reasons for this. One was that while *Survey* developed *pari passu* with the expansion of academic institutions devoted to Soviet studies (which, to use the expression of one of the contributors to this issue, "have come of age"), the gap between the available information and the public awareness of the problems involved in East-West relations remained wide. Although the claim that "there are only different degrees of ignorance about the Soviet Union" could no longer be plausibly made, governments continued to behave as if it were true.

Yet in the democratic countries, whatever the cynics may think, there is a connexion between the state of public opinion and the behaviour of governments. And with the advent of the sixties and seventies, the illusions of the thirties were replaced by new political illusions, swinging between the new utopianism and the old un-*Realpolitik*. Auden's "low, dishonest decade" found its match in an era which saw American historical "revisionism," "radical chic," Watergate and the euphoria of pseudo-*détente*.

When *Survey* began its publication, the long ideological romance of the Western radical intelligentsia with Stalinism was coming to an end. Khrushchev's "secret speech" produced an ideological earthquake. But

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was Trotsky right when he said 40 years ago, in his speech to the Dewey Commission on the Moscow Trials, that " in the long-run, history puts everybody in his place? " His faith in *die Weltgeschichte als Weltgericht* has not been confirmed by Soviet justice. And in the West, where its character has been recognized, it was still possible, 20 years after Khrushchev's speech, for the British foreign minister to claim that Katyn is a " controversial " question (for which he was roundly condemned by the British press); for Miss Lillian Hellman, a supporter of the Moscow Trials, to appear, with the approval of many reviewers of her memoirs, as a political heroine and a martyr who survived " Scoundrel Time " (just compare her experience with that of Nadezhda Mandelstam!); and for the Socialist International to refuse even to discuss the cause of the Polish workers (whatever happened—again—to that celebrated class solidarity?).

Are these examples, chosen at random, characteristic of the spirit of the age? Only future historians will be able to pronounce on our *Zeitgeist* with any degree of assurance. But if it was necessary to enlighten the public about Stalinism, it was also now necessary to do it about the new wave of self-induced blindness and the recidivism of ignorance in the West.

Another reason for our growing preoccupation with the developments in the West was that its morale, political will, and historical awareness were being undermined at the time when the balance of power was turning against it. The growing internal *malaise* of the West increased our concern with matters of foreign policy and defence. It was of course not a question of " vulgar anti-communism of the cold warriors looking for reds under the beds "—nobody wants to engage in " anti-communist crusades " in a nuclear age. Even the most " anti-Soviet " dissidents prefer an evolutionary path in the communist countries to a revolutionary one. But the survival of a libertarian civilization is too serious a matter to be looked upon through the prism of silly catch-phrases, which are replacing analysis by a semantic blackmail; nor is it safe in the hands of less " progressive " appeasers.

The third reason for a new emphasis on the Western scene in *Survey* studies was the need to bring a wider frame of historical reference to the post-second world war generation. It obviously had no experience of Stalinism; its own historical trauma was the war in Vietnam. Its political perceptions were so heavily influenced by that war that it tended to disregard some of the earlier " lessons of history."

SOLZHENITSYN is not the only person who asked whether it is possible to transmit one's own historical experience to another country or to another generation. Hegel, and many thinkers before him, gave an emphatically negative answer to this question. But on a practical level it is a " more or less " rather than an " either-or " question, both historically and as a matter of education. In this respect Solzhenitsyn himself was trying to engage in the Hegelian business of *aufheben,* i.e.

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of raising the level of Western consciousness. In spite of his ignorance of the ways of the West, and some jarring notes in his message to it, he was rather successful.

Generations change, historical traditions continue. If it was possible for the phenomenon of dissidence to appear in the Soviet Union—a country with both the tradition of Russian autocracy and the long dark period of Stalinism behind it—there is no reason why the liberal tradition of the West should not find its way to self-preservation. Generations grow up and acquire experience. One has only to recall what has happened to the ideological evolution of the young pacifists of the twenties and of the young fellow-travellers of the thirties to imagine the possible evolution of the generation which included the young New Left radicals of the sixties. They will, after all, have to face the real world in the eighties.

But if we can face the prospect of 1984 without too many Orwellian apprehensions, we should nevertheless not be indifferent to the persistence of " the smelly little orthodoxies " on whose representatives the famous author poured such scorn and who are trying to transmit their old illusions—unruffled by the historical experiences of our epoch—to the next generation.

IF there was one thing that was even more ironical in the post-war period than the Soviet " peaceful " propaganda accompanying the rise of the Soviet Union as a military super-power, it was the juxtaposition of the decline of the ideological appeal of Marxism in communist countries and its rise in non-communist countries in the sixties. It was an apposite postscript to the " end of ideology " diagnosis which contrasted the ideological militancy of the communist countries with the exhaustion of the ideological postures in the West in the fifties.

In the seventies there seems to be another turn of the wheel. The New Left is no longer on the upgrade: it is merely engaged in a " long march through the institutions." The illusions of *détente,* of the alleged end of " the era of confrontation," have been dispelled to some extent. Soviet propaganda faces the problem of diminishing returns: Stalin's Stockholm Appeal had a far greater success than Brezhnev's Stockholm Appeal II. Even the " progressive " French intellectuals have become disenchanted. Louis Aragon (who once described Stalin as " the most humane of all people ") implicitly admitted his ideological failure. Pierre Daix, who at the time of the Rousset trial wrote a pamphlet denying the existence of the forced labour camps in Stalin's Russia, has become a champion of Solzhenitsyn in France. Unlike Miss Lillian Hellman, he has faced his own past and settled his scores with it. He wrote an honest autobiography (*J'ai cru au matin*) in which he described his evolution and explained how he, " the inmate of Mathausen has helped the henchmen of Gulag." Dominique Desanti, once the Stalinist star reporter of *l'Humanité,* who covered for it the fraudulent trials exported in the forties from Moscow to Prague, Sofia and Budapest,

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depicted in her autobiography (*Les Staliniens*) the relation between her delusions, her perceptions and her writings at the time. Claude Roy, the archetypal French *gauchiste,* presented in another autobiographical book (*Somme toute*) the reasons for his disillusionment with the mental clichés of *progressisme* and warned the younger *gauchistes* against embracing " les fantasmes stalinoides." Even the Grand Master himself, Jean Paul Sartre, was no longer too preoccupied with the preservation of the illusions of the workers of Billancourt (" *Ne pas désespérer Billancourt* . . ."), for he signed an appeal on behalf of the Polish workers.

All this in France, where the leftist intellectuals rejected the earlier literature of disenchantment (described by K. A. Jelenski in *Survey,* No. 41) in the forties and in the fifties and managed to resist the conclusions of the disillusioned French comrades (Edgar Morin, Roger Vailland, Annie Kriegel, Roger Garaudy). Perhaps the title of the autobiography of that wonderful actress and former fellow-traveller, Simone Signoret, *La Nostalgie n'est plus ce qu'elle était,* best conveys the sentiments of the disenchanted *gauchistes.*

NOSTALGIA is no longer what it used to be, and not only for the backward French " progressives." A melancholy realism affects us all. The reasons for it may however be different for different people. It is sad to realize how many of the best and most creative writers, artists and intellectuals among the Soviet and East European dissenters have been forced to leave their countries, where they embodied the hope for a brighter future. It is also sad to reflect on how difficult it is to bridge the gap between their political perceptions, rooted as these are in their historical experience, and the political perceptions of the Western public, which still has only a very vague idea of the nature of this experience, or of the lessons which follow from it. Perhaps I may be allowed my own bit of nostalgia about the contributors to *Survey* " from the other shore." When I first wrote about them, I did not know what their destinies would be and what ideological evolution they might undergo. I certainly could not predict that eventually they would turn up in the West, although I had a suspicion that some of them would. On 1 August 1969, I published an article in *The Times* on the strains of intellectual life in Russia, entitled " Why Soviet writers may think of leaving," in which I wrote:

> It is now a decade and a half since Ehrenburg's *Thaw* gave its name to the hopes of Soviet writers, and Pomerantsev's article " On Sincerity in Literature " indicated their basic preoccupation. Since then, there have been many ups and downs, periods when writers were allowed a greater degree of latitude alternating with times of stricter party control of literature. However, these fifteen years of cyclical ebb and flow have also witnessed the progress of disenchantment among the literary intelligentsia, whose hopes were dashed as they became increasingly and acutely aware that they were still facing only two prospects: either to be the obedient

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> servants of the regime (with a somewhat greater degree of personal security than Stalin's "engineers of human souls"), or to be its victims if they showed themselves too deeply concerned with Pomerantsev's first prerequisite of the literary vocation . . . The earlier, rosy expectations having failed, those of them who write for Samizdat have no longer any need for self-censorship or Aesopian language. They can, therefore, be more explicit, abandoning that inevitable Orwellian ingredient of the Soviet-style printed word, doublethink. They may come to realize the full meaning of the verse by Akhmatova:
>
> To lose the freshness of words
> and the singleness of feeling
> is for us the same as for the painter
> to lose his eyesight.
>
> If the Soviet authorities were to clamp down on Samizdat, the number of literary defectors might increase.

This is indeed what happened later. But I could hardly imagine that it would be a flood and not a trickle. The number of independent-thinking writers and intellectuals who, with the permission or forcible encouragement of the authorities, have found themselves in the West, include the most talented names in contemporary Russian literature and thought: Solzhenitsyn, Sinyavsky, Brodsky, Amalrik, Maximov, Korzhavin, Galich, Nekrasov, and many, many others. I did not expect that I would soon meet some of these authors, whom we had published and about whom I had written, in England, France, Italy, Holland and Switzerland.

FOLLOWING their early careers helped me to understand the politico-cultural processes in post-Stalin Russia. In December 1962 I wrote with Max Hayward the introduction to the first edition of a novel called *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* by an unknown writer whose name was Alexander Solzhenitsyn. We did not know the full implications of our judgment when we described it then as "a literary masterpiece and a revolutionary document that will affect the climate of life inside the Soviet Union." It is only when I collected the documents on his subsequent career [1] (many of which were first published in *Survey*) that the full significance of the Solzhenitsyn phenomenon became clear to me.

I was on surer ground when I assessed the significance of the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial [2]:

> By refusing to plead guilty, by behaving like normal men and not like conditioned robots, by expressing authentic thoughts and emotions instead of synthetic formulae, by speaking the truth as they saw it and not the conventional lies expected of them, Sinyavsky

[1] Leopold Labedz (Ed.), *Solzhenitsyn, A Documentary Record*, London, 1970 (2nd edition, 1974).

[2] Leopold Labedz and Max Hayward (Ed.), *On Trial, The Case of Sinyavsky (Tertz) and Daniel (Arzhak)*, London, 1967.

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> and Daniel exposed in effect the artificial character of the Soviet "consensus." Their conduct in court broke the magic spell of the Moscow Trials. They have shown that—despite years of indoctrination and psychological conditioning—critical intelligence, independence of mind and the courage to speak it continue to survive.

And indeed, the trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel was a turning point in the history of Soviet literary dissent, to which it was a spur.

When I wrote an introduction to the American collection of Amalrik's writings I also tried to discern the meaning of his "case:"

> The significance of the Amalrik phenomenon transcends the question of whether he is correct in his prognostications on the future Sino-Soviet war and the not-so-distant collapse of the Soviet empire . . . Already the spectres of Slavophiles and Westernizers are stalking the scene . . . For obvious reasons (the main one being Soviet cultural isolation during the last fifty years) there is a heavy preponderance of the Slavophile tradition. This is clearly visible both in Solzhenitsyn and Sinyavsky. It is fascinating to see a manifestation of the opposite tendency in Amalrik.[3]

Not only the writings reflecting such tendencies in *samizdat,* but also the subsequent emergence of similar divisions among the new Soviet exiles in the West confirmed this diagnosis. (*The Times'* editorial, entitled "When the Fish Begins to Talk," which dealt with Amalrik's first essay in *Survey,* turned out to be similarly prescient.)

IT is perhaps just as well to remember those Western comments at the time which completely misunderstood (or worse) the significance of the phenomena represented by the cases of these dissident writers.

Mr Henry S. Bradsher from the Washington *Evening Star* declared Amalrik a KGB agent, Mr Ulyanov, in the New York Russian emigré newspaper *Novoe Russkoe Slovo,* "proved" that Solzhenitsyn did not exist and that his writings are KGB concoctions. In Italy Signor Vigorelli from the *Comunita Europea degli Scrittori* (COMES) asserted in *Il Tempo* that Sinyavsky was a Polish or Jewish emigré pretending to be a Soviet writer but who was in fact writing in the West. In England Mr D. A. N. Jones affirmed in *New Society* that Amalrik was not a real person but only a figment of the imagination of some reactionary Western Sovietologists who, as in the case of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, managed to promote misleading anti-Soviet material. Mr Jones also attacked me earlier in *The Listener* for misinterpreting, in my introduction to Kolakowski's book, *Marxism and Beyond,* the ideological evolution of the Polish philosopher, who, according to him, did not deviate from the true progressive faith.

Since the arrival of the real Polish philosopher and of the ectoplasmic Russian dissidents in the West, Mr Jones (who has an *ad lib.* weekly column in *The Listener*) has not attempted to verify his assertions or to

[3] Andrei Amalrik, *Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?*, Introduction by Leopold Labedz (New York, 1971).

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put any corrections in print. Nor have the other gentlemen mentioned above done anything to apologize in public for the absurd statements which they publicly made about the Russian authors who were then still in the Soviet Union and could not effectively defend themselves.

THE question transcends the problem of personalities. For instance, the question of the evolution of Kolakowski is relevant to the general problem of the evolution of the Marxist revisionists in Eastern Europe, and thus in the long run to the prospects of the legitimacy of the communist rule itself.

In 1962, I wrote in my book, *Revisionism*:

> We are witnessing an increase in diversity in the communist bloc and within it there is a new distribution of power between different communist states. But internally the Party still remains at the pinnacle of power: "Polycentric" Communism does not mean the diffusion of power *within* the Communist states. This and this alone could promise a more pluralistic society pressing for a greater degree of freedom. The diffusion of political power remains the decisive criterion of democratic development and its necessary condition.

Kolakowski, whose essay on Marxism was included in the book, recently summed up his conclusions about "revisionism" at a 1976 Paris colloquium devoted to the 20th anniversary of the Polish October and the Hungarian Revolution. He referred to the "great and short-lived illusions" held by the revisionists. Such illusions finally died in 1968, the year of "the invasion of Czechslovakia and of the cultural pogrom in Poland." Since then, "revisionism" has ceased to exist as ideological perspective, although earlier it played a positive role in stimulating the thinking part of the Marxist intelligentsia. Kolakowski's criticism of "revisionism" included the recognition of this as an historical fact:

> The dreams about rejuvenated or regenerated communism, or even about Leninism that would not be Stalinism, the reveries which may now appear as intellectually pitiful, played their role in the disintegration of the system whose one weakness is its inability to do without an ideological façade which provides its principles of legitimacy. Precisely because it has drawn attention to the grotesque contrasts between the phraseological façade and the true realities of social life, the concept of a non-totalitarian communism, which to many of us today seems like the idea of fried snowballs, became one of the main factors in the present ideological disintegration of communism.

As can indeed be seen from the essay in this issue by Adam Michnik, Kolakowski's young successor among the dissident intelligentsia, "revisionism" is no longer the ideological framework of the new generation of political oppositionists in Poland. They have replaced the perspective of reform of the system through the Party with the perspective of obtaining gradual concessions through the mobilization of pressure from

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outside. Such a perspective, taken in conjunction with the new self-confidence of the workers, may perceptibly add to Mr Brezhnev's troubles in Eastern Europe. And he may have other problems to face.

UNLIKE some of his predecessors, the new American president, Jimmy Carter, may stay in office for two full terms, that is until the fateful year 1984. What sort of world would his successor inherit from him? This will of course depend to some degree on the foreign policy of the new president. A further shift in the balance of power would put the West in grave danger. It is therefore imperative that he should avoid the mistakes of his two predecessors and the euphoria of *détente*. The international situation which he faces is full of dangers: the trouble spots of the world—the Middle East, Southern Africa, Cyprus, Korea—are not going to disappear, and new ones may arise in the future. None the less, it is possible that the next period may be more troublesome from the point of view of Mr Brezhnev (or his successor) in contrast to the previous Soviet foreign policy successes. Not only is the Soviet Union overstretched, facing at the same time rivalry with the United States, with China and with Western Europe, but it may encounter an acute intensification of its internal problems. This may be due to its failure to reform its rigid economic system, to its relative technological backwardness, or to the possible rise of nationalism in the Soviet empire. Kissinger has not exploited Soviet weaknesses, but if Carter does, there would be no reason for the West to fall behind its historical rival.

IN the last few years *Survey* has been concerned with the problems of foreign policy because we felt that the West is slipping. But, in spite of occasional polemics (against Isaac Deutscher, Alexander Werth, or Henry Kissinger), our main focus is on scholarship and we do not intend to neglect it. We are now preparing special issues of *Survey* which will deal with the internal Soviet problems after the 25th CPSU Congress, with science and technology, and with the question of nationalities in the Soviet Union.

To paraphrase the celebrated 11th Thesis on Feuerbach: so far, Marxist philosophers have been changing the world, the point now is to learn how to interpret it.

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Europe and the Soviet Union

Andrei Amalrik

I HAVE the impression that the prevailing opinion in the West is that there is no threat of a Soviet military invasion of Europe. I would myself be very surprised if Soviet troops were to cross the West German or Austrian frontier tomorrow. The Soviet Union appears to be more interested in preserving the status quo in Europe and in obtaining recognition of what it has already achieved than in launching a frontal attack. We may assume that Soviet expansion is more cautious and chooses more circuitous routes via Africa and the Middle East, while the troops stationed in Eastern Europe are more probably intended to lend weight to every word the Soviet Union directs at Western European governments. Those troops do not need to make any move; their presence alone and the aura of power emanating from them exert a considerable influence on the situation in Europe.

Yet I believe European security is based neither on the goodwill of the Soviet Union nor on the will of the European states to resist—which is highly questionable—but on three precarious factors.

The first of these is the American military presence in Europe, which threatens the Soviet Union with a retaliatory nuclear strike and restrains the USSR from taking risky steps such as, for instance, the occupation of West Berlin.

Secondly, there are the USSR's own domestic difficulties and its attitude of mistrust towards the countries of Eastern Europe. These problems impel the USSR into economic cooperation with the West and also prompt it to attempt to establish stable relations in Europe.

The third factor is the constant threat from China and the desirability of tranquillity in the rear in the event of an open Sino-Soviet confrontation.

If we assume that Western European security is indeed based on these three factors combined, we must consider it highly unstable.

In the first place, the American military presence cannot be regarded as permanent. Isolationist ideas may one day triumph in the USA, or there may even be a readiness to view the whole of Europe, not just its Eastern part, as the Soviet sphere of influence and as the price to pay for the USSR leaving the USA alone. The notion that the withdrawal of US troops from Western Europe in exchange for a partial Soviet troop withdrawal from Eastern Europe will lead to improved US-Soviet understanding and promote international stability may become very popular in the USA. The American public still does not understand the real nature of the Soviet Union and is prone to regard it as a superpower just like the USA, i.e. having foreign political ambitions, but striving towards a reasonable compromise. In fact, if a mutual troop withdrawal were to take place, the USSR, using its land frontiers,

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would easily be able to put them back at short notice, while the USA would find this extremely hard to do, both for strategic and political reasons.

In the second place, Soviet domestic problems such as the economic troubles, intensifying discord between nationalities, the conflict with the intelligentsia and other factors, may prompt the Soviet leaders to seek their solution precisely in foreign political conflicts, as Russian governments before them have tried to do, on the eve of the 1905 and 1917 revolutions. In addition, if no application is found for it abroad, the growing army will constitute a permanent threat to the Soviet political leadership.

Thirdly, the possibility always remains that the USSR and China will find a common language. This is especially likely now that, following the death of Mao Tse-tung, China might experience an internal political struggle and will endeavour not to exacerbate relations with its northern neighbour. It is, moreover, quite possible that victorious "moderate" elements would try to establish neighbourly—if reserved—relations with the USSR and make the USSR feel that its rear is safe. In addition, it is said that pro-Soviet elements are still strong in the Chinese army. I do not believe that any good relations the USSR may establish with China will last for very long, and I consider a conflict between them sooner or later almost inevitable; but for a certain time they may have a mutual understanding and even reach agreement on the division of spheres of influence in Europe and Asia, and this may foreshadow hard times for Europe. Furthermore, European indifference to China, coupled with the ambiguous stance of the USA, which has clearly been trying to establish closer relations with the USSR, using China simply as a means of blackmail, may accelerate the process of Sino-Soviet *rapprochement*.

Unless the Western states—and in the first instance the USA—can summon up enough political will to withstand the USSR in Europe and try to influence Soviet internal liberalization, unless they have enough political wisdom to attempt a *rapprochement* with China, supporting its stance of independence from the USSR, France and Britain may one fine day find themselves in the position of Hungary or Czechoslovakia.

Translated by Hilary Sternberg.

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Thoughts About the Future of East-West Relations

John A. Armstrong

FOR over a decade, significant changes in East-West relations have depended on developments in United States policy more than on Soviet initiatives. Consequently, it is exceptionally difficult to assess the future of these relations, writing in October 1976, when the results of the American election and the victorious President's choice of advisors may determine US–USSR interactions for years to come. It is especially hard for an American observer, emotionally involved in his turbulent domestic developments, to assess these interactions.

Nevertheless, it seems clear to me that Soviet policy, which was slowly moving toward a status quo posture as recently as 1973, has significantly changed direction because of changes since then in the American posture which may well prove to be transitory. The status quo (perhaps *immobiliste* is a preferable term) trend in Soviet policy between 1964 and 1973 was obscured by the increasingly harsh treatment of intellectuals and by remilitarization of the stagnant economy. But intellectual repression took the form of negative restrictions characteristic of rigid authoritarian dictatorships rather than earlier Soviet regimes' totalitarian demand for positive conformity. Hence the increase in repression was essentially a defensive effort to maintain the illiberal domestic status quo rather than an attempt to extend the present regime's sphere of authority. In a somewhat similar way, the considerable arms build-up (especially in ICBMs), while providing the USSR with a military potential for a more aggressive foreign policy, could also have resulted in acceptance of a bilateral balance of mutual destructive capacity. The diversion of economic resources to munitions revealed the technological limitations of the Soviet economy. As a result stable relations which would permit the USSR to acquire US technological advances (e.g. computers) directly, instead of via Western Europe and Japan, were attractive. Soviet defensiveness vis-à-vis a more dynamic (or at least more innovative) Chinese leadership and the kaleidoscopic radical movements of the late 1960s also contributed to the desire for a prolonged period of stability which can reasonably be called " détente."

The critical test of Soviet intentions, in the short term, was the regime's willingness to respect the territorial status quo. In a series of incidents during 1970–72 the USSR appeared to accept this delimitation. While it continued to seek clients among dissatisfied developing nations, the USSR seemed to be warning its clients that they should not use Soviet-supplied weapons to attack American clients. When

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Soviet clients violated this " rule of alliance responsibility," the Soviet regime did not shelter them from retaliation by the United States and its allies. To the extent to which this emerging " rule " was accepted tacitly by both sides, a notable element of stability was introduced into international relations.

Soviet-induced restraint resulted from the Soviet regime's fear of adverse American reactions (particularly the *uncertainty* of the extent of US reaction deliberately cultivated by the first Nixon Administration) rather than the dynamics of the Soviet system itself. Unfortunately, these dynamics present any Soviet leadership pursuing foreign policies adjusted to the status quo with a fundamental dilemma. Western interpretations which grossly exaggerate the role of Marxism-Leninism as a motivating force in Soviet policy have produced a counter-tendency to discount the force of ideology altogether. What both simplistic interpretations fail to consider is the significance of Communist ideology as a legitimization for the present regime, especially for its continued rigid control of the non-Russian half of the Soviet population. Moscow's authority is legitimized as a necessary means for attaining the millenial goal of complete Communism. Especially in the period since 1961, when Khrushchev asserted that this goal would be attained by the end of this century, the legitimacy of the Soviet regime has rested on its claim to be making definite progress toward full Communism, although in recent years official spokesmen have cautiously avoided reiterating Khrushchev's timetable. Leninist ideology has always, moreover, posited an intimate temporal relationship between the attainment of full Communism in any one society and the " march " towards Communism throughout the world. As a result—particularly when, as is now the case, domestic economic progress has faltered—a Soviet regime is always tempted to achieve spectacular successes abroad to demonstrate to its subject peoples that the Leninist prediction of world Communism is being fulfilled.

It is in this perspective even more than in the light of concrete territorial and strategic attainments that one must assess Soviet advances and American retreats since 1973. Very soon after it became apparent that the second Nixon Administration was hamstrung and moribund, Soviet spokesmen began (as they had in the late Khrushchev period) to sound a triumphant note of the approaching doom of " capitalist imperialism." This note swelled to a crescendo (played mainly by non-ruling Communist representatives but orchestrated in the Kremlin) during the 25th Party Congress. How seriously the ageing oligarchs of the Politbureau take this theme is hard to estimate; but it can hardly fail to impress their putative successors who are somewhat younger and more vigorous. Consequently, what happens in the short period before the latter assume control (at the latest by the 26th Party Congress scheduled for 1981) is crucial. If the progression

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of Soviet victories—whether truly strategic or only diplomatic—continues, there is a strong possibility that the caution which characterized Soviet foreign policy even under Stalin may disappear. Instead of dubious victories in peripheral areas, a new Soviet leadership, less constrained by age but less secure in its authority, may try to advance in areas vital to maintenance of the East-West balance. Unhappily, opportunities for dangerous probes are almost certain to occur during the late 1970s. Yugoslavia, and beyond it the whole Western Mediterranean, is entering a period of transition; quite possibly China is, too. Berlin is a constant temptation to Soviet policy makers; and it is hardly conceivable that the Middle East will not afford new scope for adventures.

In any of these areas a drastic Soviet move, based on the assumption that American leaders would not or could not react, could bring about a catastrophe. There is little doubt that US policy—perhaps even more than during the last four years—will be dominated by self-consciously populist politicians. It would be very wrong to conclude, however, that populist pressures will inevitably lead (as during the recent past) to inaction. Historically American populism has produced spectacular initiatives as often as isolationism. There are already indications that the *soi-disant* moralist critics of foreign policy may press for uncoordinated but drastic actions abroad. Confronted by self-evident Soviet aggression in an area salient in popular perceptions, populist political leaders might well react in an extreme manner. It is hardly necessary to remind the readers of this journal (or any other experienced observers of international affairs) that, whatever the minor shifts in the balance of power in the near future, a superpower will possess the means for a reaction of catastrophic proportions. Much (I should say *most*) depends, then, on whether the American shift from isolationist to activist populism occurs before or after a Soviet leadership (old or new) has undertaken risks in critical areas. In the former case, strong if erratic American reactions to peripheral Soviet advances may induce a reassertion of traditional caution in Soviet policy. Even in that most favourable case, the road back to the tacit status quo understandings of 1972 will be long and perilous. If, on the other hand, American reaction is delayed until cumulative Soviet advances have overstepped the unpredictable tolerance margin of American public opinion, the result may be world catastrophe of unprecedented dimensions. Since either contingency depends heavily on accidents of mortality and personality among a handful of Soviet and American politicians, the extent of the danger is matched only by our inability to assess its probability.

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The Future of East-West Relations

Max Beloff

I HAVE been asked to write on East-West relations to mark the 100th anniversary issue of *Survey*. It is natural to look back to 1955 when *Survey* was founded and to ask what strikes one as the most important difference over these 22 years and what in the light of the experience in this period seems most worth emphasizing today.

I am probably not alone in feeling it difficult to be other than pessimistic. In the mid-fifties, there seemed to be the prospect of a "thaw." Perhaps the disappearance of the arch-tyrant would, however slowly, lead to an unfreezing of the Russian situation, to the emergence of new currents of thought, or the reappearance of old ones and the development of a new situation in which whatever the differences between East and West some kind of fruitful dialogue might be possible. How these hopes have been disappointed, it is not necessary to remind the readers of *Survey*.

Of course, the disappearance of the more horrible aspects of Stalin's rule is a net gain that we comfortable in the West should not underestimate. On the other hand, it is disquieting to discover that the extent of Stalin's cruelty was not necessary for the maintenance of the regime. A policed bureaucratic regime can obviously sustain itself with only the minimum of force where the mass of the population is concerned; the active dissidents are (unless there is some externally generated catastrophe) likely to be sufficiently few for coercion against them to be undertaken without major repercussions in the population at large. And such dissidence where it does arise and manifest itself is likely on the whole to derive from some objective fact in its situation not directly linked to the nature of the regime itself. It looks as though nationality was the sole important divisive factor—the Jewish case being for obvious reasons the most easily observable one—with religion a possible secondary source of questioning. If the "thaw" gave us the Decembrists, we are now back with Nicholas I.

The second reflection is that the Soviet grip upon Eastern Europe shows no signs of being relaxed. The Hungarian rising of 1956 seemed to suggest that there might be so much underlying non-Communist vitality in Eastern Europe that the Russians would not be able except at great risk to intervene to prevent the eastern European countries from working out their own destinies. 1968 in Czechoslovakia cured us of that illusion. The Russians can and will use their superior force to maintain a position in which there is no chance of an alternative model developing. Writing as I am at a time when Tito's health may be failing, one must ask with even more urgency than usual what this

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portends for Yugoslavia. I suppose that 22 years ago one would have hesitated to prophesy that the special position of Yugoslavia would have lasted as long as it has. Yet despite the obvious and important differences, not least where external cultural relations are concerned, between Yugoslavia and the other East European countries, one must not overlook the fact that by now a not inconsiderable *rapprochement* between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union has in fact taken place and that, objectively speaking, the Russians have not done too badly out of the position that Yugoslavia has assumed in world politics. If one thinks of the extent to which the "non-aligned" group of countries has on all occasions identified itself with pro-Soviet and anti-American attitudes towards particular conflicts, one could say that Yugoslavia has been an important element in preventing any genuine non-alignment from growing up. Tito's dissidence has not been all loss where the Russians are concerned.

The third reflection is that while the West has not lost any further positions in Europe to the Communist bloc, it has retreated both in South East Asia and in Africa. And it has shown no capacity either through negotiation or through pressure to affect the course of Soviet policy at home or abroad. Even Kennedy's apparent victory in the Cuba missile crisis looks pretty thin with Cuban troops acting freely as agents of Soviet policies in Angola today, and who knows where tomorrow? What has prevented Soviet pressure from being even more formidable in Europe and the Middle East is not the resistance of the West but the continued dissidence of China—another factor that we would have been hard put to prognosticate 21 years ago. Following the death of Mao, a Sino-Soviet pact could have all the alarming implications of the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939. That we rely on China to preserve the world balance is not a consoling thought.

My pessimism does not however spring primarily from the contemplation of these major issues in world affairs but from something more domestic. I believe that we require a period of introspection and revaluation in the West of our attitudes towards the Soviet Union and East Europe. We may have been diverted from this necessary process by Solzhenitsyn's eruption onto the Western scene; the apocalyptic nature of his preachings about Western decadence comes from so different a cultural tradition that while it may arouse great interest it is not something that can be built upon. What I have in mind is more mundane.

What has been done by journals like *Survey*, by systematic study in many Western universities and learned institutions is to produce for those who wish to know a fairly detailed and credible picture of how the Soviet Union functions, its strengths and its weaknesses, its aims and its methods. This makes the situation very different from that which existed in the 1930s for instance. Rubbish like the Webbs' *Soviet Communism* would hardly get a respectful audience today. One feature

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of such modern studies (which are supported by the observations of much better qualified journalists than those who wrote in the 1930s) is that they have a large measure of agreement even when their authors differ in respect of their own ideologies or party allegiance or nationality. Soviet studies have come of age. Yet there appears to be an immense gap between this array of easily available facts and the way in which our governments conduct affairs. And not only governments, but wide sections of public opinion ignore these lessons, not only in respect of the Soviet Union but in respect of the way in which other communist parties behave or are likely to behave.

I am not depressed about the large-scale non-fulfilment by the Russians (and their puppets) of the Helsinki agreements about great freedom of movement or the freer circulation of ideas because I never thought for one single minute that any of this was likely to come about. Why should the Russians have wanted to concede anything under this head? All we know about the regime suggests that it needs a high degree of thought-control and educational conditioning to enable it to work without too much overt recourse to coercion. Stalin may have liked killing people—there is no reason to believe that his successors would not rather do without it. From the time of the Decembrists, as Mr Edward Crankshaw so clearly brings out in his remarkable book, *The Shadow of the Winter Palace*, the source of ideological infection was seen as being in the West. Russia's present rulers, in this as in so much the descendants of Nicholas I and Alexander III, see things no differently. What then did Western statesmen think they were getting by all the time spent on preparing for Helsinki, at Helsinki or monitoring Helsinki now? Are we so flush in trained diplomats, linguists, paper and ink that the extravagance of the enterprise should not have been questioned, as well as its effect in building up illusions that may be dangerous?

Nor is it necessary to say that because the Soviet world will remain closed to us for as long as Russia's rulers can manage it, there is no room for negotiation on practical matters, trade (where it is genuinely mutually beneficial) disarmament and arms control where these can be monitored and do not rely on Soviet good faith, which is a meaningless concept across the ideologies. Things may change and our studies of the Soviet phenomenon should never be thought of as having reached finality. That is why it is sad to see the run-down of centres of expertise in the United States and elsewhere. If there is to be change (and nothing is eternal) we shall want to be informed. But our real task must be for the moment to find some way through which our existing knowledge can be channelled to those who seem to wish only to be deceived.

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Jimmy Who? and Zbigniew Who?

Enzo Bettiza

THE election of Jimmy Carter as President of the United States is undoubtedly an event full of implications for the future of East-West relations. To see them clearly one must, I believe, disregard some of the odd pronouncements made by Carter during the electoral campaign. In particular, it is necessary to consider what Carter said on the question of Yugoslavia as an electoral stunt to get the isolationist vote: electoral campaigns, above all those in America, are extremely passionate affairs, and the candidates often allow themselves to promise things which they do not believe in and which they know they are not going to carry out. Fortunately, the American Presidents, as soon as they are elected, almost always refute by their actions many of the things which they have so effusively put in words as presidential candidates. The Russians know this better than anyone. They also remember how, after having challenged a new Democratic President in 1962, they suffered a defeat in the Cuban missile crisis. It is not accidental that their prudence today in assessing the outcome of the American election is much more pronounced than that of the West European Left, from the communist Berlinguer to the socialist Mitterrand.

But besides the change of the President, it is of course also necessary to take into account changes in the other key positions in American politics such as the one that occurred in the post of the National Security Adviser to the President. If Zbigniew Brzezinski plays a role in the Carter administration which is in some ways comparable to that of Kissinger in the administrations of Nixon and Ford, we will have once again at the top of the American foreign policy decision-making set-up a person of European extraction, with a particular sensitivity to the problems of communism and the East European countries dominated by it.

It would be interesting to compare the positions of Kissinger and Brzezinski: the sceptical *Weltanschauung* of the former with the more positive attitude of the latter. From such a comparison one could even perhaps infer, in part, Carter's foreign policy orientation in facing the Soviet Union and Communism in various parts of the world.

One can say one thing now: the *Weltanschauung* of Kissinger contained a Spenglerian element which included a certain philosophical doubt about the political and historical vitality of the Western world. In essence the policy of Kissinger has been that of pessimistic containment of Soviet expansionism in the world. Even the use he has made of the American *rapprochement* with China has been passive rather than active. Basically, Kissinger transferred—*mutatis mutandis*—the traditional methods of power balancing from the nineteenth to the twentieth century, assigning to the United States, the Soviet Union, China and

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Japan the changing and balancing roles which in the nineteenth century were played by Austro-Hungary, Great Britain, Prussia, etc. But if one reads the books of Brzezinski, one realizes that his conception of contemporary history and politics is profoundly different: it is more modern and more sophisticated, more complex and more articulated than Kissinger's. While for Kissinger the point of reference for present policy was always in the past, for Brzezinski the present is always seen and projected in a perspective of the future. Apart from being sensitive to the problems of East-West relations, Brzezinski is also very conscious of that other great contemporary problem: seeing the North always more developed and the agricultural South always falling behind, finding it difficult to fill the gap which separates it from the rich industrial powers.

If Brzezinski effectively becomes one of the predominant advisers of Carter, it is probable that we will witness a new dynamism in the American policy towards the communist world of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and Asia, as well as towards European communism in the countries where it is not in power, but represents a considerable force in opposition.

Although the early pronouncements of President Carter indicate an American policy which will be very selective in confronting the communist phenomenon, watching the developments in "Euro-communism" closely, it is also very sensitive about the evolution of China after Mao. I think that the testing points of the new American policy towards Moscow will be the following: the demystification of the *détente* and of the "peaceful coexistence" which until now have only brought advantages to the Soviet Union and disadvantages to the West; the strengthening of economic and above all technological ties with China which needs arms to resist the constant Soviet military pressure on its frontiers; prudent but continuing assurances of support to Yugoslavia to preserve its independence in the period after Tito's disappearance from the scene; contacts with the representatives of "Euro-communism," avoiding the dangers of legitimizing it prematurely by attributing to it a democratic character.

It is clear that the American political prospects in the Middle East, in Africa, in Latin America etc. will depend on the way in which the new American administration knows how to confront in an analytical and selective manner the communist problem in all its complexity, from Rome to Moscow, from Belgrade to Peking, from Warsaw to Havana. The important thing for Carter will be to avoid the error of considering the Soviet Union as the only power worthy of dialogue; it would be fundamental for Carter, Vance and Brzezinski to exploit instead, more dynamically than Ford and Kissinger did, the internal contradictions of the communist world, giving to some communist governments and to some communist but anti-Soviet countries the feeling of not having been completely abandoned by the paramount Western power.

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The prudence with which the Soviet Union has reacted to Carter's election victory demonstrates that it will face an energetic and active administration, which is free from the nightmares of Vietnam and Watergate. The great powers only exist in so far as they resist each other. If America and its potential ally, China, do not take a stand against Soviet imperialism one of them will cease to be a great power and the other will not become the great power it aspires to be.

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Comments on East-West Relations

Zbigniew Brzezinski

THE policy of the West towards the Communist states should be shaped with the over-all global context in mind. Our world has become much more complex. It is composed mostly of nationally emancipated states—the majority of them, however, not democratic —and the international system is now composed not of some 40 states, as immediately after the second world war, but of some 150 nation-states. It is thus essential for the United States to make it abundantly clear that its long-range commitment—so in keeping with its own internal dedication to the primacy of liberty—is to the shaping of a world which is both pluralistic and increasingly, cooperative. This requires acceptance of global diversity in political systems and a willingness to participate with others in shaping an international system which is broader and more encompassing than the one created right after the second world war. In a world of so many new states, there is the need for substantial reform of existing international arrangements. Unless the existing international system is reformed, there is the danger that it will actually break down, thereby making the notion of a hostile world a self-fulfilling prophecy.

In the light of the foregoing, American foreign policy must pursue three interrelated priorities. *Our first priority* must be to create more stable and cooperative relations among the advanced industrialized democracies of North America, Western Europe, and the Far East. Such a trilateral priority is necessary because we are the richest and economically the most essential component of the world system. Without such cooperation, neither North-South nor East-West relations will be stable. Even more important, the moral values that we represent are essential to human development, both social and spiritual.

Secondly, a reformed international system has to entail greater North-South cooperation. It should be the major task of American foreign policy to enlist as many as possible of the new nations in such cooperation, thereby separating the more moderate states from the more radical or demagogic states. In so doing, we have to be responsive to the concerns of many of the new states, be it on the economic or on the political plane. This is why our mishandling of the Angolan conflict has been so damaging and has created openings for adversary powers such as the Soviet Union.

Thirdly, the East-West relationship must be improved and *détente* should be a major purpose of American policy, for this relationship

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bears directly on the problem of human survival. We realize that the ideological as well as political conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union will go on for a long time but we should strive to moderate it gradually. To achieve that moderation both cooperation as well as vigilance will be necessary. Consequently, the maintenance of a strong American military deterrent is a necessary precondition for a stable and increasingly comprehensive as well as reciprocal *détente*—a *détente* which will remain both competitive as well as cooperative.

The above three policies are inter-related. It is impossible to assign clear-cut priorities to them, but it is quite obvious that unless the first is attained, progress in the second will prove impossible. Without closer American–Japanese–European cooperation, it will be impossible to formulate the kind of policies which the advanced world needs to pursue towards the developing world. Neither UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) nor CIEC (Conference on International Economic Cooperation) will prove successful, without closer and more coordinated Western policy. Finally, without progress with regard both to the first and to the second priorities, East-West relations will remain conflictive. Global instability is bound to feed back into the East-West relationship, making it less cooperative and more competitive, less predictable and more antagonistic. An unstable world automatically leads to more direct American-Soviet confrontations.

In the period ahead, with regard to trilateral relations, more of an effort will need to be made to promote required consultations and closer understanding. Some consideration should be given to the creation of a trilateral consultative mechanism, in which the European community might find it possible to work through a single representative together with the Japanese and North American representatives. In addition, the advanced countries might consider giving more attention to the coordination of macro-economic policies within the OECD and to synchronizing their approaches in a concerted effort to deal with global economic problems. In addition, thought might be given to the enlargement of OECD, in keeping with the changing status of some of the more successful developing countries.

With respect to North-South relations, the United States has committed itself to a comprehensive programme of reform, both at the seventh United Nations Special General Assembly and at the recent UNCTAD conference. The fulfilment of these undertakings is a precondition of a stable and progressively more cooperative North-South relationship, or of what has been called the New Economic Order. Moreover, thought needs to be given to the reinforcement of existing forums for North-South negotiations. The Conference on International Economic Cooperation might prove a constructive device for consultation among developed and developing countries, and perhaps

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a small secretariat should be established to support its work, in keeping with the recommendation recently made by the Trilateral Commission. New institutions may be required to deal with deep-seabed mining.

Beyond these immediate concerns, closer North-South cooperation will be necessary to reduce the probability of nuclear proliferation and to develop joint responses to such pressing problems as food, population, and the environment. Effective measures to slow down the spread of nuclear weaponry will require cooperation among the suppliers of nuclear technology on behalf of a moratorium on the export of enrichment and reprocessing plants, as well as arrangements which give some of the developing countries effective access to nuclear fuel for peaceful nuclear energy available without increasing the risks of nuclear weapons and proliferation.

With regard to East-West relations, the need for a further agreement in SALT remains paramount, given the threat to human survival posed by the nuclear arms race. Closer American-Soviet cooperation to prevent nuclear proliferation is also desirable, and I strongly endorse a recent proposal made by Governor Carter for a US–Soviet suspension of nuclear tests for a period of five years. The Soviet Union is today perhaps the most selfish of the industrial powers, donating only a tenth of 1 per cent of its GNP to foreign aid, and hence an effort should be made to obtain its greater involvement in dealing cooperatively with global problems, as for instance in regard to food. The United States should also try to explore the possibility of obtaining increased Soviet cooperation in dealing with existing or emerging regional problems. This will require more Soviet restraint in such areas as the Middle East or southern Africa, and perhaps also a willingness to define certain areas as zones of reciprocal restraint. It should be reiterated in this connexion that *détente* is unlikely to be stable if the Soviet leadership concludes that the USSR is demonstrably superior to the United States either in political will or in military power. This is why American self-confidence as well as US strategic and conventional military adequacy are important preconditions for more stable East-West relations.

In addition, it should be desirable for the United States to maintain and expand its relationships with China and with Eastern Europe. A polycentric Communist world is a necessary component of a more pluralist world, and polycentrism in Communism is a precondition also for the very gradual evolution of Communist regimes into more cooperative members of the international community. Accordingly, we should reiterate our continued interest in the independence of such states as Yugoslavia or Rumania, and we should avoid any hints that the United States favours dividing the world into exclusive spheres of influence.

The above represents clearly a massive—and highly generalized—

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agenda for action. We are entering a new phase of world affairs in which, to the traditional threat of war, the new threat of global chaos has been added. In the past, American policy focused on the defence of freedom; in the emerging phase, on the basis of enlightened self-interest and a clear-cut view of our basic values, we must also strive to enhance the promotion of global justice.

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Soviet-American Academic Exchange

Robert F. Byrnes*

MANY of us today fail to appreciate the character of the barriers that separate those parts of the world which communists rule, from the United States and Western Europe, even after the changes that have occurred in recent years. Even during the tense 1930s, when the Nazis had begun to inflict their barbarities on some elements of the German population and to threaten Germany's neighbours, thousands of citizens from other countries freely travelled through and lived in Germany, as Germans did in other countries, except the Soviet Union. Publications and broadcasts crossed boundaries as freely as peoples did. Trade flourished. Similarly, we forget that more Poles studied in Western Europe in the sixteenth century than do today, even though that earlier period endured religious wars, conflicts within and among petty and large states, and ineffective transportation.

Between 1958 and 1975 several academic exchange programmes carried out as parts of the official exchanges agreements signed biennially by the two governments enabled more than 1,000 American scholars to spend from two months to two academic years in the Soviet Union. The principal programme enabled approximately 650 graduate students and young scholars to spend an academic year, generally in either Moscow State University or Leningrad State University; the other programmes have allowed over 200 teachers of Russian to spend a summer in a special programme at Moscow State University and approximately 300 senior scholars to enjoy one or several months of research and meeting colleagues, generally in the Soviet Union's two major cities. Soviet scholars in approximately equal numbers have enjoyed similar opportunities in universities throughout the United States. The cost of the programme was modest: during the period between 1958 and 1975 the American government, foundations, and universities together spent less than $50,000,000 to support academic exchange programmes with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, only a fraction of the annual budget of a major state university in the 1970s or of the cost of the Apollo-Soyuz joint manned space laboratory in July 1975.

In total, perhaps as many as 3,000 graduate students and scholars from all Western countries together spent a few months or an academic year in study and research in the Soviet Union from 1958 to 1975, and approximately the same number of Soviet citizens studied in the West in that period. In contrast, in 1974–75 alone, somewhat

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more than 150,000 foreign students and scholars studied in the United States. In the same year, about 25,000 foreigners, of whom only about 200 were from Western countries, studied in the Soviet Union. In most years from 1958 to 1975, more students from Iceland than from the Soviet Union studied in the United States. In 1972–73 alone, more than 3,600 British students and approximately 2,000 each from France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Greece attended American universities.

Throughout these 17 years, less than 20 Americans have taught for even a semester in the Soviet Union, and less than 300 scholars from Western countries have taught in Soviet institutions for a semester or a year. About 90 per cent of these men and women were language teachers, and more than half came from France. In 1974–75 one large American state university, Indiana University, had approximately 400 citizens of countries other than the United States as members of its faculty.[1]

Throughout the period since 1958 the United States, its universities, and its learned societies have made little progress in expanding the volume of academic exchanges. Indeed, the 1963–64 peak for the most important part of the programme, that for young scholars, was reached again only in 1974–75 and exceeded only in 1975–76. The target set in 1964 for the period 1965–70 was twice as high as the actual figure realized. The apparent increase in numbers since 1971 is due almost entirely to special short exploratory trips, arranged by various Soviet ministries and by executive agencies of the American government such as the National Science Foundation and the Department of Agriculture, in the hope that this would lead to joint research projects on problems of common interest. The highly-publicized 1973 agreement for cooperation in science and technology has led to a large number of brief meetings of working groups of scientists in a dozen fields, but three years later only one American scientist had begun research in the Soviet Union under this programme.

Moreover, the pattern of the academic exchange programmes has remained substantially unchanged, and progress has been slow and grudging. Indeed, the Nixon-Brezhnev agreement in Washington in 1973 froze the framework until 1979. Basically, academic exchanges are governed by a larger exchanges agreement concluded by the governments. They remain a primitive form of barter or horse-trading, an artificial and unnatural arrangement with a quota system and a restrictive spirit, with access to a laboratory balanced against access to a library, and reciprocity, not equity or mutual advantage, being the guiding factor. The basic restrictions remain, and most changes

[1] Reference to the comparative magnitude of Western trade with communist-ruled states may help keep this perspective. In 1973 West Germany, the Soviet Union's most important trade partner, had more trade with tiny Luxemburg than with the Soviet Union, and its exports to Sweden equalled those to the USSR and the states of Eastern Europe.

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have been minor and cosmetic. Constant pressure from American academic organizations, with vigorous support from the Department of State, and some thawing of the Soviet system have reduced the number of Soviet rejections of qualified candidates. In 1974–75 and 1975–76, the Ministry of Higher Education accepted all IREX[2] nominations in the principal programme, as it had in 1962–63, although it did not then place them in the agreed Soviet institutions when the academic years began. Moreover the Ministry denied admission to four young American scholars in 1976–77. The Soviets now grant admission to spouses of participants and even to couples with their children. Most American scholars are still assigned to Moscow and Leningrad, but since 1967 a handful have been sprinkled among other cities, especially in European Russia, and restrictions on access to archives and on travel have loosened somewhat.[3] In recent years the KGB has been less evident and less barbarous than formerly, though it no doubt observes American participants and their Soviet associates with its traditional care. The Soviet government remains sensitive to research subjects on contemporary politics and foreign policy, but in 1973–74 and 1974–75 it allowed some research on contemporary social problems. Soviet officials in general are more relaxed and flexible in negotiation than earlier. Other Western states have progressed, too, especially France and the United Kingdom. In short, the situation has improved over 1958–59. Above all, one must remember that no American studied in Soviet universities between 1936 and 1958 and that the Soviet decision to send some of their elite to their central rival and to accept Americans in their dormitories touches a most critical Soviet nerve.

However, we have made little progress towards the free interchange of information and ideas. Some Soviet attitudes and practices have appeared to change, but the Soviet Union has not shifted its basic policies. We are still far from the circumstances in which a handful of American scholars worked in relative freedom under the tsars or in which Mosely, Robinson, and Simmons lived and worked in the Soviet Union between 1924 and 1936. The Soviet government remains adamantly opposed to relaxing controls over the movement of people or ideas, as the two years of negotiations over the European security agreement and Soviet actions since the Helsinki agreement was signed have both demonstrated. Most of the divisive issues have therefore remained impervious to even the most skilled and adroit diplomacy. As the report of IREX for 1972–73 indicated, "*Détente* has not solved any fundamental problems of scholarly contact with the Soviet Union."

In 1955 only a dozen American scholars had lived and studied in the Soviet Union. Now the United States has a relatively large cadre of

[2] International Research and Exchanges Board.

[3] In 1975–76 the Soviet Ministry placed only three of the 52 American junior scholars outside Moscow and Leningrad.

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specialists who have had that experience. In fact, the academic exchange programme is far less essential for Russian studies than it was two decades ago. Many scholars became interested in Russian affairs because the Inter-University Committee helped open the door to the Soviet Union, and a direct relationship exists between access to Soviet society, limited as it is, and the great boom in Russian studies in the 1960s. About 80 per cent of those who participated in the academic exchange programme were specialists in one field or another of Russian studies, generally history, literature, or political science, in that order. These men and women have benefited greatly from the increased knowledge and understanding of the Soviet Union they acquired from living in Soviet cities and working in Soviet libraries and archives. Their opportunities have also helped make their views of Soviet life and policy less abstract and doctrinaire, and more realistic and humanistic than they would have been. One of the principal consequences of these exchange programmes has been the humanizing of Western observers, who had been paralysed by great slogans and written generalities. They have helped to carry on the intellectual modernization of the American university by encouraging systematic study of other cultures. Their participants' independent judgments help supplement and challenge the views of government officials on issues of national concern. Finally, their qualities and their achievements have helped give Russian and East European studies a responsible national base in the United States.

American specialists on Russia have enjoyed many common experiences, but they emerged with many different interpretations of Soviet reality. Generally, they returned from the Soviet Union more critical of the Soviet system than when they arrived. These attitudes may be among the more important consequences of the academic exchange programme, and they will help shape the American image of the Soviet Union for many years ahead.[4]

Those American who have studied in Eastern Europe have in addition been impressed by the faith, determination, and skill with which most East European peoples have sought to defend their national traditions and to regain their freedoms. The growing national appreciation of the simple truth that the countries of Eastern Europe differ from each other and are vastly different from the Soviet Union may be one of the most important consequences of increasing American understanding of Russia and Eastern Europe. Scholarly studies of Eastern Europe also demonstrate the dynamism of national communism there. They have thus increased American insight into the minority problems facing the Soviet Union and the pressures that have riven the international communist movement.

Moreover, free cooperation between American scholars and the

[4] Mr David Bonavia's comment that correspondents arrive in Moscow green, that those who leave after a short time come out white with anger and fear, and that none come out " red " applies to most participants.

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government has improved as participants have increased their knowledge of the realities of Soviet life and of international politics. Few American specialists on Russia and Eastern Europe have written extensively about Soviet foreign policy or Soviet-American relations, but the books and articles published generally reflect balance and objectivity. No specialist on the Soviet Union has joined the currently popular revisionist school, whose members have little knowledge of the Soviet system, have not lived or worked there, cannot read Russian, and usually fail to analyse even the Soviet materials that are available in Western languages, but who assign the bulk, if not all, of the responsibility for the Cold War to the United States.

Academic exchanges, and other exchanges as well, increase and improve the Soviet elites' knowledge of the American people, thus beginning to reduce some of the misapprehensions caused in part by Soviet philosophy, propaganda, and way of looking at the world and in part by simple lack of information.

The very existence of the exchange programmes and of the more relaxed Soviet-American relationship that they reflect, the increased trickle of information the Soviet government tolerates, and the subtle Western pressure to relax Soviet controls encourage dissidence and dissent among intellectuals, ethnic and religious minorities, and all those who simply want more freedoms. Even the great majority of utterly loyal Soviet citizens have been influenced by the observations and attitudes of their colleagues who have travelled abroad or worked closely with foreign scholars. Thus, every Soviet scholar abroad and every American and other foreign scholar in the Soviet Union helps break down the wall which has isolated that country from the rest of the world.

Soviet rulers have paid special attention to these programmes and to East-West trade and constantly measure their advantages and hazards. They have naturally emphasized research in the scientific and technical fields central to continued Soviet progress. The scientists and engineers who have benefited from the various exchange programmes and from increased access to professional literature are among those most critical of the Soviet system, particularly of the restraints it places upon travel and access to information. They therefore constitute a modest pressure upon Soviet policies. More important, they have introduced critical information and attitudes directly into the research areas crucial to the Soviet government and into the higher reaches of the Soviet system.

The evident brooding sense of dissatisfaction among some of those most central to their country's continued intellectual, scientific, technical, and economic progress already constitutes a serious problem for the leadership. It will almost certainly grow if contact with the West deepens, and it may increase even more vigorously should it be restricted. In this sense, Louis XIV's dictum that states touch only at the top

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remains true, and Western influence flows into the Soviet Union through the new elites.

HOWEVER, the West pays a price for these benefits. For those who go to the Soviet Union, the most annoying costs are the monumental inefficiencies of the Soviet system, which they cheerfully accept, and the indecencies and indignities to which many are subjected and which they bitterly resent. During the past five years some improvements have occurred, but most changes have been cosmetic and glaring inequities still abound.

Most Americans engaged in any of the cultural exchange programmes are especially concerned that they occur under an official intergovernmental agreement. Our scholars, cultural leaders, and officials were all reluctant in 1958 to accept the exchanges agreement because we sought free trade in men and ideas, not a primitive barter, or even reciprocal trade, in which bureaucrats count scientists and athletes as carefully as bales of cotton. Americans still seek arrangements in which scholars may travel and study freely in the Soviet Union, and remain eager to ensure similar opportunities for Soviet scholars in the US. However, the Soviet government would open its frontiers and some of its cities, universities, laboratories, and archives only if the United States accepted an official agreement. The agreements themselves, which explicitly define and limit the opportunities for study and ensure Soviet control over a substantial part of the activities, therefore constitute a major penalty for the United States.

Western governments inevitably become involved in many important relationships involving the Soviet Union because of the nature of the Soviet system. The American government, like others, has been directly engaged in the cultural relations process since negotiations began in the fall of 1957, but it has encouraged universities and private foundations to assume administrative responsibilities. Direct exchanges between universities failed utterly in the first few years, but until 1969 the universities retained full control over the most important academic exchanges under their chosen instrument, the Inter-University Committee. However, under IREX, university interest and authority have slowly declined and the central authority of IREX has increased.

The government's role has grown in the last decade in particular and threatens to become overwhelming, making Washington a kind of St Petersburg-on-the-Potomac. Foundation support will continue to decline, even as prices rise. The government thus looms as the main, almost the lone, financial supporter, which will of course increase its authority. The Department of State's contribution to the IREX budget for 1976–77 may account for more than half of the total (it was somewhat less than one-third in 1974–75).

Ironically, the ideas concerning joint research on common problems that the Inter-University Committee proposed in 1964 and that were

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discussed in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the following three years were accepted by the Soviet government in the 1970s under conditions that increased the American government's authority over exchanges and higher education. These agreements on weather, environmental protection, medicine, science and technology, agriculture, transport, and oceanography promise benefits to both countries and progress toward peaceful relations. At the same time, they also buttress federal influence. Moreover, the dangers are increased by the 1975 Helsinki agreement, even though the Western states fought to draft a document which would increase the free flow of men and information. First, the signatory governments in effect gave a kind of formal approval to the principle that cultural relations shall be the responsibility of governments. Second, the effort to monitor the flow of ideas and people will only increase the role of government. Indeed, as President Kingman Brewster of Yale University recently noted, American scholars and universities must now devote increasing energies to defending their independence from the expanding powers of their own benevolent government.

However, the greatest cost Americans pay in accepting controlled cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union is granting respectability and dignity, parity and legitimacy to a government that denies the freedoms essential to civilized life. Sending novelists to a country, or accepting chemists from one in which historians are imprisoned for seeking objectivity and in which scientists of independent mind are hounded from their positions, is a high price, one that may lead into further moral demobilization and intellectual corruption. Americans have become so accustomed to exchange agreements with the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe that the restrictions which used to chafe are now quietly accepted, Americans are often far more critical of similar restrictions when exercised by other states than they are of those that communists rule.

Those who support cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union, whether or not they are aware of the moral issues raised, point out that Americans have no choice, that the Soviet Union exists in an ever-smaller universe, that the United States itself is a flawed society in an imperfect world, and that Americans must use the instruments available to advance learning and at the same time to press for free movement of men and ideas. In short, academic exchanges with the Soviet Union as presently organized are unsatisfactory, but the most satisfactory we can hope to obtain in current circumstances.

Men such as Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn illustrate with blinding clarity the dilemma that academic relationships with the Soviet Union pose. They agree that the United States should negotiate with the Soviet Union in order to reduce the likelihood of war. However, they and their counterparts in Eastern Europe condemn the United States for weakness and irresolution and for failing to use its influence, or for wielding it ineffectively, to advance the rights of the Soviet and

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East European peoples and therefore the prospects for genuine peace. They urge that the United States should not grant legitimacy and respectability and, above all, not provide scientific and technological assistance to a government that denies its citizens rights to which they are entitled under their own constitution.

THE Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe naturally would not allow or encourage academic exchanges unless they believed that their own benefits were considerable, and more than those of the United States. Thus, the Soviet leaders clearly believe that the exchanges operate to their advantage, just as Americans believe they do to those of the United States. In fact, advantages from exchanges must be considered mutual if they are to survive and thrive.

Soviet advantages and disadvantages from academic exchanges are in many ways the obverse of American. Soviet scholars, of course, have many of the same interests as Americans. In particular, they welcome opportunities to go "out," to share information and insights with fellow specialists, to acquire a new perspective, and to obtain recognition from the international community of scholars. However, most have no influence, although senior scientists, or scientific administrators, may have some input into central decisions concerning contact with the outside world.

For Soviet leaders, the main advantages are clear. They appreciate the respectability and prestige the exchanges bring and the impressions that their artists, dancers, and eminent scientists create. As Zhores Medvedev has revealed in detail, they also use travel abroad as a patronage instrument, denying those of independent or unorthodox mind the opportunity and awarding a bonus to those who faithfully endorse every government action. They exercise some influence over American scholarship by denying admission to qualified scholars with legitimate subjects. Many discouraged from studying twentieth-century history, the Soviet economy, or Russian foreign policy thus turn to subjects more comfortable for the Soviet system, or even abandon Soviet studies. Some timid intellectuals refrain from protests against Soviet treatment of dissidents and from participating in conferences in which subjects distasteful to the Soviet government might be discussed. Some may even censor themselves.

The Soviet Union utilizes cultural exchanges to narrow the considerable gap between Soviet and Western science and technology by obtaining access to the equipment, techniques, and discoveries of American campuses and laboratories, just as it uses trade to obtain industrial data and to inject Western technology into critical parts of the Soviet economy. Thus, the Soviet Union has obtained significant increments to its scientific and technical knowledge, from basic information concerning polio vaccines and training in econometrics and new systems of business management to the latest work in electronics, oil drilling, and biochemistry. In 1969–70 all 29 Soviet participants in

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the main academic programme were scientists. In 1971–72, 31 of 34 were scientists or engineers. In 1973 eight Soviet nominees were computer specialists. Indeed, more than 90 per cent of the Soviet participants in the exchange of young scholars since 1969 have been scientists. The same proportions prevail in exchange programmes with other Western countries. In 1970, for example, 90 per cent of the Soviet scholars in the German programme were scientists. All 11 agreements for cooperative research the Soviet Union has so eagerly signed in the 1970s involve science and technology, and American scientists agree that the Soviet Union learns far more than the United States does from them.

Finally, the Soviet government seeks to create the impression that the Soviet Union is not a threat, that the basic issues which divide the Soviet Union and the West have been resolved, and that the world has returned to some kind of placid normalcy in which Western efforts to maintain military strength and coordination are unnecessary. They have achieved considerable success with this policy, which has contributed to the gradual decline of Western resolution and unity.

The Soviet price of these programmes is in many ways the American benefit, because the programmes provide dissonant information, stimulate dissidence, and open up some of the higher levels of Soviet society to Western ideas. Occasional eminent defectors are an embarrassment. Moreover, the Soviet system and the means its leaders use to restrict the costs of exposure inflict further damage. The secrecy and the restrictions it imposes upon those foreigners whom it admits on a carefully controlled basis create resentment and hostility among many visitors and a sense of shame among informed Soviet citizens, as the policies of Nicholas I and Alexander III did in the nineteenth century.

However, the main price, a fearfully high one, is the infectious spread of Western ideas from the contacts the exchanges allow. Soviet rulers claim the enthusiastic support of their peoples, but at the same time they deeply fear their exposure to outside influences. Travel, art forms, hybrid corn and Holsteins, the presence of Soviet citizens in American dormitories, exhibits of kitchen equipment, cooperation in cancer research, study of computer technology, and the adoption of American business management techniques—all affect the Soviet intellectual elite, as Pepsi Cola, jazz, mini-skirts, jeans, and grain do at other levels. Any Soviet citizens who remember Khrushchev's boasts in the early 1960s about surpassing the United States in important fields of production must wonder what has happened. Even the most obtuse Soviet citizen must suspect from the flow of Western science and technology that the West retains its cultural leadership. Imagine the effect if Americans were drinking *kvas* and importing Soviet equipment to exploit American oil and gas resources!

The Muscovite rulers clearly appreciate the price they pay to satisfy their desperate needs and to obtain the envisaged political advantages.

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They apparently believe that the most grave internal threat is from those most highly educated. The government of Brezhnev very much resembles that of Nicholas I, which also sent students abroad, in its "plot mentality" and in the suspicion with which it views its own peoples. This ideological sensitivity is reflected in constant vigilance campaigns and the refrain that there can be no peaceful coexistence in ideology. However, the more they borrow abroad, the more they open the new Soviet elite to ideas that they consider dangerous. They have learned that the Soviet Union cannot be open technologically and closed culturally, and that any relaxation, even to obtain great benefits, simultaneously raises great hazards. The Soviet Union wishes to participate in cultural exchanges and to increase trade, but on the condition that it maintain censorship and other forms of control. It seeks "a fire that will not burn."

The Soviet Union lives in one world and now seeks to join the world, but it relentlessly rejects "ideological coexistence." It demands that its dogmas be unchallenged with especial insistence because the Soviet Union in the 1970s has no ideas to sell and is stagnant and vulnerable. Fifty years ago Soviet economic plans and exciting cultural life offered many attractions to the outer world. Today, the Soviet Union possesses enormous military power, but it is a society based on blind faith and dogma. It has little intellectual vitality in an age when ideas are as important as ever. As Sir Isaiah Berlin noted two decades ago, there is a "silence in Russian culture."

Thus, the very nature of the exchange programme places the Soviet government on the horns of a fearful and constant dilemma. To obtain benefits that it thinks important, even crucial, it must risk contamination of its intellectual elite and of its ideological foundations. To allow ballet troupes to dazzle crowds abroad, it must accept the likelihood that some of its best dancers will defect, no matter how precise the controls. To obtain scientific, technical, and military information and some political advantages, it must expose itself to criticism and at the same time tolerate gentle pressure for similar policies from East European governments, which are much more interested than the Soviet Union in freer relationships with the West. In short, just as the Department of State and the universities ever ponder the wisdom of enduring the inequalities and hazards Soviet practices create, and the threat to American principles these relationships pose, so the Soviet rulers constantly discuss the balance between the advantages they acquire and the "infections" that constitute the price. They cannot afford freedom, and they therefore seek a series of reciprocal trade agreements in which they barter opportunities for research useful to the United States in return for information useful to them.

EASTERN Europe is a part of the Soviet empire, but yet another world. The dilemma for the East European governments is even more acute than that of the Soviet government, as is their need for

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access to Western science, technology, and intellectual sustenance. The magnetic and contagious attraction that the West has for long exercised on Eastern Europe, intensified by events since 1945, has been boosted by the various exchanges, the greatly increased economic ties, and the tantalizing opportunities to taste the previously forbidden fruits. These erode the economic, ideological, and political bases of the governments and weaken ties with Moscow in the same kind of "unbinding" that the Russian empire witnessed a century ago. They promote pragmatic and more traditional attitudes and tend to make the Communist leaders ever more nationalistic. They also bring closer together the peoples and their governments—the peoples eager to "rejoin Europe" and to enjoy the benefits of this century's advances, and the governments eager to acquire Western information to modernize their economies.

However, the East European governments cannot import knowledge from American universities, laboratories, factories, and farms without importing the ideas and values at the heart of Western institutions. These constitute a continuing source of infection among a people already vulnerable, raising spectres of 1956 and 1968 but under more subtle and dangerous circumstances. Eastern Europe is a section of the Soviet empire not yet digested, and perhaps indigestible. In a sense, the 1956 and 1968 efforts to press dramatically toward greater freedom or toward "socialism with a human face" were all successes in the long run, although they were apparent immediate failures. The level of information throughout Eastern Europe has risen substantially. In spite of all the restrictions, in Czechoslovakia and Rumania in particular, the over-all picture is brighter than in 1955.

A shrewd British observer has pointed out that one can reach the Soviet Union only over a wall and across a moat, while entrance to (and exit from) resilient Eastern Europe is simpler, through a criss-cross of turnstiles, which Eastern and Western Europeans are now mastering. Moreover, because it stands at the crossroads of European civilization, Eastern Europe will remain an especially critical area and a most likely cause of future tensions between the Soviet Union and the West. If the peoples of Eastern Europe succeed in inching their way to increased liberties and to greater independence from Soviet rule, the Soviet Union will be directly affected and the future of Western Europe, and of the world, will become significantly brighter and freer.

THE success with which the West has protected Soviet dissidents illustrates the Soviet dilemma and the significant way in which the West can marshal its resources to advance human rights and international security. The presence of 240 foreign correspondents in Moscow, the courage and skill with which these men and women and the Soviet dissidents have kept in touch with each other, the diffusion of information about the dissidents throughout the world, and broadcasting back

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into the Soviet Union information about them and their views have restricted Soviet action against them and protected them. Thus, the Soviet decision to expel, rather than to imprison, Solzhenitsyn in February 1974 reflected in part his courage and in part the pressure exerted by the information made available to the world and then to the Soviet public at a time when the Soviet government was desperate for Western scientific and technical aid.

Similarly, the warning issued by the National Academy of Sciences in September 1973 served to safeguard Andrei D. Sakharov, to define the price of more open relationships with the West, and to demonstrate that Americans are determined that the Soviet Union modify its policies if it is to obtain the benefits of cultural and economic cooperation. Sakharov was in serious danger until President Philip Handler of the National Academy of Sciences informed the Soviet Academy that depriving Sakharov of his rights would end Soviet-American scientific cooperation. The Soviet government then chose to continue to tolerate Sakharov and his activities.

If Americans defend their principles shrewdly and resolutely in this continuing struggle, the Soviet government will face a constant and painful dilemma. It is trying to combine more open relations with the West with tighter controls over its own peoples, but it may be forced to choose between reducing sharply or even ending its intellectual and economic relations with the West, or adopting a far more flexible and relaxed policy towards control over the Soviet population, one that would almost certainly undermine the system. Consequently, academic relations raise fundamental questions for any totalitarian government.

The very questions raised by this aspect of Soviet-American relations explain why academic exchanges are both sensitive and important to the improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. These exchanges are less crucial than discussions concerning limitations of nuclear weapons and those concerning the reduction of military forces in Central Europe, but they touch principles central to both societies and they serve as a most illuminating indicator of Soviet policies. They demonstrate that changes have occurred within the Soviet Union and in Soviet policies towards the West. However, the political system remains fundamentally untouched, and controls over the population are as systematic and effective as before. Western people are little closer to or more intimate with the Soviet population than 20 years ago. The Soviet Union has relaxed some restraints in its relations with other states, but slowly and without revising its philosophy, reducing its military strength, or weakening its control of Lenin's "commanding heights." The United States and the Soviet Union remain locked together in a shrinking world, suspicious of each other, unable on the one hand to conquer by force but equally unable to disengage or to find some kind of armed security. In short, the cultural exchange programmes reflect the eternal contest between

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authority and freedom, as well as the age-old pressure that Russia has exerted upon its western borderlands. The present conflict between the states established on Lenin's ideas and those of Jefferson is also a struggle between power and freedom. The concentration camp and the Berlin Wall, the open library and the travelling scholar, are its appropriate symbols.

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Relating to Russia

Robert Conquest

I SHOULD like to advance the following propositions, which stand in their own right, but may also serve as a text for further comment:

1. That the Soviet leaders are the product of a political culture, and nourish a political psychology, quite different from our own. They and their motivations and probable actions are not to be understood by projecting on to them our own notions of natural, "commonsensical" behaviour.

2. That the centuries-old tradition of post-Mongol Russia produced a system of unlimited despotism, with a tendency to unlimited expansionism; that this was somewhat modified by two generations of Europeanization after 1860; but that this Western tendency was destroyed by the Revolution, which, moreover, grafted on to the old despotic tradition a newer Messianic revolutionary despotism with explicit pretence to world rule.

3. That Russia never had a tradition that trade and negotiation can lead to mutual benefit; and that the Communist contribution to this outlook was the even sharper basic principle of Leninism—*Kto-kavo*: the idea that every act is part of a struggle which one side loses and the other wins; and that the regime will not make any concession unless it is made absolutely clear that they can gain no advantage by defaulting.

4. That the Soviet leaders are not just reasonable men who chance to hold certain views, but men totally determined by their Marxist-Leninist attitudes, and unable to see the world in other terms. It follows that concessions made to them will not buy goodwill, and that weakness will be exploited by expansionism.

5. That it also follows that the effort to "civilize" the regime by piecemeal contact, trade, cultural exchange and general erosion cannot have any but the most superficial effect over the critical period of the next few decades.

6. That, politically speaking, the Western culture *is* civilization; that theirs is a backward system, which wishes to have enough economic contact to gain the technology of the West while rejecting the civic order which produces that technology, just as in the times of Peter the Great and Stalin.

7. That the main product of technological input into the USSR is a vast armament, reflecting the inbuilt expansionism of the system; that it is not in the Western interest to aid or subsidize this venture, itself a sign of insufficiently peaceable intent; that it is not sensible to prop up their inefficient civilian economy with the result that they can concentrate yet more on armaments.

What follows for Western policy-makers should be obvious enough.

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The Meaning of "Détente"

Maurice Cranston

TEN years ago or thereabouts the situation of the Soviet Union was extremely unfavourable. The emergence of a hostile regime in China meant that Russia was encircled: the widespread dissemination of New Left, Maoist, Trotskyite and other rival brands of Marxism robbed the Communists of their old ideological dominance in left-wing movements throughout the world. The Soviet Union had therefore to revise its strategy: it could no longer rely just on its own brute strength and the sheepish loyalty of foreign Leftists. A new cunning was needed: and the policy of *détente* is part of that cunning.

From a position of weakness, the Russians have now achieved one of strength: and their record over the past ten years has proved the truth of Machiavelli's maxim that fraud is better than force. Luck, or *fortuna* as Machiavelli called it, has also favoured the Russians; and they have worked hard to win it.

Events in Chile may be thought to have gone badly for the Communists: but even that was a situation from which they learned important lessons. Allende, they could see from the beginning, was an imprudent New Left enthusiast who allowed himself to be pushed by the conflicting pressures of assorted extremists into a situation where a counter-revolutionary *coup* was inevitable. The Communists, being, not of course more moderate, but more methodical than the other Leftists, tried to restrain Allende, but were too weak in Chile to protect him from the fate they foresaw.

In Southern Europe the lesson of Chile reinforced the Communist belief that patience was essential; and that any association with the Far Left must be used mainly to curb the unthinking revolutionary zeal of such allies. If in Italy and Spain the Communists are in a favourable position today, it is largely because they have played the part of moderates. Indeed in the Italian election campaign in the spring of 1976 Berlinguer presented himself almost as a right-wing Conservative: while Christian-Democratic politicians on Italian television invoked "class conflict" and "alienation" and similar Marxist shibboleths, Berlinguer pleaded for law and order and freedom: it was an uncanny reversal of roles.

"Moderation" in Europe has made it all the easier for the Communists to use violence in less temperate climates: the final ruthless takeover of Vietnam and Laos, the swift invasion of Angola were substantial Communist gains: and the systematic creation of the greatest naval force in the world has equipped the Russians for further exercises of this kind. With Cambodia and Mozambique in the hands of Marxists of a less orthodox kind, Soviet naval power may not be directed solely against "western imperialists" and towards imposing the Soviet will

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on the non-aligned countries of the Third World; it may also prove useful for stamping out Maoist and Far Left heresies.

It is widely assumed that the policy of *détente*, the Helsinki agreements and so forth, imply some sort of "liberalization" within the Soviet Union: and we do undoubtedly now hear some voices of opposition that were not heard in Stalin's time; we have more cultural exchanges, and even dialogue between privileged individuals from either side of the great divide, all of which is desirable. But a totalitarian system is in a sense a machine expressly devised to resist liberalization. In the case of literature for example—the Soviet State had some years ago agreed that Soviet writers might join International PEN: but there proved to be no means whereby any writer could join; all that seemed open was the adhesion of the bureaucratic corporation, the Writers' Union.

Détente will be bad for the West if it has a soporific effect. In America, the tradition of isolationism is still strong: in England, the Labour movement is notoriously uninterested in foreign affairs. Neither country needs much encouragement to look inward. France and Italy have their powerful Communist parties to remind them that Communism is a reality, but since *détente* requires the French Communists to play second fiddle for the time being to Mitterrand, and the Italians to wear their bourgeois mask, a certain complacency is noticeable even in those countries.

I do not myself regard Mr Ford's so-called "gaffe" in his election debate on American television when he said that the Eastern European state were not dominated by the Soviet Union as being a trivial mistake: here was the authentic voice of the unconscious Western desire to believe that the satellite states of the Soviet Union were free, and that therefore there is no need to feel either responsibility or anxiety. In what is called "public opinion," the passage from what is wished to be true and what is thought to be true is very easily accomplished.

If *détente* means cutting down the aggressive talk between Western and Communist states, and politer diplomatic relationships between them, then no sensible person should object to it: if Western diplomatic skill is a match for the Communists, then it could even work to the Western advantage; but if *détente* means people in the Western world taking seriously the humbug and hypocrisy of the Helsinki agreements, then it will prove to be an unmitigated disaster for them and their posterity.

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The Fruits of Interaction

Alexander Dallin

THE political strategy of the Western world vis-à-vis the Soviet Union must be based on the pursuit, first, of strategic balance as a short-term prerequisite for all else, and second, of desirable change in attitudes, perceptions, and objectives—perhaps in the West, certainly in the USSR. Such change is not only necessary; it is possible and is in fact already taking place.

Beyond Balance

While the gross " correlation of forces " between the two super-powers is probably not nearly so much in jeopardy as some alarmists have been arguing, of late, there is no doubt that as a matter of universal interest the Western powers must stabilize the strategic balance between the two camps; despite all its weaknesses, the West has of course a substantial advantage in economic and technological capability and innovation.

The Western powers must also seek to reduce the chances of war, improve mechanisms for crisis resolution, and promote with greater commitment and speed the negotiation of firm and fair limits on weapon development and deployment. All these are essential policy directions, but in the end they are only aspirins and band-aids. The relationship between the USSR and the Western powers cannot be normalized or settled in a healthy and constructive way *à la longue*, until and unless there is a change in Soviet values and perceptions. For present purposes, may I be permitted to skip over the need for changes in Western, and especially American, values, perceptions, and style of behaviour.

We can " coexist " well short of such changes in the Soviet system and we may well have to. Like death and taxes, the Soviet Union is here to stay as a major power, however much this runs against the grain of typical American impatience and the American instinct for rapid, total, sweeping solutions (or else disengagement).

In recent years we have often tended to underestimate Soviet needs, Sovit weaknesses, Soviet vulnerabilities, and Soviet uncertainties. And sometimes we have been inclined to take at face value the obligatory " optimism " of Soviet pronouncements about the way the world (and the USSR) is moving. In fact it is clearly difficult for Moscow to develop its economy as rapidly and as well as it wishes and to satisfy a variety of domestic claimants without more interaction and technology transfers from abroad. Soviet policy-makers as well as their public would welcome a reduction in military expenditures perhaps even more than we would. Unless the United States misses the boat once again, the confrontation with China still adds substance to Mos-

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cow's interest in close links with the "West." Shortages and inefficiencies in the Soviet economy are chronic. Recent events have again confirmed that Soviet leadership of "international communism" is a thing of the past. There are thus indeed a variety of opportunities for the Western powers to seek leverage, assuming that the domestic constituencies permit them to move ahead with a "calculus of risks and benefits" that would instruct the Soviet decision-makers credibly, in a giant learning process, regarding the benefits of restraint and cooperation, the incentives for decent behaviour, and the penalties for what we deem to be wrong with Soviet actions abroad. Essentially Soviet priorities, I am persuaded, are at home, not abroad. We can help keep them there.

If—amidst the spectrum of different views of world affairs among serious Soviet observers—there are people in Moscow who would hope to make *détente* a mechanism for change in their favour, it is only proper for us to think of increased interaction with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as an instrument of peaceful and desirable change: I refer to licit interaction, not subversion. In fact, changes in East-West relations have already begun to generate or strengthen some moderate and restrained forces and attitudes in the Soviet elite, whatever the prevalent image conveyed in our media.

Interaction, Information, Learning

Put most concisely, the hypothesis here presented is based on the following propositions.

(1) In the long run, we consider change in the Soviet Union essential for a durable resolution of mutual problems. Change in Soviet priorities and perceptions is indeed possible, and changes have in fact occurred time and again since Stalin's death. It would be a serious error to view Soviet outlook and policy as immutable and unchanging.

(2) Changes which we would consider desirable are not promoted by a policy of what we have come to call "cold war." Under conditions of international tensions and conflicts, moderates and reformers in Moscow tend to lose out; our "friends" are then silenced and isolated.

(3) Desirable change may or may not result from increased interaction with the outside world. Its effects on the Soviet domestic environment are ambiguous but far more likely to be benign than in any alternative setting. This is precisely why there are those in the Soviet bureaucracy who are concerned about the—perhaps still invisible—price which increased interaction is bound to exact from the system. Greater reliance on foreign goods, technology, and know-how; increased contact with "live" foreigners; a growing sense of viable alternatives to the status quo; an implicit challenge to bureaucratic routines: all these and more are perceived by some Soviet officials as possible outcomes of a policy which has, after all, in however limited a fashion, eased contacts and access to information, made possible

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some emigration, and tacitly identified certain communalities of interest between East and West. They are worried precisely about what Henry Kissinger may have had in mind when he spoke of a "web of interdependence," which would presumably impose restraints on Soviet behaviour.

There is a good deal of evidence that as a result of greater interaction a process of learning is already taking place which deserves closer study than it seems to have received to date. This is true, for instance, of arms control concepts, of empirical sociology, of concern over environmental pollution, of management techniques, of the uses of quantitative methods in the social sciences, and many other areas, large or small. There is a distinct increase in shared perceptions that would have been impossible a generation ago; for instance, the "mutual hostage" posture written into the SALT agreements, so much at variance with orthodox Leninism; or the recognition of "non-zero sum games," with the un-Bolshevik implication that not everything your adversary is for, you are necessarily against; or the occasional sense of solidarity of the super-powers vis-à-vis others, be it China or Third World countries demanding capital assistance.

Often this process is bound to be unacknowledged or even denied. But in the long run, the multiplication of exposure and contacts cannot but yield a cumulation of new assumptions and attitudes—an unwitting process of borrowing and learning. And—this may be critical—among other things it should promote among the next younger generation of the Soviet elite a firm conviction that it is to their own advantage to get along with the outside world. This will be true if and only if we make it worth their while.

Now there is bound to be a time lag in this difficult and elusive business. Even under the best of circumstances, absorbing and internalizing the lessons is bound to be slow. And this means that one cannot at every moment ask for a new and illusory scorecard of "who is ahead." If this is a worthwhile investment in a long-term enterprise, we cannot expect to collect the dividends any time at will. Now whether the Western powers and especially the United States are capable of conducting foreign policy in this fashion, given the pressures of lobbies and demagogues, is of course another question. It would be sad indeed if the "civilized" countries were incapable of such deferred gratification.

The Spectrum of Transactions

Among the more tangible areas of contact, there is good evidence of a basic Soviet departure from the traditional pursuit of autarky. If the West does decide to perfect a structure of incentives, it would here find tools to exert leverage—including the ability and willingness to provide some things the USSR wants and needs, and if necessary to withhold or withdraw them: things that would affect the Soviet calculus of costs and benefits of using Soviet power abroad.

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Among the less apparent payoffs, one might well ponder the changes in regard to superficially non-political facets of Soviet life. There is a striking contrast between the virtual isolation of the Soviet citizen from the outside world, in the final years of Stalinism, on the one hand, and the current state of affairs, on the other. Blue jeans may well be America's most effective ambassadors abroad. Jazz and rock are reluctantly legalized in Moscow (even if they must sometimes be called Cuban to pass). At the Olympics Soviet athletes perform to the strains of Western music. Professional colleagues in virtually all fields of endeavour meet on a variety of occasions, and time and again geologists, endocrinologists, and balletomanes "here" and "there" easily discover a common language (figuratively speaking).

Hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens have (after a fashion) been tourists abroad. Hundreds of thousands of others have left the country for good. Of course, in both instances these have been very exceptional categories. And yet their experiences too make waves, are known to others, and are widely discussed. A general awareness of the outside world—no longer as a totally unknowable, forbidden land—has grown remarkably. Ridiculous to think, Soviet citizens have travelled from Moscow to Estonia to watch on television from Finnish stations reruns of "I Love Lucy" . . . (bless their souls).

In spite of all the obstacles, foreign broadcasts, films and publications are more widely known in the Soviet Union than ever before. Soviet officials abroad and their families include a substantial number whose favourite pilgrimages in New York or London are to the fanciest and most expensive stores. Pepsi-Cola for the masses (or at least for a few of its members) and Cadillacs for the elite (or at least for the General Secretary): the Kremlin aids and abets the new spirit. Not only transient tourists come in contact with Soviet citizens but foreign specialists, students, in some cases workers by the thousands have begun to live among them, with varying degrees of exposure to the "natives."

If it were possible to arrive at a statistical measure of transactions between Soviet and foreign citizens, the number today would surely be hundreds (perhaps thousands) of times larger than it was a generation ago, and this does not even include the impact of foreign variants of communism on the Soviet population. If today the world is so much more with them, this is due essentially to two trends: (1) developmental changes: economic accomplishments, technological improvements, and educational gains; and (2) volitional changes: the whole sequence of policies and gestures that the Kremlin has chosen to make in its attempt to ease certain domestic problems by using external sources and resources.

Of course we cannot automatically assume that such changes in preference or competence among the Soviet people must find translation into official policies. The whole relationship between social differentiation and political diversity and responsiveness is a tricky

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one and cannot be dealt with here. By the same token, it cannot be ignored or dismissed out of hand, and we cannot simply write off Soviet society as a factor irrelevant to official behaviour.

In fact, as some observers have tried, one can tentatively divide (at least the potentially influential elements of) Soviet society into those who see themselves as benefiting from a policy that procures oil-drilling or automation equipment or grain abroad, even at some political price; and those who see their interests best served by international tension or perceive undue risks and costs in the current policy. This is a hazardous business, and some of the groups may well not have a clear sense of their self-interest, are divided, and experience changing reactions with increasing exposure. It is important to maintain a sense of proportion about the anticipated results. Hedrick Smith, in *The Russians*, aptly quotes a young Soviet student as telling him, "Just because we love Jimi Hendrix, don't think that we are any less patriotic or less dedicated to our country." Interdependence of the sort I have been discussing does not amount to any challenge to Soviet security. I am talking of the unintended consequences of interaction.

IN substance I have tried to point out the emergence of significant sectors of Soviet society and economy that conform to what political scientists call "linkage groups." Where previously they constituted only the tiniest part of Soviet society, they are becoming increasingly substantial and varied. And they range across the entire social landscape of the USSR—from Olga Korbut and Boris Korchnoi [1] to scientists in Novosibirsk and government-connected academics and consultants or world affairs. There is a substantial Soviet constituency that follows Western fads and fashions, from T-shirts to game theory. In the Soviet context nothing is apolitical.

I am aware of the counter-argument that "all this merely strengthens them." My main point here is that, whether or not it strengthens them, it also changes them in ways both sides may have ignored. And I am also cognizant of the fear some observers have expressed of the reciprocal effects of increased interpenetration on, for instance, American society and economy. No doubt, some Western corporations might acquire a material interest in "getting along" with the USSR to the point of ignoring unpleasant Soviet behaviour. But I have enough faith in the basic sanity of open societies not to be perturbed by the prospect, say, of having Mary Tyler Moore introduce a performance of the Bolshoi Ballet on prime-time TV. We have too often in the past deprived ourselves of political opportunities out of a misplaced phobia of "untouchability." It is high time to make the most of the fact that ours in a shrinking planet.

[1] Since this article was written Boris Korchnoi has "defected" to the West. He has been stripped of his title of Grand Master by the Societ authorities and pressure was put by them on the Internation Chess Federation to prevent him from taking part in the world contests (Ed.).

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The Need for a New Analysis of East-West Relations

Milovan Djilas

IT is now generally accepted that the "cold war" is over. Churchill's warning that the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe had sown the seeds of the third world war has not been borne out. In particular, Lenin's preaching about the inevitability of a "final reckoning" between "capitalism" and "socialism" has been shown to be deception or self-deception. Relations between the countries of the world, especially in Europe, are not developing in this atomic era only according to the classical formulas of state and class interests but also as a clash between civilizations and philosophies. Therefore, in so far as all this is true—and I hold that in the main it is—this would seem to be a sure sign that East-West relations have entered into a phase of peaceful competition. It is important for everyone to perceive the distinguishing features of this phase. And this should be specially important to those who are fighting for more open and more rational social relations.

The "cold war" had its objective causes in the antagonism between the two leading powers—the USSR and the USA—although it was expressed most frequently as a conflict between "capitalism" and "socialism," or between democracy and totalitarianism. It is certain that even these true causes derived, at least in some respects, from the exaggerated fears, the ambitions of the leaders and the currently ruling doctrines. But trying to determine who was "to blame" or who acted out of "selfish" motives would only divert us from a consideration of the immediate issue, i.e. of the present prospects for East-West relations.

Now, when the "cold war" has subsided, except in the minds of those who regarded it as an expression of the "eternal" struggle between good and evil, it is possible to examine in a more definitive manner the ruins—the deceptions and self-deceptions—which it has left in its wake.

What have been exposed on both sides are the internal conditions, as well as the strengths and weaknesses, of the two leading powers—the USA and the USSR. These conditions and developments within "capitalism" and "socialism" can no longer be depicted in a one-sided, prejudiced way, nor in terms of an opportunistic, abstract, "fair" symmetry: in neither world is everything going well; each has its advantages and its shortcomings. An analysis ought to be concrete, carefully thought out and utterly truthful—as though there had never been a "cold war" and the "true causes" of rivalry no longer existed. A one-sided approach and an attempt to establish a "fair" symmetry would deprive us of creative discernment and would make of us mere

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observers of the fate of humanity, which is, when all is said and done, today one and the same for all nations and for every human being.

We are led to such conclusions by the changes in the relations between East and West, i.e. between the USSR and the USA, and even more by the internal changes within " capitalism " and " socialism."

My conclusions are too summary to satisfy the demands I make on others: primarily because of my " poet's " way of thinking, rather than because of the limited length of this article.

WHAT emerges most strikingly, I would say, is that the systems in force in the West are not as bad, and that those in the East are not as good, as they are described by the ideological dogmatists and those who manipulate the ideologies.

" Capitalism " is not at all as it is described, not least in the statements of its own politicians or the apologetics of its theorists. It is obviously neither the ideal nor even the best possible form of society. Perhaps the significance of Western democracies and the extent to which they offer an ideal lie in the fact that they deny their own perfection and by so doing make it possible for themselves to embark on a process of intellectual and social criticism.

In short: the Western democracies have demonstrated a vitality and adaptability for which neither the business companies nor the imperialists, nor even the capitalist class itself, was sufficient, suitable or capable. Social systems in the West are in a state of ferment and movement. Which way are they going, and how are they getting there? No thinking person can be sure. But undoubtedly in the direction of still greater abundance and more " immoral," less inhibited forms: those who prophesied dictatorships of the Left or the Right were wrong. The capitalism described by socialist theorists of the nineteenth century still exists in the form of the right to capitalist property. But that property is no longer the same: it is neither sacred nor stable. And the imperialisms of the adventurers and profiteers are only the vestiges of the " glorious old days " or of vacillating pragmatic appraisals. What is most striking in the West is the striving for freedom of trade and the preservation of strategic points. A desire to reorganize the world on its own lines has been given up there along with the rejection of " perfect," closed models at home. By virtue of its basic humanistic qualities the West is today incomparably closer to the classic—indeed, Marxist, if you wish—socialist teaching than is the East.

" Eastern " bureaucratic " socialism " is in every respect inferior to democratic " capitalism." I have never said this before in such a direct way. I am reluctant to say it even now, because I consider such a comparison of the realities of the two forms of society to be schematic. But I do it now so that there should be no doubt about what I think and to put on record my complete agreement with a similar line of thought by the Polish thinker, Leszek Kolakowski. Perhaps there were at one time hopes—even if only among revolutionaries and the poor—

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that it would not be so. But it is so today. And this must also be said: truth and criticism, even when disguised and labelled "constructive," will not in any circumstances meet with understanding or kindness among the ideological policemen and the police ideologues.

Such an assertion and such a comparison do not mean in my case nor in the case of Kolakowski or of any independent critic in the East that we have just opted for the West. For us the West is not a model and certainly not an ideal. For us the West means humane and humanistic support in a long-drawn-out, for the most part hopeless and invariably selfless, struggle for intellectual freedom. The West has enabled us to extend our intellectual—and in some cases our physical—life, and by its very unwillingness to impose controls over our opinions or our actions it has strengthened in us the conviction that those who try to determine other people's way of life are condemned to perdition in their own. Just as it would be catastrophic for the West to accept the "wisdom" of the Messianic prophets of the East, so it would be futile for the East to copy Western models. When we speak of the superiority of the West we do not even think of copying it, but of restraining our "Eastern" dogmatic tyrannies, which, by deforming knowledge and conscience, ensure their monopolistic position and prevent the spontaneous development of contacts between East and West, North and South. People who insist that their world is the best are in fact enslaving that world and threatening others.

The prospect of a long period of peaceful competition imposes the need for a more complex approach and deeper responsibility. The truth in freedom, that is to say an honest analysis of society and an undogmatic description of the way people live—this seems to me to be the most effective and the most reasonable method. That does not mean that such a method has not been used before. On the contrary, it is the very method which has been the most fruitful up to now. We should continue on the basis of these achievements. It is the method which, in my view, is best suited to be the predominant, if not the only, one in the period into which we are now entering. In short, the truth—unbiased truth, truth which does not claim absolute validity, truth which is the sacred principle of objective research—this is what, as opposed to the doctrinaire, mad ways of the Cold War period, is appropriate to the present period of relaxation and confrontation.

In the light of such an analysis and such a description the systems in Eastern Europe will certainly appear different—literally different, that is to say in many ways worse and in many ways better—than they have been depicted by their neo-Manichean or imbalanced opponents.

All this leads me to say, again briefly and schematically, something about the situation in the countries of Eastern Europe. But this is also a provisional judgment, without prejudice to any conclusion, because no final conclusion is possible even about a "dead" material and certainly not about something as alive as human society.

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So: societies there (in the East) are already stratified and in many respects pluralistic. But ideology is in a state of stagnation and in some cases is already moribund. But ideology can still be used, as a ritual practice and as a ritual obligation. In this way an authoritarian political system, i.e. monopolistic power and party bureaucracies, still continues to manipulate the masses effectively and suppress any initiatives on the part of undogmatic and other opposition elements. The rulers find this easy to do not only because of their monopoly of power but also because modern technology enables them to satisfy people's basic material—not to say biological—needs. Even in those countries it is possible to live and to survive—in a limited, crippled way: those who have any ideas of their own or a desire to be creative in their own way are condemned in advance to revolt or to suffering restrictions. People can live and survive in the East, but in a way far below the possibilities which intellectual and political freedom would have afforded them. For it is not that in those countries devils rule over saintly people, but that ordinary people with all their faults are governed by people who use their power as a source of every imaginable privilege for themselves: that is why they identify themselves and their class with the people and the state and manipulate the ideology and the mythical revolutionary and national values.

No one can determine with any certainty how long this is going to last. But anyone who devotes even a little attention to the "reforms" taking place in any of the countries of Eastern Europe will be convinced that, despite the scattered nature of the opposition, the attempts at "consolidation" on the basis of the present ideology and political system are futile. The inefficiency of the system is incurable, for the good reason that this inefficiency is an essential feature of the system. Internal trends and external "models"—the democratic changes in the West and especially the ferment taking place in the European communist parties—are today so irresistible and obvious that the party monopolists are forced to be cautious in the use of their powers and methods of repression, though they have an abundance of the former and incomparable experience with the latter.

Circumstances vary from country to country, though one-party rule and the tendency to standardized, "socialist" ownership are features common to all East European countries. I would emphasize, by the way, that the Soviet Union is the most conservative and the most unadaptable power in the East, if not in the whole world. That is mainly because of the closed nature of Soviet society and the imperialist pretensions of the [Soviet] party bureaucracy.

These very differences between the countries of Eastern Europe point to the need of analysis and description based on the fairest and most discerning methods. The topicality of such methods and the need for them not only do not exclude a day-by-day truthful reaction [to events]; they make it necessary. Moreover, such reaction is a condition and a

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component part of such methods: politics is life, even if not in its totality, at least at its most fateful moments.

All this appears clearer and more necessary if account is taken of the disintegration of the blocs and the softening of the sharp divisions between them (the " heresies " of Yugoslavia and Rumania in the East, France's " independent line " and Greece's " withdrawal " in the West).

It has fallen, perhaps to a greater extent than ever before, to the philosophers and artists to participate in the fate of Europe and the world. It seems as though, instead of a frightening picture, something grotesque is exposed to view: a battle, a war of the philosophers in place of the insanities of the Cold War.

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East-West Polarities

Martin Esslin

"MARXISM as a credible political philosophy collapsed on the day the Russians invaded Czechoslovakia in August 1968." That is not my opinion, but that of an East European intellectual of the first rank who had been a fervent Marxist for most of his life. And, indeed, it is difficult nowadays to find a really convinced believer in Marxism in any of the East European satellite states. Marxism there has become the established religion of the state: ritual lip-service is paid to it; you cannot hope for a career or advancement without using its phraseology and subscribing to its articles of faith, just as you had to profess yourself a pious Anglican if you wanted to get anywhere in England in the eighteenth century. Whether the same situation also exists in the Soviet Union I cannot judge. My impression is that there the creed has even further fossilized into a system of almost automatic ritual responses behind which—who can tell?—there may or may not dwell remnants of genuine thought. Certainly, in reading Russian newspapers and journals the Byzantine quality of the mechanically repeated formulae of allegiance produces a depressing effect. And the Soviet delegates I meet at the international gatherings I occasionally attend usually remain reticent and inhibited and cling to the ritual phrases as though they were afraid of uttering any genuine opinion. But, perhaps, they really have none.

In the West, on the other hand, Marxism—or what goes by that name—is still highly fashionable among intellectuals. Here there is still genuine Marxist thought. For Marxism as a method of thought is by no means finished. The difficulty lies in separating the real users of that method, who are relatively few, from the vast number of intellectually underprivileged snobs who merely bandy one or two scraps of Marxist terminology about as a badge of with-it up-to-dateness.

This, then, is the paradox of the post-Cold-War period: no more Marxists to speak of in the Soviet empire; plenty of pseudo-Marxist dandies and a few genuine Marxist thinkers in the Western world. And in the East, dissidents who either over-idealize the West or become deeply disillusioned with its indifference to their plight.

No wonder the Cold War fizzled out and faded away. It had never been much of a genuine ideological contest between rival world systems. But in its heyday both the West and the East still *believed* in their own systems, at least up to a point.

The Vietnam War and the collapse of the last remnants of the idea that the American ideology of democracy represented a genuinely revolutionary outlook undermined the credibility of the Western system of belief as thoroughly as the invasions of Czechoslovakia and Hungary

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destroyed the idea that the Leninist brand of revolution was a liberating force.

The vacuum which remains on both sides gives rise to cynicism and despair. It is, I am convinced, a dangerous state of affairs and the sooner that vacuum is filled on both sides, the better.

Alas, there are few signs that this process has actually begun or is even likely to start in the foreseeable future. What the Byzantinism in the East has done to undermine the capacity for clear, constructive and original thought, has in the West been accomplished by a number of equally destructive cultural factors. The onrush of shallow and over-simplified material on the mass media and the resultant over-stimulation of the population by an overabundance of claims to their attention, highly destructive of concentration and the capacity for sustained reasoning, is one of these factors. The educational explosion, by which larger and larger numbers of second- or third-rate intellects are being given fourth- or fifth-rate instruction by the products of second- or third-rate instruction and so on *ad infinitum* down the scale, is another. Where today are the Marxes or John Stuart Mills whose thought (whatever one might feel about it) was based on vast knowledge and intensive and concentrated work? And even if they did exist, where are the brains in the media who would be able to recognize the importance of their thought? Or, indeed, even if some of these could be found, how could they put their thoughts across to the masses through the media of today which are quite incapable of presenting sustained argument? The daily press and weekly and monthly reviews in the nineteenth century were, admittedly, written for a small elite. That is why they had the space—and the writers—to disseminate the fruits of genuine thinking to the members of the elite who alone had influence and determined the course of affairs.

The disappearance of such elites and their organs has left us with the dismal intellectual level of political thinking in the West, both on the left and on the right. The student movement of the late sixties in France, Germany and the United States expressed a genuine and deep emotional revulsion against the uglier aspects of Western society. Its heart was certainly in the right place. But what did it have in its head? Nothing whatever. "Let us destroy the existing order and then the solutions will appear of their own accord," was the totality of their political philosophy. The dissidents of the Soviet empire hardly do better. Even the best among them, the ideologues of the Prague Spring, imagined that it would be possible to retain the system of state monopoly of the whole economy while introducing liberal democratic political institutions. Even without the Soviet invasion they would have had a rude awakening from that self-contradictory concept.

With the decline of genuine, constructive political thought we have, in the East as in the West, entered upon a phase of pragmatism and muddling-through. One only has to listen to the debates between Ford and Carter, or to the speeches Callaghan and Mrs Thatcher make to

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their respective party conferences, to realize to what depths our political leadership has sunk. And in the East, Stalin seems to have been the last, however feebly and crazily, to have even staked a claim to be regarded as a theoretician.

That the muddling-through and pragmatism of the West is still preferable to the Byzantine regurgitation of fossilized formulae in the East seems to me beyond doubt. But it is equally clear that such pragmatism is incapable of arousing sufficient enthusiasm and depth of conviction to represent a viable basis for the system. Hence the disillusionment of the young, their mindless resort to violent solutions on the lines of the Baader-Meinhof group. Hence their equally mindless and ill-informed modish flirtation with some of the more easily quotable slogans of Marxism.

The West is more threatened in this respect than the East. Totalitarian systems do not rely on enthusiasm or consensus, they impose themselves by force and fear.

There is a further disquieting and saddening aspect of our epoch: the Third World, liberated from the constraints of colonialism and still suffering from the backwardness which both led to, and resulted from, colonial rule, will take a long time to achieve the level of political organization and intellectual capacity which is needed for stability and continuity. We have, in many areas, returned to the pre-colonial situation already, where the writ of civilized international law simply no longer runs. In the nineteenth century the Western world organized collective action to put down the Barbary pirates. Today countries which give shelter to hijackers and clearly are the modern equivalent of the Barbary pirates seem to be immune from any such international action. I have little doubt that the blank spots on the world's map which mark the areas outside the system of the civilized international polity will grow for some considerable time to come.

WHAT, then, is to be done? The optimistic vision of the gradual convergence of the Eastern and Western systems is clearly discredited. Nor does it appear that the Soviet empire will become more and more liberalized as its economic situation improves. Its economic situation seems as bad as ever. The slight degree of liberalization which has occurred can now be seen as merely a retreat from the madness of Stalin. That dissidents like Sinyavsky, Solzhenitsyn or Amalrik are allowed to leave the country should be applauded. But it must also be seen as a far more effective way of dealing with dangerous intellectuals in a totalitarian regime than what was done in Stalin's time with Mandelstam or Meyerhold. In that sense the new policy of expulsion is more efficient totalitarianism rather than greater liberality. Yet, if there is no hope of convergence, there is some of continued détente. As the Soviet system becomes less and less ideological and more and more pragmatic it might well find it useful to strive for stability and international order in a world in which the areas of total breakdown of

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legality increase. On the other hand, the continued economic failure of the Soviet empire might well lead to foreign adventures. An East Germany party member said to me some time ago that East Germany has had practically the same regime—totalitarianism—since 1933. And indeed, as Marxist ideology fades into mere formalism, the Soviet political system becomes more and more akin to Hitler's, including its anti-Semitism. Economic crisis might therefore well precipitate attempts to get hold of industrial strength by conquest.

So military vigilance on the part of the West remains a necessity. On the ideological front what is needed is a re-thinking of the West's philosophy. It is ridiculous to persist even in calling the West's system capitalism in an era where there is no Western country that does not have a large sector under public control. Much re-thinking is needed, after the fiasco of the Vietnam War, on the role of the developed countries in the Third World. But above all some attempt must be made to formulate the West's actual—as against the many remnants of fossilized conventional and traditional—positive ideals and *ideas*. The West must realise that the relatively marginal but very ugly aspects of its system—high-pressure salesmanship or the exploitation of under-privileged sectors of society—have an effect in alienating the young quite out of proportion to their actual importance in the working of the system. And ways and means must be found to stem the tide of mindlessness in the media, to rationalize the educational system and thus to produce a genuinely humane cultural climate.

These are objectives which will be very difficult to achieve. Yet one should not be too pessimistic: the technological revolution of the last hundred years has, for the first time, made it possible to think in terms of universal well-being and culture rather than reserving them merely for the benefit of elites. Perhaps the lowering of standards we now experience is analogous to the vulgarity of some *nouveaux riches* whose children or grandchildren, having grown up in more civilized conditions, eventually attain to genuine culture. All we need is the respite of three generations to allow it actually to happen.

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East & West

Etiemble

SINCE I think of history as contingent rather than inevitable, how should I dare to predict, like a second Nostradamus, future relations between "East" and "West," expressions which I do not accept anyway? Ever since we have known that the Earth revolves around the Sun, East has been West and West East; Brest is to the West of Paris in one sense, but also to the far East of our capital.

Thus Mao's famous saying about the East wind prevailing over the West wind is only yet another of those poetic images in which the "Great Helmsman" naturally indulged. But politics does not care about images: it is the art of the possible and, in fact, the story of a thousand contingencies; we were expecting Grouchy, and Blücher turned up—and that was our Waterloo: your Waterloo Station.

Philosophically speaking, was it "necessary" that Chu En-lai should die before Mao? Certainly not. If Mao had preceded him to the Yellow Springs by a few months, or even several days, Teng Hsiao-ping would not have been dismissed, he would have stayed on as chief of the army, become Prime Minister, and would have become once again General Secretary of the Party. However, as Chu died first, Mao's hatred for Teng Hsiao-ping who was guilty of having criticized Mao's thought 20 years ago, pushed the Deputy Prime Minister of 1975 into limbo. For ever? Who knows?

It would also be interesting to know whether, with Teng Hsiao-ping in charge, China's general policy would have changed completely—particularly her foreign policy. Geopolitics was not invented by the Nazis. The 6,000 kilometres of border between Russia and China; the hatred of the "Mongols" which still exists in the hearts and memory of the Russians who, like the racists that they fundamentally are, consider Chinese and Mongols as identical; the Tsars' territorial encroachments into Asia, in defiance of the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689), which was intended to ensure "eternal peace" between the two empires, and the refusal of the "new Tsars" to withdraw, defending "sacred frontiers" against the legitimate claims of Peking—everything conspires to make of these two supposedly fraternal, "Marxist-Leninist" worlds, two worlds which are inexorably and implacably hostile.

I realized this for the first time in 1957, during my trip to China, and my conviction was strengthened a year later when I was staying in Moscow. The only question the Russians and Chinese ask themselves is: them or us?

This is why, despite its ideology-religion, China makes friends with, or makes overtures towards, anyone whom she thinks will support her cause by providing a second and a third front against Public Enemy Number One: Moscow. The United States, capitalist Europe, Iran, why

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not even Pinochet's Chile? Yellow peril, white fear, white peril, yellow fear—these formidable phantasms today loom more menacingly than ever over the future, over the very survival of our species. I would not shed many tears over the end of a species which is more resolutely incorrigible, stupid and cruel than any other animal species. But I would give a wry smile at the thought that it is the hatred of the two brother-enemies, of the two "Leninist" peoples, each striving to outdo the other, which would blow the whole lot up . . .

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Reflections on the Shifting East-West Balance of Forces

Elliot R. Goodman

THE NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation in Europe appears increasingly to be favouring the Kremlin. The fact that the Communist bloc states operate on a command economy makes it possible for them to allocate resources for military purposes in a way that would not be tolerated in the West. Revised intelligence estimates show that since 1970 annual Soviet defence expenditures have absorbed some 11–13 per cent of the Soviet GNP, which is more than twice as much as the average NATO percentage of the GNP devoted to defence.[1] Moreover the Soviet defence ruble stretches much farther than the US defence dollar. The Soviet Union, and the Warsaw Pact states generally, still have military conscription, and so do not have to dissipate funds in paying for an expensive all-volunteer military service. The result is that the United States presently spends over 50 per cent of its military budget on personnel pay and less than 30 per cent on weapons and equipment R and D and arms procurement. The figures for the Soviet Union are exactly the opposite: over 50 per cent for arms R and D and procurement, and around 30 per cent for personnel.

Nor is this situation likely to improve in the future. As long as inflation continues in the market economies of the West the situation will tend to deteriorate. This is a rather bleak prospect since in fiscal year 1976 former US Secretary of Defence James Schlesinger revealed in his annual report to the Congress that in absolute terms the Soviet Union already outspent the United States by 20 per cent in arms R and D and by 25 per cent in military procurement.

Moreover, of the arms procured the Warsaw Pact has the advantage of using almost completely standardized models imposed upon it by the Russians, whereas the NATO forces comprise a collection of different, non-standardized national armaments and military equipment. This has led to a needless duplication of effort which NATO can ill afford. With their military budgets under severe constraints the NATO allies nevertheless continue to waste more than $10 thousand million annually in "reinventing the wheel" in arms and equipment. The existence side by side in Europe of allied forces equipped with non-standardized arms also creates a lack of flexibility in their deployment and use which could be crucial in times of emergency. Fortunately NATO has at last begun to move seriously in the direction of

[1] Military briefing given to the NATO Defence Ministers on 10 June 1976, *NATO Review*, August 1976, p. 29.

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standardization, or at the least of interoperability, of its arms and equipment, although progress will necessarily be slow in overcoming parochial, vested national interests.[2]

The accumulated military exertions of both sides have resulted in a significant military advantage for the Warsaw Pact in the major confrontation of forces that exist in central Europe. In the mutual arms reduction negotiations which have been under way in Vienna, the West has tried, totally in vain, to eliminate the Warsaw Pact superiority in manpower, tanks and aeroplanes by having both sides agree to reduce their military strength down to a common ceiling. But the Kremlin has displayed no interest in this proposition, nor is it likely to do so. If the Soviet leaders hold on to their potentially intimidating position long enough, the will-power of the NATO states will eventually crumble, so they must reason, and their predominant military position can then yield political dividends. Of course if the West Europeans could finally "build Europe," including a European defence community, Soviet expectations for making such inroads into Western Europe could be substantially thwarted. But then we have all been waiting a long time for a political Europe to take shape, as undoubtedly we shall continue to do, and the military formation of this united Europe will obviously be one of the last steps in this protracted process.

The NATO states have given the Soviet bloc other advantages as well, although these are of a different character. They come under the rubric of self-inflicted wounds.

The bitter conflicts between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus as well as over mineral exploration of the continental shelf beneath the Aegean Sea have injured NATO's ability to operate effectively in the Eastern Mediterranean. American diplomacy, or the lack of it at the crucial moment before the Turks invaded Cyprus, has managed to alienate both the Greeks and the Turks. At the time, Secretary Kissinger was preoccupied with his shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East, among other things, and so the Cyprus crisis simply exploded out of control. Even Britain, which had a treaty obligation to ensure the integrity of Cyprus, remained passive awaiting some American initiative which never came.

Even though the Russians cannot be said to have caused this inter-alliance strife, they have certainly been the beneficiary of it. Greece has withdrawn from the NATO integrated command structure and has circumscribed the availability of US military bases in Greece, while Turkey has expelled American military personnel from a series of bases on Turkish soil that were said to be responsible for about one-third of the Western intelligence operations over the Soviet Union. While new agreements with both Greece and Turkey have been

[2] See Elliot R. Goodman, "The Puzzle of European Defence: The Issue of Arms Procurement," in this issue of *Survey*, p. 218.

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prepared by the US administration which would go a long way in repairing the damage, they must be approved not only by Greece and Turkey but by the US Congress. And the Congress demands measurable progress over Cyprus, which at the moment appears most unlikely, before appropriating the military assistance funds involved in these agreements.

The Cod War between Britain and Iceland came close to providing the Kremlin with another unearned bonus. As the dispute grew nasty and diplomatic relations were broken between Reykjavik and London, Iceland also threatened to withdraw from NATO. This would have involved the loss of the strategically-located Keflavik air base which the United States has long used to track Soviet naval movements in the North Atlantic area. The fact that London gave way finally eased the situation, but the dispute clearly revealed the shallow nature of Iceland's commitment to NATO and suggested the trouble that might still lie ahead.

Neither was the Kremlin responsible for the fall of the Caetano dictatorship in Portugal in April 1974. While the Soviet leadership looked on uncertainly from abroad, the events that almost brought the Communists to power in Portugal unfolded largely as a result of the internal dynamics of forces at play inside Portugal. During the summer of 1975 the political situation appeared to deteriorate rapidly, and it was an open secret that Secretary Kissinger was prepared to write off the loss of Portugal as irretrievable. Even when Azevedo replaced the fellow-travelling Goncalves as Premier on 29 August, the new government had only a precarious hold on power and a Communist takeover still seemed clearly conceivable. It was only after the forceful repression of the attempted leftist coup of 25 November 1975 that the tide against Communist power was decisively turned, and a new alignment of forces made possible a non-Communist path of development. Even in retrospect, knowing that Portugal has taken this dramatic turn, it still seems like a miracle that the country managed to escape falling into Communist hands.

Not that all is now well in Portugal, of course, for the revolutionary upheaval has left the country with staggering economic problems, including the worst inflation rate in Europe. In addition this small country must absorb some 600,000 destitute refugees who have returned from the lost overseas territories. Nevertheless the current Portuguese government is determined to make a positive contribution to NATO in a way that was not possible when the country's resources were being siphoned abroad in the fruitless attempt to fight colonial wars. Given time and sympathetic aid from its Western allies, Portugal should be able to take its place as a valued partner in the Western comity of nations, not only in NATO but also in the European Community.

The prospect for participation of the Communist Parties of Italy

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and France in their governments is quite another matter. Although the circumstances differ in each country, the probability is high in both cases that within the next few years Communist ministers will make their appearance in Rome and Paris. The consequences for NATO will be serious in both countries.

Ever since 1966 France has not had NATO bases on its territory, nor has it participated in the NATO integrated command structure and it has never taken part in such sensitive NATO agencies as the Nuclear Planning Group. Nevertheless, in recent years French *de facto* cooperation with NATO has been increasingly satisfactory, and close, informal arrangements have been worked out with NATO authorities in many areas. By way of contrast, the Common Programme of the French Communist and Socialist Parties is so bitterly anti-NATO that it is *plus Gaulliste que de Gaulle*. Communist ministers in Paris could only threaten to unravel these delicate NATO ties.

Italy, on the other hand, is host to several important NATO installations and headquarters and has American forces on its territory. It also participates fully in the NATO integrated command structure and in bodies like the Nuclear Planning Group. Even though Enrico Berlinguer has promised to keep Italy's NATO ties intact with Communist participation in government, questions must arise from the NATO point of view as to how trustworthy and secure these contacts might be. In the past Communist ministers have appeared briefly in Iceland, and more recently in Portugal, without causing a break in their NATO bond. Iceland, of course, has no armed forces, while Portugal in fact did not participate in a meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group, as it was otherwise scheduled to do, during the period in question. But Italy is not just another Iceland or Portugal, and major precautions would have to be taken to restrict sensitive materials to Italian officials and limit Italian participation in various NATO bodies. How exactly this would affect the performance of the Italian mission to NATO or the operation of NATO agencies in Italy would be difficult to anticipate in detail, but generally speaking it could only damage the relationship in both directions.

On the other hand, the Italian Communist Party is a sword that cuts in two directions. So to a lesser extent is the French Party which has trailed behind the Italians in adopting revisionist doctrine. The Spanish Communists must also be mentioned on this account, although at this point it is too early to tell what impact they may have on the Spanish polity. If these parties demonstrate that they mean what they say about abandoning the Soviet model and accepting the rules of pluralist democracy, then you will have a Euro-Communism that, in time, could help undermine Soviet control over the Warsaw Pact states.

Even though for the moment Soviet control appears secure, it must not be forgotten that the Kremlin has found it necessary to resort to armed force in East Germany in 1953, in Hungary in 1956 and in

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Czechoslovakia in 1968 in order to restore its control. Berlinguer has reportedly said that one of the reasons he approves of Italy's continued membership in NATO is that this provides protection for the unhindered development of the PCI, in contrast to the perilous situation in which the Dubcek reformers found themselves. There membership in the Warsaw Pact permitted the Soviet Army to invade Czechoslovakia with impunity and suppress a Communist movement the Soviet leadership did not like.

The subversive influence of a revisionist West European Communist Party that would be beyond the reach of the Soviet Army can already be demonstrated. After the Polish riots of 25 June 1976, which erupted in protest against the announced increases in the price of food, the Polish dissident historian and former Communist, Jacek Kuron, appealed to the Italian Communist Party to intervene on behalf of the arrested rioters. Berlinguer promptly asked Warsaw to show clemency and many Poles detected a softening effect on the official Polish reactions as a result of the Italian intervention.

But beyond that the Italian Party's concept of political organization held an attraction for the revamping of Polish institutions. Polish officials were quick to admit that they were "walking a razor's edge between growing economic pressures on the one hand and the political force of the population on the other." The Polish leadership generally agreed that "the only solution will be to involve the people to a much greater extent than hitherto in the basic decision-making process of the nation." A prominent Party leader was quoted to this effect:

> I cannot say what model of socialism we are going to have to create, but one must look for something new and more effective. Maybe even new institutions will be required. Changes in the press of this country, the trade unions, the Party organizations—many things may be necessary to reestablish essential communication between the people and their leaders. And the need is urgent.[3]

The relative calm that has prevailed in the Soviet bloc since the invasion of Czechoslovakia is really deceptive, since massive discontents and the desire for liberalizing reforms continue to bubble up just below the surface. It is scarcely conceivable that the Kremlin can forever keep the lid on its kind of socialism in Eastern Europe. Nor can further colonial revolts be ruled out of the question. The Warsaw Pact rests on a Soviet military imperium and represents the last major empire in the world today. At some point in the future this empire will go the way of all the others.

[3] Malcolm W. Browne, *New York Times*, 9 and 10 Aug. 1976.

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East-West Relations Today

Pierre Hassner

I CONSIDER the East-West dimension to remain as it has been since the second world war, the " most crucial dimension of world politics " in a double sense. First, the spiritual tradition of the West embodied, however imperfectly, in the political form of constitutional government is under threat from illiberal trends and regimes; secondly, the most powerful and dangerous representative of those trends and regimes is the Soviet Union, who is, militarily, in an ascending phase. The overlap between these two realities—i.e. the direct or indirect destruction of Western democracies by Soviet power—represents the point of maximum danger in East-West relations. Even within their framework, however, one should be careful to speak of overlap or interaction in precise circumstances and in various forms, rather than of identification between the threats to Western democracy and the expansion of the Soviet Union; the latter—or even communism itself—is by no means the sole nor very often the main originator or beneficiary of the former; too quick an identification of the internal crisis of the West, or of the decline of human rights in the world, with the Soviet threat may lead to catastrophic mistakes in defining their respective causes and remedies.

This is all the more so since in the perception of many, perhaps most people in the West, the East-West dimension as such has lost precedence in favour both of narrower and of broader concerns.

On the one hand, the salience of the East-West conflict and balance has been diminished by the assertion of local or racial, national or regional, social or biological realities and tensions within the West, and, in a partly repressed but no less real form, within the East—and on the other hand too, by the awareness of common problems like the avoidance of nuclear war, of famine, of ecological catastrophe, or even of economic collapse at the global level. I believe, however, that they have not diminished its importance and that, even in terms of perceptions, the emphasis on the new global concerns is more of a Western phenomenon; the Soviet emphasis on a correlation of forces moving in their favour may seem primitive to sophisticated and well-meaning Western intellectuals but may also testify to the " importance of being old-fashioned " in a world which remains dominated by considerations of power and conflict as much as of order and cooperation.

This does not allow us to neglect the transformations of power and conflict, the multiplication of their dimensions and of their battlegrounds and the limits brought to each of them by this very multiplicity. Nor can one forget, either from an analytical or from a practical point of view, that while it is true that control means power and that management implies manipulation, the control of the arms race, of nuclear proliferation, of escalation in violent conflicts and the management of

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social and economic interdependence are unavoidable tasks which must be seen in the perspective of the East-West confrontation but which also, in return, impose their own logic upon it.

EVEN Dr Kissinger would no longer maintain that we have left the era of confrontation to enter that of negotiation. Indeed, if one distinguishes, as I think one should, three dimensions of East-West relations, that of direct confrontation, that of direct negotiation and cooperation, and that of indirect competition and influence, one observes at the present moment a certain stagnation of the second. While the Cold War proper was dominated by the concern with the possibility of confrontation, while the early seventies were dominated by the promises of negotiation and cooperation, in 1976 one is struck on the one hand by the resurgence of some of the ghosts of the fifties which show that the concern with the possibility of direct conflict is by no means over (shootings at the border between the two Koreas and between the two Germanies, East German threats about access to West Berlin, revelations about defectors or new weapon systems) and on the other hand, by the mutual disappointment in East-West economic relations, by the lack of progress in and enthusiasm for, SALT and MBFR, and by the Soviet unwillingness to get involved in the North-South negotiations, or (with some possible exceptions like the law of the sea conference) in the global concerns in which the United States is seeking to engage them.

But such issues as nuclear proliferation—vertical and horizontal—are bound, sooner or later and in one way or the other, to work for communication and parallelism if not confrontation and cooperation between the super-powers in order to minimize the uncertainties of an increasingly unpredictable and unmanageable technological and political environment while seeking, at the same time, to exploit it for their respective unilateral advantage.

It seems to me, however, that the decisive dimension is increasingly the third one, which concerns not what the super-powers do to each other or to each other's allies but the way they handle their relations with third areas, within their own alliance systems, and with their own societies, the way they respond to common challenges as well as to their own specific crises. It is in analysing this third dimension, which I call that of "hot peace" and whose dominant trend has been so aptly characterized by Leopold Labedz as "competitive decadence," that I part company with those, from Solzhenitsyn to Leopold Labedz himself (in his essay on the "USA and the World Today"—*Survey*, Winter 1976) who focus their whole analysis on the growing threat of Soviet expansion and their whole recommendations on a call to resistance.

To take the example of the above-quoted article, I agree with practically all of Labedz's affirmations, like the dynamic thrust and "*Kto-Kavo*" mentality of Soviet policy which makes nonsense of the "no unilateral advantage" and "stable structure of peace" formulas, its

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steady effort for gaining military superiority in regard to the West and complete control of its own empire under the guise of "socialist internationalism" as well as the weaknesses of the West, in particular the unlikelihood of major progress in West European unification and defence and the additional problems created for the latter by the rise of the Left in countries like France and Italy, the Communist Party of the latter being, in spite of its pro-Europeanist attitude, more likely to practise compromise with the Soviet Union as with everyone else than to demonstrate militant resistance.

But the over-strong emphasis on these realities, to the practical exclusion of no less important countervailing ones, leads to an analysis which manages, in an article on the United States and the World, practically not to mention trends in the areas which concern the United States most immediately, or are of most crucial importance for world balances, like Latin America and the Middle East, nor to consider the specific strengths in economic and technological leverage of the United States in front of the Soviet military involvements. Even more important, perhaps, it neglects the specific structures and tensions of the various regions and countries which are far more complex, more unpredictable and less dominated by the Soviet-American military balance and confrontation than would appear from the article.

To consider the problem of the PCI's role in Italy essentially in the light of perfectly valid considerations about the complications it creates for NATO and for military resistance to the Soviet Union, is misleading as long as one does not consider the alternatives for Italy's social and economic stability or the chances for the digestion or cooptation of the PCI as of other radical movements by Italian and more generally, by Western society whose strength lies precisely in their absorptive capacity as opposed to the rigidity of the Soviet system.

Similarly, could it be that the glaring absence of an analysis of the Middle East in Labedz's piece comes from the resistance of the region to an assessment in terms of the general framework of the article, let alone of the general trend it emphasizes? Indeed, it is striking that the 1967 war, which saw the military triumph of Israel and prompted some effervescent Americans (like Z. Brzezinski) to scorn the Soviet Union as a mere regional power, was followed by a spectacular increase in Soviet presence and influence, while the 1973 war, which saw a certain rehabilitation of the Soviet Union's allies and was interpreted by some thundering critics of Kissinger (like Leo Labedz) as a major Soviet victory, was followed by a major increase in American influence and a major decline in the Soviet one. Of course this is not the end of the story. But it should show that evaluations of changes in the balance of power when they claim to discern a global trend rather than to present an instant photography, often suffer from insufficient regard for the volatility and the contradictions of the international scene as well as for the ambiguity of the relationship between local and specific balances and the global and multidimensional one.

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TO register just a few impressionistic and simplified assessments, it would seem that in the Middle East in the present phase the Soviet Union is definitely losing, while in Africa she is definitely winning. In the spheres of domination of the two super-powers, the power of each seems to be increasing: in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union is, on balance, successful in the patient *Gleichschaltung* of her bloc, while in Latin America, radical and semi-radical regimes are, one after the other, replaced by more conservative ones, open at least to American economic influence. In both regions, however, social and economic problems and the repressive character of governments may make the direct or indirect control of the super-power less and less harmonious.

In Western Europe and in Asia, the situation is much more open and contradictory. Western Europe seems to be the scene of a competition which is more and more fluid and ambiguous and in which the Soviet Union seems much less certain of what she stands to gain, than the United States is certain (perhaps wrongly) of what she stands to lose herself. As Ugo La Malfa says, the Soviet Union is militarily more and more uncomfortably close to Western Europe at the same time as West European Communists get more and more distant from Moscow. According to the respective strength and to the many possible combinations of these two trends, the Western gift for taming through seduction, cooptation or corruption or the Soviet one for taming through intimidation will prove more decisive. In Asia, the balance sheet seems fragmented on regional lines. Japan, in spite of American shocks, defeats and scandals is closer to the United States than she has been for a long time. On the other hand, in South East Asia the consequences of the Vietnam War have led to a marked increase in Soviet influence, although the coup in Thailand shows that counter-domino effects are not excluded. Australia has evolved in a pro-American and anti-Soviet direction.

For both of the latter continents as well as for the global relationship, the greatest element of uncertainty is the future role of China. It would seem that the greatest advantage of the United States over the Soviet Union is America's favourable position in the triangle both constitute with China, but in the present phase this advantage seems to be diminishing. This may be due both to foreign policy mistakes (those of the United States who may have got too close to the Soviet Union and not have gone far enough in exploiting the Chinese connexion, and those of China herself who may, on the contrary, have followed a too rigid and automatic line of befriending whoever the Soviet Union opposes and vice versa) and even more to China's internal political troubles and political instability. The victory of a more moderate line over a more radical one may be to the advantage of the Chinese people but to the disadvantage of the West if it leads to a more conciliatory line towards the Soviet Union too. At any rate, China seems to be losing to the Soviet Union not only in the projection of military and economic power

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but also in ideological influence among Communist parties in the Third World.

The relation of the two super-powers to the Third World is a good illustration of their respective strengths and weaknesses and of the present impossibility of giving a clear advantage to either. Ideologically, the West seems to be more and more isolated in front of a more united and more aggressive Third World which does not look for inspiration to the Soviet Union but does not single it out for attack either. On the other hand, in crucial regions, the rising powers are conservative ones—Iran, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Brazil—whose ties are to the United States and, partly under their influences, the evolution of Egypt and Syria is in the same direction.

But the economic and technical leverage of the United States and her multiple ties at the social as well as the diplomatic level are countered by the new global mobility of the Soviet Union and her political daring, which seem, in Africa at least, to give her a new political chance as the main supporter of " liberation struggles."

The question arises as to whether the Soviet Union is acquiring the instruments of traditional control just when they are becoming obsolete, fragile or counter-productive—at least in faraway lands—(as would be shown both by the West's experience and by the Soviet one with leaders like Sadat) or whether in a world where lofty concerns and peaceful assurances are an alibi for the decline of political will, she is becoming the only global power while the United States, by carefully limiting her commitments (beyond her immediate sphere) to Israel, Western Europe and Japan, would be becoming a regional one. But, while trends in American public opinion would seem to go in the latter direction, the increasing involvement of the United States in regions like the Persian Gulf certainly does not seem to confirm it; it only emphasizes again the mixture of symmetries and asymmetries which characterizes the global confrontation.

Domestically, asymmetries dominate.

Western societies seem able to absorb shocks from outside and within but at the cost of considerable decline in the authority of government and its capacity for action. Their strategy of conflict resolution consists in cooptation for absorption at the risk of erosion. The Soviet bloc has been able to remain, in the last few years, a rock of solidarity in an unsettled world but only through rigid control of the central state and at the expense of creativity and influence. Its strategy is to buy time by containing conflicts instead of absorbing them, by excluding or liquidating dissidents through repressions, at the risk of explosion, rather than coopting them.

IT is interesting that the opposition becomes blurred when one looks at the strategies of the two super-powers in front of peripheral or external challenges. With the conservative oil states as well as with the other parties to the Middle Eastern conflict, the United States, true to

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her associative and depolarizing gifts, is following a policy of accommodating to trends and creating interests in orderly change. This is what she has recently been trying to do in Africa, admittedly at the risk of being carried by the winds of change further than she wants to go. Until then, in Africa, and, more surprisingly to this day in Europe, a rigid conservative and polarizing policy based on the primacy of strategic considerations has deprived her of the chance to utilize the Western capacity for managing conflict by coopting radicals and has risked promoting explosions or exclusions which can only benefit the Soviet Union.

The latter follows the rigid strategy wherever she continues to enjoy exclusive control. But she has shown remarkable flexibility in her external relations; both with the non-aligned movement and with the Euro-Communist parties she has succeeded in establishing a relationship which, in spite of differences and polemics at the ideological level, brings them together in a vast "anti-imperialist" coalition at least as far as events in the Third World are concerned. She is able to some extent to have her cake and eat it too; to practise a certain degree of great-power solidarity in the Suppliers' club or in the Law of the Sea conference, and "inter-continental militant proletarian solidarity" with Cuba in Angola, to practise doctrinal hardening against the Italian Communists and to bargain with them on practical matters. But, again, there are times and places where she must choose between Syrians and Palestinians, between nuclear restraint and support for Gadhafi, between considering Yugoslavia as a non-aligned country or as a member of the Socialist community.

THE picture which emerges, then, is that of a world of multiple inequalities and conflicts which, precisely by their multiplicity, make room for a multiplicity of balances and cooperations. Neither bipolarity nor one pentagon or two triangles, nor any geometrical illustration will do justice to what could be called a multiplicity of shifting oligarchies, oligopolies, concerts, and coalitions which vary according to issues and to regions.

HOW can recognition of (and adaptation to) this kind of world be combined with the priority of the East-West confrontation which I have indicated at the beginning? Only by understanding that both in terms of goals and in terms of means the confrontation has to be seen in a broad and often indirect way.

In terms of goals, the very principle which makes us see the main threat in Soviet totalitarianism, may lead us, in certain cases, to accept military or economic drawbacks rather than abandon the respect for pluralism, diversity and democracy on which our rejection of totalitarianism is based.

In terms of means, while direct Soviet or clear proxy threat or in-

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volvement must be met on their own terms, unconditional opposition to non-Communist leftist or nationalist movements, or, even to non-Soviet communist forces or powers may be self-defeating. While in some situations West and East are inevitably backing their respective champions, allies or satellites, in others they must, no less inevitably, compete for influence over the same forces which are the only viable ones.

The three considerations: (1) universal concern for freedom and human rights, (2) recognition of the constraints of the East-West balance of power, which limits Western ability to help the subjects of the Soviet empire and requires Western will to protect itself against its expansion, and (3) recognition of the elusive character of external ability to understand and influence changing and complex societies, should always be combined in proportions which vary from case to case.

In this respect, I suspect that while I would agree with Leo Labedz in his criticism of Kissinger's illusions about the Soviet Union and indifference towards Eastern Europe, my criticism and praise would be the opposite of his where policies in the Third World or in Southern Europe are concerned. Personally, I think that very often the United States has not been intransigent enough towards the main adversary, and has been too intransigent towards forces, whether nationalist or communist, which could be tolerated, or even absorbed or utilized to divide the Soviet camp rather than making it easier for it to maintain its unity.

The combination of moral concern, of military balance and of socio-economic influence should, I think, lead in the case of relations with the *Soviet Union* to a primacy of considerations of balance. The possibilities of absorption or cooptation through the diffuse influence of trade, contacts and involvement in common responsibilities are very limited and uncertain. They go both against Soviet objectives and against Soviet power. But indirect and marginal use of economic leverage in specific political cases is possible and should not be underestimated.

With *Eastern Europe*, possibilities of influence are greater because of greater economic leverage through economic interdependence and socio-cultural communication. But they are also limited by Soviet power and by the nature of the regime.

In the *Third World*, the competition for influence (rather than control) with the Soviet Union may lead the USA to seek association with the same forces and trends as her as well as to champion opposite ones. The outcome of such competition would be dictated by the Western comparative advantage in the manipulation of economic, technological and cultural ties and the Soviet one in that of military support. In general, indirect assistance to favourable autonomous forces or trends is likely to be more effective for the West than direct intervention or threats. Some of this is true in *Southern Europe*, as shown by the case of Portugal.

In the *West* itself, where the United States has preponderant power,

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it should be more confident in absorption through a flexible, associative strategy.

In general, whatever its difficulties, the West is favoured by the forces of diversification and interdependence. While military, and especially nuclear, considerations make a certain acceptance of bipolar division inevitable, this should be seen as a desirable state of influence or a "*cuius regio, eius religio*" policy. The "*religio*" of the West can only be diversity. Neither a siege mentality nor a legitimization of the Soviet empire, nor their combination as in the so-called Kissinger-Sonnenfeldt doctrine are true to the West's principles and interests. A West which had regained faith in itself should be able, within the limits of avoiding both war and decisive shifts of the military balance, both to accept internal challenges or opportunities like Euro-Communism [1] and to adopt a more dynamic policy in support of aspirations to autonomy and communication in the Soviet empire.

[1] This could be called a reverse form of finlandization, namely that of Communist parties by Western society: in the September issue of the Prague *Problems of Peace and Socialism* (*World Marxist Review*) T. Sinisalo, leader of the Stalinist faction of the Finnish Communist Party denounces "*the new strategy of the bourgeoisie*" consisting in associating Communist Parties to government in order to force them to accept the system and to lose their popularity.

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"I know there will be a future . . ."

Michael Heller

THUS a Soviet poet begins his poem, and it is an assertion with which all but the most diehard pessimists would probably agree. There will be a future. What provokes most heated argument, however, is the nature of that future. The heat is especially fierce when the subject of the argument is the future of East-West relations, which will decide the future of the whole of mankind, and thus determine whether there will be a future at all . . .

Hegel called the historian a prophet looking backwards. As we know, it is not easy to prophesy even looking back into the past. It is still more risky to divine the future by looking ahead. However, this banal truth is least of all convincing when applied to East-West relations. Their future *can* be foretold. Prediction is facilitated by the special character of the Soviet state, which has remained immutable since the day it came into existence.

Leaders have come and gone: Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev. Policies have succeeded one another: War Communism, NEP, the deadly Stalinist witch-hunts, the Cold War and *détente*. The basis of the Soviet state has remained unaltered. The state was born in expectation of a miracle. And it continues to live in expectation of one.

When Lenin persuaded the Bolshevik Central Committee to start an uprising, he promised them a miracle: revolution in Germany within two months and then world revolution, no less. Since that moment, the history of the USSR has been the history of waiting for a miracle, the history of a quest for the philosopher's stone, a search for the magic key which would soon open the door to a golden age and a happy future. But the only real miracle was the country's reconstruction during the first years of NEP. Then came again the waiting-for-a-miracle periods: the expectation of a miracle from collectivization, or from industrialization; or the miracle in agrobiology promised in the very near future by the magician Lysenko.

The expected miracle was always proclaimed as if it were supposed to be produced by a magic formula: "world revolution," "total collectivization and the liquidation of the *kulaks*," "cadres solve everything," "technology solves everything." The guarantee of success was "Russian revolutionary sweep and American efficiency," "we cannot expect favours from nature, our task is to seize them." Stalin's litany on the results of the first five-year plan was the proclamation that the miracle had occurred: "We had no ferrous metal industry . . . We have one now. We had no tractor industry. We have one now. We had no automobile industry. We have one now."

Expectation of a miracle did not cease with Stalin's death. Indeed,

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the very death of the great "miracle-worker" became an occasion for the expectation of another miracle, the miracle of "de-Stalinization," "the liquidation of the personality cult," which was to open the door to full Communism. The Khrushchev decade was one continuous expectation of a miracle. "Tsar Nikita" was constantly in search of the magic key: maize; the development, over a two year period, of 13 million hectares of virgin land, an area the size of England; the National Economic Councils. The missiles on Cuba, too, were a hope for a miracle; they seemed the magic key to the heart of the USA, to the extension of power over the world, which would enable the Soviet Union to solve all its difficulties and approach the future as a victor.

Khrushchev was overthrown for his "faith in miracles"—for this was the meaning, rendered into simple language, of the charge of "voluntarism" brought against him. But Khrushchev himself had come to power with a condemnation of the "miracle-worker," the creator of the "personality cult." Personality cult, voluntarism—these are synonyms for a policy based on belief in a miracle, in the search for a magic key. However, by its very nature the Soviet state cannot conduct any other policy. Having deposed Khrushchev, Brezhnev is now continuing the policy of "waiting for a miracle." In the 1960s the magic formula was the abbreviation "NTR"—*nauchno-tekhnicheskaya revolyutsiya*, the scientific-technological revolution. Computerization, the application of the American system of production management were to work the miracle—to modernize the economy without altering any part of its Soviet structure and to make it the most advanced in the world.

At the beginning of the 1970s it became clear that the scientific-technological revolution was a miracle fraught with danger: if the computer could solve all problems more correctly than the Politbureau, the Politbureau was superfluous. The "technocrats" too, the American-style managers, the specialists in their own field, had proved on closer examination to be dangerous people who reasoned in terms of the good of their cause, not the good of the Party. Reliance on the miracle of "scientific-technological revolution" was buried in the graveyard of all other miracles. A review of the two-volume edition of Leonid Brezhnev's speeches and reports, which appeared in *Izvestiya* on 21 August 1975, passed a death-sentence on the formula of "scientific-technological revolution":

> The speeches and reports of Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev make a valuable theoretical contribution, stressing the historical inevitability of the increasing role of the Communist Party in economic construction. Only the Party, armed with the teaching of Marxism-Leninism and its experience in political organization of the masses, is capable of determining the chief directions of social development.

And the Party chooses the direction of a new miracle: the monstrous

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development of the Soviet armed forces, which, by their very enormousness and unbelievable mass, are to force the capitalist world into further and further retreat. The Helsinki Conference was, for Brezhnev, a confirmation of the possibility of realizing this miracle, through the snare of *détente*.

When we imagine the future of East-West relations, we have to picture the relationship between a state living in the expectation of a miracle and somehow believing in its imminence, with other states living in the real world. We have to envisage relations between two quite dissimilar civilizations. The book *Sovetskiye lyudi* [*Soviet People*], published in Moscow in 1974 by the *Politizdat* publishing house, says that millions of years were required to create *Homo sapiens*, thinking man and his civilization. In the past 60 years,

> a new civilization has arisen . . . The name of that civilization is well known: the Soviet Union. It is the first realm on earth of freedom for the working man. It is the land of a new, superior type of thinking man—*Homo Sovieticus*.

The Soviet state is the only one in the world today to declare that it is peopled by a "new type of thinking man." We must therefore picture the future as one of the relationships between the old *Homo sapiens* and the new *Homo Sovieticus*, between a civilization with a history of thousands of years and one numbering 60 years.

The French historian Alain Besançon, in his *Short Treatise on Sovietology for Civilian, Military and Religious Authorities*, warns all students and would-be students of the Soviet Union that the most difficult thing is to believe in the incredible. What is incredible is the non-resemblance of the Soviet state to any other social structure, past or present.

In a story by the Soviet writer A. Chernousov entitled *Praktikant* [*The Apprentice*], a young specialist who dreams of the scientific-technological revolution asks the factory's chief engineer: "You know, of course, what an automated control system [ASU] is? Well, I assume you do . . . Then why don't you introduce one? In a single second an electronic computer will digest thousands of bits of information and come out with the optimum solution." "Look, stop pestering me with your ASU this and ASU that," said the chief engineer with annoyance, brushing Gena aside. "Take it from me, there's no ASU that can make allowances for some Ivanov or Petrov climbing over the factory wall tomorrow in working hours and popping into the shop for a bottle of port . . ."

It seems to me that, just as it is hard to use electronic computers in the Soviet Union, where the managers are afraid of them and the workers have no need of them, it is similarly difficult to use them to determine the future of a state that lives in hope of a miracle. A miracle that will permit it to bring happiness to the whole of mankind. As Arthur C. Clark has observed, the future today is no longer what it used to be.

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The Future of East-West Relations

Paul Hollander

FOR obvious reasons my comments will be limited to Soviet-American relations and particularly to the influence exerted by the internal characteristics of each society on its relations with the other and on its international policies in general. I will be looking at some of the social forces and processes which less obtrusively, more indirectly shape participation in international affairs. I will also try to envisage the future relations of these two countries (and by implication, the others grouped around them) by extrapolating from their respective domestic conditions. Most attention will be paid to some of the properties of American society today which encourage the global ascendancy of Soviet power and influence.

Let me start with a simple prediction. If "good" relations between the USSR and the US mean the avoidance of nuclear and conventional war accompanied by the maintenance of trade, cultural relations and scientific exchanges—then one might project continued "good" relations between East and West, or their major and most powerful representatives. Moreover, nothing precludes the indefinite continuation of such relations as long as the US is willing to get out of the way of the Soviet Union and will make sure to avoid confrontation. In other words Soviet-American relations will remain free of significant friction provided the US will continue to scale down its international commitments, redefine its national interests, rationalize the ascendancy of Soviet military power and influence, dismiss Soviet initiatives in various parts of the world as insignificant and even redefine what constitutes the expansion of Soviet power. All these processes are much in evidence. In short, as long as the contraction of American power and influence across the globe continues, Soviet-American relations will remain cordial; should the US attempt to arrest or reverse this process they will become clouded. Hence I foresee the continuation of *détente* accompanied by the shrinking of areas under American influence, that is to say, areas where some degree of political and cultural pluralism or political democracy can survive or might have a chance to develop. As a corollary I also foresee the continued rise of Soviet confidence and activism following on the heels of declining American confidence, assertiveness and involvement in international affairs.[1] A graphic,

[1] At the time of writing this it was reported that North Korean soldiers bludgeoned to death two American officers in the demilitarized zone. The American official response consisted of angry words deploring the incident. The US representative in the UN decided not to call a Security Council meeting "this time" and was content to make a report to the Council about the atrocity. Given the US response to the hijacking of the *Pueblo* it is hardly surprising that the North Koreans consider their violent provocations a risk-free activity.

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quantitative illustration of these inverse, but functionally related processes can be found in the growing number of Soviet military bases, port and airport facilities over the world, paralleled by the loss of similar facilities on the part of the US during the past decade. The contrasting trends are quite dramatic.

I am of course not prepared to predict what exact forms the coordinated process of increasing Soviet assertiveness and declining American one will take. It will presumably include further withdrawals of American military forces from various parts of the world (Thailand may be followed by the Philippines and South Korea); the growing reluctance of the US to aid pro-Western movements or regimes (as in Angola); and the corresponding, emboldened Soviet resolve to aid other movements and regimes, with or without the military forces of nations allied to the Soviet Union (as was the case with the use of Cuban troops in Angola). Soviet-East German pressure on Berlin may also revive and there have already been some signs of such a revival. One can also anticipate increasingly shrill and menacing Soviet rhetoric at times when the US might intervene to help pro-Western movements or regimes and feeble American responses even at the verbal level. It can also be expected that the Soviet Union will continue to take the initiative in the UN and various other international gatherings sponsoring or supporting hosts of anti-American resolutions, " exposing US imperialism " and reaping not inconsiderable propaganda benefits. It is also highly probable that the US will continue its policy of not presenting its case forcefully to either world or domestic public opinion. In particular American spokesmen will continue avoiding critical references to the Soviet Union in the interests of *détente*, a gesture that has gone unreciprocated for many years. Perhaps in the end former senator Fulbright's proposal to close down US-supported radio stations critical of the Soviet Union, without getting anything in return, will be accepted in order " to reduce international tension."

Assuming that my perception of growing Soviet assertiveness and declining American global influence is essentially correct (and could be supported by far more evidence and argument than produced above), the next step is to offer some explanation of these trends.

WHAT is it in American society today that creates pressures for the development of an isolationist foreign policy in general and the appeasement of the Soviet Union in particular? Why is it that American foreign policy-makers, politicians, intellectuals, businessmen and public opinion at large considered the Soviet Union far more threatening at a time (roughly between 1947–56) when it was a good deal weaker and in many ways more cautious than today? The multiple ramifications of American involvement and failure in Vietnam provide the most obvious and most frequently proposed answer to these questions. But Vietnam in itself, and without regard to other circumstances, cannot account for the phenomena being discussed here.

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I think the most fundamental reasons for the gradual American retreat from the international arena are to be found in the declining number of Americans (especially among those of various elite groups) who believe that the values and institutions of American society are worth defending or promoting in other parts of the world. This is what other authors have referred to as the crisis of confidence, failure of nerve, the malaise of the 1960s, the greening of American foreign policy, decadence or alienation. All the terms used add up to one thing: a highly unfavourable collective self-image held by a significant portion of Americans. Such collective self-images are highly consequential in international affairs. It matters a great deal when large numbers of people in any given society believe that their country has little to offer to the world, that it has few if any values, institutions or policies worthy of emulation or promotion or defence. A significant and vocal minority, mostly among the better-educated young, the intellectuals and academics in the humanities and social sciences, alongside some of the guilty rich genuinely believe that the US is a uniquely evil society. They welcome the advances of any country, movement or system made at the expense of American power or influence. This bitterly hostile minority may be small but it is not without influence. Its views have percolated far and wide and even if not totally accepted they have succeeded in neutralizing more favourable assessments of and attitudes towards American society.[2]

The negative attitudes towards American society sketched above are associated with a combination of individualism, hedonism and a self-conscious pursuit of "self-fulfilment." More specific expressions of these attitudes range from "consumerism" to preoccupation with mysticism, religious cults and various forms of psychotheraphy. Such concerns are obviously incompatible with any policy that may require some degree of deprivation or deferred gratification. There is an unwillingness to subordinate, to any degree, personal interests to any social or collective purpose, which could incapacitate a country both in the conduct of foreign affairs and domestic policies. Andrew Hacker remarked that "The inflation of 200 million egos . . . carries political consequences. A society so inordinately attached to personal pursuits cannot be expected to renounce them simply because social survival demands such an adjustment." [3]

A further explanation of current American attitudes toward international affairs can be found, somewhat paradoxically, in the level of security, which, despite all protestations to the contrary, most Americans have attained. A majority of Americans find it hard, if not totally impossible, to imagine that their ways of life could be threatened, or

[2] For example it has become virtually impossible on most American college campuses to make any favourable comment or assessment of American society without confronting scorn, scepticism or outright hostility. It may be noted here that although the activism and political protest of the 1960s is a thing of the past, student values and attitudes changed much less than behaviour.

[3] A. Hacker, *The End of the American Era* (1970), p. 143.

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significantly altered by political events and especially those which originate abroad. The idea that the actions of some foreign power in some distant part of the world might have some tangible effect on his life is as bizarre and inconceivable for the midwestern farmer as it is for the liberal East Coast academic or California drop-out. This profound sense of security has often been connected with the American historical experience which excluded foreign invasions, occupations, enemy bombardments or battles fought on American soil since the Civil War. Efficient police states and their impact on the lives of their citizens remain hazy abstractions for most Americans, particularly the Soviet Union and those modelled after it. I believe that neither the Cold War, nor its alleged end (with the attendant increase in information), has made much of a dent on this kind of deep gut-ignorance and incomprehension of the social-political arrangements which prevail in communist societies. It could of course be argued that the conduct of foreign policy has little to do with the level of information possessed by the citizens about the international setting and its major protagonists. After all few would argue that the Soviet public is well informed about the US or Western Europe and that Soviet foreign policy is anchored in a popular understanding of the Western world. For better or worse, public opinion in the US does have a considerable impact on foreign policy and therefore it matters what people believe, or know, or do not know.

High expectations directed at their own society also contribute to the trends outlined here. Many educated and idealistic Americans feel strongly that their country should retreat from the international arena until it has attained a much higher level of social justice at home and has solved its social problems. (This is what Nathan Glazer called the "clean hand argument" in a recent article.) For Americans of this persuasion any policy or action designed to uphold political democracy and the values associated with it in other parts of the world is totally hypocritical. Interestingly enough while these Americans expect a great deal of their own country, they are extremely tolerant of the vices of countries hostile toward their own, particularly if these countries claim to adhere to some form of socialism. Such attitudes range from benevolent neutrality, giving the benefit of doubt, to active sympathy toward the Soviet bloc countries and, even more so, of the Third World. Incipient distaste over political repression will be instantaneously neutralized by any professed intent on the part of these countries to eliminate social inequalities.

The remarkable fact is that the contributions made to the current state of American foreign policy stem from so many diverse sources and sectors of society. If much of what I have said so far applies primarily to a loosely defined left-liberal-intellectual-middle class contingent, Wall Street and its lackeys play a part of their own. Increasingly American businessmen and corporations are showing that they are willing and intent on doing business with anybody, any country

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or political system as long as a reasonable profit can be anticipated. If in the past such a disposition often led to the covert or open support of stable right-wing dictatorships which provided a favourable climate for investment, today identical attitudes emerge towards stable left-wing dictatorships which provide new and secure opportunities for trade and business. (The veritable romance of Mr Kendall of the Pepsi Corporation with the Soviet Union and Brezhnev in particular is a good example of this trend.) The alacrity with which Gulf Oil Company established good working relations with the pro-Cuban and pro-Soviet regime in Angola is another example. The devotion of the oil lobby to a wide range of anti-democratic Arab regimes is further indication of how business comes before politics and ideology. Marx was wrong: capitalists are not class-conscious, they are often politically illiterate. Lenin had a better idea conveyed in his famous remark about the willingness of capitalists to sell the rope . . .

A more vigorous foreign policy, a more perceptive assessment of Soviet motives and actions, is further hindered by the unfortunate circumstance that in recent American history much of the most vocal opposition to Soviet expansionism and Soviet-supported or inspired dictatorships has come from the less educated, less intelligent, domestically illiberal segments of the American population and political leadership. How could American liberals take seriously the Soviet threat, now or in the past, if by doing so they became the strange bedfellows of some of the most reactionary politicians or fundamentalist eccentrics of the political spectrum? The problem is not new but it persists tenaciously. If it was Richard Nixon who accused Alger Hiss, the latter must be innocent. If Senator Stennis of Mississippi pushes for a bigger military budget then the Soviet threat must be fake. In short it has been a disturbing aspect of recent American history and domestic politics that many of those who have taken the threat of Soviet global ascendancy the most seriously belong to the more unattractive elements of the political spectrum and leadership.

Could the elusive American national character have anything to do with the present problems and flaws of American foreign policy? I think it may, especially in combination with the other factors discussed above. Already de Tocqueville has observed how much Americans want to be loved, that they excel in the desire to please and to be popular, that they find disapproval unusually painful and hostility more difficult to face than many other nations and nationalities. Correspondingly it is most uncongenial for most Americans to believe that hostile attitudes between nations may be sustained for years or decades. They find it hard to live with such tensions and a strong desire builds up over time to redefine the situation. In foreign as in personal relations Americans try to convince themselves that if they do the right thing (e.g. trade exchange-scholars, refrain from criticizing the other party), sooner or later they will overcome unfriendliness. I never cease to be impressed by the extent to which Americans can be affected by both hostile and

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friendly gestures. Highly trained, competent academics no less than hard-nosed business executives are capable of believing that the key to Soviet conduct can be found in after dinner convivialities lubricated by drink and jokes, that those who smile cannot be threatening and that international conflicts can be ironed out through face-to-face communications and intimate personal contacts.[4] Correspondingly, many Americans are bewildered and pained by hostility (again, more so than people of other countries) and tend to search their souls for the reason why such sentiments are directed at them. Richard Pipes said most perceptively that "A strong residue of Protestant ethic causes Americans to regard all hostility to them as being at least in some measure brought about by their own faults . . . It is quite possible to exploit this tendency to self-accusation by setting into motion a steady barrage of hostile actions accompanied by expressions of hatred. The natural reaction of the victims, if they are Americans, can be and often is, bewilderment, followed by guilt. Thus is created an atmosphere conducive to concessions whose purpose is to propitiate the allegedly injured party." [5] To be sure, these attitudes coexist with many others which are often contradictory; nor am I suggesting that they are evenly distributed in the population. On the contrary they are concentrated among those who matter more: people with power, influence, education, access to the media and those who show a greater (if selective) concern toward public affairs.

I WOULD also like to say something about ways in which the attitudes described above are translated into political behaviour. Two major mechanisms serve this purpose: wishful thinking and projection. Wishful thinking regarding Soviet foreign (or, for that matter, domestic) policy has been with us for a long time. Its major theme is the denial of Soviet aggression when it occurs and the questioning of aggressive intent when it can be inferred from ideology or policy statement. For the wishful thinker Soviet statements are accepted at their face value when they convey benevolent intentions but they are disbelieved when belligerent. In the latter case they are viewed as "rhetoric" masking peaceful attitudes or dismissed as ideological window dressing proffered for the benefit of a few aged "diehards" left over from the Stalin era. It is understandable why so many American journalists, social scientists and politicians have been at such pains to deny or dispute the ideological underpinnings of Soviet policy. Should they be taken more seriously they would make a most significant contribution to the understanding and appreciation of Soviet expan-

[4] An entire organization is dedicated to this proposition: The Citizens Exchange Corps Inc. of New York which promotes such informal get-togethers between "ordinary" Soviet and American citizens in order to reduce international tension through personal understanding.

[5] Quoted in P. Hollander: *Soviet and American Society: A Comparison* (1973), p. 24.

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sionism—the very phenomenon the same groups wish to deny. The more serious Soviet leaders are about their ideology, the more menacing they become and the less they resemble that team of pragmatic-technocratic-managerial types wishful Americans have been trying to conjure up. Even a perception of the Soviet Union as merely obeying the dictates and dynamics of great power status and inexorably filling in the gaps left by another, retreating great power is more comforting than the image of a system propelled by any degree of Messianic urge, intent on spreading the true belief and the institutions supporting it.

Wishful thinking also means that in so far as Soviet expansionism is acknowledged it is viewed as limited in its objectives, capable of satisfaction (or appeasement) and a mere continuation of the age-old Russian quest for security.

Projection, closely related to wishful thinking, comes into play as Soviet leaders and policies are cast into shapes familiar to and deriving from the American experience. Thus they have their hardliners as we have ours; their military lobbies for a bigger slice of the pie just like ours; their leaders must be responsive to a public that demands more consumer goods and has no stomach for military adventures; their leaders no more believe in their ideological pronouncements than the average American politician making a 4 July speech; they are just as interested in the balance of power, global stability and status quo as we are.

ALTHOUGH I believe that the current global retreat of the US is more significantly determined by conditions existing in American than in Soviet society, I would also like to make a few comments about Soviet social-political conditions which facilitate the present global ascendancy of Soviet power. There are numerous aspects of the Soviet social order and Soviet-Russian political tradition which are helpful for the conduct of a vigorous, expansionist foreign policy.

To begin with, public opinion plays no part in the formulation or implementation or influencing of foreign policy. Fatalism, apathy, passivity and apolitical attitudes among the vast majority of Soviet people (in addition to the decision-making structures of the system) provide the leadership with a virtually free hand. Soviet people have been traditionally uninvolved in politics and especially foreign affairs which are totally removed from their purview. This well established pattern of non-participation (or pseudo-participation: "Soviet collective farmers fervently demand that the President of Sudan commute the death sentences of local communist party leaders accused of conspiracy...") increases the flexibility of Soviet foreign policy makers.

There is also an element of traditional patriotism which allows the Soviet masses to derive some satisfaction from the growing strength of their country that has hardly any counterpart today in the US. For large numbers of Soviet people the external successes of the regime help to legitimate its domestic policies and provide some compensation

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for the material deprivations experienced. If people in Cuba or Angola or Iraq seem to opt for "socialism" of some sort and allegedly look up to Soviet society for aid and inspiration, then the average Soviet citizen's acceptance of his political system is enhanced. Even the better educated must feel that "we are doing *something* right" if Soviet influence is waxing in so many parts of the world. Such global successes warm the sense of patriotism of Soviet people. Moreover they learn little about the costs of such policies. Thanks to the state monopoly of the means of mass communications and political information, few people have a clear conception of the economic drain resulting from the Soviet conduct of foreign policy (i.e. military and non-military aid programmes) and the magnitude of the resources devoured by the constantly modernizing Soviet military machine. Moreover it seems that the Soviet regime succeeded in convincing its people that all Soviet moves abroad are basically defensive. Nor is the Soviet public informed of attitudes toward the Soviet Union in parts of the world where official support is given to Soviet policies (East Europe in particular). And on the occasions when unwilling allies need to be coerced (viz. Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia) Soviet patriotism and insecurity can be invoked.

We shall doubtless never know the exact nature of the beliefs of Soviet leaders in their system, in Marxism-Leninism, in their historical mission. Yet it can hardly be denied that having expropriated a Messianic-millennial ideology they must find it easier to justify and maintain an assertive posture in international affairs. I suspect that increasingly Soviet leaders are beginning to take their ideology more seriously, especially those parts which prophesy the doom and decline of the capitalist world. There is a good deal in the behaviour of Americans (and Western Europeans too, for that matter) that begins to make the predictions of Marxism plausible.

TWO final points need to be made in concluding these gloomy reflections. My impressions of the moods and attitudes prevailing in American society are heavily coloured by the mass media and the academic setting. Neither should be taken as the source of representative or reliable information, or insight about the American condition today, although both are symptomatic of many social processes of the present. However, even distorted representations of American reality, such as the mass media often convey, have a certain self-fulfilling quality.

When allowance is made for the difficulties of speculating about such weighty matters in a limited space, I cannot help feeling that the reasons sketched above provide a regrettably firm basis for pessimism about the part played by the US in East-West relations. Nothing would please me more than to be proved wrong in regard to all major propositions and predictions I have made here.

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The Road Ahead: "Open" or "Closed"

Harold R. Isaacs

IT should be an embarrassment to ask, much less to try to answer a question about the future of what are still so ambiguously called "East-West" relations. Little that has happened in world politics has gone according to anyone's script. Indeed, many of the most critical events affecting the world power struggle in these years—e.g. in Chinese internal politics, Chinese-Russian relations, Soviet bloc relations, American politics—were never in anyone's script at all. Now even the measurable threat of nuclear collision between the super-powers may have to yield to the incalculable possibilities opened by nuclear proliferation. It is not at all unreasonable now to imagine that the next finger to pull a nuclear trigger will belong not to a super-tribal warrior but to some small-tribal warrior engaged in some murky struggle of his own for power, place, and primacy on his own little corner of the inter-continental turf.

BUT if the immediate future is to be shaped in some critical degree by what is past, the critical element, it seems to me, is what has become of our politics. The post second world war decades began with the collapse of the colonial empires and their replacement by new national regimes committed by their rhetoric and even in their new constitutions to liberty, equality, fraternity, and the pursuit of happiness. These ideas, taken whole from nineteenth century European libertarian traditions, provided most of the moral mobilizing force that in the end defeated nineteenth century European colonial rapacity. They may not have been readily re-digestible in the new settings and new circumstances but they did in most places give initial impetus and form to the creation of new democratic institutions. But unfortunately, if ever there was a chance that colonial tyranny could be replaced by anything resembling open politics, it withered early.

This was—in some partial but definite measure—due to the failure of the United States to act on its professions of principle. If there was a chance in the immediate aftermath of the second world war for the United States, then the dominant world power, to foster open politics in the new states of Asia and Africa, that chance was not taken. The United States did not support the nationalist movements when it was time to do so. When she finally came around to trying to bolster up some post-colonial client, the right moment had usually long since passed, the client turned out to be someone like Nguyen Van Thieu (as earlier in China it had been Chiang Kai-shek),

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and the governing American idea was that successful policy could rest on brute force alone. Thus eventually, Vietnam, and again just recently, the Ford-Kissinger offer of Angola as a new pit to fall into, an invitation which the American Congress and people fortunately did not accept. By this time, of course, in the Russian-Chinese-American grabs for influence in Africa or elsewhere in the post-colonial world, open politics, or even the promise of it, no longer has anything to do with the case.

If there ever was a chance that colonial nationalism in Asia and Africa could flower from its own roots and grow into democratic or even minimally open or humane political systems, that chance unfortunately flickered only most briefly and in a very few places. Such pretences as there were to open government in the post-colonial world faded quickly. The fragile shoots of democratic politics that did grow out of colonial soil in a few places, as in the Philippines or India, lived a somewhat longer but sickly life, withering and dying with hardly a struggle after barely 25 years.

In China there was never any pretence to anything open in the "freedom" that Mao brought with him to power. China's great mass was added to the vast, already-closed Communist systems in Russia and Eastern Europe; the profound fissures that subsequently opened within came out of deep-laid nationalist faults, not out of any of the differences between the Russian and Chinese styles of building gulag societies. Much as they differ, all but perhaps two dozen of the world's 150-odd states are now governed in greater or lesser degree by closed political systems of one kind or another, from total orders of control and mobilization, as in China, to ineffectual little satrapies maintained only by a bloody-handed palace guard, as in Uganda. Never have more "liberated" people become more subject to more tyrannies in the name of achieving more freedom, or in so short a period of time.

Alongside this outcome there is that other impressive paradox of these years: the more global the pressures of power, resources, and politics, the more fragmented all our politics have become. The breakdown of the old systems of power (which held diverse peoples in some controlled balance) has not only ushered in a period of multiplying national states in an age when some new and broader world system has become a condition for effective human survival; it has also loosed enormous centrifugal pressures of groups of people seeking in one way or another in virtually all societies on earth to reassert their separatenesses and regain some greater measure of control over their own distinctive existences. Along with this surge towards some more decent autonomy and the acceptance of identities that mark the differences among human groups goes, inescapably, the aggravation of conflict between and among them. There is just so much turf, physical, psychological, cultural, moral, and there are so many groups, and into each one's assertion of its own there is built-in not

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only its separation but its collision with others. Where this becomes a matter of competing for the political power thrown up for grabs by the breakdown of all the previously-governing power systems, the result is the outbreak—as of a plague—of the racial, tribal, religious, regional, linguistic, national conflicts that have taken somewhere between 10 and 20 million lives in all parts of the world in these same 30 years. These continue, amid bloody violence in some places or in the hardly less painful and costly simmering hostility and abrasive non-co-existence of competing groups in so many others.

ALONG with the "larger" facts of power and economics that govern world politics, these are the conditions and paradoxes that dominate the near foreground of what lies ahead. There is no way of blinking away any of the larger impinging questions: On what basis will surviving democratic systems in the North Atlantic region continue to survive in an overwhelmingly non-democratic and anti-democratic world pressing its own claims to inter-continental power even while it is itself torn by its own major and minor conflicts? What new pecking orders of power will emerge from the great fragmentation of politics in most of the world, or what new pluralisms? And somehow we must try to imagine these outcomes under still larger shadows that will not go away: the implicit threat of some nuclear final solution to our current power struggles, or the onset of new conquests by science to bedevil humankind still further, especially at the frontiers of biochemistry where approaching new knowledge promises to put in the hands of men of power who already control so many human lives the ultimate power to control life itself.

THIS is a matter of politics, and in the matter of politics we remain unhappily subject to high volatility of circumstance and a painfully low capacity for prediction. What is called "political science" not only has difficulty foreseeing what is to come; it has trouble enough describing what it is. And among historians, we continue to need scorecards to tell us who is playing what position in the great game of writing and revising our versions of what is past. We have been touching here on events of only the last 30 years. It is perhaps easy—easier for geologists and philosophers than for educators and students, not to say practitioners of politics—to say that three decades is but a drop in the great pool of time. But this drop of time has made quite a splash, enough to dampen, indeed to drown the hopes and dreams of several generations of people who have persisted in the effort to create a more humane human society. Last time around—also a matter of only a few decades—it took history's most destructive war to keep the Nazis and the Japanese generals from deciding what further direction world politics should take. No such "remedy" is now reasonably available. No other is in sight.

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In the United States where, I believe, the last best hopes of democratic survival still lie, professions of democracy continue to come under acute and aggravated question. It is not difficult to despair of the outcome. But despair is a geriatric condition. The United States has just had a bicentennial anniversary, which may qualify us at least by age for further lapses to come. The question is whether our national democratic ethos will finally succeed in imposing itself as fact on those forces and conditions in our society that would, if they could, keep it a fiction. It will take a better prophet than Khrushchev was to guess how it will come out. The fact is that American society *is* engaged in trying to see how—and if—it *can* integrate its society, to assure to *all* its members in fact the equality of status and opportunity which they have always theoretically enjoyed, and to see if government can in fact be of, by, and for all the people, assuring the free choice of those who elect and the accountability of those who are elected. This is what all the current hugger-mugger is about. The way the US deals with it and emerges from it will determine—among other things—the shape and strength of American influence in world affairs in coming decades. If a test of force can be deferred, it will be by the test of *this* politics that the future of the world will be decided.

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Birth Pangs of a New World Order

Morton A. Kaplan

SURVEY, one of the very few genuinely distinguished journals in the area of social science, has almost reached the quarter-century mark with its 100th issue. Throughout its history it has been concerned primarily with Eastern Europe and the relationship between East and West. This is a particularly auspicious time to re-examine relations between East and West, for we are in a state of transition the implications of which may be so radical that they are difficult to grasp. I do not, however, wish to imply that any particular transition is inevitable, for the shape that the future takes will be determined by the decisions that are made as we create it.

Although historians who write with hindsight 50 years from today may perceive their world as already formed in the womb of the present, there is in history no equivalent to the DNA information that uniquely determines the development of the fetus in an acceptable environment. If the political, economic, and social " forces " inherent in contemporary society constrain the shapes we may place upon the future, they do this by exclusion rather than by predetermination of a single outcome. Moreover, this process cannot be outlined even in terms of a single, if limited, set of alternatives. The set of alternatives is constantly changing as our actual decisions and reactions to events in the real world transform future potentialities by selection from among contemporary Potentialities. Yet the birth pangs are no less real than in the biological case. What is in doubt is whether the womb of the present will produce a monster, a still-birth, or a squalling but sturdy offspring.

THE leader of the Spanish Communist Party, Santiago Carillo, has called the 1976 Berlin meeting of the Communist parties the beginning of the Reformation in the Communist movement. Enrico Berlinguer, the leader of the Italian Communist Party, dismissed the very idea of a world Communist movement. Such a concept, he said, implied a structural continuity that the Italian Communist Party found unacceptable. The insistence by the Western Communist parties on a declaration which excluded official ideologies for their countries, if these parties came to power, and which recognized the legitimacy of party pluralism has implications that go far beyond those of the Reformation in Christianity. Luther's movement may have denied the infallibility of the Pope and his right to rule over the whole of Christendom. However, the disavowal of the legitimacy of an official ideology potentially undermines the ideological foundations of one-party regimes in Russia and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, and at least as important, it is the opening for undermining the very concept of scientific socialism.

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Although the churches that arose from the Reformation did not quickly move to religious pluralism in their own territories, the Western Communist parties have condensed the two phases of ideological liberalism in a continuous or permanent revolution. Whereas religious pluralism could be reconciled with the Protestant belief in the direct relationship between man and God, scientific socialism rests upon the belief in correct scientific prescriptions for the state of worldly political affairs. It insists upon the inseparability of theory and practice. The denial of the legitimacy of an official state ideology is *ipso facto* a denial of scientific socialism as a true prescription for man's fate. As this implication becomes more evident, the common elements that still exist in Christianity and that permit at least some attempts, however halting, towards ecumenicism will lose whatever force they still retain within the Communist movement.

In the meantime, while those common elements still retain some meaning, it will be possible to emphasize those aspects of Marxian doctrine that are part of the great Western humanistic tradition and, thereby, to influence both Western and Eastern Communist parties towards greater individual freedom. Indeed, because we do not fully understand those internal Soviet requirements that led Brezhnev into a meeting that had so many momentous and dangerous implications for Soviet relations with the Communist parties of Eastern and Western Europe as well as for its own internal regime, there may have been some elements in the Soviet leadership, even if in the minority, that perhaps do not find these implications entirely uncongenial.

These developments provide both opportunities and pitfalls for Western statecraft. However, although we can be aware of this in general, it is far from easy to determine exactly what the opportunities and pitfalls happen to be. One suspects that the leaderships of the various Western Communist parties themselves cannot be entirely sure of the implications of these developments. We do not know to what extent their future conduct will be influenced by Stalinist elements within the parties or by radical but competitive alternatives outside the parties. We do not know to what extent, if they come to power, their actions will be determined not so much by present intentions as by the situational alternatives with which they are confronted. For instance, suppose a Communist party in power in Italy were confronted with a massive flight of capital that threatened to produce economic chaos. Even if it originally favours pluralism, might not its attempt to stem the flow of capital produce levels of political resistance, including perhaps violence and conspiracies, that might induce it to adopt measures whose cumulative impact might move it in an authoritarian direction?

Obviously, what may happen in a situation of the prior kind depends upon the concrete elements of individual scenarios. We cannot begin to sketch these in advance, for even if counterfactually we could name the individual elements of the scenarios, their sequence and their differ-

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ential impact in particular cases would determine the concrete outcomes. We can be aware only that the future is not fixed and that our activities during the flux will determine particular outcomes.

Clearly the public pronouncements of Henry Kissinger and John Connally's sally into the Italian situation have been stupid, because even if their fears are valid, the means are counter-productive and the expression of the fears perhaps even self-fulfilling. However, it is easier to label particular interventions as stupid than to specify those postures that would represent genuine wisdom.

There are some things we can keep in mind with respect to changes in the situation of Western European Communist parties. It is not clear that we wish to encourage a break between the Italian Communist Party, for instance, and the CPs of Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union. First, such a break might well undermine the legitimacy of the present leadership of the party, forcing a split in the party or encouraging more radical alternatives. Secondly, such a split would weaken the leavening influence of the Italian party in Eastern Europe and even in the Soviet Union. In the third place, such a split would intensify the military disjunction between Eastern and Western Europe. However, if Italian Communists were in the government in responsible positions, their presence in occasional world or regional Communist meetings might begin to undermine the legitimacy of the Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe by providing a guarantee for the non-aggressive character of NATO as well as of its compatibility with socialism. The excessive Gaullism of the French party presents far more complex problems that we will not attempt to adumbrate here.

It also seems clear that we should not want events to move too fast. Whatever the panoply of reasons that produced the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, military reasons and pressures from the East Germans clearly played an important role. Particularly given the nationality problems within the Soviet Union, too rapid a dissolution of Soviet legitimacy within the Eastern bloc might imperil a peaceful evolution in the relations between Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. It might even trigger a violent military counter-response by the Soviet Union in the face of bloc or regime disaster. Although maintenance of a strong NATO is an important requirement in guarding against the low, although not insignificant, probability of a Soviet military threat, too rapid a dissolution of the Soviet regime in a way that is threatening to the leadership might produce a holocaust. Thus, as this process develops, we should continue to search for ways and means—although more in cooperation with our European partners than in the past—of cooperation with the Soviet Union on important issues that reduce direct threats to immediate Soviet interests.

Although it is essential to maintain a military position that is adequate in view of the massive Soviet armed posture, statesmanship will have overriding importance. Moreover, the statesmanship of the next 10 to 20 years will require a far more sophisticated understanding of national

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and global political and economic processes than has ever been the case in the past. We must be capable of recognizing opportunities as they arise, and sophisticated in utilizing them, which means maintaining enough self-control not to overexploit them. While utilizing opportunities that develop, we must always be concerned to find acceptable alternatives for the Soviet Union and its Eastern European associates.

We must develop a foreign policy that is so variegated functionally and geographically that our competitive interests with the Soviet Union are overshadowed by the multiplicity of positive programmes that engage their willing cooperation; or, where this is not possible, we should ignore the Soviet Union, but engage the cooperation of other nations whose cooperation is important for the Soviet Union. We must drop the fixed ideas that governed our behaviour in the past. We must be alert to the nuances of developing situations almost before they manifest themselves. Opportunities may fade very fast in the years ahead unless we can recognize them immediately and respond in an appropriate way. Fixed guidelines, even for a few years, are inappropriate for the international system phase that is in process. If we are lucky, one of the alternatives that may develop is a Europe, not from the Atlantic to the Urals, but from England to the Soviet borders, that provides Western Europe with enough spacial depth to minimize the Soviet military overhang. This may permit eventual American troop withdrawal, and, therefore, may relieve the Soviet Union of any residual fears of attack. But that is only one, and not necessarily the most likely, possibility. Many more could be sketched depending upon the specificity of concrete events in the intervening years.

Of course, East/West policy can never be considered entirely in isolation. We must avoid, in so far as is possible, sharp disequilibria in the international environment that threaten important national interests. The oil crisis of 1974 may have been only a mild harbinger of some of the possibilities that lie ahead. These can be provided for, but only if long-term governmental and intergovernmental planning provide the means. We do not yet have any significant policies in the areas of resources and resource substitutions through means of which appropriate transitions can be managed. Nor despite the meetings in Rambouillet and Puerto Rico have we yet found—and the finding will probably take years—the measures of economic coordination among the major OECD nations that will permit us to avoid excessively rapid major shifts in the values of their currencies: a condition that might very well produce an extremely competitive set of national economic policies which would interfere with the cooperative activities that are necessary if we are to maintain peace while providing for transitions in national systems consistent with Western humanistic values.

The " invisible hand " will not work in reaching these goals; for the measures that need to be taken, and the institutions that need to be built, are so massive that the capital is not available to individual companies; the time span is usually so long that consideration of them would

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be inordinately low in the list of priorities for individual concerns; and the decisions would be subject to defeat through the policies of particular nations if intergovernmental planning among the major OECD nations were not available to prevent it. Because these problems require long-term planning, if we do not begin to prepare for them now, it will be impossible to deal with them in any even semi-satisfactory way when solutions are required five or 10 years hence.

My last thought on this extremely important subject is that we are well past the period in the history of international politics in which cleverness, manipulation as a general technique, or the pursuit of narrow national interests, even though wrapped in noble rhetoric, can cope with the problems that are faced in today's world. Although I do not entirely discount the instrumental solution of particular problems, that technique should play only a minor role in the national complement of policies. The world has become so interdependent that unless our policies are governed by a comprehensive image—not a plan, for a plan would be far too constrictive—we will find that we have won individual battles at the expense of our most important institutions and values. Furthermore, unless we respond in the fashion I suggest, we shall lose those allies we have left and what little support remains among our national intelligentsia.

If we can project an image of the kind of world we wish to build, and of the values and institutions that will characterize it, we are more likely to be able to improvise policies that meet our genuine needs and to inspire support among those whose support we will need in carrying those policies out.

Let me further suggest that we should not make the mistake of formulating our programme with a view to instant support, for that is only another modality of the old manipulative technique. A high price will be paid if the formulation of policies is not really adapted towards ends that we can genuinely live with over the long run.

Although I will not dwell upon this or attempt to explain it, let me suggest that Henry Kissinger's recent shift of policy with respect to South Africa is just as manipulative as his original policy and that it will eventually entangle the United States in a morass. There are times when it is better to face immediate wrath than to concede to contemporary popular beliefs, for genuine policy is never a thing of the moment but a means for building a path to the future.

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Euro-Communism and East-West Relations

Arrigo Levi

THE newest factor in the complicated interplay of political and other developments between East and West is Euro-Communism. A collection of all the fundamental texts connected with Euro-Communism would have to include not only "national" documents, but also some international ones: the common statements of 1975 by the Italian and French, and by the Italian and Spanish Communist Parties; the Berlin conference communiqué, which was the product of years of wrangling between the "Euro-Communists" and Yugoslavs on one side, the pro-Soviet parties on the other—this was interesting not so much for what it said, but for what it left out, including the traditional formula ("proletarian internationalism") symbolizing communist parties' allegiance to Moscow.

But "domestic" documents, speeches, interviews, too, carry important international implications. In the case of the Italian Communist Party, a collection of texts (they would make a very thick book indeed), ought to include a growing number of excerpts from the "bourgeois" press. Of these, the Berlinguer interview with *Corriere della Sera* of 15 June was particularly interesting. In answer to a question whether he felt that the Atlantic Pact would be "a useful shield behind which to build socialism in freedom" he said:

> I do not want Italy to leave the Atlantic Alliance also for that reason, and not only because our departure would upset the international balance. I feel more secure where I am, but I also see that here, too, there are serious attempts to limit our autonomy.... Of course the Western system has fewer constraints.

Although *Unità* left out, in reprinting this interview, some of Berlinguer's more revealing admissions, it published, a few days later, the full text of a television interview by the Party leader, where practically the same point (that the West is safer than the East for Euro-Communists) was clearly made.

HOWEVER incomplete and diversified the new ideology and political strategy of "Euro-Communists" may be (in Italy, throughout 1976, the main subject for debate between the communists and the others was the concept of "pluralism," and the definition of what a communist democratic state might turn out to be: communists had obvious difficulties in explaining how Marxism and Leninism could be reconciled with "pluralism"). The fact that a challenge to the "Soviet model" is issued by Euro-Communists is

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undeniable. Italian and French communists still stick, they do at present, to the belief that the Soviet world is an example of "socialism" (though no longer their model—they keep being found guilty of "indifference" as to whether the values of pluralistic democracy are or are not essential to socialism: if they are essential in Italy, why not in Russia or Hungary?); in spite of their contradictions, they clearly feel that genuine, democratic socialism could better be built in the West, rather than in the East; under American protection, rather than under Brezhnev's iron law of "limited sovereignty." And they leave no doubts about their criticism of Soviet society, whose lack of democratic political and personal freedoms cannot for ever be explained as a "remainder of the past."

The Soviet leaders and ideologists are clearly upset by these views and policies. Might some of the "satellite" leaders be tempted to follow them? Are not the "Eurocommunists" providing a bad example, as well as potentially a rival international centre, further reducing the diminished "Soviet area" of communism? Would not a Western government which included communist ministers present as great a challenge to the stability of "Soviet Europe," as to the stability of "American Europe"? During the years 1975 and 1976 the Kremlin repeatedly looked as unhappy about the political progress of "Euro-Communists" in Latin Europe as did the White House. But are these fears (whose reality cannot be denied) justified?

ONE of America's top experts on Eastern European politics, a man responsible for the inspiration of many Kissinger policies in this area, as well as for some of their implementation, recently summed up this problem to me, in private conversation, as follows. People tell us (he said) that if the Euro-Communists became members of a government coalition, in Italy or elsewhere in the West, and if they were happily accepted by America and the rest of the West as bona fide democrats, this would greatly help the revisionist communist forces of Eastern Europe, lending strength to their efforts to achieve greater independence from the Soviet Union. Even some of the people from Eastern Europe directly involved in this matter—he went on—tell us that we must therefore accept and support Euro-Communism, for their sake. Now, while it is false that we, the USA, are so interested in keeping the "status quo" that we no longer want to support the more liberal and independent revisionist forces in Eastern Europe, we still do not believe that the progress of Euro-Communism would help those who work for peaceful and gradual change in the East. Why? The fact is that if some nation in the West, such as Italy, France or Spain, came to be ruled by "Eurocommunists," this would inevitably upset and weaken the Atlantic Alliance, and therefore upset and weaken that strategic balance of power, to which Signor Berlinguer himself attributes such a great importance, as the necessary pre-condition of *détente*. But with an

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unstable balance of power, without *détente*, and with a weaker West, you would certainly get a much more intolerant and domineering Soviet power: therefore, chances for greater independence of satellite nations in Eastern Europe would not increase but greatly diminish.

OTHERS point out that, in any case, Soviet Russia would see to it that any "political mobility" remained limited to the West. The Kremlin leaders would also surely attempt to regain control upon the Communist parties of the West, should these succeed in gaining the upper hand in their countries. Furthemore, the access to power of a communist party in the West could set in motion an unstoppable and disagreeable chain of events: the nation involved would suffer from increasing isolation from its former Western allies, capital and capitalists would flee, Western economic help might be reduced or cut; under such circumstances, even if unwillingly at first, a "Euro-Communist" government might find itself in the absolute need to turn to Russia and the East for support. Finally, one cannot foresee how Western communists, once in power, would react to a possible crisis of *détente*: would they come out in favour of the West, or would their deepest and oldest instincts prevail, pushing them in the direction of Moscow interests?

All this, to be sure, is hypothetical talk. It should suffice, however, to show how complicated the interplay would be between East and West should Messrs. Berlinguer and Marchais prove able to gain participation in government power, in Rome or Paris. One need only mention the further uncertainties certainly accompanying the political development of a post-Tito Yugoslavia in order to make the whole picture even more intricate, and any clear forecast surely impossible.

HISTORICAL experience so far has usually shown events in Eastern Europe playing a fundamental role in provoking change inside Western European communist parties, ever since the 20th congress, rather than the opposite. Even in the future it is to be expected that the potential crises of Soviet Europe will powerfully influence, in ways that cannot be foretold, the development of Euro-Communism (for instance: would Soviet interference in post-Tito Yugoslavia slow down or accelerate the potentially schismatic progress of Italian communism?)

What is new is the fact that, perhaps for the first time since Togliatti threw a stone into already troubled waters by proclaiming the slogan of "polycentrism," Western communism has been playing, and is bound to play even more in the future, an important political role which may have an influence upon what remains (in Europe, but also elsewhere) of the "Soviet camp": once monolithic and world wide, today surely neither of the two.

Of course, the stronger and more satisfying the definition of the

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new ideologies and policies of " Euro-Communism " becomes, the more they will represent a challenge to the Soviet Union, its dated ideology, its immobile policies. But again, it is the vitality of Western democracy, as developed by a great variety of political forces (liberal, Catholic, democratic, radical, social-democratic), as much as the many failures of Leninist communism, that has compelled Western communists to go through an agonizing reappraisal of their traditional ideas. We must conclude that if Western democrats really want to influence the Soviet world, challenging it in a direct and indirect way, they ought perhaps to pay less attention to " Euro-Communism " and more to their own policies, so that they can better meet and satisfy the ever-expanding demands for more equality, liberty and democratic participation, by contemporary society.

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Cold War and *Détente* In the 16th Century

Bernard Lewis

THE drawing of historical parallels has fallen into disrepute of late, partly no doubt as a result of some strikingly inept and widely disseminated recent examples. The working historian is accustomed to evidence which is fragmentary, unreliable, inconsistent and often contradictory, thus accurately reflecting the human condition. It is for this reason that history is one of the most valuable of educational and intellectual disciplines; for this reason too that historical statements are much more tentative, much more hypothetical than is normally expected in the comparativist social sciences. The historian knows that his materials are friable and unsafe, and he can only watch with wonderment and alarm as the model-building social scientists raise great structures of the bricks which he reluctantly supplies to them.

A common form of comparison involves the use of modern Western statements about non-modern or non-Western societies, thus, in effect, arguing in a circle. If, for example, we compare the Crusades with current events in the Middle East, and do so on the basis of a modern Western historian of the Crusades, then we are in fact not making a comparison between two sequences of events at different times, but between two modern views, one of the medieval, the other of the present-day Middle East, the first inevitably contaminated by the second. Such a comparison is of little value, since the similarities lie not in the events or situations, but in the eye of the observer.

Sometimes, however, it happens that an authentic contemporary document depicts a situation which suggests striking parallels with our own day. The comparison is often made between the confrontation of the free world and the Soviet Union at the present time, and the confrontation of Christendom and Islam, the Hapsburgs and the Ottomans, in the sixteenth century. Then as now, two different worlds, two different ideologies, two different ways of life stood face to face and contended for the mastery of the known world. There were times when it seemed that the centralized, disciplined power of the Turk was overwhelming and that Christian Europe, weak, divided and irresolute, was doomed. To complete the parallel, the Turk was hampered by the presence of another, rival Islamic power on his Eastern flank—the Shi'ite Empire of Persia, which prevented him from concentrating all his forces in the West and thus gave Europe a respite from destruction. All these points are graphically made in a letter dated 1 June 1560 and written in Istanbul by Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, the Hapsburg Ambassador to the Ottoman Court. Busbecq describes the patience, sobriety and strict discipline of the Turks and goes on to say:

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> How different are our soldiers, who on campaign despise ordinary food and expect dainty dishes . . . and elaborate meals. If these are not supplied, they mutiny and cause their own ruin; and even if they are supplied, they ruin themselves just the same. For each man is his own worst enemy and has no more deadly foe than his own intemperance which kills him if the enemy is slow to do so. I tremble when I think of what the future must bring when I compare the Turkish system with our own; one army must prevail and the other be destroyed, for certainly both cannot remain unscathed. On their side are the resources of a mighty empire, strength unimpaired, experience and practice in fighting, a veteran soldiery, habituation to victory, endurance of toil, unity, order, discipline, frugality, and watchfulness. On our side is public poverty, private luxury, impaired strength, broken spirit, lack of endurance and training; the soldiers are insubordinate, the officers avaricious; there is contempt for discipline; licence, recklessness, drunkenness, and debauchery are rife; and, worst of all, the enemy is accustomed to victory, and we to defeat. Can we doubt what the result will be? Persia alone interposes in our favour; for the enemy, as he hastens to attack, must keep an eye on this menace in his rear. But Persia is only delaying our fate; it cannot save us. When the Turks have settled with Persia, they will fly at our throats supported by the might of the whole East; how unprepared we are I dare not say! [1]

To Busbecq and his contemporaries it may well have seemed that Europe was doomed. Yet how wrong they were. Though the Ottoman power was still to survive for some time, it had already passed its peak. The Turks did not in fact settle with Persia but continued to fight wars against them until the eighteenth century, after which both Turkey and Persia ceased to pose a serious threat. The great age of the Eastern empires was past; the great age of Christian Europe was just beginning.

[1] Edward Seymour Forster (trans.), *The Turkish Letters of Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1927), pp. 111–12.

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The Long Strain of Coexistence

Richard Lowenthal

IN looking today at the state of East-West relations, the first thing that strikes me is the remarkable stability of each of the two systems confronting each other. For a long time now, there has been talk of "competitive decadence," and the evidence has certainly not been lacking—we have had growing gerontocratic rigidity in the Soviet Union, and multiplying crises, conflicts, scandals and general flabbiness in the Western world. Yet if one looks back at what has really changed after a period of time, what does it all amount to? The Soviet bloc has been held together, by military intervention of its leading power in some cases, by a certain degree of forbearance on the part of the same power in others, notably towards Rumania. There have been minor changes of economic organization but no major reforms, substantial failures followed by murmurs of discontent but no major upheavals—even the Polish troubles of last summer were certainly noteworthy but without major consequences as far as we can see.

Conversely, while Soviet military power has greatly increased over the last dozen years, American military power also shows an unbroken capacity for qualitative (and if need be quantitative) growth. Even during the presidential election campaign, the United States has emerged from its post-Vietnam and post-Watergate paralysis with a remarkable resurgence of plain democratic patriotism (and I *don't* mean demagogic chauvinism à la Reagan which is a marginal phenomenon). The economic recession is all but over in most of the industrially advanced democracies, and despite the break-up of the Bretton Woods system, it has been overcome without any state yielding to the temptation of beggar-my-neighbour policies for currency or trade; inflation is being brought under control even in Britain. The structure of NATO remains intact outside the Aegean trouble spot and not so far seriously harmed there, and despite all the prophets of gloom, the communists are not taking over Western Europe. On the contrary, the official abandonment of Leninist dogma by the Italian, Spanish, French and Japanese Communist Parties—the only mass Parties in the West apart from Finland—is impressive proof of the growing integrating effect the advanced democracies exert on the communist following, regardless of the much-debated sincerity of their leaders (which I regard as well-nigh certain in the Italian case, probable in the Spanish and Japanese and improbable in the French case).

My second observation: the counterpart of the remarkable stability of both blocs is that there is no evidence whatever of convergence of the systems, of "change by *rapprochement*." No doubt the Soviet

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system of government will change some time, as there is nothing unchangeable in this world, and the possible near-simultaneous retirement of the present gerontocracy may precipitate *some* change in the comparatively near future, but there is nothing to indicate its direction. The habit of coasting along at a low level of efficiency, except in the military sector, and a low level of dissatisfaction is well ingrained. As for the West, it has not become "ungovernable," and if it did, this would be more likely to lead to authoritarian than to pro-communist regimes: that realistic estimate is the basis for the remarkable moderation of the Italian communists.

My third observation is that the relation of these two blocs is, and is likely to remain, the unstable coexistence of two stable adversaries, characterized both by permanent rivalry and permanent negotiation. Recognition of their common interest in limiting the forms of their conflict for the sake of survival is by now long established, and the possibility of successfully settling specific issues that have become "ripe" has been proved since the beginning of *détente*. But that does not mean that the present regime of the Soviet Union could be lured into helping to build a stable world order: the rivalry natural between two super-powers is reinforced in its case by the ideological hostility to every different system which is institutionalized as part of the legitimation of Leninist party rule. They will continue to take advantage of their opponents' weaknesses wherever they can do so without serious risk in areas not covered by high-level agreement, as they did in Angola, and so, one hopes, will the United States, as they did in Egypt.

My fourth remark is that this continuing East-West conflict has by no means been superseded by what is called the North-South conflict, but is being greatly modified by the latter's growing importance and by other forms of the diffusion of power in the world—beginning, of course, with the Sino-Soviet break. While it is on the cards that post-Mao China may one day take up the standing Soviet offer of a normalization of relations with Moscow, this would hardly go beyond what is now regarded as "normal" in Soviet-American relations: no conceivable Chinese regime could afford to "restore Communist unity," i.e. abandon the crowning achievement of Chinese independence as a factor in world affairs. More generally, the emergence of a collective self-consciousness of the less developed "Southern" nations in the last dozen years means that while the East-West rivalry for spheres of influence in those countries continues, the range of possible success has become more limited for both sides. The "Southern" countries have, with eager Soviet encouragement, generally turned away from Western models of democracy and mostly also from "free enterprise," but few of them have effectively turned to Soviet models. The Soviets have been negatively successful in turning a number of former Western spheres of influence into contested areas, but have had little

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positive success in establishing secure spheres of their own, even in areas of their greatest effort like the Middle East. It is in those contested areas that East-West rivalry will above all continue—as will East-West negotiations from time to time.

In conclusion, East-West relations seem to me not to be moving towards a dénouement either by gradual reconciliation or by sudden catastrophe, but to be set for continuing the long strain of antagonistic coexistence.

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Peking–Washington–Moscow—A New Shape to the Triangle?

Roderick MacFarquhar

IT is a sobering thought that Leonid Brezhnev is now the most experienced statesman to be found among the major countries of the world. But there is consolation too. While the arteries of the Soviet leadership harden, in America and China there is the certainty of change and the prospect of movement.

Of course the options are not great. The replacement of leaders does not alter the basic facts of international relations. Nevertheless, the end of the Watergate presidencies and the purge of the Shanghai Mafia do offer some room for manoeuvre in Washington and Peking.

The stakes are high. The Sino-Soviet dispute has been the fundamental element in the big league during the past 15 years. Now that Mao is dead and his ideological Praetorian guard has been dismissed, the dispute can no longer be taken happily for granted in the West. Mao's obsession with revolutionary degeneration and his personal certainty of the rightness of his own vision have died with him. His successors may also distrust the Soviet Union; but they are unlikely to possess the self-confidence and conviction with which he pursued his crusade against Soviet revisionism. The advantages of accommodation with Moscow could well seem tempting to the Chinese: a secure frontier and far greater diplomatic flexibility. Peking might replace Washington as the fulcrum of the Sino-Russo-American relationship. And in the Third World, China could continue to adopt the role of champion without engendering the suspicions of those countries friendly to Russia. Above all, the danger of an encirclement that seemed to worry the Chinese in the early 1970s, when the Russians signed their treaty with the Indians and entertained hopes of wooing the Japanese, would be dispelled.

There would be no need and no likelihood of a return to the Sino-Soviet friendship of the 1950s. But a *modus vivendi* could remove a substantial worry from the minds of the emerging generation of Chinese leaders and enable them to concentrate on economic development.

For the Russians, such an accommodation would do something to recoup the great defeat that the Sino-Soviet split represented. The shattered image of the united and multiplying army of world revolutionaries marching in step towards relentless victory cannot be restored. But if at least a vague sense of oecumenical unity could be conferred upon the communist movement once more, it would add greatly to the prestige of the Soviet Union and give its leaders greater leverage in their dealings with the United States.

For these reasons, the new American president will probably seek ways of preventing all but the most limited Sino-Soviet *rapprochement*

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from taking place. He has two major weapons at his disposal, technology and recognition. Already the debate has begun in America as to whether or not advanced military technology should be imparted to the Chinese. Whatever the decision, it is problematic whether even important sales would be effective in binding China to America. Indeed, it might be highly embarrassing to the new Chinese leadership to accept military technology from the imperialist superpower with Mao barely cold in his grave.

The diplomatic weapon could be far more effective: a switch of recognition from Taipei to Peking followed by an invitation to Chairman Hua to visit America. Such a move would enhance Mr Hua's prestige by providing him with a victory that eluded Mao and Chou, and it could thus give him a personal stake in the American connexion. But for a deal to be concluded, Hua would need to be strong enough to assure Washington in some way that there would be no attempt to take over Taiwan by force. Neither the new President, with his election commitment to an "independent" Taiwan, nor the American people would easily stomach reneging on an ally in a manner that would devalue American treaty commitments throughout the world.

Whether or not the new Chinese chairman can and will agree to an appropriate arrangement, what is certainly true is that of the three men—Brezhnev, Hua and Carter—it is the latter as a new but fully legitimated leader who has the greatest freedom of action. But he will need to act fast if he is to reap the maximum advantage.

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East-West Relations Within the Communist Movement

Neil McInnes

THE question of East-West relations, in exactly the sense that *Survey* has dealt with them since its foundation, henceforth is posed *within* the communist movement. The Communist Parties that claim to have established their autonomy vis-à-vis Moscow now must find a foreign policy, an over-all attitude to the Soviet bloc. They must make the transition from the ideological and organizational problems of their relations with Moscow to the foreign-policy problems of relations between the free, pluralist societies (to which they claim to adhere from now on) and the communist world seen as something alien.

Some of them have not been slow to grasp this point. Enrico Berlinguer, leader of the Italian Communist Party, said during the campaign for the 20 June elections that, now that it was free of Moscow's domination, the PCI favoured Italy staying in NATO not just for the *conservative* reason he later gave at the East Berlin conference of CPs (no sudden or unilateral change in the balance of power in Europe) but for the substantive reason that only under Western protection could "democratic communism" be built. Actually, Berlinguer did not say baldly that NATO's military might would be needed to save him from Dubcek's fate, supposing he ever led an Italian government, but the gist of his answers to the *Corriere della Sera* (15 June 1976) and on television on the same date was that "Italy's right to decide its destiny freely" was, for all the difficulties, better guaranteed inside NATO.

Santiago Carrillo, leader of the Spanish Communist Party, quickly rallied to this view. As recently as a year ago, the PCE was opposed to Spain joining the Western military alliance, even after it had agreed that the US should retain its bases in Spain. But in August 1976 Carrillo told C. L. Sulzberger (*International Herald Tribune*, 7–8 August) that Spain should apply for membership of NATO, provided of course that "NATO doesn't veto communist participation in our government." He added: "I think my attitude is identical with that of Italy's Berlinguer."

The question (which, for my part, I consider vain) of the "sincerity" of western communists in their break with Moscow should be disposed of by these remarks. It is, after all, an enormity for a communist leader to suggest that his country should join an anti-Soviet alliance (that being the way communists see NATO), especially when he couples the proposal with the observation, "Only when the Russians get their installations out of Czechoslovakia, for example, should the United States get its out of Spain." What makes these views obnoxious in Moscow is not only the implied distrust of Soviet intentions but the

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coincidence that this is precisely what Peking is urging upon West Europeans. At least two of the western Communist Parties have thus not merely taken up pro-NATO attitudes but pro-Chinese ones. The fact that the French Party has not yet done so only reinforces the import of the other Parties' pronouncements: if Berlinguer and Carrillo are kidding, why do the words stick in Marchais's throat? Actually, the PCF's views on NATO, which have been fluid and inconsistent for some time, are evolving rapidly, and since this is one of the points at issue in the proposed renegotiation of the Common Programme of the Left, the communists are presumably saving up further concessions until they get to the bargaining table with the socialists.

It has often been said that the autonomous behaviour and liberal airs of the western Parties will oblige Moscow to tighten its grip over East Europe, for fear of contagion. Actually, there will be no need for Moscow to act, because the local authorities in the satellites have already perceived the danger. The new doctrines of the western communists (and it makes literally no difference whatsoever whether they are sincerely held, as long as they are publicly advanced) threaten the legitimacy not only of Soviet rule but of the rule of the East European Communist Parties in general. The recent behaviour of Bucharest is instructive in this respect. Rumania has long been the leader of the Parties refractory to Moscow's domination, and it provided, as only a national government can, aid and comfort to all the west European parties, especially those that had no secure home base, such as the Spanish and Greek (Interior) Parties. Yet Bucharest began a reconciliation with Moscow this summer when, having wrested the recognition of its independence, it noticed that the western Parties were going too far, by dropping the dictatorship of the proletariat, listing the civil liberties that should be retained under communism and carrying their attacks on proletarian internationalism to unseemly lengths.

Looked at from the point of view of the western Parties, this change of climate in Bucharest also signifies the transition from ideology to foreign policy: the ideological allies of yesterday suddenly turn cold when their own rule is endangered, thus obliging western communists to consider the eastern bloc as a whole, as something alien. That is why, within the space of a few weeks, the PCI recalled the illegitimacy of the present government of Czechoslovakia, warned Warsaw against oppression after the summer food-price riots and protested against the shooting of an Italian (a communist, as it happened) at an East German border crossing. This is a process that can only continue and gather momentum—not because it is an automatic mechanism but because the domestic allies and critics of the communists will insist that they be consistent in their attacks on East European tyranny, and thereby force them into deeper and deeper water. The Soviet bloc may be relied upon to provide an endless series of occasions for such attacks, for its repressive nature has not changed.

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Opinions may fairly differ about how far the Communists are capable of carrying their new reflection upon East-West relations and, in particular, on whether it is consistent with being a communist to perceive that the Soviet Union is a threat to the independence of west European nations. What cannot be denied is that the biggest western parties have started thinking about this subject now that they have taken off the blinkers of proletarian internationalism (i.e. subservience to Moscow in every detail). The problem henceforth is how they can be encouraged (or pushed) into working out a realistic foreign policy based on a factual (not ideological) estimate of East-West relations.

The most powerful incentive will, no doubt, continue to be the criticism of their compatriots, i.e. what they call "anti-communism," which was singled out for unanimous denunciation at the East Berlin meeting in June. If the Communists have evolved, it has been because of local political pressures; and maintenance of those pressures, notably when backed and informed by the sort of material *Survey* has made available for decades past, is the best hope of continued evolution. Another important force has been the growing communist hope of participating in western governments, for nothing is so sobering as the prospect of actually exercising power. (On that score, it has not been sufficiently noted how Alvaro Cunhal, at the East Berlin meeting, shed his image of Moscow's faithful stooge and sided decisively with the Italians, Spaniards and French. Carrillo has said Cunhal is slow to learn, but he *does* learn.) It follows that an outright refusal to tolerate communists in western governments, at any time and under any circumstances, would be a sure way of arresting their development and thrusting them back to the unrealistic ideological attitudes of the days when they never seriously aspired to office.

That is not to say that anything should be done to help them nearer power in the hope that they will thereby become more reasonable (though it is to say that the Spanish Party should be legalized). It implies simply that as long as their compatriots ask them to take seriously the problems of maintaining national independence in the shadow of the Soviet Union's enormous and arbitrary power, then the communists must be allowed to take seriously the prospect of winning office whenever they can convince enough voters they have grasped the realities of East-West relations, in addition to accepting the democratic system.

One hears much of the dangers that this course entails, and one would not wish to dismiss them lightly. It would indeed be dangerous for a western democracy to have even the most reformed and "revisionist" communist party in its government; supposing it went quietly when the electors dismissed it soon after, its absurd economic policies and its propensity to "colonize" ministries with its placemen would have a ruinous cost. Still, the dangers are not all on one side. Participation in democratic politics would prove lethal to the Leninist party structure in the long run. And the sight of a western communist party playing

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according to the rules of parliamentary democracy and remaining in an anti-Soviet alliance would be gravely inconvenient for the present rulers of the Soviet Union and East Europe. Everyone, then, will be taking risks as the communists continue their march through western institutions, but it is these latter that are most soundly based and widely cherished, and thus should have least to fear.

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The Future of East-West Relations

Donald G. MacRae

BLANQUI, who knew as much about how to make a revolution as any man of his century—and a great deal more than Marx or Engels—was no phrase-maker, but one saying of his is memorably gnomic: "Who has iron has bread." It is an assertion of power as against wealth and it can be read as something typically French and extreme, an assertion of will and force in line with the theories of a Sorel, of a Clémenceau and, come to that, of a Foch. Or it can be read as a counter-Marxist declaration, an assertion of the primacy of the political over the economic in the shaping of human affairs. Now no single formula of primacy in the flux of affairs can ever be true, but on the whole, Blanqui seems to me to have been right: Marx and Engels wrong. Nothing seems more clearly to illustrate this than the history of the USSR and of East-West relations. And it is the primacy of the political which I believe will still continue to dominate East-West relations, as in the past.

But power and politics are themselves summary names for the operation of the factors that direct human action. They include the planning of the most sophisticated chiefs of staff and the most apparently evanescent of ideological items, and no matrix has been developed in which they can all be integrated and analysed. (In principle I do not think that such a goal is attainable, but that is another matter.) The USSR 20 years ago could be subsumed under the headings of an ideology, an organization, a mission, an empire, an economy, all of which taken together were a politicized reality of force, fear and conspiracy. There had been no society of any scale in which the primacy of the political was so ruthlessly and extensively imposed so that all were guilty before its demands. But society is never stable: all social equilibria are maintained by adjustment and are subject to shifts of balance and of direction. In the USSR and East Europe political generations are very long, but even there they do not last for ever. In the nature of things the ruling elite of Russia must alter, even if it is unlikely to happen by the time these words appear in print.

Take the question of ideology; today we find that the received wisdom of most students of communism is that the attitude towards Marxism of most citizens and practically all officials and intellectuals in the Soviet imperium is one of the most profound cynicism. I suspect that there are more true believers than this view suggests, but in a way that is less important than the fact that even if there is a universal reign of pragmatic cynicism, yet it takes place within a thought-world, and is about a thought-world, which is that of Marxism in its received

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form. There is the well-known story of the Ulsterman who declared himself an atheist: it did not save him from the realities of life in Belfast. What, his neighbours demanded, kind of atheist was he? A Protestant or a Catholic atheist? Similarly a Marxist cynic is very different from a liberal sceptic. Much ideological profession must be merely ritual observance, but the habit and limitation of such observance is itself a force directing mind and action.

Yet let us assume that ideology is in decline; then certain things will follow. Some are obvious and threatening enough, like the strengthening of primitive nationalism and xenophobia. Others may prove equally important, such as the likely rise of essentially Marxist heresies within the Eastern bloc, and it is not impossible that we will see also a revival, perhaps in heterodox forms, of religion within the system. (I return later to Marxist heresy as a factor in East-West relations.) What I am saying is that in the forseeable future ideology *may* be a diminishing factor in East-West relations but it will not become a negligible one, if only because it provides for even the most cynical a rhetoric and a frame of reference which cannot but influence their initiatives and responses. In dealing with new generations of the political elite shaped by the experiences of the 1950s and 1960s in the West will no doubt find these people slightly more polymorphous/perverse in their attitudes, perhaps even more nationalistic, but still as shaped by ideology as was Khrushchev—and Khrushchev was only comprehensible if one began by accepting his Marxist primitivism.

Within the Bolshevik ideology there has always been a sense of world mission and this has been, as observers have never failed to note, congruent with old and profound elements of Russian culture. Of course this mission has not been, nor always will be, uniformly and relentlessly pursued. If one believes that time is on one's side then, of course, one can always play a waiting game. Nevertheless the mission remains and where is a power-vacuum, where there is instability, there the mission can be pursued. And of course instabilities will continue and so will areas of uncertain domination. We see this today in Africa and the Indian Ocean. We conceivably may see it before the decade is out in Western Europe. What is striking is that in so much of the world, not just in the more backward areas, this sense of society as mission is accepted as legitimate and as unthreatening by so many indigenous peoples. It is quite true that Russia is no longer thought of as Utopia on earth, yet Russian communism is still thought of as liberating and transforming, on the "wave of the future." The facts of oppression are discounted and this discounting gives a dynamic to anti-Western forces everywhere. Given our knowledge of the history of the Russian polity and empire this is one of the most astonishing facts of our world, explicable only if one remembers that so much of political aspiration is not for the right to be free but for the right to tyrannize.

There seems to be no obvious opening for the West to counteract

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the legitimacy which greets so much Soviet interventionism, and the West is further weakened by historic guilts which, oddly enough, the USA has done much to reinforce by its long vision of itself as a basically guiltless state in a wicked world and as the friend of "progress" —a concept, alas, now debased, ambivalent and unexamined. If one regards the East-West situation as essentially one of contest (a simplification not without reason, given that such is the attitude of the East) then at least it is high time for the West to regard its acts with a greater measure of cool accountancy and less prejudice, less unexamined ideological acceptance.

Here one factor will perhaps become of importance. The fate of the Iberian Peninsula and of Greece is not merely intrinsically important and strategically vital. If it can be shown that authoritarianism can yield to representative government and the rule of law, then the aid expended on this ought to produce returns far greater than even the local advantages. There is no obvious technique for lobsters to get out of lobster-pots, except by external help. Western interventionism in such endeavours is not likely to be countered by a worsening of East-West relations unless, as I do not think improbable, a new more militant Soviet elite emerges. But if that should happen, then worsening relations are anyhow inevitable.

The central questions that then arise concern the West and the role of the Communist parties in Western Europe. Here I do not believe that any just assessment can yet be made. The idea of Communist parties in power, as tolerant of the institutional being of their rivals, as being open to dismissal from power, as tolerating reversible change, is not completely a novelty. (Both the British and American parties in the days of Browder and Pollit advocated such positions and that much of their tiny constituency accepted such professions as real seems indisputable.) Nevertheless the new line, particularly in Italy, raises questions essential to East-West relations. Europe is still the great prize for the communist cause. But does anyone in the West—perhaps even in the USSR itself—really understand the varieties and relative autonomies of international communist organization? Elementary though the point is, the divide in the world in terms of freedom—not of power—is between systems wherein political associations are tolerant of each other and those where they are not. But in terms of power the situation is different. To gain power in Western Europe opens vertiginous and even frightening possibilities to Russia, but would it not also consolidate that hold on the satellite empire which has been so tenacious and, at so little cost save in human evil, so advantageous?

Also affecting the balance of relations is the fate of social democracy, a fate concerning which one could write many alternative "scenarios," and indeed a separate article. My view is that European social democracy even in neutral Sweden is overwhelmingly on balance likely to oppose the dynamics of Soviet power save in one most essential field, that of defence provision. But in saying that I assume a kind

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of ideological stability in the West, and about that assumption I may well be wrong. Oddly enough the loosening of the grip of Stalinist primitivism after 1953 strengthened the ideology and ultimately the mission of the Soviet imperium. Forces latent in Marxism and the revolutionary tradition, romantic, primitivist, populist, now had freer play. Being left became orthodox; Marx ceased to be merely a Prophet and became an accepted reference for social, economic and political thought; the cause of justice in an unjust world was associated with the cause of the revolution; the judgment of history and virtue were confounded. Now this has had but little effect—none perhaps—in Russia, and only a small overt power in the East European empire. But it has resulted in West Europe in the generations now coming to power of a "Marxistizing" set of assumptions, not least in the social democratic parties, in a fear of "enemies to the left," and in a new respect for the USSR. I cannot but fear these effects: those with other values will welcome them.

In all this I have not mentioned *détente*. One reason for this is the existence of the admirable discussions edited by G. Urban [1] which leave little to say. Another reason is simple incredulity. No serious Communist regime can admit the freedoms of mind and body which are the core of normal intercourse in the West. Such relations with the East might strengthen the West—and be bought cheaply at the price of having a few more spies, agents and propagandists about. But the over-politicized polities of the East cannot bear such relations: the ideology as much as the bureaucracy of the East forms an iron cage. It may rust. It might be broken. Its inmates and makers are meantime caught like the man in the old Slav story of the smith who made his own fetters.

All of which must seem banal enough; a mere assertion that predominant trends will rule East-West relations and yet will change if only for the reason that everything changes. So far I have had a good "track record" in assuming such things, and through not being betrayed into hopes of radical change in 1956, 1968 or 1975. Banality has paid off. Within the limitations of my belief that there will be no armed Sino-Soviet conflict and that the policies of the United States will fluctuate in detail but stand in mass (and be unready to cosset foes rather than friends), I have nothing more to say that would not take me into the areas of technology, economic deployment and, above all, intellectual life: all these are elements in the relations of power, but in some measure demand other analytical modes. We are, on both sides of the East-West divide, most likely to have to continue to live with the politics of vigilance and to accept that, just as motorists must tolerate traffic jams, the internal impasse of the Soviet system will continue in the foreseeable future and that with it a basic continuity in East-West relations will also persist.

[1] George Urban (ed.), *Détente* (London, 1976).

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The Future of East-West Relations

Klaus Mehnert

IT is difficult enough to describe the present state of East–West relations, not to mention their future. But let us try. (By East I mean here the Soviet empire in Eurasia, including its East European dependencies—prior to President Ford's strange definition in his second TV duel with Jimmy Carter—and excluding China; by West the European countries outside the Soviet empire, together with the USA and Japan.) There are five points that I should like to make.

1. East and West differ in many respects, but especially in their dealings with foreign relations. In the East a small monopolist leadership, located in Moscow, shapes foreign policy and tells an almost completely silent public what to think about it; in the West foreign affairs are carried out in nearly complete openness, in the glare of TV lamps and under the constant scrutiny and admonition of the media, the public and the allies. In this respect, I see no reason to expect any change in either the East or the West.

2. In the East little attention is being paid by Moscow to the views of dependent governments or "fraternal parties." Yet the Kremlin has become slightly more aware of allies' wishes, as it had to—because of their restiveness, so obvious at the recent Communist summit in East Berlin. This trend is likely to become more pronounced as time goes on and the national Party leaders listen—in their own interest—to the national aspirations of their peoples. In the West efforts are under way most of the time to coordinate America's foreign policy views with those of its allies. This is, unfortunately, more difficult today than it was 10 or 15 years ago.

3. In the East, foreign policy is: power in the service of an ideology which still proclaims to have all the right prescriptions for the ills of our time and which, for this reason, wants to change the status quo in the world (while preserving it by all means at home!). The West, all eloquence during election campaigns notwithstanding, has no comparable ideology and directs its efforts mainly towards the preservation of the status quo in the world (while experimenting wildly and rather haphazardly in many other respects).

4. The attractiveness of the East's official ideology, Soviet communism, is at a low ebb. The elections in West Germany and in the USA have demonstrated how minute the ranks of its adherents are. In Italy the CP is forced to proclaim its distance from and its criticism of Soviet Communism to win new voters and to keep the old ones. The New Left of the sixties, truly a world revolt, if not a world revolution, detested the Kremlin as much as it hated Wall Street. Respect for Soviet com-

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munism could increase only if it became more open and more modern. But Soviet leaders are far too timid for this. Such openness, they are convinced, would destroy the cohesion of their world-wide power net. There are no indications that Brezhnev (or the little Brezhnevs to follow him) will overcome these fears. In the West, the ideology, such as it is, and the political situation are changing constantly, but without any clear direction; Western pluralistic society produces no comprehensible alternatives (which explains the many close elections in recent years in one country after another). Among the alternatives offered, the Soviet model is one of the least attractive.

5. In the East, the population is unhappy about its small share in the national product, the lion's share still going to armaments and heavy industry. In Poland the limits of popular patience have been reached. But in the Soviet " camp " as a whole no serious rebellions are to be expected; the military-industrial complex will continue to grow faster than the output of consumer goods. In the West, the reluctance against military expenses is just as great and the chances to express such feelings far greater. Yet the necessity to preserve the " balance of terror " between the two sides is understood by the leaders and it will be kept up, especially by constantly increased quality. The areas where tests of arms are likely lie outside the territories discussed here, mainly in the East and in Africa.

IN looking at these facts and trends, I find no indications for substantial changes in East–West relations. Compared to the last ten years, the prognosis for the coming ten years is: The same, only more so.

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On Soviet Policy and Intentions

Alec Nove

THESE lines are being written in the immediate aftermath of a refusal of a visa by the Soviet authorities. I am therefore not in a very kindly mood vis-à-vis the said authorities. None the less, I remain uneasy when reading the sayings of Leo Labedz, Richard Pipes and others such about *détente*. Let me explain why, and in the process perhaps clarify my own thoughts.

First of all, I do not *know* what Soviet objectives are. It is surely pointless to deduce them from published statements, whether by Lenin or Brezhnev, and this for two reasons: there are certain ideologically "compulsory" declarations which they feel compelled to make, which may or may not mean that they set much real store by them, and, more important, the term "objective" or "aim" is operationally meaningless. One has to know the weight attached to this objective or aim as compared with others, the price they are prepared to pay, the risks they are prepared to take.

Secondly, I am influenced by the nonsense that certainly was written at the height of the Cold War, both about Soviet intentions and Soviet strength, especially the latter. In modern weapons and the means of delivering them the United States was *very* far superior, from 1945 until the late sixties. This is now universally acknowledged. Why, then, were we told of imminent menace, missile gaps and the rest? Stalin, Malenkov and Khrushchev must have been sorely puzzled, as they knew how far behind they were. It is, of course, possible that the Soviets successfully concealed their weakness, that we did not know the extent of it. None the less, we were misled.

This makes me cautious in interpreting the undoubtedly large Soviet military build-up of the last 10 years. Opinions seem to differ, ranging from Lord Chalfont's acute alarm to the much calmer views of his successor at *The Times*. After the Cuban débâcle the Soviet Union's military planners appear to have aimed at parity with the United States plus something in hand for China. Both sides are hard at work on R & D. The American cruise missile has been hailed as a breakthrough. Whether it is balanced by a Soviet superiority in numbers of submarines or weight of ICBMs I have no means of knowing.

Of course the possession of more weapons, a bigger fleet, provides new opportunities. There was Angola. But there was also the fiasco in Egypt, there were setbacks in other Arab countries. There is a stronger relationship with India, but the challenge of China is felt in many Asian and African countries, and hopes of a takeover by Cunhal in Portugal have been disappointed. The Soviet position in Eastern Europe is by no means secure, as recent events in Poland demonstrate.

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True, Poland is firmly locked in the Warsaw pact structure, but her disaffected population is more of a liability than an asset. If I were Brezhnev, I would not rely much on Rumanian or Czech troops either. I find it difficult to see the basis of the deep pessimism of such as Solzhenitsyn. Some Soviet manoeuvres have succeeded, others have failed. They win friends and influence people sometimes, run into hostility also.

Ah, someone will say, look at Western disarray. Yes indeed, a very important point. I am indeed greatly alarmed. But how little this has to do with Soviet actions, and how much with our own internal troubles! Britain is a case in point. Our communists do some limited damage, but the basic causes of our crisis have very little to do with them. Nor have the essential remedies anything much to do with the size of our armed forces. It is possible to argue that the *moderation* of the French and Italian Communist Parties is an important contribution to stability in their countries. It is surely clear that the Soviet leadership views *independent* communists with ill-concealed dismay, even if on occasion they can contribute to confusion in the Western ranks. As for the far left-wing revolutionaries in the West, they do not even bother to conceal their hostility to the USSR. Just as the Soviet Union is China's main enemy, and Peking never tires of advising visiting Western statesmen to strengthen NATO.

So where does this leave us? Firstly, facing the evident duty of preventing our own internal unassisted disintegration. Secondly, while a deterrent is evidently necessary, we ought to ask ourselves questions about the rationality or insanity of an arms race when every citizen can be killed ten times over already. When does insurance become overinsurance? *Why* should the other side take serious risks? History, they believe (or say they believe), is on their side. True, they are still expansionist, in the sense that they will pick up unguarded pieces. *Kazak beryot chto plokho lezhit*, the Cossack takes what is badly put away. The door should be kept locked. But we have greatly overreacted in the past. It may not be necessary to suspend a bomb over the burglar's house for 24 hours a day to prevent him from entering your house, especially as he has plenty of problems of his own (and large potential riches on his own property).

My scepticism about the Labedz–Pipes posture is *not* based upon any starry-eyed vision of a Soviet society peacefully evolving towards democracy. The party-state machine is very strongly entrenched, and resists any challenge from its own people. The leadership does not wish to risk international conflict. *Détente* is, for them, a way of getting recognition for their status as a world power and for their rights to the existing boundaries in Europe. I do not think that the policy ever had a *primarily* economic motivation, but technology, credits, grain, are very welcome to Brezhnev. I have never understood the parrot-cry: "*détente* is a one-way street." Why? If they *pay* for their imports, it

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is a two-way street. The idea that they are able to extract more advantage from trade than we can hardly bears examination (there certainly was a "great grain robbery" in 1972, but they are not usually so clever. One has only to read their own sharp criticisms of the foreign-trade bureaucracy). Some arguments raised in this connexion are almost comic: thus there are the surplus space-suits which the Soviets bought for much less than they cost the Americans to produce and develop. This is said to give them a disproportionate benefit. Really? Has anyone heard of selling off surplus stocks cheaply? Or of marginal cost pricing? And when the *Soviets* sell below cost, we accuse them of dumping, i.e. damaging us.

There is a good case for limiting credits to the USSR, because they have now incurred very large debts to the West. (Indeed, the Soviets themselves must be concerned about the magnitude of their indebtedness.) There is a good case for carefully and suspiciously examining their military effort, and an overwhelming case for remedying the many internal ills from which the West is suffering. This does not justify either Solzhenitsyn-style panic or pleas for a (to me rather meaningless) rejection of *détente*. What is the alternative? Detonation?

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East-West Economic Competition

John Pinder

IN the 1960s, the economies in both East and West performed fairly well. An impartial umpire, examining the statistics of production growth, would have to declare the result of the economic competition a draw. In the 1970s there is still no winner emerging. But both, now, are performing badly. The Soviet economy is limping into a period of decelerating growth. The West is maintaining high unemployment while it tries to master its inflation.

This makes the economic equilibrium between the two less stable than before. The creeping ailment of either could reach a sudden crisis; or either could regain its health long before the other. In each case one side would secure a clear economic advantage that could influence, perhaps decisively, their political relationship. They could, equally, prolong the draw by both reaching crisis or cure at much the same time. But the prospect of an important shift in the economic balance is a good deal less remote than before.

There is no lack of superficial explanations for the difficulties in which each side is floundering: in the East, the weather; in the West, the money supply and the sheikhs. But the causes also lie deeper, in the fundamental dilemma of modern economic management. The modern economy is so complex that each part of it can be understood only by the manager on the spot; decentralization is therefore essential. Yet production and labour markets are now so specialized and organized that managers and unions wield decisive market power; and the various markets are so interdependent that shocks in one sector are transmitted rapidly throughout the economy. Thus centralized control is also essential. Nobody has yet found the way to balance these opposing requirements of centralization and decentralization.

THE Soviet Union certainly has not. For some time its growth has been slow for a country at that stage of development. The new five-year plan projects a deceleration; and the outcome will probably be slower still. Since Stalin died there have been recurrent proposals to lighten the heavy hand of central directive planning, and some piecemeal attempts at reform. But little impression has been made on the cumbersome centralized structure. Managers remain constricted by a remote control which is bound to be insensitive to the particular needs of each technology and market. The Soviet leaders have stopped short of any real economic reform because they fear that economic decentralization would weaken their political control.

Other East European countries have shown that reforms giving

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more freedom for managers and scope for market mechanisms can regenerate their economies, at least for a time. Soviet leaders bold enough to do the same might transform the prospects for the Soviet economy. But this does not fit their contemporary bureaucratic style. More likely, on present form, is a vicious circle of slow growth leading to more dissatisfaction, heavier repression, tighter economic control and yet slower growth. If other East Europeans continue to perform better, this will place increasing strain on Comecon.

SO far from "burying" the United States, then, the Soviet economy is slowly burying itself. If the West were still prospering as it did during the Khrushchev period, this would be ironic enough. But to double the irony, the West has been obligingly burying itself too. Unemployment is high and growth is slow in almost every country, and expected to remain so for the rest of this decade. To attribute this to the monetary mistakes of a few years ago, causing and abetted by the quadrupling of the price of oil, is unconvincing. If it is just loose money that turns on the inflationary tap, why can tight money not turn it off without five years of unemployment and stagnation? It is by now pretty clear that even if the money markets and commodity shocks provide an initial impulse, it is the wage push of powerful unions combined with the price push of oligopolistic firms that maintain the inflationary pressure at a pitch where such restrictive demand management is required for so many years to keep inflation down.

It is not, with hindsight, surprising that the cost-push/price-push spiral has come to dominate our economies. With the interlocking complexity and high capital intensity of modern production, too many groups of workers are in a position to cause too much damage if they stop work; and with the continued narrowing of specialization and enlargement of the scale of production, too many firms have the market power to pass cost increases on to the consumer, even if they refrain from giving prices their own autonomous push. The control of global demand which is the basic system of western economic management has to squeeze harder and harder against the growing pressure from this Galbraithian market power.

If the great "stagflation" of the 1970s does indeed have these structural causes, there is no reason to expect that the 1980s will be better than the 1970s, unless methods of economic management are reformed so as to control the market power. On the contrary, with the continued development of specialization, interdependence and social organization, the 1980s are likely to be worse. We face the prospect of two-figure inflation or two-figure unemployment percentages, or both, unless we can develop a new economic management to master the new economy.

The classical economists provided the key. Where monopolists can fix a price, they must be controlled by the public power. But modern economists and politicians have lacked the strength to unlock the

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door. Economists jib at the moral and mental effort of reconstructing their model of the economy on the basis of oligopoly and market power, so they offer little intellectual support to the politicians; and the politicians have been unable to overcome the opposition of enterprises as well as unions to the constraint of permanent price and income controls. West Germany has had most success, based on the voluntary restraint of unions with direct experience of hyper-inflation. But even there, employment and growth are likely to remain low; and other Western countries will fare still worse until they establish price and income controls at the centre of their economic management.

TECHNICALLY, the way through the economic dilemma of both East and West may not appear too difficult. In the East, the Soviet Union could earn at least a reprieve from economic failure by doing what the Hungarians and Poles have done. In the West, the accumulated experience of official price or income control in a number of countries including Britain, France, the Netherlands and the United States, and of voluntary union restraint in Sweden and Western Germany, offers a technical basis if there is a political will. Yet the East Europeans still have a long distance to go before their economies become as advanced and complex as those in the West, and they are likely to find economic realities pressing hard in the direction of further decentralization on the way; while the western experiences of price and income controls have been piecemeal and mostly short-lived, so that the problem of exerting enough control to maintain stability, while avoiding the inflexible centralization that is dragging the Soviet economy down, has never been faced. The advanced industrial economy is a new and complicated piece of machinery, and we should not be surprised if its regulation presents difficulties for which there are no ready-made solutions. These difficulties will continue to compound the political obstacles that oppose the necessary reforms.

The political obstacle in the Soviet Union is obvious and understandable. The history of Russia as a whole and of the Bolsheviks in particular has instilled in the Soviet leaders a deep fear for the stability of their system if they allow any relaxation of control. So their resistance to economic decentralization, even of the limited varieties undertaken by their East European neighbours, is very deeply entrenched.

In the West, the necessary centralization also touches political nerve centres. Private enterprise is clearly affected, and in some countries, such as the United States, its resistance will be particularly strong. Trade unions tend to see wage controls as threatening their *raison d'être*. Adequate systems of price and income control can hardly be established without far-reaching changes of economic ideology (beyond neo-classical liberalism) and of political relationships

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(a permanent social contract). The political obstacles must not be underestimated. The West does have the advantage of a variety of methods and attitudes in half a dozen countries each big enough to set the pace by the success of its own reforms; and of the capacity for innovation that political freedom allows. But only if the aptitude for political innovation is translated into effective economic reform can the West get the better of the economic competition between the two systems.

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Prospects for East-West Relations

Richard Pipes

I AM afraid I can see no reason why the tension between the Communist bloc and the democratic world should attenuate in the years immediately ahead. A basic precondition for a meaningful improvement in East-West relations would be the acceptance by the Communist regimes and parties of the concept of a stable world order; this would have, as a consequence, the reduction of disagreements to a level where diplomacy and other traditional methods of "crisis management" could do their work. There is no evidence that the Communists are either able or willing to accept such an order. They are not able because to accept stability would mean giving up the expansionist drive to which they are committed by the inherent poverty and inefficiency of their economic systems. They are not willing because without the artificially created spectre of a "capitalist" threat they would have no justification for the economic exploitation and political repression of their citizens on which the privileged position of the Communist elites depends.

Paradoxically, the principal stabilizing factor in the super-power rivalry is the fear of nuclear war. If it were not for the apprehension that conventional war can easily get out of hand and transform itself into an all-out nuclear one, it is most probable that NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries would have locked in combat long ago. The Soviet generals seem very militant and they are certainly actively preparing to fight and to win a nuclear war; but fortunately Soviet politicians appear more sensible, preferring to use more indirect methods to achieve their aims.

It is a commonplace that the Western countries are in a condition of crisis, and that their political and economic systems as well as their system of values are under strong stress. But the Communist world is also experiencing a crisis, perhaps even of greater dimensions. The chronic inability of the Communist economy to produce efficiently is a source of constant trouble both in relations between the governments and their people and in their military build-ups. There is no remedy short of introducing the market system and meaningful incentives, and this remedy, for obvious reasons, cannot be taken. Political dissent, often accompanied by nationalism, is rife. The ideology of Communism has lost all meaning (in Communist countries, at any rate). The only way out of these crises afflicting the Eastern world is expansion and here lies a source of unending dangers.

Ultimately, I believe, the issue will be resolved (unless there is general war) by the inner vitality of the two rival systems; or, to put it in other words, by which system will disintegrate from its internal pressures first. The West should not have any difficulty winning this contest if it finds the self-confidence and the will which survival requires.

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Reflections on East-West Relations

Robert A. Scalapino

OURS is an age of negotiations. They take place at many levels and among many parties on the global stage—allies, "neutrals" and erstwhile antagonists. Protracted in time, intensive in nature, complex in the issues around which they revolve, these negotiations constitute the main thrust of international politics in the late twentieth century. Through them, new institutions are beginning to emerge, together with new agreements seeking to govern behaviour at the international level.

It is easy to overrate the achievements thus far. At best, the results have been partial and tentative. Moreover, one can advance the argument that in important East-West negotiations, "progress" has often been the product of significant Western concessions unmatched by the communist side. It is the West, for example, that has abandoned most efforts to liberate people from political systems that in Western eyes are repressive. The communists continue to pledge full support to *their* liberation programmes, and, not infrequently, accompany such pledges with action. It is the West that has replaced policies based upon military superiority with those accepting military parity—but without evidence that even parity is acceptable to the communist side. The major concessions involving divided states have also been made thus far by the West, some of them far-reaching.

In response to such criticisms, supporters of recent policies have followed two lines of argument. On the one hand, they have asserted that Western concessions have been less extensive and less unilateral than is charged. On the other hand, they have insisted that the concessions, desirable or otherwise, merely represent an acknowledgement of existing realities or trends long underway. When post-1945 Western policies were first enunciated, the United States was in a position of supreme, unchallengeable power. Hence, a Pax Americana could in considerable measure be effected, or at least enunciated. Inevitably, however, this unnatural situation was changed, and appropriate adjustments became essential.

No consensus has been reached on the fundamental issues surrounding this debate, but the pendulum in recent times has swung in the direction of caution and greater firmness. In the United States, President Ford has even sought to exorcize the word "détente" from the political vocabulary. Yet few are prepared to assert that the negotiation process can or should be abandoned. Thus, the critical issues now relate to the principles that should underwrite that process.

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ONE theme currently enjoys wide support: "negotiations from strength." It is now generally accepted in Western circles that in relations with the communists, nothing will come easily or without a *quid pro quo*. Also widely acknowledged is the fact that in both values and institutions, the gulf separating the democratic and communist systems remains very wide. Changes in the communist world are taking place, and some of them may be of signal importance to world politics in the course of the coming decades. However, the earlier optimism that a convergence between democracy and communism was *en route*, with the assumption that this involved, among other things, a substantial liberalization of the Soviet system was at best premature, and quite possibly mistaken. Thus, from now on, a reduction of threat rather than mutual trust will form the basis for most agreements reached, and this involves issues of strength and weakness.

The concept of negotiation from strength, however, is not one easily defined. Obviously, a portion of national strength must lie in the military realm. Weapons must be abreast of the extraordinary developments in technology now underway, flexible enough to meet a wide range of contingencies, and adequate in size and distribution to impress those whom one wishes to impress.

It is not easy to achieve correct and timely decisions on these matters, as the American record of the last 30 years so clearly indicates. However, it may be easier to make up deficiencies and correct errors in this field than in some others. As the recent action of the US Congress in passing a strong defence budget has indicated, when a concrete threat in the form of rising Soviet military power is perceived, the response can be swift.

BUT strength must also be derived from a nation's economic and political systems, and from the international environment. Here, some of the current problems seem less tractable. First, let us briefly note the strengths. The mixed economy that has evolved in politically open societies has some remarkable achievements to its credit. On balance, the United States and most other societies of this category have demonstrated sustained productivity and creativeness. Moreover, these traits extend to all branches of the economy, encompassing agriculture as well as industry. For example, America's food production, as is now commonly recognized, is destined to be a vital factor in world politics for the foreseeable future. But one can cite the productive gains of a number of other nations operating under comparable economic systems, among them various West European states, Japan, and more recently, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore.

To be sure, as this list suggests, cultural as well as economic factors are involved. Nor are the results from such societies uniformly favourable. In comparison with the strongly collectivist enonomic systems,

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however, especially when they reach a secondary stage of development and beyond, the mixed economy appears superior.

Now, however, an impressive range of problems must be faced. Some illustrate the close interaction between politics and economics. The increasing demand for greater egalitarianism is one example. What economic treatment should be extended to the marginal elements within a society? How is the work ethic to be sustained? Does statism threaten to overwhelm the private sector, even in the mixed economy? Can inflation be controlled, particularly in the light of unresolved issues relating to resources? How are North-South differences to be resolved, and what final decisions will be reached regarding maritime resources? These are but a few of the concerns which illustrate the acute need for new and revised economic procedures and institutions in the international arena. Economic nationalism has proved to be a persistent force.

THE economic health of the democracies, and particularly of the United States, constitutes a vital component in any assessment of strength. No less important, however, are factors in the political realm. Democracy depends upon an intricate balance between authority-with-restraint and freedom-with-responsibility. Yet each of these requirements has been placed in jeopardy in recent times, and in a fashion both reciprocal and paradoxical.

On the one hand, the power of government has reached new heights, advanced by a wide range of factors. Paradoxically, however, the area of freedom has also grown enormously. Our resources (material and intellectual), our mobility and our rights have all been advanced to an unprecedented degree. In some respects, we in the United States and in comparable societies are on the frontiers of total freedom.

If the purpose of government is to liberate the human spirit and allow each individual to achieve his maximum potential, very considerable progress has been achieved by the modern democratic society. But increasingly, that degree of societal consensus and discipline essential to political stability and even survival appears threatened. The struggle for power within democratic states has never been waged more vigorously. And when big business, big labour and big media contest with government for authority, they not infrequently win. The government, to be sure, strikes back, seeking to curb what it regards as private excesses and to manage the dissemination of information, often advancing excesses of its own. In a time of enormous state power, however, it is supremely ironic that many governments in the democratic world struggle desperately to preserve that quotient of authority necessary to govern.

Governments abuse power and citizens abuse freedom, and in these mutual abuses, which are interactive and accelerating, lie the crises that currently affect democracy everywhere. In the midst of crisis, moreover, it has been extremely difficult to articulate a democratic

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ideology suitable to this era—a cosmic, interrelated set of ideas that guide values and actions, unifying the people of a free society. Yet the widespread search for a set of beliefs, a political faith, especially among younger generations, serves as a clear indication that the need for ideology has not ceased.

Understandably, these problems have given rise to uncertainties regarding the capacities of modern democracies to compete with authoritarianism, and they bear directly upon the issue of negotiations through strength. These questions set forth the doubts: Can a society like the United States exhibit that degree of consensus that enables its leaders to speak with an authoritative voice at the bargaining table? Does the contemporary democratic system provide the necessary discipline and patience allowing its negotiators to hold to a given position for an indefinite period of time if required by principles or interests? In a complex era, can leaders translate complexity into meaningful terms for a citizenry having real power, enabling them both to scrutinize and support, as the occasion demands?

IN pondering these questions, one glimpses the handicaps that have plagued the more open societies as they have pursued negotiations in recent years. What of the future? No miracles are in sight. Taking the United States as an example, it will not be easy to produce a firm consensus regarding American duties and rights in a highly diverse, extremely unstable world, and in the absence of a clearly perceived external threat. The problem is made more difficult because Americans must now cope with their special revolution, the massive, rolling changes of the past half-century that have affected every citizen in a most profound manner. Under these circumstances, the balance between domestic and international priorities becomes exceedingly difficult to establish and maintain. Yet it is precisely the general foreign policies of the United States that will either contribute to, or subtract from its position vis-à-vis the major communist nations.

Here, a reasonably firm prediction is possible. Despite the yearnings and temptations, the United States will not return to the type of isolationism historically associated with it. American involvement in the world is too great and the world itself is now too small to permit withdrawal. More possible is an experiment with enclavism, namely, a policy that concentrates commitments, especially strategic commitments, on the " advanced industrial nations." Such a policy is currently in vogue in certain quarters both because it reduces American responsibilities and relates them to societies of a similar type (Japan and West Europe). Sooner or later, however, it will be discovered that this policy, if applied rigorously, will not work, partly because it ignores the strategic linkages essential to those nations. To assume, for example, that the United States can limit its commitments in Asia essentially to Japan is to ignore the degree to which Japanese security, as well as Japan's economic and political health, are related to a broader

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strategic-political equilibrium in the Pacific-Asian region. In increasing measure in recent months, Japanese spokesmen have been reminding Americans of that fact.

Thus, the United States will remain committed to policies of internationalism, albeit a selective internationalism and one that puts an increased premium upon the contributions of others. Commitments will be determined in accordance with three criteria: *strategic importance*, either directly or as an important element of a larger unit; *viability*—a capacity for survival; and *compatibility*—having values and institutions with which the United States can feel comfortable. Commitments will not hinge upon 100 per cent compliance, but these are the criteria that will be weighed.

In these respects, the "emerging" states will constitute a serious problem in many instances. Few will be truly viable. Some will exist in almost perpetual crisis. Most will continue to tilt away from political openness, affecting adversely the maintenance of any global political equilibrium supportive of democratic values. Only small pockets of political openness are likely to exist in Asia, Africa and Latin America for the near future at least This will not necessarily accrue to the advantage of the communists, particularly the Soviet Union, since most of these states will display a high degree of opportunism and few sustained political principles. The advanced industrial societies, and particularly the large ones, will be convenient targets, however, and the level of abuse directed towards them will be high.

Regarding this problem, US attitudes and policies are *en route* to a change. Abuse will no longer remain unanswered. Nor will it come cheaply. American approval of Ambassador Moynihan's responses to critics in the United Nations was overwhelming, and constitutes a probable guide to the future. With the era of self-depreciation coming to a close, most Americans are in no mood to take lightly polemic attacks upon the United States from the Amins of this world. Nor are they prepared to give assistance in exchange for further attacks.

Almost certainly, the bulk of US aid will be conditional both upon the capacities and the attitudes of the recipient, and in most instances, upon multilateral arrangements involving the contributions of other nations as well. While sympathetic attention will be given North-South issues and some initiatives will be advanced, the age of American largess is over. So is the era of successful blackmail when a nation could obtain US support by threatening to go to the Russians. (Only the Chinese communists might be able to play this game—but even here, the outcome is by no means clear.) A new American nationalism is becoming apparent—one that does not deny international responsibilities but that also insists upon American rights and which will demand a monitoring of the behaviour of others towards the United States.

In this connexion, a major task confronts Washington and the

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American people. Distinctions in attitudes and policies must be made between those states that are quasi-open, having some evolutionary potential as well as an importance to the global equilibrium, and those that are firmly committed to dictatorship, the destruction of democratic values, and association with the coalition of forces dedicated to these ends. This means that states like South Korea, Singapore, the Congo (Kinshasa) and Egypt—to mention only a few—should not be put in the same category as North Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia and Guinea. Curiously, the critical necessity of making this distinction seems particularly difficult for a portion of the American intellectual community to accept.

IT is symbolic of the new nationalist trend and of the deep desire to move towards a greater unity, that the American people today are seeking a strong leader. To be sure, elements of ambivalence and paradox are built into this quest. Few individuals or groups want a leader who will adversely affect *their* special privileges. But the longing for a President who is at once trustworthy, firm and capable of articulating American positions at home and abroad runs deep. Max Weber was only partly correct when, in a brilliant insight, he perceived that political modernization consisted of the movement from charismatic leadership to a routinized bureaucratism. In times of crises, *all* societies seek leaders with qualities that can be labelled charismatic.

Sooner or later, this quest will be successful. A " strong " leader will not resolve the problems outlined earlier in any complete or final fashion. Institutions change slowly, and behaviour patterns are altered in a fundamental fashion only as broader social changes permit and encourage this. Nevertheless, a strong leader can affect national self-confidence, trust in government, and in considerable measure, therefore, unity. Compared to the recent past, the psychological dimensions of American strength are likely to increase.

As indicated earlier, however, the nature of the threat as well as how to cope with it will remain complex, and hence subject to disagreement. The age of monolithic communism is over. Cleavages and diversity within the communist world will continue for the foreseeable future. Indeed, these may well increase. Should communism in the West extend its power still further, it will probably create additional problems for Moscow. But can solace be taken from that fact? Granting certain major advantages to the democracies from the nationalist, pluralist quotient that now dominates international communism, and particularly, the importance of the Sino-Soviet split, this new condition also presents substantial disadvantages. If communism in nationalist cloak advances in support without abandoning its fundamentally authoritarian character, has the democratic world gained?[1] If communist divisions demand more complex, differentiated

[1] Whether communism in such countries as Italy, France and Japan can shed authoritarianism and remain communist seems doubtful, recent pledges notwithstanding.

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policies on the part of non-communist societies, can such policies be successfully devised and then explained in a fashion that garners support, not merely confusion from the citizenry?

The latter question contains the central dilemma of today. Is it to be equidistance, a consistent tilt, or even a strategic alliance? With each of the major communist countries, for example, the United States—while the leading representative of the democratic world—has certain interests in common at present. Between Russia and America, such common interests include the desire to avoid nuclear war, the unwillingness to be played off against each other for the benefit of a third party, and the need to husband limited resources in a global strategy, hence, the necessity of placing lower priorities on some regions and issues. Similarly, among the common interests between China and the United States are those of containing Soviet power, preventing a direct confrontation between Peking and Washington, and for these reasons, possibly agreeing upon some equilibrium in the Pacific-Asian region, at least for the short run.

CONFRONTED with these realities, what course will American policy pursue? Recently, some Americans have advocated a sustained tilt towards China on the score that one must combine with the weaker opponent against the stronger. A few individuals even envisage a *de facto* alliance among China, Japan and the United States aimed at containing the Soviet Union. Such a policy shows a limited grasp of realities. It would threaten the real advantages which the United States has gained from its central position between Russia and China, without compensating advantages. All agreements with the Soviet Union would become more difficult, since Soviet reaction to any such development would be sharp. The impact upon Asia, especially upon non-communist Asia—including Japan—would be enormous, and generally adverse to the interests of the United States, and to the cause of political openness.

The American interest, and that of many other nations as well, lies in a stance of determining policies on an issue-by-issue basis, taking into consideration the impact of decisions upon our allies and ourselves. These decisions, moreover, should be based upon the principles of reciprocity and accountability. Reciprocity requires that there be an equity of concession and a balance of commitment. There must be no more unilateral, unmatched concessions by the democracies. Accountability means not only that each agreement must be carefully monitored to check adherance, but that the actions of a given nation in one international situation will be taken into consideration in the course of negotiations on other matters.

It is not merely that these principles *should* be pursued by the United States and other democracies in their relations with the communist states. It is that they *must* be pursued if coexistence is to remain viable,

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and hence, one can predict with some assurance that they will become stronger elements in East-West relations. Similarly, because any predictable, sustained tilt or *de facto* alliance with one major communist state against another is not in the interest of the United States or other states, it will not become a part of American policy. The policies of independence of action and non-alignment with any part of the communist world will be preserved, albeit with the recognition that equidistance in a rigid, mechanical fashion is neither possible nor desirable.

This probable future is neither risk-free nor likely to be played out in some dramatic, heroic fashion. Communist-democratic relations above all will be characterized by tedious, wearisome negotiations over every detail; by firmness and counterfirmness; and by periodic crises testing the fragile fabric of ties that have been constructed. The danger to the democracies will be less a nuclear war, and more the threat of erosion through a successful communist nibbling process, and one made the more threatening because it is not coordinated.

The democratic realist should perhaps be roughly balanced between pessimism and optimism at present. The weaknesses of the open and quasi-open societies have been noted together with the fact that most of these weaknesses will continue. The fact that current trends are generally running against freedom and democratic institutions on the global front has also been acknowledged. But the strengths of the modern democracies deserve to be given their full weight. In productivity and in culture, for example, they are powerful forces, capable of penetrating the inner defences of the communist world. And there remains the eternal appeal of freedom—an appeal that encompasses diverse cultures and has shown itself able to survive lengthy periods of repression.

NOR should one overlook communist weaknesses in assessing the present and future. The problems of China are so apparent that they scarcely need emphasis. As the first-generation communist leaders pass from the scene, the Chinese nation faces multiple crises. Deeply-rooted factionalism and a recent history of repeated purges contribute to the grave uncertainties of today. The major institutions and policies of the People's Republic of China face stern tests in the years ahead. Even such a basic issue as that of revolution versus development remains to be resolved. And whatever mix of these two forces is determined, the task of modernizing this society of nearly 900 million people, soon to be 1,000 million, is so formidable that even under optimal conditions, it will take a very long time.

This is not to minimize the impact that China can have upon its small neighbours. Nor is it to forget that Peking harbours grandiose ambitions including those of serving as global revolutionary model, spokesman for the Third World, and—more concretely—becoming a rich and powerful nation with special interests in Asia. It would be a

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mistake to slough off these goals as mere rhetoric, because to some extent, they can and will affect Chinese international behaviour as, indeed, is presently the case. But it is also important to appreciate the real limitations upon Chinese power that are implicit in China's domestic circumstances.

SOVIET weaknesses may be less monumental, but they are no less real. In many respects, the USSR continues to be an economically backward nation, with serious, unresolved problems both in the agrarian and industrial sectors. Living standards remain low, even in comparison with certain East European states. And to the extent they have risen in recent years, this contributes to even more rapidly rising desires. Such desires are most notable today within Soviet elites, making the issue of priorities certain to assume greater importance on future agendas.

Without minimizing the limited openness still characterizing Soviet politics or arguing that the convergence of communist and liberal systems is at hand, moreover, Russia can be described as a more porous society at present than at any time since the Bolshevik Revolution, possibly since the beginning of modern Russian history. External influences are flowing in from a variety of sources, especially in European Russia, and one can detect growing doubts on the part of the current political elite as to how to handle certain problems. There is, after all, a profound difference between exterminating one's opponents and exiling or harassing them. To the extent that they can be preserved, the combination of rising living standards and external influences pressing against the extraordinary conservatism and bureaucratization of the Soviet political system contains within it the seeds of future problems.

The domestic shortcomings of the USSR are matched by weaknesses in the international arena. Here, the Soviet Union has displayed a notable lack of finesse, an extraordinary capacity for heavy-handedness. Thus, in a region like Asia, despite an enormous expenditure in effort and funds, Russia remains very foreign, scarcely exerting the type of political influence which it covets and certainly not as revolutionary model. Even among those countries strongly dependent upon it like Vietnam and India, a very high quotient of opportunism rather than genuine admiration is the dominant element.

In some degree, indeed, the Soviet Union must cultivate military power to compensate for its socio-economic and political weaknesses in the Pacific-Asian area. Unquestionably, Russia will develop its Siberian and Central Asian regions militarily as well as economically in the years ahead. But it also seems clear that the Soviet Union will remain essentially outside the cultures and the needs of most peoples in Asia and similar regions. And one may doubt whether Russian military power can substitute for basic cultural-political deficiencies, especially given the likely character of conflicts in the period ahead.

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To outline Soviet weaknesses is not intended as an argument for complacency on the part of the democratic world. The USSR is one of the world's two most formidable powers, and it has demonstrated that it is willing to use its power fully on occasion. Indeed, Russia is more credible on this score than the United States at present. But in many instances, even the Soviet Union has been inhibited from resorting to force directly, appreciative of the risks and costs.

INTERNATIONAL politics today is generally defined as being dependent upon a balance of power. Increasingly, however, we must also contend with a balance of weakness, as has just been indicated. The combination of formidable internal difficulties affecting every major nation (and Japan along with the states of West Europe can be added to the list), together with the growing complexity of global, even regional politics places substantial new restraints upon the international actions of each large state. The increased use of client states in conflict situations, the technique of undeclared wars, and a host of other recently employed policies are but further evidence of this fact.

As in the case of power, weakness is neither permanently nor fully balanced, and therein lie the dangers. It is possible, however, that with respect to East-West relations in the years immediately ahead, the communist weaknesses which lie so formidably in the material and cultural fields will more than match those of the democratic societies which are most strikingly reflected in organization and ideology at present. In any case, despite a resolve to negotiate from strength, the open societies cannot escape a continuous testing of their comparative weaknesses, for in the outcome of negotiations, as in the outcome of revolutions, this will be the truly decisive element.

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The Future of East-West Relations

Leonard Schapiro

AN assessment of the future of East-West relations depends in some measure on one's view of those relations in the past. Looked at from the Soviet side, what strikes me most forcibly is the continuity of Soviet foreign policy—continuity of ultimate aim, continuity of the general principle that the Soviet Union enjoys the advantages in which foreign policy operates as a united policy undisturbed either by public opinion or by rivalry between different elements of the ruling machine; above all, continuity of the overriding determination to exploit every weakness exposed in the non-communist world for the advancement of the ultimate Soviet aim. This aim seems to me to be clear: the extension of the Soviet system and Soviet domination of the whole world ("World Socialism") without war, preferably, or at any rate without a war involving the risk of Soviet defeat.

Two further general observations:

1. It is no longer possible, as it perhaps was, a decade ago, to interpret Soviet policy as motivated primarily by considerations of defence or fear of NATO. Soviet intervention in Vietnam and in the Middle East, the intensification of the Soviet assault on Southern Africa, beginning, but not likely to end, in Angola, and the rapid expansion of the Soviet navy—all go to show that Soviet policy is aggressive and expansionist at least as much as it is defensive.

2. Soviet policy always tends to be a reaction to Western credibility and determination, or lack of them. Examples are numerous: the invasion of South Korea in response to what appeared to be a US declaration of indifference to the fate of this area; the intervention in the Vietnam war out of fear that US lack of determination would lead to a communist victory for which the Soviet Union could claim no credit; aggressive intervention in Africa in response to US and British moral indignation about Rhodesian opposition to majority rule or South African *apartheid*. The Soviet Union has recognized, probably rightly, that these are areas which the Western world has very nearly (not yet quite) put it, by its own policy, out of its power to defend—even against a communist take-over. The recent policy of "*détente*" was taken over and developed to its own advantage by the Soviet Union out of something that was started as a political gimmick by President Nixon and Dr Kissinger.

The continuity of Soviet policy can be traced throughout its history and is probably best summed up in the phrase "peaceful coexistence" (contrary to many assertions, the phrase *was* used once by Lenin). In Soviet intentions, the meaning of this phrase is quite clear: it expresses

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the state of relations with the "imperialist" powers characterized by the absence of direct *military* conflict; by the exploitation by the Soviet Union of the stronger "imperialist" economies in order to build up its own; and by the political exploitation by the Soviet Union of the democratic nature of the "imperialist" regimes in order to influence and subvert them, and to help the advancement of "socialism" from within.

Lenin, with greater frankness than his successors, was quite explicit about these aims, at any rate after 1920, when early hopes of revolution in the main industrial countries had faded. Stalin perfected the integration of the activities of the Western communist parties with Soviet foreign policy. When the Comintern was dissolved in 1943, this work of integration was continued (as it is today, though not at the present moment with great success) by the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU. True, Khrushchev's era showed certain aberrations from traditional policy: talk of "getting off the hook" in South-East Asia for example; or complete exclusion of nuclear war (as distinct from nuclear bluff) as an integral element of policy on the grounds that it is too destructive of life. But these aberrations have been reversed by the present administration. The policy of "*détente*" is squarely based on the classic principles of "peaceful coexistence"—that is to say, the desire to exploit Western technology and capital in order to build up Soviet industry, particularly military industry, and in order to feed the Soviet and East European populations. The Stalinist principle of whipping the Western Communist Parties into service for the advancement of Soviet prosperity has not proved very successful. But that is not for want of trying. The French and Italian Communist Parties, in an endeavour to gather electoral support, have openly rejected Soviet hegemony; while the Soviet Union fears that too much electoral success by these parties at this stage may frighten the "imperialists" and endanger the very much needed economic prizes of "*détente.*" As regards nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union seems to have overcome Khrushchev's sentimental aberrations. Soviet military doctrine now regards nuclear war as by no means excluded by reason of the destructive force of modern weapons. On the contrary, this destructive force is a challenge which has to be met in order to make sure that a nuclear war, if it should occur, is successfully won. To this end, the military experts discuss, occasionally, the need for a "pre-emptive strike" against the "imperialists"—defensive, of course. There is also much emphasis in Soviet military thinking on the need to prepare the population for nuclear war. Nor is this preparation confined to writing articles: the Soviet Union alone among the major military powers, has a fairly effective civil defence and industrial dispersal policy.

If, as suggested above, Soviet policy is in the main a policy of reaction to the credibility which Western resistance to the advance

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of communist influence presents, it follows that the future of East-West relations will depend as much, if not more, on Western policy as on Soviet policy. If the present Western policy is pursued, it is difficult to be optimistic. The United States has encouraged the Soviet Union to believe that it will get what it needs in food, technology and credits, without making any political concessions. In the matter of absence of human rights inside the Soviet Union—probably in the end the most significant aspect of Soviet policy—the United States, and to a certain extent some of the other NATO powers, have accepted the principle that this is a purely domestic matter. Some of the NATO powers are showing reluctance to pay for their defence to the extent that the threat from the expanding Soviet forces requires. In some countries, of which this is one, public opinion seems to be almost totally unprepared for its own defence against the increasing degree of subversion and undermining of morale in which the Soviet Union and its conscious and unconscious agents are engaged. In areas like South Africa and Rhodesia, Western political opinion seems to be unable to face the fact that it may be necessary to rally to the defence of an imperfect authoritarian regime in order to avoid the victory of a totalitarian regime. If these disastrous trends should continue as they are, even after a change of President in the United States, the outlook is grim indeed. The gradual extension of Soviet dominating influence over European powers that have lost their will to resist and an ultimate challenge to the USA—this is the picture that one foresees.

However, the battle is not yet lost, and much could be saved by the West adopting a determined policy to use its resources—economic and moral ascendancy. This policy seems to me to require three elements:

1. Open and full support by Western Governments of the healthy oppositional elements within the USSR, such as national dissent or the movement for the support of human rights in the USSR. The grounds for this Western support, the humanitarian and moral aspects apart, are that transformation of Soviet Society into a less aggressive and more civilized regime can only come from these dissenting elements.

2. The exaction of a political price, in the form of concessions on internal policy (designed to sustain and encourage these dissenting elements) for any economic benefit, including grain, conferred on the Soviet Union.

3. Determined defence within our own boundaries against Soviet subversion and undermining. In a democracy, this cannot take the form of our becoming police states. But it calls for constant, persistent and convincing education of our publics by our governments so that this growing menace can be met by a conscious public reaction; and by zeal and determination to resist this threat to our survival as free peoples.

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The Endless Retreat

Hugh Seton-Watson

DURING the 22 years of *Survey's* existence the world has changed, but the basic threat to European and Europe-derived values (which cannot be subsumed under the word "capitalism") has not. The evidence is that the Soviet leaders' hostility to the West, judged not only by their words publicly addressed to other nations and—much more important—to their own subjects, but also by their actions, has in no way diminished; while their military power relative to the West has increased.

Ever since the United Nations became the leading forum for governments' propaganda, Soviet spokesmen have denounced the remaining colonial, but rapidly decolonizing powers, while maintaining undiminished their own sovereign domination over the non-Russian nations which form almost half their subjects, and their juridically different but little less complete domination over a hundred million other Europeans. "Imperialism" has been accepted by "world opinion" as being something which only West Europeans or North Americans practise. It is not only in the Soviet parlance that "The Imperialists" today simply means the government of the United States.

During the past 30 years hundreds of millions of Asians and Africans have obtained sovereign independence from their former colonial rulers. During the same years the Soviet rulers have refused to the Ukrainians, Uzbeks and other non-Russian nations of their empire the right to decide whether they wish to be independent or not. The attempt of the Hungarians, just 20 years ago, to restore multi-party democracy, and the attempt of the Czech and Slovak communists 12 years later to create "socialism with a human face" were both suppressed by invading Soviet troops. This however was not "imperialism": the Soviet army saved Hungary from fascism and rendered brotherly aid to socialism in Czechoslovakia. There were some protests in the United States about the Hungarian affair, which even dragged on for some months; and some Western governments (with the notable exceptions of the United States and France) made some gestures of disapproval in the Czechoslovak affair, which lasted a week or so. Then things resumed their usual course.

Systematically throughout the years of decolonization Soviet policy has been designed to maximize the hatred of Asian and African peoples for the West. When independence was achieved quickly, with good will on both sides, Soviet propagandists have laboured valiantly and rather successfully to sow distrust. Where the process was protracted and painful, they did their best to make it more so. Where independence was rejected, and the nationalists resorted to armed struggle (as in Angola and Rhodesia) they trained guerrilla fighters and supplied

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weapons. Everywhere they have toiled away to create hate and bloodshed. And apart from the odd episodic squeak of anger, Western leaders have accepted without question this glaring contrast between Soviet incitement to insurrection elsewhere and suppression of national feeling within the Soviet empire. Only the Chinese speak loudly and repeatedly of the misdeeds of " the new Tsars."

All this is of course drearily familiar to those who follow international events closely—unless they have their own reasons for denying it or ignoring it. But it is not familiar to the Western public, or even to most Western politicians. That is why it remains the painful duty of the specialist to incur the certain odium of being thought a bore, by going on pointing out the unpleasant facts.

Eastern Europe and the Ukraine, and still more Transcaucasia and Turkestan, have remained " faraway countries of which we know nothing," though it is noteworthy that the successors of Neville Chamberlain today eagerly claim a share of guilt for the defunct British Empire whenever civil wars or massacres occur, or are threatened, 6,000 miles or more from the shores of Britain. What is easily overlooked is that the prospective victims of Western indifference to Soviet imperialism may well be the Western peoples. It is they who are not being told the truth about the dangers which threaten them, who are being allowed to think that an anarchic hedonism which will not look beyond tomorrow is a sufficient foundation for society; or, if they are of a more idealistic frame of mind, are being encouraged to believe that, once the Rhodesian settlers, Afrikaner fanatics of apartheid and Brazilian generals are overthrown, no matter by whom, world politics will be set on a fair progressive course. The dream world in which prominent Western minds are floating recalls the dream world of post-Munich euphoria. A powerful book entitled *Guilty Men* exposed in 1940 the sins of the men of Munich. Its author in 1976 proudly takes his place among the leaders of the march to cloud-cuckoo land.

We may be thankful that Western polities do not possess tens of thousands of professionals of *agitprop*, to pour out hatred of the enemy in regular meetings up and down their countries. But if Western spokesmen would sometimes use in public the words " Soviet empire " instead of " Soviet Union," and would sometimes throw back at the Soviet rulers the words " the imperialists " and " imperialism," a little good might be done. The reluctance of Western leaders to indulge in futile slanging-matches is understandable, and the profession of diplomacy—essentially a product of civilized societies—is especially averse to it. At any particular moment, politeness and avoidance of scandal always seems the right course; yet looking back over a longer period it appears that the spokesmen for the Western nations have accepted a protracted unilateral political and moral disarmament, have preferred a long series of small surrenders in what has become a unilateral war. This is true also on the less dangerous, but not unimportant level of cultural rela-

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tions. The agreements made have given Soviet visitors free access to Western libraries and laboratories, while Western visitors are frequently denied entry even to such harmless places as nineteenth-century historical archives. In order to maintain some possibility of contact with the admirable Russian people, and with other nations of the Soviet Union, and still more in order to develop personal and professional relations between Western citizens and our fellow-Europeans who live west of the Soviet borders, Western politicians and officials have found it necessary to strike unequal bargains and to submit to the manifold varieties of Soviet obstruction. They do not appear to have given much thought to the alternative of counter-pressure, denying to the Soviet Union the economic and cultural facilities which the West has to offer until genuine reciprocity is ensured.

Men and women conditioned by their upbringing and career ethos to dignified behaviour and precise use of language have no inclination for the type of tactics which their Soviet counterparts regard as the essence of " peaceful coexistence." It may be said that effective diplomacy and hostile propaganda do not go together. But the Soviet political elite succeed in using both simultaneously: when they wish, they can be as discreet and devious as any diplomats in the world, but all the time their ideological artillery is keeping up its barrage of hate. The propaganda is of course often stupid, and it may boomerang against its authors. But it would be unwise to be too complacent about this. The capacity even of distinguished members of Western intellectual elites for national self-deception and self-abasement should not be underrated; while the less sophisticated public of business, the press and its readers come to accept large parts of the Soviet propaganda case; and from them there is a feedback on to the politicians which in time must limit, and in historical reality has limited, the freedom of decision at the top.

However I do not wish to argue that fastidiousness on the part of honourable West European or North American officials has been the main cause of Western passivity. The roots go deeper, reaching down to the mysterious level of national morale. Public indifference, and failure of nerve among rulers, defy precise analysis; but these phenomena are demonstrably widespread in Western Europe, and visible—though one can still hope, not predominant—in the United States. Good rulers subject their own ideas to constant critical review in the light of reality, while strengthening the courage and unity of their peoples. The rulers of the West in recent years—especially perhaps the rulers of Britain—have done the opposite: they have basked in the warmth of their own self-satisfaction, party comrades alternately slapping and stabbing each other in the back, while the mass media have spread envy, disunity and despondency far and wide. Yet refusal to recognize or to combat real dangers does not make the dangers run away. Conventional wisdom appears to be that politicians can only win votes by promising what they know they cannot give and evading real issues. Yet many nations,

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not least the British, have borne hardship cheerfully in the past when they could see a purpose and could feel that they were being governed not by clowns but by men.

THE best way to console oneself for the dismal condition of Western policy is to take a glance at the other side of the hill, where one's vision is inevitably less clear and less complete, yet suffices to show that those to whose insults and threats we are accustomed to submit are very far from being supermen. The impressive facade of Soviet power conceals major weaknesses and limitations. The gap by which Soviet industrial technology lags behind American does not seem to be narrowing. Soviet agriculture continues to stagnate: as has often been said, the world economy can hardly afford the inefficiency of farming in a huge country which, if properly organized, could be a major source of food to the hungry nations. Within the Soviet empire, the expansion of the Russians has reached its limit as it has come up against the much higher rates of natural increase of the peripheral peoples, from the Lithuanians to the Caucasians and the Central Asian Turkic nations. All historical experience suggests that the continued economic and cultural progress of the nations of Turkestan (of which Soviet propagandists inform the world with a strangely naïve pride), is increasingly bringing into operation the "law of colonial ingratitude": it is not the cruelties which imperial Powers commit, but the benefits they confer, which raise up enemies against them. Russian dissent, the expression of perhaps small and certainly heroic minorities among the Russians, cannot, it now seems, be destroyed by repression. In Eastern Europe, with the possible but not certain exception of Bulgaria, the Soviet Russian imperialists are universally hated. *Oderint dum metuant* may be a good short-term prescription; but the trouble is that successive generations lose their fear, and crises recur at unpredictable but rather short intervals.

As the Soviet leaders see it, these troubles are basically due not to their own folly, not to their own persistent refusal to content themselves with a mere veto over foreign policy (as in Finland), not to their insistence on detailed political supervision, perversion of indigenous culture and national humiliation; but can be mainly explained by the infiltration of an intellectual poison from "the capitalist countries," whose flow will only be stopped when "capitalism" is overthrown.

Beset by these failures and dangers, the Soviet leaders possess only one clear and certain asset: their vast armies and their panoply of weapons, from guerrilla to thermonuclear levels.

What, one wonders, do the rising generation of *apparatchiks* think that they can do with these? "The capitalist world" can be useful, as long as it is willing to buttress up the Soviet economy by injecting Western technology and selling food surpluses when Soviet harvests fail, thereby enabling the Soviet government to pay the full cost of its armed forces. But this same "capitalist world" looks as if it is getting

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steadily weaker, under the leadership of weaker men. As men who have not known war begin to replace, at the top of the Soviet pyramid of power, the survivors from the wartime generation, the temptation to use the one great Soviet asset must grow stronger. For the time being it would be too risky to make a frontal attack in Europe. Even an invasion of Yugoslavia, should internal conflicts provide an excuse after Tito's death, would probably involve too great risks, in spite of the green light obligingly given by (then only presidential candidate) Mr Carter during his electoral television performance. The Yugoslavs would fight, and a demonstration of Soviet aggression would drive the members of NATO together and might even bring Greeks and Turks scuttling separately back into the NATO camp, thus ending the rather promising prospects of Soviet political gains in the Eastern Mediterranean. But increasing intervention by proxy in Africa, new guerrillas and civil wars designed to deprive Europe of the minerals of central as well as of southern Africa, a policy of the mailed fist *à la* William II, with Soviet fleets proclaiming the Soviet empire a *Weltmacht* in the southern Atlantic and the Indian Ocean become more attractive, and every success is likely to increase the willingness to take risks. This is the way big wars start.

THE public postures of Western politicians suggest at times that they know of these dangers, but that they believe that they can choose only between danegeld and surrender: they hope to buy off the new Tsars by continuous instalments of economic aid, but when the new Tsars strike at some third party they acquiesce, congratulating themselves that at least it is not they who are the victims. The trouble about this attitude is not only that it is undignified in itself but that it is likely to produce the most dangerous results in the Soviet Union. It is a reasonable hypothesis, supported by odd scraps of evidence, that there is disagreement within the Soviet establishment (as within other establishments) between those who seek a long-term truce with the West and those who argue that the final collapse of " capitalism " is at hand, and should be given a push. Western attitudes seem more likely to encourage the Soviet " hawks " than the " doves." Naturally, the " doves " would like the West to make further concessions, so that the long-term truce can be as profitable as possible to the Soviet side; and therefore the " doves " do not like to see a " hard line " adopted by the West. But concessions granted in advance to the Soviet leaders in the hope of " creating good will " have—as George Kennan so clearly showed 30 years ago—the effect of strengthening the " hawks." If we wish to come to terms with the " doves," our posture should not be too dove-like, even if the " doves " urge us in this direction.

At present the West is engaged in an increasingly unilateral war, a war in which one side acts and the other hides its head in the sand. It is still a " cold " war, but is no less a war for the fact that it is fought

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with little or no shooting, and with no casualties to the active belligerent forces. (The two bloody episodes in 30 years of this war—in Korea and in Vietnam—brought American casualties, but the Soviet empire did not have to put a single soldier in the field.) It is no less a war because it is described on the Soviet side as " peaceful coexistence " or " relaxation of tension." Soviet spokesmen always point out that these phrases are compatible with " competition between social systems," " ideological rivalry " and " aid to national liberation movements "—bland euphemisms which cover such operations as the airlift of 12,000 Cuban troops across the Atlantic to conquer an African country many thousands of miles from Soviet territory.

It is not beyond the power of the West to force the Soviet leaders to give up this war, but it cannot be done quickly. The combined political and economic skills and enormous over-all cultural superiority of North America, Western Europe, Japan and China—all equally menaced by the new Tsars—far outstrip the resources of the Soviet empire, the basic weakness of which is the fact that it contains about 250 million reluctant European and Asian colonial subjects. Victory for the West in this war would come not by the humiliation of the Soviet Union or of the Russian nation—which very few in the West desire—but by the gradual abandonment by the Soviet leaders of their policy of world-wide provocation and incitement to violence, by the gradual fizzling out of dogmatic hostility. In the end one would hope to reach the type of relationship advocated by Academician Sakharov, who so cogently argues that the " struggle between socialism and capitalism " is irrelevant to the main problems which beset humanity.

This can only be a protracted process, during which, if Western policies are both firm and reasonable, men of reason within the Soviet political class will gain ground. But it cannot begin until the Western leaders have become aware of the nature of the war in which, little though they wish it, they have become involved, and have communicated this awareness to their peoples. It is no use saying that democratic governments depend on the public, and that the public is as ignorant and unwilling to learn as its leaders. These things may be true, but the duty of leaders is to lead.

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The Burden of 1917

Edward Shils

I

THE years of grandiose and feverish expectations of a " world revolution " which prevailed in communist circles after the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in October 1917 have long since passed. The exultant heroism and the squalor of the first congress of the Third International are scarcely even remembered any more. A boring, heavy-handed oligarchy has established and maintains itself. The ideal of the Webbs has been realized by Tartars. Great Russian nationalism has reasserted itself. The idiom of socialism has however persisted and so has the belief that it is written that socialism, under the auspices and protection of the Soviet Union, must prevail everywhere. Its expenditures on military equipment are still justified as required for the defence of the achievements of the socialist revolution and of the socialist society thereafter established; diplomatic and military intervention in other countries in support of groups sympathetic towards the Soviet Union is called " proletarian internationalism." The provision of military equipment and military advisers and the diplomatic support of the countries of the " third world " are justified by the self-evident necessity of confining the power of imperialism and colonialism and aiding the masses to gain control over their own destinies.

For a long time now—indeed, ever since the West became aware of the harsh repression of differences of opinion in the Soviet Union—it has been argued that the chief ground of Soviet policy at home and abroad was to guarantee the security of the socialistic regime against its " enemies." The conduct of the Soviet Union in world politics was regretfully and apologetically explained by persons who were shy of " vulgar anti-Marxism," by its sense of insecurity in the face of the hostility of the capitalistic, imperialistic powers of the West; the Allied intervention of 1919, its facts forgotten or never known, became the principle of justification for Soviet hostility and distrust towards the outer world. But for this justified fear, so the story went, the Soviet Union would be happy to cultivate its own garden. In the period of the " Cold War," a related but different argument was used to reply to the then prevailing view that the Soviet Union wished to expand by the establishment of communist regimes, called " people's democracies," far beyond its borders; this argument insisted that the Soviet Union was not concerned with the expansion of communism on " ideological " grounds but was concerned rather with the protection of its " national interest." This was the basis of Professor Hans Morgenthau's " realistic " criticism of the foreign policies of John Foster Dulles.

There seemed none the less to be a contradiction between the declarations and policies of the Soviet elite and the views of those who, without being sympathizers, sought to explain them away. On the one side,

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the leaders of the Soviet Union have repeatedly put themselves forward as the trustees of the proletariat, not only in the Soviet Union but throughout the world, as the selfless protectors of the interests of the masses in all countries whose well-being is injured by capitalism and imperialism. On the other side, influential politicians and intellectuals outside communist countries have declared that such statements were only a veil to hide the nationalistic, self-interested conduct of the Soviet Union. Sometimes the " veil " of the necessary triumph of the " socialist system " has been treated by persons detesting communism as an unfortunately persistent remnant of a revolutionary enthusiasm now extinct. Sometimes it is denounced by some revolutionaries who have been resentful against the Soviet Union for having turned away from the internationalistic ideal of the aggressive establishment of a world-wide communistic society; other revolutionaries regard these declarations as evidence of good faith and of a token of better revolutionary times to come. All these see the Soviet Union as concentrated, for better, for worse, on its own internal arrangements and their protection.

During the period of the " Cold War," the dominant Western view took at its face-value the declaration of the rulers of the Soviet Union regarding the ultimate realization of the ideal of the world-wide militant leadership of the Soviet Union. Western policy was intended to prevent the expansion of the Soviet Union and the establishment of communistic regimes or of regimes sympathetic to the Soviet Union. The moral strain of the " Cold War " was too much for Western opinion. It grasped at the enunciation of the principle of " competitive coexistence "; the prospect of " coexistence " overshadowed the " competitive " intention. The observation of the expansionist features of Soviet policy is nowadays denounced as no more than the malevolence of " cold warriors."

II

THE international revolutionary movement dominated by the Third International claimed that it aimed equally at regimes of social justice and at a world without war. The Soviet regime denounced " militarists," " secret diplomacy " and armaments, as well as capitalists and imperialists. The Soviet Union and its partisans in Western countries became the " party of peace." After the second world war, " peace-lovingness " became interchangeable with " support of the Soviet Union." Communist regimes and the " non-aligned " countries which aligned themselves with the Soviet Union in most controversies in the international sphere were called " peace-loving " countries. The monopoly of " peace-lovingness " by the partisans of the Soviet Union leaves the onus of desiring war on their opponents, as if that were the only alternative.

This conception of the Soviet Union as the protector of its own security and hence of peace was accepted even before " revolutionism " became pervasive among intellectuals in Western countries. Correspond-

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ingly, the internal policies of the Soviet Union were accorded the same self-evident virtue. Except among defenders of the capitalistic order, who were neither many nor greatly esteemed in the dominant intellectual circles, and others who criticized it because of its repression of intellectual and personal freedom, the internal regime of the Soviet Union appeared self-evidently right.

Among the collectivistic liberals of the West, the exhilaration which accompanied the early years of the Soviet Union has expired. An acknowledgement, which is often reluctant, of the brutality of the Stalinist regime and of the repressiveness of the successor regimes is now very widespread. None the less, a certain image of the institutions and practices of the Soviet system has over four decades become imprinted in the minds of Western intellectuals; it comprises "public ownership" of the instruments of production, social security from the cradle to the grave, "no unemployment," the avoidance of inflation, the extirpation of the "acquisitive instinct" or the "profit motive," social equality and the solution of the "ethnic problem." The polycentric communist parties of the West naturally hold this view. Even embittered Trotskyists admit the essential rightness of the Soviet order, however degenerate the "workers' state" might have become. Maoists might hate the Soviet Union but they never deny the correctness of the dictatorship of the proletariat in defence of the socialist scheme of things, particularly the ownership of the instruments of production by the people.

One need not be a "fellow-traveller"—if there are any of the old sort still remaining—or a "Moscow-communist" to grant the Soviet Union the credit of "peace-lovingness" and "social justice." The monopoly of power by the oligarchy of the party does not offend Western intellectual sensibilities, apart from its discrimination against Jewish and other critics. A diffuse radical view is too pervasive for that. Even though Solzhenitsyn's account of the concentration camps is accepted, it still does not obliterate or even affect the older belief in the Soviet Union as the protector of the peace and of a fundamentally right social and economic order. Perhaps the greatest success of the Soviet Union in its 60 years of existence is the firmness of the belief, in Western countries and in the new states of Asia and Africa as well as in Latin America, that the Soviet Union is the country of justice and peace. It has become so firm that any discordant elements are set aside as either minor and transient blemishes or as simply in the eye of the beholder. The renunciation of expansion of communism is part of this image so eagerly assimilated and so carefully retained.

III

THE period of the "Cold War" is now looked upon by many intellectuals and politicians in the West as the product of a mistake. I do not refer only to those who say that President Truman and Secretary

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Byrnes and Winston Churchill started the "Cold War" and kept it going or that it was the product of a desire to placate Senator McCarthy, or that it was the result of the mistaken Western interpretation of the Soviet concern for its own security. Whatever its cause it is almost universally regretted and it is agreed that its recrudescence must be avoided.

Whatever the explanation of the origins and motives of the "Cold War" it is now usually regarded as having been an unfortunate policy which set the world back. It is regarded as having been a nightmare which must never be allowed to recur. To be called a "cold warrior" nowadays is almost as severe an accusation as once being called a "Nazi-sympathizer" or being called a "commie" by Senator McCarthy or his supporters 25 years ago.

Yet much of the Cold War still goes on, and it is being carried on unceasingly from the Soviet side. The fact that the conduct of its "Cold War" by the Soviet Union is by no means always successful does not contradict the proposition that it is being carried on unceasingly. Was the Soviet invasion and its present dominion over Czechoslovakia eight years ago not concerned with the maintenance of the type of communist regime which the Soviet political leaders think of as the right one? What was the intention of Soviet intervention in Angola and the Soviet support of Egypt, Syria and Iraq simultaneously or in succession over the past decade? Regardless of whether one takes the view that the Soviet Union only follows its "national interest" and is concerned only with its own security or takes the view that it is concerned to spread its ideal, how, bearing in mind Soviet actions in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Africa and the Middle East, can it be said that the "Cold War" no longer goes on?

Many politicians and intellectuals in the United States, Great Britain, France, Sweden and other Western countries use the term "Cold War" as a term to designate a policy dead and buried; many of them see it as a period of unjust and ill-intentioned misjudgment of the Soviet Union. The leaders of the Soviet Union, with an air of injured innocence, accuse those who criticize them of wishing to reopen the "Cold War." Nevertheless the Cold War is being prosecuted by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union idiom really admits it, but under different names. Is "proletarian internationalism," which Mr Brezhnev says is sacred to him, anything other than support, by money, weapons, advisors and Cuban soldiers, for communist and Soviet dominion? Is "competitive coexistence" anything other than a slogan which stands for the belief that the communistic and the capitalistic systems are engaged in a conflict which will necessarily end in the extinction of the capitalistic system? The very idea that there must be a struggle between the two systems for domination over the world shows what is concealed behind the unctuous amiability of "competitive coexistence." There has never been any intimation that the "competition" will endure for ever. The clear implication is that it will end with the triumph of communism.

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Until then, the Soviet Union must lead the struggle without relaxation. The means might vary somewhat from time to time; that is only a matter of tactics. The end remains the same.

The idiom of competitive coexistence and all its accompaniments are brought into prominence by Soviet leaders in almost every discussion of their foreign relations. They emphasize that they are the party of peace; they do not want war; they abjure conquest. But the fruits of conquest are to be obtained through "proletarian internationalism" which involves the supply of Soviet armaments, of alien soldiers of communist countries and of military advisors and expert military technicians from the Soviet Union.

Of course it might be said that all the actions which correspond to the pursuit of "competitive coexistence" and "proletarian internationalism" are not the outcome of any doctrinaire or ideological Leninist-Marxist belief in the historical imperative of a world-wide communistic order. It might just be a desiccated hull of words in which the speakers no longer believe but which they believe that others whom they address believe. After all, their discourse is filled with the clichés of the Leninist variant of Marxism. They address the "proletariat" as if it is what their predecessors thought it was in 1919, a class of revolutionaries by "historical necessity" and held down by coercion. They speak of the peasant masses as surging with a discontent ready to be transmuted into revolutionary action. These clichés do not represent the truth but they are part of the tradition of Bolshevism which anticipated revolutionary outbreaks sooner or later everywhere in the world and their ultimate success under the leadership of the Soviet Union and the Communist International. The fundamental view of the world is still that of the classical period of communism with adaptations to the dangers of nuclear warfare; "competitive coexistence" is such an adaptation. The intent of "competitive coexistence" is not to play a game according to conventional rules, a game which begins again from the beginning on every day that a new match begins, and at the beginning of every season, when the players begin their competition anew. The competition apparently envisaged by Soviet leaders has a definitive outcome which can never be undone. The intended and predicted outcome is the universal establishment of communism.

But is it taken seriously? Is it said by the leaders of the Soviet Union only to give themselves the sense that they are struggling to realize a lofty ideal disclosed to them by the "scientific study of history" while what they really care for is the protection of their dominion over the territory now making up the Soviet Union and which they wrested from the Tsarist regime and the Kerensky government? Maybe they are, after all, realistic politicians for whom the "ideology" of Leninist-Marxism is only a legitimatory façade in whose validity they do not themselves believe? If these questions are answered as certain "realistic" interpreters of the conduct of the Soviet elite would answer them, then the Soviet leaders are concerned only with the security of their own terri-

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tory and " proletarian internationalism " is a survival in the realm of words, and in that realm only. These realistic interpreters would have to explain the presence of the Soviet Union in Angola.

They would also have to explain the developments in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union where the dogmas of Leninist-Marxism are clung to with a tenacity which does not relax. For decades the Soviet elite has insisted on the necessity of collective agricultural production. The evidence that it is not as efficient or as productive as agricultural production carried on by peasant proprietors or by a system of private ownership of land by the cultivators has been very clear for many years. The productivity of the peasant " plots " in the Soviet Union in comparison with the collectively operated farms should be convincing to persons who can deal with reality in a matter-of-fact way. Yet this evidence is disregarded and the Soviet Union continues with a form of agricultural organization which is tangibly inferior to certain known alternatives.

Why do they do so? They do so because their doctrine requires that they organize production in that manner. They might also be afraid that if they permit " capitalism " in the countryside, it will be reintroduced in industry. They might be afraid that an economically independent peasantry would become critical of communism in general, just as they are afraid of " modern "—non-representational—painting and other marginally important activities of intellectuals. The leaders of the Soviet Union remain dogmatically attached to an ideal of the communist organization of society. This ideal which has practically no ethical merit as it is practised in the Soviet Union is as vital to them as redemption has traditionally been for believing Christians. They hold to it unswervingly. Their beliefs, still adhered to with monotonous obstinacy and not with visionary rapture, are fortified by the vested interests of a vast bureaucracy. Like bureaucracies everywhere, the bureaucracy of the Soviet Union is apprehensive of any change which could diminish their power and prerogatives. They justify their powers and prerogatives as integral to the maintenance and attainment of the Marxist-Leninist ideal.

IV

IN principle, the programme of *détente* is a good and necessary one. *Détente* is a necessity for our continued existence. Why should the two militarily most powerful countries in the world be in conflict over which " system " will prevail in the world over the next century, particularly when a war between them would be unprecedentedly destructive? The Soviet Union is in favour of *détente*—as long as it is unilateral! It favours *détente*, if the sacred dogma of " proletarian internationalism," which means direct and indirect military action by communist countries in other countries, is left inviolate. A genuine *détente* requires concessions from both sides. In principle, the ideas implicit in SALT are good ideas; the idea of an increase in trade, if it does not entail what is in

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effect a subsidy to the defective Soviet economy by Western governments at the cost of Western taxpayers and at the cost of Western military security, is a very good idea too. But a genuine *détente* is not in prospect as long as the Soviet Union insists that the principle of " proletarian internationalism " is sacred, as long as the world is kept on the boil and as long as the West and Japan are rendered vulnerable to the disruption of their supply of oil from the Middle East.

I appreciate the initiative which former President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger took to promote peaceful coexistence. I support the initiatives which have been taken on the part of the West. Once however the initiatives were taken from the Western side, mutuality of concessions was called for. I know that it is extremely difficult to equate the concessions which each side offers or should offer to make to the other. The effort must be continued. It must not however be conducted by unilateral concessions.

What are the prospects of such a mutual concession and reconciliation? The obstacles seem to me to be three-fold, at the very least. One obstacle lies within the Western countries and Japan, where the intellectuals are increasingly powerful and where the obdurate devotion to the ideal of a world-wide socialist order is not only strong but increasing in strength. For a variety of reasons, the image of the Soviet Union which was formed among " progressive " intellectuals and politicians has not lost any of its firmness. It is true that many qualifications have been introduced into it, but in a variety of ways, subtle and crude, the picture of the world which took shape in the 1920s still obtains and is no less powerful than it ever was. It was a picture of a socialist country with all the incomparable virtues of socialism, surrounded by a ring of capitalistic countries, corrupt and insupportable at home and determined to encompass the destruction of the Soviet Union which is put forward as the one hope of mankind.

The reputation of the Soviet Union has become somewhat tarnished since that time but fundamentally the Soviet Union retains its hold. The Soviet Union, with all its flaws, is still accepted as representing the socialist ideal, a phantasm which Western intellectuals will not renounce as the measuring standard of all that is necessary for the permanent improvement of human life. National jealousy notwithstanding, the dominant currents of belief among intellectuals in Western countries portray their own societies as corrupt and hopeless unless they are thoroughgoingly transformed. The model of that transformation is still the " first socialist country in the world." With all its recognized deformities and with all their reservations, the Soviet Union still claims the hearts of socialist and collectivistic liberal intellectuals in the West. The simple Leninist-Marxist view of the relations between the various national states and societies remains at bottom, intact, despite the superimposition of numerous revisions and complications.

The second obstacle lies within the Soviet elite itself. Although the Third International is only a memory and no glory attaches to the

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Cominform, the view of the world which was espoused in the former is still intact.

The third obstacle lies in the rulers and intellectuals of the countries of Latin America, Asia and Africa. Whatever may be their present misfortunes under military and civilian oligarchies, capitalism, colonialism and the culture of the West are regarded by the intellectuals in most of these countries and by the rulers of many of them as the sources of their all too tangible miseries. They are for the most part not Soviet satellites in the way in which the German Democratic Republic or Czechoslovakia are. They are independent sovereign states and they have no Soviet armed forces stationed in their midst. Many of them are hostile to their domestic communists. None the less, like the Western intellectuals from whom they acquired a formative part of their outlook on the world, the Soviet Union remains a socialistic, anti-imperialistic, anti-capitalistic and anti-Western power and it therefore draws and holds much of their sympathy.

THE ruling politicians and their plausible rivals in the Western countries are either social-democrats, collectivistic liberals or " conservatives " who accept much of the collectivistic liberal outlook. Distasteful as many of them find the internal repressiveness and the international political actions of the Soviet Union, they too see it as another welfare state which has allegedly solved many of the problems with which the Western states are trying to deal. They are aware too of the devastation which would be caused by a nuclear war in which their relatively small, highly urbanized societies might be involved.

In the United States, the leading politicians are in the same position and are also aware of the crucial consequences of their decisions. In all these countries, the politicians are subjected to an increasing flow of criticism from intellectuals in their journalistic and academic institutions. They are under great pressure to take initiatives which will reduce the threat of nuclear war. In the United Nations, which is a great amplifying system of propaganda, the tendency of opinion is to take the Soviet side. Anti-imperialism, anti-neo-colonialism and the " North-South gap " are incessantly propagated there. Although the credit of the majority in the United Nations and its affiliated organizations has been much reduced in the past few years, the Western powers try to be conciliatory to their prejudices and resentments. Humanity, well-intentioned prejudice and political considerations, domestic and international, impel concessions there.

These are some of the circumstances under which the Western states must act in their relations with the Soviet Union. They are not favourable to a bilateral *détente* but that must remain one of the goals of Western foreign policy.

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East-West Relations and the Future

Adam B. Ulam

THERE is a somewhat old-fashioned flavour about the phrase, "East-West Relations and the Future." The world has become much more complex since those relations provided the unique key to, and filled most of the content of, world politics. The simple bipolar nature of world politics had come to an end at least 15 years ago in fact, though nobody in the West then realized it, with Stalin's death. So much has happened since that time to make the pattern of current international relations resemble a surrealist canvas: the Sino-Soviet conflict; decolonialization and hence the emergence of a throng of new states, most of them belonging to what is quaintly described as the Third World; the oil crisis; the development of a new international political subculture of terrorism; etc., etc.

The very terms "great power" and "super-power" have become something of an anachronism. The United States and the USSR are still possessed of enormous *strength*, economic and military, but does that strength translate itself readily into *power*? The USSR was unable to retain tiny Albania as a docile satellite. As for the US, it would be superfluous to refer to Vietnam, Panama and other areas where the vast strength of the great Western democracy has proven, or is proving, ineffective. Do Japan or West Germany exert an influence on world affairs even faintly commensurate with their economic power and military potential? What is being decided in Teheran, Cairo and Tel Aviv is currently more important in affecting the world situation than any decisions or pronouncements emanating from 10 Downing Street. At times the world's most populous country casts a huge shadow in world events, but then, as currently, incomprehensible (to an outsider and probably to the bulk of the 800 million Chinese) internal developments seem to make Peking impotent to affect the course of events. Is China without Mao going to become, to revert to the conventional terminology, a third superpower, or will she be plunged into a profound domestic turmoil? What of the future of South Africa, and its potential reverberations, racial, economic and political? Here then is a sample of problems which are, to a varying degree, connected with East-West relations, but which have acquired, in most cases unhappily, a life and momentum of their own, and which in turn affect the course of policy of both the US and the USSR.

Of the two strongest powers, America's ability to influence what used to be called the Free World, never as extensive as General de Gaulle or America's "revisionist" historians asserted, is now severely constrained. The "socialist camp" is still briskly controlled by the Soviet Union

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and the memories of Budapest in 1956 and Prague in 1968. But economic troubles and other fissiparous forces make this control increasingly more vulnerable from Moscow's point of view. And as to the international Communist movement, even if one remains sceptical of the Italian and French Communists' recent conversion to a pluralistic society, it is still undergoing an internal crisis, with Moscow now having to negotiate with its members rather than commanding them as of old. In brief, it is neither the East nor the West " wind " which is prevailing. Rather, we have during the past 15 years witnessed a clear erosion of the power and unity of purpose in the West, and in a less pronounced way, the growth of centrifugal forces within the Communist world. The over-all picture is no longer that of a duel between two powers, but of a general mêlée. In some areas the two strongest states cheer and support opposing parties; on some issues they negotiate and occasionally agree, but appear incapable or unwilling to reach an agreement which would reverse the tendencies of the last 30 years, and thus begin the process of bringing some elements of stability, order and rationality to international relations. To the present generation, peace has become synonymous with the absence of a major nuclear war, and not with the situation where there exists a real community of sovereign nations, their disputes and aspiration subject to definite rules and conventions. The very name of the organization which had been designed to promote international peace and stability now sounds gratingly ironical in the context of the increasingly anarchic world: the United Nations.

But we must not give in to the feeling of unrelieved gloom about the future. It is within the power of the West to prevent further deterioration of the international scene and to begin the arduous task of reversing the current trend, and it is within the realm of possibility that more intelligent and realistic policies on the part of the West will bring in turn a positive response in those of the East. Paradoxically it is not so much or even primarily Western policies vis-à-vis the USSR which would persuade the Soviets of the vitality and strength of the West. The West would have to overcome its recession, in many ways much more psychologico-political than economic in character. Western Europe would have to recover its momentum towards political unity which seemed so promising in the early sixties, before de Gaulle and the reverberations of Vietnam dealt it a blow. Both Western Europe and the US would have to shed the debilitating sense of guilt and helplessness vis-à-vis the Third World, which has been such a prominent feature of world politics since at least 1956, and which brought its disastrous fruit in the oil crisis, and the intermittent blackmail to which the West has been subjected, whether in the United Nations, on raw materials, or concerning who should compete in the Olympic Games. Synchronization of economic policies of the advanced industrial countries of the non-Communist bloc has become an indispensable condition of a more hopeful development of international relations. It is sometimes claimed that to use whatever economic assets the West has, e.g. food and tech-

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nology, for purposes of bargaining, whether with the USSR or another country is inherently immoral. Yet, at the same time, the resort even to a threat of force on the part of a Western country, short of a desperate emergency, has become virtually inconceivable. What then except for the economic weapon can the West dispose of in negotiating about its vital interests?

But while a " tougher " (intelligently so) posture of the West is a *sine qua non* of more satisfactory relations with the USSR, it is not by the same token a guarantee of such a turn of events. For all the elements of reasonability in them, most of the hypotheses about future Soviet policies such as based on the theories of containment, convergence, etc., have foundered on the basic fact that in Communist countries decision-making rests in the hands of a small group of people, who if they wish so, can, even if not indefinitely, remain immune to the logic of economic and social statistics, as well as to their peoples' needs and aspirations—if not as much as under Stalin then still to an extent unimaginable, not only in a democracy, but even in a country like Spain. The mental processes of the 20 or so people who decide the policies of the USSR are considerably different from those of Western politicians. From our perspective, it makes little sense for the USSR to continue its efforts to erode still further the world position of the West through its support of " wars of national liberation," or to keep an unrelenting grip on Eastern Europe. The West's defeats, as we see them, are not always Soviet victories—witness China. The unwillingness to allow more freedom to her socialist junior partners may, in fact eventually is bound to, bring about crises like the ones of 1956 and 1968, and not necessarily with the same results. But for elderly people brought up on the gospel of Marxism-Leninism, no matter how cynical or realistic they may be, it is almost impossible to alter their habits of thought and action. They see, and not entirely without reason, any concessions, whether to the West, East Europeans, or their own dissident intellectuals as producing new demands and eventually threatening the very foundations both of the Soviet domestic system and the Soviet bloc. It is just possible that the new generation of leaders, people now in their forties, will see the world from a different perspective. They would not install a two-party system or allow the freedom of the press, but might become more broadminded about individual dissent. They would not repudiate their ideology, but might realize that the USSR now has a stake in preserving a modicum of world order. And perhaps the increasing bother and, occasionally, expense of keeping a continuous watch over what happens in Warsaw or Bucharest would incline them to authorize what might be called " finlandization " of *Eastern* Europe.

These are rather modest hopes, but it is about the maximum we can expect short of some unforeseeable crisis within the USSR or a violent heating up of the Sino-Soviet dispute. But we have no right to expect any improvement in the East-West relations unless the latter puts its own house in order, achieves greater unity and regains self-confidence.

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Some Reflections on the Future of East-West Relations

Gustav Wetter

IN my analysis of the question of the future of East-West relations I should like to confine myself to a single area, one which I am particularly closely concerned with, namely the religious aspect of East-West relations. For those in the West who have religious beliefs, the situation of their fellow-believers in the East can hardly be a matter of indifference.

But can we speak here of East-West relations in their proper sense? Is religious policy not an internal affair, the concern only of each individual state? True, perhaps, in respect of certain aspects of the religious situation, but it must also be said that certain other aspects of policy—not only towards religious practice but towards people's living conditions in general—are not the purely internal affair of an individual state. Whatever these universal aspects are, they could all come under the rough heading of what one calls human rights. In our world of today, a gross infringement of human rights arouses (and rightly so) widespread opposition and protest. What other basis would world opinion have in protesting against the use of torture in certain countries? On the basis of what arguments would communist organizations in various countries be able to organize campaigns such as the one to free Corvalan (before he was exchanged for Bukovsky)?

If, therefore, we maintain that not all aspects of the relationship between a state and its citizens are purely its own business, this is particularly true of the state's policy towards its citizens who are believers in various religions and creeds. Discriminating against those with religious beliefs, preventing believers from living according to their religious laws—all this will rightly arouse a storm of alarm and protest in other countries, especially amongst fellow-believers. But this is particularly true where, as with the Jews, not only a religious but also an ethnic bond is at stake, or, as with Roman Catholicism, where an organizational link (loyalty to Rome) cannot be renounced because it is intrinsic in the dogma.

It can be seen from these reflections that religious beliefs are in fact a special element within the whole network of East-West relations. Thus an improvement in general relations between East and West, which was the main aim of the European Conference on Security and Cooperation, necessarily involves improving East-West relations in the religious sphere, and this in turn is dependent on an improvement in the situation of believers in communist-controlled countries.

But is any future progress in this direction conceivable? Is atheism

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not an esential characteristic of Marxism? Is it not therefore an overriding political necessity for communist governments to strive to convert the entire population living under their rule to dialectical and historical materialism? Can an improvement in the religious situation in those countries ever be a realistic political aim?

To take atheism in Marxism first. Marx himself was certainly an atheist; his image of mankind in his early writings is completely atheistic. The same is true of dialectical materialism (which, it should be noted, is a later addition to historical materialism deriving chiefly from Engels). Marxism, however, must not be identified either with the anthropology of Marx's early writings or with dialectical materialism. Clearly, Soviet ideology has moved away from that in Marx's early writings. But even dialectical materialism does not have to be considered as an essential element of Marxist ideology. There are non-Soviet communists who have formally discarded dialectical materialism: the Italian Communist Party, for example, recognizes in its programme not only religious freedom but also freedom of philosophical beliefs in general.

The nucleus of Marxist ideology lies in historical materialism. Whether this should necessarily be interpreted as atheistic is not easy to decide, but it certainly does not demand an active campaign against religion. The term "historical materialism" should not mislead one into assuming that the doctrine it describes includes materialism in the philosophical sense. The "matter" which historical materialism considers is not the "matter" of physics and chemistry but the production of the material goods which are essential for everyday life—in other words, society's "material life" as opposed to its "spiritual life" (the various forms of social consciousness such as morality, art, philosophy, religion, etc.). But "producing" (as distinct from brute labour) already includes the essential element of consciousness—spiritual activity. The birth of consciousness *can* also be interpreted in the sense of philosophical materialism, but it does not *have* to be so interpreted. Historical materialism *per se* is quite distinct from this question.

From the standpoint of historical materialism, too, one could go as far as to confer upon religion an authentic human worth, as with art, philosophy, etc. A recent development within Soviet philosophy is highly significant in this connexion. Recently it has been recognized that not every element within the ideological superstructure is determined by socio-economic circumstances, but that, in addition to the elements determined by class and historical moment, it also contains elements of general human significance. And this is true not only of the time in the future when the classless society has been achieved, and no alienated social existence is left to produce alienated consciousness, but also of earlier periods still characterized by class domination. For instance, in this sense they speak these days of a general human morality, whose claims have always been valid,

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even if in earlier times they were "distorted out of all recognition or shamelessly trodden underfoot."[1] Naturally, this general human morality is considered by communism to be communist morality, but it is still significant that it is seen as general human morality which has always possessed validity. The same goes for other forms of social consciousness, for philosophy, for art; only religion is still treated as an exception—it is not deemed to contain any element of truth, since communism considers it a form of social consciousness which by its very nature reflects a distorted image of reality. There is in fact an inconsistency here. If religion is recognized as a specific form of social consciousness, then the same ought to be true of religion as of the other forms of consciousness: that in addition to "ideological" elements determined by the time- and class-factors, it also contains elements of general human validity. Thus Marxism could, it if wanted, without self-betrayal or departure from historical materialism, recognize authentic human value in religion too.[2]

We are still a long way from that possibility. Yet even within its current understanding of historical materialism it would be possible for Marxism to adopt a tolerant attitude towards religion. In the standard interpretation of historical materialism, religion will automatically die out, as an illusory form of social consciousness, as soon as exploitation and class domination have been overcome in social relations. Accordingly, it would be possible to have a Marxist religious policy which tolerated religion, and left it to history to accomplish its extirpation. The best thing for a Marxist to do to hasten the historical process would then be to put all his efforts into overcoming social need, in order to remove the social roots of religion. The believers would gladly put up with an anti-religious "campaign" of this kind.

SO if a truly tolerant Marxist policy towards religion is, in theory, quite within the realms of possibility, why is it that in every communist-controlled country an administrative war is being waged against religion, using governmental powers—recently with ever-increasing determination? The reason seems to me to be that the communist party's position of power as the only guiding force in socialist society has its theoretical premise in Marxist-Leninist ideology, that this position of power as the only guiding force in socialist society is only guaranteed in practice if that ideology is seen to possess sole validity. The party's power monopoly is based first and foremost on certain theoretical propositions, such as the doctrine of the world-historical mission of the working-class to overcome all class divisions within society, the doctrine of the dictatorship of the

[1] Programme of the CPSU 1961, 2, V, 1, c.

[2] I have developed this thesis at greater length in my article "Evangelization and Marxism" in the collected essays *Evangelisation*, edited by M. Dhavamony S.J. (Rome, 1975), pp. 381–404.

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proletariat and various other theses of historical materialism. But dialectical materialism too has a decisive role in guaranteeing power. By eliminating other philosophical systems and conceptual world-pictures from open discussion, it can in fact ensure that historical materialism is not put in question.

The great importance attached to dialectical as well as historical materialism in maintaining the power monopoly of the party makes every attempt to improve East-West relations extremely difficult. This applies not only to the religious sphere but also to the general area of cultural relations. But as long as this kind of religious and cultural policy continues in the East, all promises of religious and cultural freedom made by the "Euro-Communists" will be greeted with justified suspicion.

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Leninism and *Weltinnenpolitik*

Peter Wiles

IF there were civil rights and democracy in the USSR there would be no Cold War and probably no capitalism, for Soviet society would be superior. It is simply false that a small capitalist class could maintain its privileges in the West in defiance of almost every interest of the population at large. Of course this falsehood is excellent, nay quintessential, Marxism, and the old man, so sharply distinguished in guilt from Lenin below, is at least to this extent responsible for our current miseries: he has persuaded millions that it is somehow ontologically impossible, not frankly admissible in polite society, that socialism everywhere should provide much less freedom and even simple decency in human relations than advanced capitalism; and that this contrast should be why that unjust system has resisted revolution.

But many more millions see clearly enough, and upon this central fact all prophecy about East-West relations must be based. Most prediction is wishful, and no doubt this one not less than others. It is that *détente* is mostly a sham, and the Cold War will still be with us for a long time, albeit in a milder form than during the Stalin-Dulles confrontation. I am at ease making this prediction because it is essentially what I want to happen: the best of many bad outcomes.

So long as Soviet society continues to be as it is, and offers no hope of change, real *détente* is impossible. Angola [1] makes this obvious to every newspaper reader. The Angolan adventure itself would not matter—except to its inhabitants! —if it was merely a matter of rival imperialisms. The truly deadly thing about it is the internal structure of the winning imperialism—deadly for Angolans, Russians and the rest of us too.

Is the writer's attitude to foreign policy to be condemned as moralistic, nay ideological? Yes. Inside every Kissinger there has to be a Dulles trying to get out, or the Kissinger is a hollow man indeed, a fancy operator in the short or medium term. But ideologies vary, and that here propounded has little in common with Mr Reagan's, though he too is sceptical of *détente*. For as I see it, and he presumably would not, the moralistic attitude is fundamentally neglectful of traditional national interests, indeed impossible ultimately to reconcile with national sovereignty itself. What was wrong with Dulles was that his ideology was narrowly traditional, and overlaid by no pragmatism at all: he wouldn't even negotiate. But a foreign policy based on no moral principles whatever, and *merely* balancing national interests,

[1] To be fair, the Helsinki Declaration deals only with Europe, and highly official Soviet statements have, throughout the period of negotiation, excluded the Third World. Angola is not yet another Soviet breach of treaty, merely a demonstration that *détente* is only a manoeuvre.

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would not ultimately hold the electorate or serve humanity. Foreign policy is of course about the balance between peace and defeat. But we avoid defeat and occupation only for some reason. And that is the preservation of our way of life, which means that foreign policy is and ought to be about the freedom of the individual, and other forms of domestic justice. All other issues are merely medium-term and instrumental. Even national sovereignty is increasingly recognized as instrumental: the British electorate has just wisely sacrificed a large part of it to a well chosen supranational body, precisely out of fear of communism.

This is not merely how democracies ought, in my view, to behave; it is how they do. The technicians succumb to *Funktionslust*, and conduct diplomacy for its sheer technical interest. The academic experts must above all show themselves sophisticated. But the electorate that pays them is never fooled; its attitude is always fundamentally moralistic. This is entirely right, since foreign policy, like other policy, is about what ought to be done, and " ought cannot be deduced from it."

The omission of the Third World makes me uneasy. The OPEC success with the oil cartel has promoted certain countries economically out of the Third World and its " non-aligned " bloc. But both Venezuela and Saudi Arabia continue to be psychologically and diplomatically members of this bloc. If, in defiance of statistics and social justice, this situation lasts, it will be bad for both NATO and freedom (two things I find closely related but not identical). If, despite its sharp internal antagonisms, the Third World continues to dominate UNESCO, and succeeds in setting up its inter-governmental news agency, these things will be indirect victories for the USSR, in the sense that individual freedom and the simple reporting of facts are at an extremely heavy discount in both areas. The rhetoric of Third World conferences is " objectively " pro-Soviet. The new Indian dictatorship is in many ways openly pro-Soviet. Chinese internal policy is of Soviet type. I assume in all that follows that all this will not be expressed too seriously on the world stage because:

(i) these countries have no economic surplus to play with;
(ii) the Third World has such sharp internal antagonisms;
(iii) its richer members will secretly and shame-facedly desert it;
(iv) the USSR will succeed in offending, one way or another, other Third World countries as she has already offended Egypt and Syria.

These assumptions may be quite wrong. But we make them, and return *à nos moutons.*

THIS contribution, then, is devoted to what has been called *Weltinnenpolitik*. The ecologists speak of " spaceship earth " and demand a world policy on pollution and depletion, since technology and econo-

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mic development have rendered national boundaries irrelevant. They are right, but in their own way military and police technology too have unified the planet. In the presence of a single imperialist power, possessed of atomic missiles but deprived of internal freedoms, all freedom is threatened. There is indeed great tension between these two correct views. The recognition of the planet's economic unity springs from a justifiable alarm at overdevelopment: where will poor nations, though too undeveloped to use them now, eventually get their minerals? Are we polluting the stratosphere? Who may catch fish? But the recognition that freedom is now indivisible [2] means more arms for NATO, and so more economic development. But how otherwise will poor nations, though at present unable even to carry over their pitiful colonial legacy, eventually develop again civil rights?

East-West relations do not take place in a vacuum, but I have neither space nor competence to deal with other countries at the length they deserve. Now that Mao is dead there will no doubt be a sharp reaction towards "pragmatism," but China's non-aligned foreign policy seems to be common ground between her factions. Nor will she foreseeably attain a serious nuclear capacity, and so be able to engage in serious imperialism. China is not in fact bidding for world power now. She affects our calculations as a holder down of Soviet troops. Whoever succeeds to Mao she will continue to hold them down.

IS the Soviet internal tyranny:

(i) a traditional Russian holdover;
(ii) due to economic backwardness;
(iii) due to technical features of a socialist economy on whatever economic level;
(iv) an aspect of Marxism;
(v) due to Lenin?

Point (i) has been discussed to death. My understanding of this point is that Russia was always a tyranny except when it was an anarchy (notably February–October 1917): varying from spectacular anticipations of Stalinism under Ivan the Terrible and Nicholas I to a decent Khrushchevian relaxation in certain years of Alexander I and Nicholas II. Lermontov said already the last word when he went into Caucasian exile in 1837:

> Land of slaves, land of masters,
> Farewell you blue uniforms
> And you the people subject to them.

—the uniforms of the KGB are partly blue too.

Only one country with a rooted democratic tradition has had communism imposed on it: Czechoslovakia. But East Germany, Poland

[2] Note the careful phrasing. In pre-nuclear times militarily powerful tyrannies threatened their neighbours only. It is unfortunate that the phrase "Freedom is indivisible" was so often prostituted in the past. Perhaps it should not have been divisible, but it was so in fact.

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and Hungary have all—as did Czechoslovakia before it was invaded—a far more civilized and relaxed atmosphere. It is obvious that we have to deal with not merely Russian imperialism and Messianism but Russian tyranny. If Marxism shares any part of the blame, it is still no accident that Russia became Marxist.

(ii) The hope that still more technology, or prosperity, or even education, will bring this state of affairs to an end is plausible in the abstract but rests on almost no concrete evidence, from Peter the Great to Brezhnev. All the great Russian tyrants except Nicholas I educated their people and imported technology: they were rightly not afraid of either process. But it is true that the great Westernizing period of the last years of Nicholas II (1906–17) did see liberty imported along with capital and technology; and a growth of parliamentarism, the rule of law, independent local government etc.; so Russian history is not quite one bleak and uninterrupted assertion of the dispensability of freedom. However the economy during these years was capitalistic and decentralized; so rather unlike what went before and very unlike what came after.

For communist rule has again cast doubt on the obvious connexion. The time of greatest liberty under Soviet rule was the NEP, when the Party was divided, and this was no doubt more important than the market economy. The worst tyrant was of course Stalin, who nevertheless educated his people and positively forced new techniques down their throats.

Nevertheless national character does alter—look at Britain—and national traditions can be forgotten. But one wonders whether in so hide-bound and conservative a tyranny the people could spontaneously relearn anything so deep-rooted. It is perhaps best to say that Russia/USSR cannot forever be a standout, but she certainly will be so for two or three decades yet: time enough to make nonsense of *détente*.

Point (iii) is also a very old chestnut. Summing up a very long debate, it is at least agreed that a free press and broadcasting depend in the long run on competition, made serious by multiple ownership—whether by capitalists, worker cooperatives or grass-roots social organizations is less important. But this competition in turn demands that newsprint, electricity, delivery systems and labour be supplied free of political direction, which means a free market also for them. In other words the economic base of a free information industry would be not just a minor enclave in a centrally commanded system, but a major anomaly like others already proposed, say for exports or retail trade. This is not to say it is impossible, but the existing experiments in exceptional decentralization for exporters are not particularly successful. Moreover the Communist government *wishes* to export, and is faced by the *force majeure* of a world market it cannot control. So it really does sacrifice the tidiness of its economic model for hard currency. Would it do that for its political opponents?

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I conclude that the economic form of socialism chosen does indeed conflict with the freedom of information and public controversy; and that while communism did not choose this form for this reason it is not discontented with the result. It will neither change the general form nor permit the required exceptions.[3]

(iv) On Marxism and freedom again we need only summarize. Freedom is very difficult for Marxists to understand at all, and here the prophet himself is wholly to blame. He had his own problems of free speech and civil rights, and on a practical level explicitly preferred Britain to Germany. But he never drew the philosophical consequences of this "merely" empirical preference, and stuck to the Hegelian definition instead: freedom is realized necessity. We saw one result already in my first paragraph: the notion that capitalism usually generates more freedom than socialism is "crimethink," a reactionary idea inexpressible in a language that might have been designed precisely to render it inexpressible. This fateful definition simply happened to be part of Marx's intellectual baggage as a Young Hegelian; it is also part of Brezhnev's intellectual baggage, and was used by *Pravda, totidem verbis*, to tell the Czechoslovaks what to do after they had been invaded.

The notion began with the Stoics, who said that to be free one must "live in accordance with Nature." Hegel, obsessed like all Germans with the ancient Greeks, took it over, only he was not a Nature philosopher but a God philosopher; his "Spirit" whose "march" constituted human history was a God-substitute, so that in realizing necessity one was now submitting one's freedom to another person, albeit a very exalted Person.[4]

For "Spirit" Marx substituted "History," which is if anything less personal. But Lenin equated History with the Proletarian Vanguard, i.e. his own political party, i.e. a group of mere persons, stated to be infallible. So when Leninized, Hegel's definition means that freedom is submission to the KGB, the sword of the Proletarian Vanguard. But if Marx or Hegel had paused to say to themselves, freedom can also be foolish, freedom isn't necessarily good, the word "freedom" would still be used more or less in its ordinary meaning and there could have been no Leninism.

In particular Marx denied that there would be a problem of freedom under socialism[5]: there would be no problem of political liberty or civil rights, since there would be no politics. Men would all be free *ipso facto*, and there would remain only the "administration of things." Marx was unfamiliar with the notion of a concealed definition, but probably there was a strong, just as among his epigoni there is an

[3] Of course a tryanny can also impose direct censorship on an information industry working in a market; this too can be effective, while abjuring most of the economic levers, as Yugoslavia shows.

[4] Anglican readers may care to recall that God's "service is perfect freedom."

[5] For the apparently single reference ("Conspectus of Bakunin's Government and Anarchy") cf. my *Political Economy of Communism* (Oxford, 1962), Chap. 18, p. 362.

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overwhelming, element of this in all his passages on socialism. If the polity has freedom problems it isn't socialist; nay, if you don't like it for any reason at all it isn't socialist.

But as we saw, a highly centralized society is bound to have freedom problems. Therefore Marx's concealed definition is of an impossible society: socialism as he conceived it could not exist. But equally we may—and Leninists do—turn the reasoning around: if you do like what you see, and the polity is real socialism, then its arrangements, whatever they are, constitute freedom.

Again there is no place for independent, stable, subjective values in Marxism. Indeed the notions of stability in subjectiveness or independence in a valuation are self-contradictory in this philosophy: only the objective is stable, and values are determined by, and vary with, history. It is of course because of this that the freedom of the individual is depreciated: the individual has no values of his own, or if he has they are only subjective—a most pejorative word.

Is it not frivolous, some kind of esoteric joke, to base foreign policy on the fact that the other side has defined freedom as Hegel did? Alas, no. There is a very direct connexion, " a near way, a clear way," from Hegel to the Cold War. If we want to be free we can make no peace with those who, not content with paying lip service to the Prussian prophet, also apply him—and, I may add, on a very reasonable interpretation. It is important to know that this is not just any tyranny, but an inwardly stable and outwardly enthusiastic one of a particular kind. It is above all important to know that Hegelianism is a psychologically viable philosophy, especially in a Marxist framework. We have no reason to think it will crumble within this setting.[6]

The Hegelian view of freedom is a double curse. It not only substitutes the policeman for history, it also means that the broad lines of history are predestined—there must be some necessity to realize. But the inevitable, in the Marxist view, can be helped along, since there is much " tolerance " in the details. And, since values derive from objective reality, to an enlightened person or country or Party " can " means " must." Thus *détente,* it is stressed over and over, will not and should not halt the objective historical process of socialist revolution, or Soviet assistance thereto.

All this doctrine is the seed-bed of aggression and tyranny. There can be no reliable peace without philosophical disarmament. And here I do but share the official Soviet view: (a) *détente* is a higher form of class war, and not peace at all; (b) ideology is wholly excluded from it, and the ideological struggle must be stepped up.

[6] Marx himself, and many of his followers, laid much stress on his substitution of materialism for Hegelian idealism, and on the basis of this single change they claim that he was not a Hegelian at all. But this is to neglect the immense weight of other borrowings from Hegel, all part of the very skeleton of Marxism: the dialectic itself, the contempt for inconvenient facts, the premature fixation on single historical explanations, etc. Moreover *dialectical* materialism is quite an idealistic variant of the materialist philosophy.

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(v) If this view is bleakly pessimistic, there is nevertheless a ray of hope in one important quarter: philosophical disarmament has in fact begun, with the *decline of Leninism*. After all, Marx did not invent the single-party regime, or advocate terrorism; and at least he was inconsistent enough to praise Anglo-American freedoms (now alas known as bourgeois freedoms) in practice. Indeed he almost seems to have identified their growth with the decline of (an extremely loosely defined) feudalism. It was Lenin who seized on the more formal theory of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, followed by that of the proletariat; and pretended that if the latter were run by one party (his party, at that) there would be more freedom than under a many-party " bourgeois dictatorship " (in which the workers had the vote!). It was Lenin who started the " re-education " of the bourgeoisie in labour camps, a thing altogether missing from Marx; and tried to abolish religion, where Marx merely said it was a kind of alienation that would wither away.

In other words Lenin was quintessentially Russian. He did not like freedom, he denigrated it abroad and he persecuted it at home. And this brings me to my sole optimistic point: the modern rejection of Lenin by West European (and covertly by East European) communists.

We can trace the dim beginnings of this in Togliatti's memorandum on the toleration of religion, written just before his death in 1964.[7] Indeed, what was the Czechoslovak invasion (1968) all about? An economic experiment? But Hungary (1968) has the all-clear, and Poland hasn't even collectivized its agriculture. On the other side, there was by no stretch of imagination a counter-revolution, as can be argued about East Germany (1953) or again Hungary (1956). It is said that one of the main complaints of the Soviet Politbureau in their pre-invasion negotiations was that vacant Party posts were being advertised in the Czechoslovak press—the principle of *konspirativnost'* was being violated! And of course there was press freedom into the bargain. . . . In other words Dubcek was abandoning Leninism, he had become simply a Marxist. But in 1968 neither side uttered these words.

In 1976, however, at the East Berlin conference in July, the death of Lenin began in real earnest. It is not simply that the non-ruling parties, in alliance with Yugoslavia and Rumania,[8] cut out all reference

[7] After all, the Italians have always had separate spiritual sources in their own Communist leaders, who were great men with high international reputations. We think here of Carlo Bordiga, but even more to the point is Antonio Gramsci, who was imprisoned by Mussolini in 1929 and died of various illnesses in 1937. Although nominally a strong Leninist, he was never tainted, as was Togliatti, by Stalinism, and in fact his Prison Notebooks show a very inquisitive and undogmatic mind. In his stress on the necessity to *prepare* the proletariat for revolution in all ways, including intellectual, on the " positional warfare " required by this preparation, on the solidarity of the social foundations of Western capitalism and the exceptional features of Tsarist society, he is not a Leninist at all. The features enumerated have all now been built into the new Italian revisionism.

[8] No ruling party, except the Czechoslovak one in 1968, has abandoned Leninism. The extent of civil liberties in Rumania may well be less than in the USSR, and even Yugoslavia is still very much a Communist tyranny.

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to Moscow as the single centre of the world movement; that had already happened in 1969.[9] The more extraordinary omission was of the phrase "Marxism-Leninism" itself—a standard self-description of the Soviet world outlook for decades, very prominent for instance in the Basic Document of 1969.

It is impossible not to be encouraged by these events. But they do not bode particularly well for capitalism, since the same parties that dictated these omissions support Soviet policy in the Near East and Angola, entertain ridiculous hopes of *détente*, etc. A super-optimist might protest that Mr Berlinguer supports NATO. But how much? Would he tax his people to pay a fair contribution? Would he honour a CoCom agreement? Would he keep spies out of the high command? If you wanted to oppose Marxism-Leninism, would you choose a Marxist leader? But the fact remains that parliamentary democracy has been accepted by many non-ruling Communist Parties without losing much membership or the sense of Apostolic Succession: Britain, Finland, Italy, Japan, Spain, Sweden and perhaps France. The acceptance is not hedged, but supported by such other changes as the declaration of peace with religion, the rejection of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and even of the phrase Marxism-Leninism itself. A big part of Communism, then, has genuinely abandoned Lenin.

It is of the highest importance that these ex-Leninist parties all operate in advanced capitalist countries. Few Communist parties in the Third World have taken this course. It appears that an effective desire for personal freedom really is generated by high income, at least in our present period—we could hardly say that it was due to the brilliant functioning of parliamentary democracy in the countries named above. Leninism is being recognized as a doctrine for backward peoples. For advanced ones Marxism suffices, as it was intended to do.

Needless to say, in the USSR nothing of the sort is happening. The October Revolution has become the Virgin Birth and the Crucifixion in one, and the city of Leningrad its Jerusalem. Visit this city: listen to the hushed tone of the guides, see the careful archaeology of each holy site—and you know that you are in the presence of the single impossible, inevitable Theodicy, except for which History runs on Marxist lines. See the tomb in Moscow, the posters anywhere: Lenin is, in Mayakovski's words, "more living than the living" (*Zhivee vsekh zhivykh*).

Moreover the USSR is a nuclear power. And where she goes there go the East European satellites (and Mongolia). "The declaration," said Berlinguer to journalists in East Berlin, "will not stop another

[9] Many journalists have much exaggerated the significance of July 1976 because they have forgotten or never read the Basic Document of the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969. I cite from Part IV (e.g. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXI/28 p. 24): "All parties have equal rights. At present, when there is no leading centre of the international Communist movement, the voluntary co-ordination of the parties' actions . . . acquires increased importance." This scholarly correction does not of course diminish the scope of the Revisionist movement outside the bloc; it only makes it more gradual.

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Czechoslovakia." Talk to a Hungarian foreign policy spokesman, and you will hear nothing but a *Pravda* leading article. Discipline is still perfect within the diminished bloc. And it is only non-ruling parties which have made all the modifications listed in this section.

Has this new spirit affected the USSR in any way at all? Only, perhaps, in that she creates no new satellites in the old sense of People's Democracies. There is far more freedom to take different courses in Cuba and—doubtless—in Angola and Somalia. But then the internal development of Poland and Hungary is also different from that of the USSR, as we saw. So the change in satellite status is perhaps everywhere the same: there is more domestic independence. But with what results for personal freedom? Poles, Hungarians, Czechs and Slovaks have an obvious will for it: their governments are hard put to repress their populations in this respect, and it is the USSR that ensures that they do. But Cuba, thousands of miles away, needs no such urging. Her communism grew and was not imposed, so she is among the most totalitarian of all Latin American countries.

IN short, either freedom grows within the USSR, in which case it will become overwhelmingly strong in Eastern Europe, and *détente* will be too weak a word for the relations we should have; or it will not, and *détente* will wither on the vine. Our present attitudes are unstable, and we will not hold them for very long.

We have no economic reason for *détente* anyway. Almost all the capital and technology tranfers go and will go one way, and the communists have very little to sell us that we cannot find elsewhere. They are even dependent on North American wheat. Moreover it is not only the West that must think again. After the initial post-Helsinki spree of machinery buying, and two bad harvests, the East has overborrowed. It must repay before it imports more, so that economic *détente* is already a questionable item even from the Eastern viewpoint. It may turn out that the economic impact was of a once-for-all kind.

If so, I am personally on balance glad. I do not believe in promoting Soviet prosperity. The beneficial effect on Soviet military and internal policy will be very indirect, chancy and slow, whereas we suffer immediately, certainly and tangibly from a weakening of our relative military position (since we must assume that resources set free by any technical advance in any sector will be partly invested in armaments). In the past, the USSR has modified her internal policy only under pressure. No one has shown that the future will be different.

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Racing Forward? Or Ambling Back?*

Albert Wohlstetter

NOT long ago the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, which since 1945 has kept time on the arms race, moved its famous clock ominously closer to midnight. The familiar reasoning is that American and Soviet negotiators at Geneva have failed to reach agreement on limiting strategic arms and so the race continues. The United States has forced the pace by overestimating the Soviet threat, and then, to play safe, spends more resources than are needed to meet even a menace so inflated. In this way we have given the USSR no alternative than to react by spending in its own self-defence—which, in turn, we meet by still more "worst case" analyses, increased spending and so on and on in the deadly "action-reaction cycle." The super-powers are engaged in a mortal contest, each provoking the other into piling up arms endlessly, wasting scarce resources, increasing the indiscriminate destructiveness of weapons, lessening rather than adding to their security, and moving the world closer to nuclear holocaust.

Secretary of State Kissinger has recently adopted one variant of this reasoning that puts the blame on technology. He has said that military technology has developed a momentum of its own, is at odds with the human capacity to comprehend it, is simply out of control or is in imminent danger of getting beyond political control. Thus we must restrain not only the number of arms but their qualitative improvement. For it seems that the very effort to design new and better techniques to protect ourselves against adversaries makes things worse for both sides and mankind.

All this is familiar, but is it true? Is it true, for example, that we chronically overestimate what the Russians will deploy and that this is the source of an "action-reaction" chain, driving the Russians and ultimately ourselves to disaster? Whatever is the case for the Soviet strategic budgets and forces, has the United States in any clear sense been racing at all? Is it true, as is claimed, that US technical innovation, in particular, has spurred us to higher and higher levels of strategic spending, destructiveness, and instability?

In fact, none of this is true. Starting in the early 1960s, we systematically *under*estimated how much and how rapidly the Soviets would increase their strategic offense forces. Moreover, for an even longer time, our own spending on strategic forces has been "spiralling" down rather than up. US strategic programme budgets ("Programme I" as it is called) in real terms fell from a plateau at the end of the 1950s

* This article is drawn from *Defending America* to be published by Basic Books Inc. in 1977. It appears by permission of Basic Books Inc. All rights reserved. I am indebted to many colleagues but especially to David McGarrey, Steven Honda, Gregory Jones, Robert Raab, Arthur Steiner and Ziria Wurtele.

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that was three and a half times the present size. In fact, the peak in strategic spending occurred in fiscal year 1952 when the budget was about 4·25 times the fiscal 1976 level (in 1976 US dollars the strategic programme budget in FY52 was 32·6 billion ** compared to 7·7 billion in FY76). Finally, the net effect of major innovations in our strategic force since the 1950s was to reduce not only its cost but also its indiscriminate destructiveness, and its instability or vulnerability to attack.

These actualities seem to contrast so sharply with the standard saying about Soviet-American competition that we need:

> First, to recall and document what the stereotypes about the strategic arms race have been;
> Second, to contrast the standard view that we chronically overestimate Soviet offense deployments with the facts about what Soviet offense forces we predicted in the 1960s and how these predictions turned out;
> Third, to contrast the theory that our strategic spending has been going up with the actual declining costs;
> Fourth, to consider briefly the concrete effects of qualitative improvements on US strategic forces and budgets.
> Finally, to ask how we could have been repeating obvious untruths for so long without embarrassment. Answers to this last question must necessarily be speculative. I'll suggest some as I go along.

I

The Standard View of the "Arms Race"

Contemporary stereotypes about the strategic arms race resemble the arms-race doctrines of Lord Grey, Bertrand Russell, Lewis Fry Richardson, and other doctrines that flourished in England between two world wars and can be traced back at least to Cobden in the mid-nineteenth century. These doctrines suggested that each side in an arms race sees as a threat an increase in arms by the other side that is intended merely for defence. Lord Grey, who had been Foreign Minister when the Great War broke out, wrote:

> The increase of armaments, that is intended in each nation to produce consciousness of strength, and a sense of security, does not produce these effects. On the contrary, it produces a consciousness of the strength of other nations and a sense of fear.... The enormous growth of armaments in Europe, the sense of insecurity and fear caused by them—it was these that made war inevitable.[1]

The Quaker physicist, Richardson, put such views into differential equations relating the rate of increase in defence budgets, on one side, to the level of spending on the other with a resulting exponential increase of budgets for both.

** All billions used in this article are US billions, equal to 1,000,000,000; trillions are US trillions, equal to 1,000,000,000,000.

[1] Sir Edward Grey, *Twenty-Five Years, 1892–1916*, Vol. I (New York, 1925), pp. 89–90.

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The doctrines of the strategic "race" that have prevailed for more than 15 years add a few new twists to the old theory. First, they talk not simply of an exaggerated fear about the intent of an opponent in amassing armaments, but about exaggerated estimates of the size of these armaments and about plans to meet the opposing side's increase which would be overcautious (assuming the "worst case") even if the estimates of the range of possibilities were correct. Second, the British theorists between the wars adopted a certain Olympian even-handedness in describing the reciprocal fears generating the race. (Richardson talks of the mistaken fear of the "Minister of Jedesland.") But current American doctrines, like revisionist history, frequently place on America the main responsibility for the rate and scale of the arms race. Third, the current doctrines stress the instabilities brought about by technology. And fourth, they locate the source of the race especially in efforts to defend civilians and destroy offensive military forces, and see the force driving the quantitative spiral to be not merely qualitative military change, but, in particular, improved technologies for destroying not people but weapons, whether in place or already on their way to target. This perverse doctrine, widely prevalent among theorists of the arms race since Sputnik, has been summarized by a sympathizer to the view in the "frosty apothegm": "Killing people is good; killing weapons is bad." [2]

Arms race dogma about "runaway technology," "exaggerated threats," "worst case analysis," "explosive increases," "uncapped volcanoes," "action-reaction," "treadmill to nowhere," etc., so pervades the statements on SALT and strategic interaction by Cabinet members, Congress and its staff, public interest lobbies, the academics, and the news media, that selecting a few out of a mass of citations may seem redundant; it risks bruising individual sensibilities.

But as Leon Festinger, a student of apocalyptic prophecies, reminds us, prophets and their disciples often deny they meant what they said, or even that they said it. So also, the apocalyptic prophets of the race to nuclear oblivion, when confronted with an empirical test and refutation of their beliefs: they have responded by denying that they or anyone else hold the dogma.[3] Here then is a sample of views documenting the points challenged.

Take the exaggerated threat "worst case" dynamic. In its more moderate form, this dogma holds that our planners have a systematic bias towards exaggerating—expecting our adversary to do more than he does—and that they compound this error by designing our force to meet a force greater than we expect—a "worst plausible case." It is this minimal form I show to be in error, not only the more obviously

[2] John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* (New York, 1973), p. 176.

[3] See, for example, Morton H. Halperin and Jeremy J. Stone in *Foreign Policy* No. 18 and the views represented in Michael L. Nacht, "The Delicate Balance of Error," in *Foreign Policy* No. 19.

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wrong extreme that talks of "invariable overestimation" or "worst possible case."

Morton Halperin and Jeremy Stone, as if arguments can be directed only at the extreme, say the notion that "arms race analysts believe in a myth of invariable US overestimation" is a "straw man." It is "obviously unlikely," they say, that "analysts believe anything is invariable." They want quotations.

For the extreme, one can introduce the flesh and blood Jeremy Stone to the straw Jeremy Stone, who has written:

> The department invariably exaggerates the Soviet threat to obtain public and congressional support for weapons that will undermine the Soviet deterrent.[4]

And less or equally extreme:

Jerome Wiesner—We always underestimate our own capabilities and overestimate those of the other fellow.[5]
Leonard Rodberg—Even though the Soviets invariably lag far behind these predictions, our own programs go forward as if the forecasts were accurate . . .[6]
Herbert Scoville—We should not again fall into the trap of perennial, compulsive reaction to timeworn exaggerated threats.[7]
Leslie Gelb—The common practice, as I think we all know, has been to exaggerate and overdramatize.[8]
Robert McNamara—. . . a strategic planner must be "conservative" in his calculations; that is, he must prepare for the worst plausible case.[9]
Stanley Hoffmann—The whole history of the postwar arms race is one of . . . preemptive escalation based on a worst case hypothesis which assumes the adversary's capacity and will to go ahead full speed.[10]
Paul Warnke—. . . in determining relative strategic balance, the other side, just as we do, must use worst case analysis. . . . They are not going to overestimate their potential and underestimate ours. If any, the error will be in the other direction.[11]

Such a belief is distinct from, but frequently associated with, a view that the United States is the catalyst for the race. Halperin and Stone

[4] Jeremy Stone in Erwin Knoll and Judith Nies McFadden, eds., *American Militarism 1970* (New York, 1969), p. 71.
[5] *Anti-Ballistic Missile: Yes or No?* (New York, 1969), pp. 13–14.
[6] Nancy Lipton and Leonard S. Rodberg, "The Missile Race—The Contest with Ourselves," in Leonard S. Rodberg and Derek Shearer, eds., *The Pentagon Watchers* (New York, 1970), p. 303.
[7] *Fiscal Year 1972 Authorization for Military Procurement*, Hearings before Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, Part II, 3 May 1971, p. 1767.
[8] Hearing-Symposium before Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, 31 May 1972, p. 98.
[9] "The Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy," Speech, 18 Sept. 1967. (Reprinted in *Department of State Bulletin*, 9 Oct. 1967, p. 445.)
[10] *Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement*, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, p. 193.
[11] Testimony before US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 13 July 1971.

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observe sagely that the two views are distinct, but seem to doubt the currency of the second view as well. We might begin the list once more with a characteristically temperate quote from Stone:

> The Department of Defense has become an inventor and a merchandiser of exaggerated fears . . . an unscrupulous lobbyist to get the weapons to answer these fears. Worst of all, through the action-and-reaction phenomenon, its aggressive pursuit of the arms race has greatly undermined the security of the nation by unnecessarily stimulating Soviet efforts to keep up.[12]

Edgar Bottome—It is my contention that with minor exceptions, the United States had led in the development of military technology and weapons production throughout the Cold War. . . . The Soviet Union has been placed in a position where all it could do was react to American initiatives in bomber or missile building programs. This American superiority, along with the highly ambitious nature of American foreign policy, has placed the United States in a position of being fundamentally responsible for every major escalation of the arms race.[13]

William Epstein—American scientists seem to have the edge in technology and to lead the way in developing new weapons, particularly in the nuclear field, but Soviet scientists follow close behind in the action-reaction chain.[14]

Bernard Feld—History guarantees that new American technology will certainly be followed . . . by Soviet emulation.[15]

Marshall Shulman—This commitment . . . has led us to force the pace of the strategic arms race, and it inescapably leads to an uncontrolled military competition with the Soviet Union.[16]

John Newhouse—America's forces apparently served as both model and catalyst for the Russians. . . . Such is the action-reaction cycle as perceived by many scientists and bureaucrats.[17]

Newhouse adds that other scientists argue, "It is the impulse of technology, not an action-reaction cycle, that drives the arms race. . . ." Most scientists in my collection see the impulse coming from us *and* technology. So, to quote Rodberg, ". . . we have used our own superior technology to drive the arms race forward."[18] But the malign role of technology is particularly important in the dogma and deserves illustration. "Is Jerome Wiesner," Michael Nacht has demanded, choos-

12 Knoll & McFadden, eds., op. cit. p. 68.

13 Edgar M. Bottome, *The Balance of Terror: A Guide to the Arms Race* (Boston, 1972), pp. xv–xvi.

14 William Epstein (former Director of the UN Secretariat Disarmament Division), "Will the Russians Play 'American Roulette,'" *Saturday Review World*, 29 June 1974.

15 Bernard T. Feld, "The Sorry History of Arms Control," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. XXVI, No. 7, Sept. 1970, p. 26.

16 Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, p. 139.

17 John Newhouse, op. cit. p. 133.

18 Nancy Lipton & Leonard S. Rodberg, op. cit. p. 303.

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ing an evidently far-fetched case, "a modern-day Luddite?" Consider the following from a committee Wiesner headed:

> It is, after all the *continuing competition to perfect and deploy new armaments* that absorbs quantities of time, energy, and resources that no static environment would demand; that exacerbates US and Soviet relations with unreal considerations of strategic advantage or disadvantage; that keeps political leaders in both great powers off-balance and ill-prepared for far-reaching agreements; that fixes the attention of both sides on the most threatening aspects of the opposing posture; and, especially, that provides heightened risks of a violent *spasm of procurement—one spurring to new levels the cost, distrust, and the explosive dangers of an unending competition in arms* (italics added).[19]

The explosive dangers feared, Wiesner makes clear elsewhere, involve "an ever-increasing likelihood of war so disastrous that civilization, if not man himself, will be eradicated."[20] Anyone who holds that military innovation has a *net* bad effect (my definition of a Luddite in the military field)—let alone the effect of ultimate catastrophe—should want to impose general restraints on it. So, to quote Herbert York:

> The recent small successes in controlling the quantitative side of the arms race also call for renewed efforts to control its qualitative side, to slow down the rate of weapons innovation, and hence to reduce the frequency of introduction of ever more complex and threatening weapons.[21]

Examples could be multiplied. But we need not leave Cambridge, Massachusetts. Consider George Kistiakowsky and George Rathjens:

> ... any understanding that slowed the rate of development and change of strategic systems would have an effect in the right direction.[22]

And take Harvey Brooks, who argues that "the most promising lines of action for controlling the qualitative arms race probably lie in mutually agreed limitations on testing," but also suggests agreements to forgo specific improvements and general declarations against destabilizing developments, even if both would be hard to interpret or verify—particularly "in closed societies."[23] Even unverifiable agreements would provide arguments in internal bureaucratic debate to those who oppose such developments—at least in open societies. Or take Paul Doty:

[19] White House Conference on International Cooperation, National Citizen's Commission Report of the Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, 28 Nov.–1 Dec. 1965.

[20] Foreword, p. 14, to Donald G. Brennan, ed., *Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security* (New York, 1961).

[21] *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, XXIX (Mar. 1973), p. 4.

[22] *Scientific American*, 222, No. 1 (Jan. 1970), p. 27.

[23] "The Military Innovation System and the Qualitative Arms Race," revised draft distributed at Aspen Conference on Arms Control, Aug. 1974.

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> ... even better would be the adoption of a generalized set of restraints that would slow the whole development and deployment process.[24]

These would have an effect in the right direction, if qualitative change has a net bias toward making strategic forces more costly, more indiscriminately destructive, more vulnerable, and harder to control. But if not, you wouldn't slow things down generally. Nor try merely to stop "unfavourable" developments (always a good idea). You would encourage the development with all deliberate speed of technologies that reduce costs, increase discrimination, make forces less vulnerable and easier to control.

I will present evidence that, whatever the false starts and mistakes in detail, the net effects of our major technological choices from the 1950s to the present were exactly the reverse of the Luddite stereotype. Generalized restraints would have been a bad idea.

II

US Predictions and Soviet Realities

Systematic or even invariable overestimation need not lead to an arms spiral. If one's aim to counter a given threat is made extremely costly by expected adversary moves, because the threat is very large and the advantage is all on the other side, the game may not be worth the candle. This was in fact Secretary McNamara's chief argument against undertaking a thick ABM defence against the Soviets. In short, the larger the threat, the more futile a response may seem. The logic that overestimating an adversary drives one to race him is not compelling. Nonetheless, it is important to ask whether the US government has in fact systematically overestimated Soviet missile and bomber deployments —an assertion central to the dogma of a spiral driven by exaggerated estimates and mistaken fear.

The "missile gap," as is well known, was a US overestimate after Sputnik of the number of ICBM launchers that the Russians would deploy in the early 1960s. Indeed, the trauma of discovering the error formed the basis of many of Mr McNamara's generalizations about our tendency to exaggerate and then to respond to anticipated larger threats rather than to what the Soviet leaders actually turned out to do. The missile gap has also generated a substantial confessional literature on the part of current proponents of the doctrine of an explosive arms race about their own role in creating the myth of the missile gap, and a substantial academic industry in doctoral theses and articles explaining this particular overestimate and the supposedly general and plainly evil habit of overestimating. A few comments, therefore, are in order on the missile gap before making a broader test of the habit. (Perhaps it is worth saying that I am on record, before and after Sputnik, as

[24] Testimony before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 12 Sept. 1974.

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having steadily opposed evaluating force effectiveness on the basis of bomber or missile gaps.)

First, the "missile gap," a brief period in which the Soviets were expected to but did not deploy ICBMs more rapidly than we did, was an ICBM gap rather than a general missile gap. During the same period, in fact, we regularly and greatly underestimated the number of *intermediate and medium range* ballistic missile (IR/MRBM) launchers that the Russians would deploy at the end of the 1950s and in the early 1960s. For example, our underestimate of the number of IR and MRBM launchers that the Russians would deploy by 1963 roughly offset our overestimate of the number of ICBM launchers they would deploy. In short, we misunderstood or reversed the priorities the Russians assigned to getting capabilities against the European as distinct from the North American part of NATO. This piece of ethnocentrism on our part was characteristic. We also greatly underestimated Soviet aircraft systems directed primarily at Europe rather than ourselves.

Second, predicting the size and exact mixture of a potential adversary's weapon deployments several years hence is a hard line of work. It is intrinsically uncertain, reversible by the adversary himself between the time of prediction and the actual deployment. Moreover, an adversary may want his opponent to estimate wrongly, either up or down. In the specific case of the missile gap, Khrushchev did what he could to make the US and the rest of the world believe that the Soviets had a larger initial programme of ICBMs than they actually had; and he succeeded.

Whatever the source and nature of our mis-estimation, it helped generate the belief that we invariably expect the Russian programmes to be larger than they turn out to be, that we compound this overestimate by deliberately designing our programmes to meet a Russian threat that is greater even than the one we expect, and then, when the Russian threat turns out to be less rather than greater than expected, the damage is done; the overlarge US force is already a reality or irreversibly committed.

It is a good idea, then, to subject to systematic test this claim of regular overestimation. It is a major element of the current dogma, repeated endlessly since 1961. In fact, the nearly universal acceptance of this belief has emerged from constant repetition of tags like "the mad momentum," "we have invariably overestimated" or "we are running a race with ourselves," etc., rather than from any systematic numerical comparison with reality.[25] Figures 1 to 3 sum up the[26] results of a

[25] E.g. Nancy Lipton and Leonard S. Rodberg, "The Missile Race—The Contest with Ourselves," in *The Pentagon Watchers* (New York, 1970), p. 303; Dr Jerome B. Wiesner, *ABM: Yes or No* (Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Fund for the Republic. Santa Barbara, California, 1969), p. 18; Dr W. K. H. Panofsky, "Roots of the Strategic Arms Race: Ambiguity and Ignorance," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. XXVII (June 1971), p. 15.

[26] For the data on the statistical distribution of predictions on which Figs. 1–3 are based, see *Strategic Review* (Fall 1974), US Strategic Institute Report 75–1.

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search for all of the long-term predictions of Soviet strategic missile and bomber deployment that could be found in the annual presentation of programmes and budgets to Congress by the Secretary of Defense from the start of 1962 to the start of 1972, and a comparison of these predictions with what the Russians actually deployed by mid-1972—the last date referred to in the predictions that could be checked at the time the analysis was completed.

Aside from their comparative accessibility, several reasons governed the choice of these predictions from the Defence Secretaries' formal statements, rather than from Army, Navy, Air Force, CIA, Bureau of Intelligence Research in State, or other estimates.

First, during this extended period the Secretary of Defence did, regularly, every year, make predictions precise enough to be proved wrong and precise enough for measuring how much they had missed the mark. The possibility of determining error here requires not only that the predictions be specific as to time and quantity, and not excessively hedged by "might" or "may conceivably," but also that the adversary realities referred to in the predictions be open to observation and highly reliable measurement by the US *after the fact*. Not all *objects* nor all characteristics predicted nor all predictors meet these requirements. Far from it.

Second, these predictions of the Secretary of Defence form a well-defined, substantial population of estimates—which is not the case for intelligence predictions in general.

Third, these estimates were presented as authoritative and official.

Fourth, they were given particular prominence in the programming and budgeting process by the fact that the Secretary used them directly to support his programme. And finally these particular forecasts relate directly to the Secretary's judgment and that of the Congress on the five-year defence programme. They are therefore most relevant for analysing possible relations between defence programmes and defence budgets and the impetus these programmes might be given by forecasts as to the future enemy force deployments. Defence systems take many years to become operational, and the forces they will confront are necessarily the subject only of long-term conjecture. In presenting these estimates the Secretary emphasized this point. For example, in 1963 he testified:

> Because of the long leadtimes involved in making these weapon systems operational, we must plan for our forces well in advance of the time when we will need them and, indeed, we now project our programs at least five years ahead of the current budget year. for the same reason we must also project our estimates of the enemy's forces at least five years into the future, and for some purposes, even beyond. These longer range projections of enemy capabilities are, of course, highly conjectural, particularly since they deal with a period beyond the production and deployment leadtimes of enemy weapon systems. Therefore, we are, in effect, attempting to anticipate production and deployment decisions which

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> our opponents, themselves, may not yet have made. This fact should be borne in mind as we discuss the intelligence estimates and our own programs based on them.[27]

The first eight charts, Figures 1a to 1h, compare US predictions of Soviet ICBM launchers to be deployed with the actuality as estimated after the fact.[28] The vertical arrows indicate the date at which the prediction was made (e.g. February 1962 in Figure 1a). The dashed line or lines indicate the range from high to low of what was predicted (in Figure 1a, a high of 650 and a low of 350, by mid-1967, five and a half years later.) Later projections usually included (as in Figure 1b), a high and a low for more than one year. This is shown in the shaded portion. The steeply rising solid line which is the same in all the charts shows the number the Russians actually completed, as estimated after the fact.

Though the claim about invariable overestimation posits that at least the middle of the range between high and low always exceeds the reality, it will be apparent that even the high end of the range seldom did that, and then only at the start of the period—and even then just barely. For ICBMs the "highs" reached as high as reality only twice in 11 times. The prediction made in 1965 (Figure 1d) is typical. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate analogously typical long-run predictions of future Soviet submarine-launched missiles deployed and future Soviet bomber deployments. The middle of the predicted range of the number of sub-launched missiles deployed was about three-quarters of the eventual reality. In the case of the bombers, we continued to believe that the Russians were going to phase them down and most drastically in the case of the medium bombers; but the Soviets never came down to our expectations. Tables 1 and 2 sum up some principal results. Out of 51 predictions, the low end of the range *never* exceeded the actual; the mean between the high and low exceeded it only twice in 51 times; our highs reached reality only nine times! Hardly a record of overestimation. Moreover, the ratios of projected-to-realized future values of the Soviet strategic force in operation display the fact that the underestimates were very substantial and that even the average of the highs was under the reality. It will be evident also that there was no systematic learning from the past as information accumulated.

In fact, since the numbers shown refer to estimates of the *cumulative* number of strategic vehicles in operation at future dates, and since the later predictions were based on much more extensive knowledge of what was already deployed or at least started in construction at the time of the prediction, the degree of bias can be made even plainer. There are several points.

[27] *Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before the House Armed Services Committee, the Fiscal Year 1964–68 Defense Program and 1964 Defense Budget* (Office of the Secretary of Defense, Jan. 1963).

[28] Predictions in Figures 1a to 1h exclude short-term estimates that are limited essentially to the completion of launchers already started.

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First, our means of acquiring information improved greatly over the period. Second, in the later years a much larger proportion of the cumulative total in operation was already in operation at the time predictions were made. And third, we had information not only about the number of launchers completed and in operation (displayed in the rising curves of Soviet ICBM and SLBM launchers) but also about the substantial numbers of launchers that had been started but not completed at the time the prediction was made. We knew that ICBMs started would generally be completed, say, in about a year and a half, and submarine-based missile launchers in about two and a half years, but in any case well before the dates in our long-run predictions. In fact, estimates of the missile launchers already started that were expected to be completed by a given time were, at the midrange, only 3 per cent below the actual number for ICBMs and 2 per cent above it for submarine-launched missiles. If we make a rough adjustment for this fact on the one hand and on the other allow for some delay in acquiring and processing information by the date predictions were made, if we assume generously a seven-month delay, the degree of understatement will be more apparent. In effect, what was being predicted was an *increment* in the force then in operation or under construction. It is appropriate to compare that increment with the actual amount newly started and completed in the ensuing interval.

Table 1

1962–1971 U.S. Predictions that Exceed the Actual Soviet Strategic Deployment *

	ICBMs	Sub-launched Missiles	Heavy Bombers	Medium Bombers	Total
Low Predictions that exceed Actual	0 of 11	0 of 15	0 of 14	0 of 11	0 of 51
Mid-Range of Predictions that exceed Actual	0 of 11	1 of 15	1 of 14	0 of 11	2 of 51
High Predictions that exceed Actual	2 of 11	3 of 15	2 of 14	2 of 11	9 of 51

Table 2

Average Ratios of Predicted-to-Actual Cumulative Numbers *
(Numbers in parentheses compare predicted to actual *change*)

	ICBMs (11 Estimates)	Sub-launched Missiles (15 Estimates)	Heavy Bombers (14 Estimates)	Medium Bombers (11 Estimates)
Lower Predictions	0·53 (0·16)	0·64 (0·12)	0·85	0·67
Mid-Range of Predictions	0·67 (0·33)	0·74 (0·47)	0·91	0·77
High Predictions	0·80 (0·50)	0·84 (0·82)	0·98	0·87

* Predictions exclude short-term estimates of ICBMs and sub-launched missiles that are limited essentially to completion of launchers already started.

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Figure 1a
ICBM Prediction Made in 1962



Figure 1b
ICBM Predictions Made in 1963



Predictions in Figures 1a–1h exclude short-term estimates that are limited essentially to the completion of launchers already started.

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Figure 1d
ICBM Predictions Made in 1965



Figure 1c
ICBM Predictions Made in 1964



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

Figure 1e
ICBM Prediction Made in 1966



Figure 1f
ICBM Prediction Made in 1967

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Figure 1h
ICBM Prediction Made in 1969



Figure 1g
ICBM Prediction Made in 1968



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Figure 3
Operational Soviet Bombers
1966 US Predictions Compared to the Actual Number



Figure 2
Operational Soviet Sub-launched Missiles
1965 US Long Term Prediction Compared to the Actual Number *



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Burying Wrong Predictions in the Known Past

Our longer-term predictions about the Soviet strategic triad were under the mark for 11 years. The long-term ICBM projections presented in Figures 1a–1h were made during the eight years from 1962–69. (Later ones referred to dates well after SALT I numerical limits on missiles took effect.) Did these eight years of long-range ICBM predictions show systematic learning?

It would not be surprising if they did, or even if, after eight years of trying, ICBM predictions finally touched reality. Programmes do, in the end, level off; and the forecaster who year after year predicts they will, sooner or later, like a stopped watch, will be right. What is surprising is that these forecasts got worse, not better.

Some analysts now grant that we underestimated, but claim that we improved with time.[29] They ignore the important difference between predicting a *cumulative* total of vehicles that will have been deployed at some future time, most of which are known to be already completed or in process at the time when the prediction is made, and predicting a *change* from this known state. This accurately-known past makes up an increasing portion of the cumulative total. Nonetheless, those who detect an improvement in forecasts compare predicted with actual totals, not predicted with actual change from what was known; and so swamp unpredicted new starts in the steadily increasing total of launchers known to be started or completed.

Suppose every year a forecaster regularly predicted that during the next 12 months an adversary was going to add 10 more missile launchers; and every year, without fail, the adversary added 100. At the end of 10 years, the adversary would have built up a force of 1,000 launchers. But in the beginning of the tenth year, with 900 in place, the forecaster, undaunted, might predict, once more, that in the *next* period the adversary would build only 10 more, so reaching a cumulative total of 910. If one used Nacht's ratio of the predicted-to-actual cumulative number deployed, it would appear that the forecaster's skill in prediction was steadily improving. In the first year the predicted-to-actual ratio was 10/100, in the second year 110/200—and so on until the great success of the tenth year, when the predicted-to-actual ratio would be 910/1,000. A success ratio of 0·91 seems a marvellous improvement over ·10. However, year after year he would have been undershooting reality in the same way. The *difference* between the predicted and actual cumulative numbers would have been the same—namely 90—and the *ratio* of predicted-to-actual *increments* would have continued to be one-tenth. The forecaster would have learned nothing about how better to anticipate the future. The cumulative ratios, as in Figure 4a, miss this essential point.

Moving from hypothetical to actual history, if we exercise a little care, it is easy to see that our long-run predictions of net future change

[29] See, for example, Nacht, op. cit.

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were getting no better, that if anything they were worsening. The most direct way to establish that fact is suggested by our hypothetical example, where the difference between prediction and reality remains constant while the cumulative ratios suggest an apparent improvement.

Figure 4a
Ratios of Predicted to Actual Cumulative Totals of Soviet ICBM Silos (Burying the Future in the Known Past) *



* Midrange of long term predictions

Figure 4a [30] presents a scatter diagram that buries errors about the future in statements that are mostly about the known past. It shows ratios of predicted-to-actual cumulative totals of finished silos. The Secretaries made these long-term predictions during the eight-year period 1962 to 1969. All refer to dates no later than mid-1972. Each dot represents one such cumulative ratio calculated at the mid-range of each prediction. In each of three of the years, the Secretaries made two long-range predictions. I have connected the subset of eight dots that maximize the impression that the worsening was reversed.[31]

In the more appropriate Figure 4b each dot represents the mean

[30] This figure is based on Nacht, op. cit.
[31] In this we follow Nacht.

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Figure 4c
Ratios of Predicted to Actual Increases in Soviet ICBM Silos
(Adjusted for Silos Completed or in Process when Predictions were made)



Figure 4b
The Average Yearly Differences between Predicted and Actual Numbers of Soviet ICBM Silos



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amount per year by which the mid-range between high and low of a long-term prediction missed reality. All of the dots throughout the entire period are below zero. All undershoot reality. The average difference between predicted and actual silos was −80·1. Second, the dots drift downward quite steeply; that is, the underestimates tended to get much worse year by year. A trend line fitted in the standard way to the points representing underestimates slopes downward at the rate of − 12·59 silos per year. For the period as a whole the evidence indicates not " learning," but " unlearning." During the later subperiod starting in 1965 (the year some analysts think of as the worst), tests do not show improvement: there is no statistically significant trend towards reducing the differences between predicted and actual. A variety of statistical tests indicates worsening.[32] Moreover Figure 4b still neglects knowledge of launchers in process. On the whole then, the evidence provided by a study of differences between predicted and actual numbers of silos suggests both underestimation and *increasing* underestimation.

That evidence can be greatly reinforced by a closer look at ratios, provided however that one looks at ratios of predicted-to-actual *changes* from the accurately known past. At the time when predictions were being made, the forecaster had hard data not only on (a) silos completed at that time, but also on (b) those that were in process of construction. Figure 4c presents ratios adjusted both for silos completed and for those in process of construction. Since the predicted numbers were less than the actual numbers, the ratios are all less than one; all are underestimates. The predictions averaged roughly a third of the actual number. The median ratio is ·34. The ratios drift downward with time, worsening at a rate of about eight percentage points a year.

In sum, the long-term US projections of Soviet ICBM silos were not only underestimates, but also deteriorating underestimates. The phenomenon cries out for explanation.

The distinction between predicting cumulative totals and predicting changes in these totals may explain not only recent errors in analysing history; it may also be part of the explanation for the slowness of the forecasters themselves to recognize a drift away from reality while it was happening. For even though the use of cumulative totals of finished launchers (and especially of ratios of predicted-to-actual totals) has its

[32] Impressions from even a relevant picture, such as Figure 4b, can stand supplementing by the computation of a few statistics and the summary of the results of a variety of statistical tests on the differences between predicted and actual silos: (a) The mean underestimate of −80·1 silos per year is significant (using the Student's t-test) at the ·001 level using the more rigorous " two-sided " criterion, that is, assuming appropriately that predictions can exceed as well as understate the reality. (b) The least squares trend line has an r^2 equal to ·40, but its slope, −12·59, is significant at the ·05 level. (c) There is no significant trend up or down at the ·05 level for the sub-period 1965–69). (d) The worsening displayed is confirmed by the Student's t-test for the difference between sample means for 1962–64 compared with 1965–69. (The difference between predicted and actual is worse for the second sample at the ·01 level.) (e) And finally, the Wilcoxon two-sample test, a robust " distribution-free " test, using only rank orders, also shows the later sample to be worse than the earlier at the ·05 significance level. All of the above tests are two-sided.

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hazards in an analysis of the success of predictions, such totals have an obvious current operational importance for those who are charged with planning for the contingency of combat. Adversaries must fight with the stocks they have ready at the time a war breaks out. " Orders of battle " are given in terms of such total stocks. For many current purposes, therefore, it is entirely natural to formulate predictions in such terms.

Nonetheless, when predictions are formulated mainly in this way—as they are—systematic forecasting errors will tend to be buried in the larger totals, and corrections are likely to be discovered later than if forecasts were made in terms of the changes expected during the prediction interval. Someone planning to buy additional forces or to phase some out, should focus on long-term *changes* in adversary forces. Failure to centre on change is only part of the explanation. Much remains to be explained. But underestimation of bomber and missile deployments for a very long time plainly persisted. That is the main point.

So far I have focused on the important set of predictions cited by the Secretaries of Defence. While these plainly played a key role in the planning and budgeting process, one might well ask whether they were typical of the intelligence community. Those reluctant to give up the myth of chronic overestimation in particular ask this question, and have in mind the official consensus and, even more, the widely reported excesses of the Air Force. In fact it is familiar that during the " missile gap " Army and Navy estimates were under, and the Air Force over, the consensus. To judge how widespread underestimation became during the 1960s, it is worth comparing Air Force long-range ICBM predictions with the official consensus starting in the autumn of 1961, and comparing both with the Soviet realities counted in post-deployment estimates.

The Air Force, the Consensus, and Reality

In the first two years (Figures 5a and 5b), the Air Force did indeed exceed both the consensus and the reality. In autumn 1962 the mid-range of the consensus was below the 1967 reality and the " high " barely reached it. In autumn 1963, the Air Force predictions still greatly exceeded the consensus, but the two began to converge. There was some overlap between them in the early years referred to in the prediction, and in the more distant years, where the Air Force outbid the consensus, even its high dropped below reality. In autumn 1964 the Air Force and official predictions came close together and overlapped for the first time in predictions about the more distant years. For these more distant years, even the Air Force highs were below reality, though the Air Force still exceeded the consensus. In autumn 1965 and 1966 (Figures 5e and 5f) underestimation worsened with further convergence. Finally, in autumn 1967, convergence was total. The Air Force endorsed the consensus on condition that the Soviets would deploy MRVs (Multiple Re-entry Vehicles—unlike MIRVs, *not* aimed independently), which

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

Figure 5b
Air Force and Official Consensus Predictions Made in Autumn 1962



Figure 5a
Air Force and Official Consensus Predictions Made in Autumn 1961

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

Figure 5d
Air Force and Official Consensus Predictions Made in Autumn 1964



Figure 5c
Air Force and Official Consensus Predictions Made in Autumn 1963

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Figure 5f
Air Force and Official Consensus Predictions
Made in Autumn 1966



Figure 5e
Air Force and Official Consensus Predictions
Made in Autumn 1965



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Figure 5g
Air Force and Official Consensus Predictions
Made in Autumn 1967



Figure 5h
Air Force and Official Consensus Predictions
Made in Autumn 1968



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they did. The highs of the long-term forecasts in these last years till mid-1967 were invariably under reality, and both the consensus and the Air Force assumed an ultimate levelling off of the Russian programme well below what happened. In autumn 1968 the Air Force concurred with the consensus on the assumption, now clearly conservative, that MIRVs would be deployed by mid-1978.

The steady movement towards the official forecasts suggests the power of consensus. That power is particularly impressive since final convergence occurred in autumn 1967, which (McNamara observed the following January) marked a 380-silo jump from autumn 1966. Deviation from the consensus on the high side went out of style just as it became objectively most plausible.

Why?

Pressures for conformity in the 1960s tended to operate against overestimating offence deployment. Overestimating rather than error had become disreputable. For example, the Secretary, in January 1964, stressed that "these longer-range projections of enemy capabilities must necessarily be highly uncertain," but, "indeed the record shows that in the last several years we have consistently *over*estimated Soviet ICBM strength" (italics added). He then cited three forecasts made in 1959, 1960, and 1961, during the "missile gap," about Soviet ICBMs expected in mid-1963. All three, of course, were far above the mark. He warned, "These facts should be borne in mind as we discuss the estimates for the 1967–69 period." But the 1964 estimate about 1967, to which he attached this caveat, turned out to be not above but way below the mark—120 silos below at mid-range. Moreover, while in the preceding two years predictions about 1967 were also below, the 1964 prediction was worse. And the 1965 prediction about 1967 was worse still. As 1967 got closer, our aim at it sank steadily further beneath the bull's eye.

Part of the pressure to conform by underestimating was very likely a reflex, over-correcting for the "missile gap" that had publicly embarrassed the intelligence community. But this could hardly explain the extraordinary persistence and even worsening of the errors, as evidence to the contrary began to pour in. It is interesting that the Secretary brought up the "missile gap" in 1964 to reinforce his caveat against overestimation. The "gap" had been given public burial in the autumn of 1961. The Defence Report had not bothered to mention it in 1962 or 1963. The Report revived the horrible example as part of the budget battle and issued ominous strictures against exaggeration as a way of cutting the ground from under importunate service demands based on anticipated large Soviet capabilities.

As for Soviet "capabilities," when the Secretary used that phrase, or "Soviet ICBM strength," as in the passage quoted, he referred explicitly to the *number* of vehicles deployed. These numbers are what

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the forecasts were overwhelmingly about, just as the forecasts during the "missile gap" had been. It was only when the number of Soviet silos completed or in process came close to catching up with the ceiling we had chosen for our ICBM force that the Secretary began to put some stress on "qualitative superiority." In effect, he asserted by way of comfort, the Soviets may get nearly as many missiles, but ours will be better. But his FY 1968 Report insisted that especially if we counted in the SLBMs, we were still ahead even in numbers—"as of now."

"As of now, we have more than three times the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (i.e. ICBMs and SLBMs) the Soviets have. Even by the early 1970s, we still expect to have a significant lead over the Soviet Union in terms of numbers . . . and," the Secretary added, in a vague but dazzling phrase, able to comfort even today, "a very substantial superiority in terms of overall combat effectiveness."

But in 1971, the Soviets had the lead in numbers. Looking on the bright side—"quality"—may have dazzled perceptions of our failure to predict the numerical shift. The Defence Reports in fact contain a treasure trove of methods of bucking us up while blurring our view. Their very vagueness soothes. "By and large," said the Secretary in 1965, "the current estimates . . . projected through mid-1970 are of the same order of magnitude as [last year's] projections through mid-1969." And in 1966, with reassuring familiarity. "By and large the current estimates projected through mid-1970 are of the same general order of magnitude as those which I discussed here last year." In 1967, he reported that the current estimates were "generally in line" with the preceding year. "Order of magnitude" is particularly mind-boggling, but strictly implied only that this year's estimates were within one-tenth to 10 times as much as last year's. Which is less reassuring. In any case, the estimates were wrong and getting worse.

In 1968, after the huge 380-silo jump in one year, McNamara said, "We believe the Soviet ICBM force will continue to grow over the next few years, but at a considerably slower rate than in the recent past." But the rate specified fell far below the one later observed. In 1969, Secretary Clifford continued in the same cheery vein. The Soviet force has grown "well over threefold in a . . . little more than two years. The rate . . . has been somewhat greater than estimated a year ago. However, we believe [it] will be considerably smaller over the next two or three years." But once again the expected rate of new starts formed a small fraction of the actual. Such muffled disappointments scarcely perturbed the theory, pushed hard in 1969 and 1970, that exaggerations drove a race.

It would be wrong, I think, to conclude that the Defence Reports display a conscious effort to obscure our failure to anticipate rapid Soviet increase. More likely, wishes and policy leanings shaped—and lowered—consciousness. But much remains to be explained. Undoubtedly, various leanings—some to expand, some to cut or reallocate

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strategic spending—influenced estimates of contending factions. But then we need to ask not only "*cui bono?*" but which estimates matched reality. Factions in or out of government have *some* compatible interests. Aside from a joint interest in accurate assessment for the common defence, all factions have at least an occupational self-interest in *not* making forecasts that fail disastrously.

Underestimates persisted for an extraordinarily long time after the error of the missile gap in part because they were fortified by an American strategic view that Americans often attributed also to the Soviets. (These were "projections" in the psychoanalyst's, as well as the forecaster's sense.) That view suggested that the Soviets did not need a large expansion of forces in order to be able to destroy a few American cities and therefore did not intend to undertake it.[33]

It was common in and out of government through the mid-1960s to hold that the Soviets wanted only a minimum deterrent, a couple of hundred missiles aimed at cities (roughly the actual number of Soviet ICBMs in 1964–65), and that they would not try to catch up.[34] We clung to this belief after they had started enough launchers to make it untenable. Then we shifted to saying they wanted *only* to catch up, just as they were passing us on the way to getting 50 per cent more. "Rough parity" can be quite rough.

Action-reaction language is vague enough to rationalize events after the fact. It was a glass through which we saw darkly. It not only led us to wrong predictions about the Soviet actions, but it made inaction on our part seem reasonable. The Russians would not act to catch up, because they knew we would react to counter them, and since they would not act, we did not have to. But in fact, they acted and we did not. And sometimes the Secretary argued that if we were to increase our active defence, the Russians would inevitably react by vastly increasing their offence so that in the end we would not only have wasted the

[33] Such a view was never consistently adopted by Mr McNamara. He came to use action-reaction language, and often talked as if the adequacy of strategic forces could be measured solely in terms of their use to destroy cities. However, he brilliantly attacked the overkill theory and continued through his last Posture Statement to insist that we keep the objective of limiting damage in case deterrence failed.

[34] See, for example, "The Soviets . . . are not seeking to engage us in . . . the quantitative race. . . . There is no indication that the Soviets are seeking to develop a strategic nuclear force as large as ours." "Interview with Robert S. McNamara, Defense Secretary," *US News and World Report*, 12 Apr. 1965, p. 52. Compare the *Military Balance, 1962–1963* (London Institute of Strategic Studies), p. 2: "The Soviet Union thus appears committed to a policy of 'minimum' or counter-city deterrence in relation to the United States, though the large medium range missile force it has now developed and deployed against targets in Europe and Japan may serve as both." This view was held by men with little else in common. So, Hedley Bull: ". . . The Soviet Union did not embark upon the massive programme of intercontinental missile construction that had been anticipated, but seemed to settle for the sort of capability that in the United States is associated with the policy of 'minimum deterrence.'" *The Control of the Arms Race* (New York, 2nd ed.), p. xxii; and Richard J. Barnet and Marcus G. Raskin: ". . . Where we once believed that the Soviets were bent on surpassing the US in military power, it now appears that . . . they are quite willing to put up with a missile gap: Indeed, we have been running much of the arms race with ourselves." *After Twenty Years: Alternatives to the Cold War in Europe*, New York (1965), p. 4.

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money, but would end up with a net increase in the number of fatalities we might suffer. In other words, if we acted, the Russians would react; therefore there was no point in taking action.

Unfortunately, a distorting and wishful myopia followed from the close polemical focus of factions in and out of government on the very latest incremental change in Soviet force dispositions and its implications for the current year's US budget, as compared to that of the preceding year. Momentary pauses in Soviet construction of launchers for one missile type, perhaps because new improved systems were being readied for deployment or because of bad weather, were seized on by outside advisers and by unnamed "highly placed officials" as an indication that Soviet programmes were "tapering off," "levelling off," "slowing down," "petering out," "grinding to a halt."[35] Since, characteristically, massive Soviet efforts in research, development, testing and evaluation parallel a countercycle in deployment, and since Russian weather is notoriously intemperate, especially during their long winters when our budget debates start, there was plenty of room for confusion, ambiguity and self-deception inside and outside the US government.

As for the public view, it was only to be expected that statements about increased Soviet missile deployments would be dismissed with a kind of naïve cynicism: the slickers in the Pentagon are using their annual scare tactics in support of bigger budgets. Some outside advisers protested the government's "'most outrageous' statements about the alleged buildup by Russia," whereas in fact, we were told, "the Soviet arms capability actually is tapering off." Dissonant sounds of reality were hardly audible in Establishment study groups meeting in Washington, Cambridge and New York. The successful attempt to save the predictions and the dogma on which they were based is quite as instructive as the performance of Sabbatai Zevi's followers, a sect that managed to survive and reinterpret a public prediction that the world would end in 1648 and even to acquire new more enthusiastic adherents; or the Millerites who gathered new followers after the world failed to end as Miller had predicted by 21 March 1844.[36] Students of the subject have observed that when predictions fail, this may only increase fervour and proselytizing for the dogma that led to the prediction. After all, it is in just such adversity that a dogma needs all the recruits it can get. Editorials and articles appear with ritual regularity in the *New York Times*, the *New Republic*, the *Christian Science Monitor*, *Scientific American* and elsewhere warning of the Pentagon's ritual exaggeration

[35] For this focus on the momentary or partial pauses, see, for example, the *New York Times*, 27 Apr. 1969; the *Chicago Sun Times*, 22 Apr. 1970; the *Milwaukee Journal*, 26 Apr. 1970; *SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament*, 1969–70 (New York, 1970), p. 53; the *Wall Street Journal*, 17 Dec. 1970; the *Manchester Guardian*, 7 Nov. 1971; *Survival*, Sept./Oct., 1972.

[36] These two cases of failed predictions are described in Leon Festinger's *When Prophecy Fails* (Harper Torch Book, 1964) and in his *Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Stanford, 1967). Festinger's model of cognitive dissonance fits the history of the theory of systematic overestimation rather well.

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of the threat and presenting in full-blown form a generalized doctrine that it is just such exaggerations that accelerate the fatal spiral.

Though holders of the dogma of regular US overestimation protested against excessive secrecy, they were in good part protected by it. Exact quantitative comparisons of past predictions with reality take time and would have met much resistance even in private; in public a systematic, long-term check was impossible. However, enough has long been public to undermine the theory of regular overestimation. We have had open official statements reflecting classified estimates that the Russians would not try to get as many missiles as the US, that they were stopping or slowing down; and equally public figures on the actual growth of Russian strategic forces. The contrast was plain, or rather would have been plain, if only we had been taking a long hard look; or even looking. More important, the reality of understatement should have destroyed the generalized theory of overstatement, but it did not.

It would be unfortunate if we should now swing from understatement to the opposite extreme. It would be nice, though far from easy, to get it nearly right. Even if we do, the implications for our strategic budgets will by no means be simple. Sober consideration, however, will discount the threat that invariably overestimating Soviet threats drives us to exponential increases and the notion that only throwing caution to the winds can stop the " race." The threat of invariable overestimation is one that is plainly exaggerated.

Some of these policy decisions, I believe, were justified on other grounds. But prevailing doctrine offered a generalized rationale for cutting rather than expanding. That is what happened, but we didn't notice. Our perceptions of actual US past declines have been as confused as our view of supposed future Soviet increases.

III

Mythical US Increases and Actual US Declines

Whatever the explanation offered for the strategic race—invariably overestimating and worst-case analysis, bureaucratic politics, technology out of control, etc.—there is a prior question as to whether or not there has been a race. To justify the term " race," any side that is racing has at least to be rapidly increasing its strategic budgets and forces. Even if the increase does not proceed at an increasing rate, for the name " race " to make any sense at all, there would have to be at the very least an increasing trend. An examination of American strategic budgets and forces since the mid-1940s suggests that on the principal relevant measures the trend is down. And an examination of the net effect of qualitative innovation in the strategic forces over the same time period equally refutes the stereotype about the net destabilizing effect of technical change. First, look at our supposed quantitative upward spiral in the total explosive energy that could be released or in its capacity for indiscriminate destruction.

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Total Explosive Energy and "Overkill"

The total explosive energy that could be released by the strategic stockpile is a measure frequently used to compare US and Soviet forces by conservative organizations, such as the American Security Council. It also appears in the popular vivid comparisons of the total explosive yield of all the bombs dropped in Korea (200,000 tons) or in the second world war (5,000,000 tons) with the explosive yield (measured in tons of some non-nuclear chemical explosive such as TNT) of a single nuclear warhead, several of which might be carried in one vehicle today. However, the drawbacks of such a measure are clear and most obvious in the vivid comparisons. A single bomb releasing five million tons of explosive energy (i.e. a five megaton weapon) is incapable of doing anything like the damage done worldwide from Japan and Burma to West Europe and Russia by the many tens of thousands of bombs exploded in the second world war, even if the total energy yield were the same. In general, one large warhead with twice the energy yield of two smaller weapons, unlike them, cannot be used to attack two very widely separated targets.

Moreover, it was understood at the dawn of the atomic age that, even though the Hiroshima bomb had roughly one thousand times the explosive yield of one of the largest second world war blockbusters, it would not do structural damage to an area one thousand times the size, but roughly one-tenth of that. By comparison with the smaller bomb, some 90 per cent of its energy would be "wasted" in "overhitting" or "overdestroying" or "overkilling" the nearby area.[37] For that comparison then, not 1,000, but its two-thirds power, 100 is a roughly correct approximation for determining relative structural damage. And even in comparing the destructive effect of stocks of bombs that are less varied in yield, some such adjustment is essential.

However, it is not only conservative polemic that exploits the misleading measure of gross "megatonnage" of explosive energy. Some of the crudest polemical uses are by opponents of increases in military budgets. In talking of "overkill," they usually divide the total population of the world into the aggregate explosive energy in the stockpile to arrive at some such figure as 10 tons of TNT equivalent for every man, woman, and child in the world. Such a measure makes exactly the confusion that the original discussions of overhitting or overdestruction of the area near the target were designed to avoid. And it adds several other more potent confusions besides. It implies that the purpose of stocks of weapons is and should be exclusively to destroy population, that what is wrong is not the killing of populations, but their overkilling. It is not strictly related to hypotheses about a spiralling increase in total explosive yield, or still less a spiral in the damage that might be done. However, by suggesting that the stocks are now far too large, it

[37] For an early appreciation of this point, see, for example, P. M. S. Blackett, *The Political and Military Consequences of Atomic Energy* (London, 1948).

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Figure 6
Combined US Strategic Offense and Defence Megatons



Figure 7
Combined US Strategic Offense and Defence Warheads



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makes plausible the notion that there has been a steady exponential increase. In fact, nuclear weapons are directed at any of a large variety of military targets, and there is no simple rule for deciding whether one has too many or too few. That is a problem we need not address here.[38] The question we are asking is whether on this measure there has been an exponential increase.

The answer indicated in Figure 6 is "clearly not." After an initial sharp increase, the total explosive energy yield declined from a peak two-and-a-half times the 1972 figure. And 1972 was about at the level of 1955. While this aggregate includes, appropriately for contemporary arms race theories, strategic defence as well as offence warheads, the decline is about the same for the aggregate explosive yield of the offence warheads alone.

The Number of Strategic Warheads

At the opposite extreme from totting up the energy releasable by all strategic warheads is a measure that ignores the yield altogether and counts simply warheads. The smallest strategic defence warheads differ from the largest strategic offence warheads by many orders of magnitude, but even if we were to limit ourselves to strategic offence warheads, merely counting warheads while neglecting yield involves an heroic distortion. In fact, the largest offence nuclear warhead is roughly a thousand times the smallest offence nuclear warhead[39]—the same as the difference between the Hiroshima bomb and the largest non-nuclear blockbusters of the second world war! Counting the largest and the smallest each as one—with even-handed justice—would then be exactly like dismissing the first two nuclear weapons as of negligible importance since they increased the stocks of "block-busters" by only a fraction of a per cent.

While there is no adequate single common measure for so heterogeneous a collection of vehicles and weapons, clearly something better is possible than a simple count of warheads.[40] That the latter is used so uncritically is one of the intellectual scandals of the current debate on SALT. Nonetheless one may ask whether the number of strategic offence and defence warheads has spiralled. And as Figure 7 shows, for

[38] I address it briefly in Fred Warner Neal and Mary Kersey Harvey, eds., *Pacem in Terris III, Vol. II, The Military Dimensions of Foreign Policy* (Santa Barbara: Fund for the Republic, Inc., 1974). I favour a US-Soviet reduction to equal lower totals. That is quite independent of the question as to whether the US totals have increased exponentially or at all.

[39] Even this fact (and not merely its implications for the incomparability of the elements in the aggregate of offence warheads) is not always recognized. It is sometimes said that US strategic warheads in general are in the megaton range. See, for example: *Arms Control: Readings from Scientific American* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1973), p. 179.

[40] One argument for simply counting warheads is the notion that the dangers of an accidental detonation increase linearly with that number. However, this is plainly false. The probability of an accidental, unauthorized detonation depends among other things on arrangements for weapons safety and for the centralization of control and command over these weapons.

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Figure 8
Average US Strategic Offense Warhead Yield

Years 1945–72
Vertical index relative to 1972 1972=1·0



Figure 9
US Strategic Offense Equivalent Megatonnage

Years 1945–72
Vertical index relative to 1972 1972=1·0



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this disparate aggregate, the answer is that it has not. It peaked in 1964 at roughly 30 per cent higher than in 1972 which was about the 1960 level.[41]

The sense of post-Sputnik arms race doctrine with its central strictures against all weapons aimed at weapons and therefore against active defence as particularly destabilizing, plainly calls for including the Spartan, Sprint, Nike-Hercules, Falcon, and all other defence warheads in the total. However, given the opportunism of the current debate, it is hardly surprising that, when convenient, the distortion involved in counting warheads is compounded by excluding the supposedly most destabilizing—the defence warheads. In fact, one great oddity is that in spite of all the fire levelled at active defence, the debaters hardly notice that US defence warheads, interceptor aircraft, surface-to-air, and air-to-air missiles have decreased drastically. The number of offence warheads has increased over time, but their average yield has decreased even more. From 1958–60 to 1972 they increased roughly by half. But their average yield was divided by four-and-a-half (Figure 8). It is essential then to consider some measure in between counting megatons and counting warheads. We turn now to a measurement widely used for that purpose in the defence and arms control technical community.

Measures of Relative Destructive Area (" EMT ")

No single number adequately measures the destructive power of military weapons, still less other important attributes of military forces—their susceptibility to attack, their safety from " accidental " or mistaken or unauthorized use, their political controllability, their capability for discriminating between non-military and military targets, and between friend and foe, their flexibility in a variety of political-military contingencies, etc. Nonetheless, as we have said, it is not hard to do better than counting warheads or counting megatons, and for comparing highly varied stocks of weapons at two different times or in two different countries, an index known (misleadingly) as " equivalent megatonnage " (EMT) has come into widespread technical use. It counts the number of weapons and their yields but makes a rough adjustment for the relative waste of explosive energy by the larger weapons through over-concentration near the target. Taking a one-megaton weapon as standard, it measures any given stock in terms of the number of such one-megaton weapons that under a variety of relevant conditions would do structural damage over an equal area.[42]

EMT, like all other indexes, has its limitations, but it captures some essentials missed in simply adding unadjusted megatons or warheads. Figure 9 shows a dramatic decrease since 1960 in the relative destructive-

[41] The curves on numbers of warheads (Figure 7 and bottom of Figure 8) are smoothed in order to approximate the calculated data points, but closely enough so that deviations from the trends discussed are not significant.

[42] The EMT of a weapon is computed by raising its yield, expressed in megatons, to the two-thirds power.

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Figure 10
Combined US Strategic Offense and Defence Obligational Authority



Figure 11
US Strategic Offense Obligational Authority



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ness, so measured, of the US strategic force. At its peak it was nearly double the 1972 figure; and 1972 was roughly at the 1956 level! In any case, no spiral. This measure is relevant among other things to test the arms race argument that the uncontrolled destructiveness of US strategic forces has increased. It has not. The area that might sustain structural damage has been halved and there has been a similar decline in potential fallout.

Offence and Defence Budgets

I could reinforce these results using curves on further physical measures. Instead I turn now to measures of the resources used in deploying a strategic force. Since these resources must be diverted from important alternative civilian uses, such measures are properly at the heart of the defence debate. In any case, they are central to arms race doctrines. Expenditures on strategic forces are most frequently identified as the variable that is supposed to be accelerating.

Figure 10 shows the total strategic budget as measured in the Defence Department Programme I,[43] extending back to the second world war. The top curve shows that the strategic budget in 1976 dollars declined from a peak of $32·6 billion in FY 1952 to $7·7 billion in FY 1976. Strategic expenditures have fluctuated, with a brief sharp decline and recovery after Korea, to very high levels varying between $24 and $28 billion in the seven years beginning in 1956; and then a more or less steady drastic decline to the recent low levels. In short, in real terms the strategic budget was well over four times higher during the Korean War and about three times as high at the end of the Eisenhower Administration as in 1976. This scarcely looks like an exponential increase in strategic budgets—more like an exponential decrease.[44] For the 24 years from 1952 to 1976, the average rate of decline was about 5 per cent. For the 15 years from fiscal 1961 to 1976, there was a decline averaging 8 per cent per year. I want to stress that this long-term decline is not simply as a percentage of GNP but in real terms. It is an absolute decline. Since real GNP was rising while strategic budgets in real terms were declining, strategic spending declined even more as a percentage of GNP. In percentage of GNP it was nearly seven times higher in the early 1950s and about five times higher in the late 1950s than in FY 1976 (3·2 per cent and about 2·5 per cent compared with ·48 per cent).

How is it possible for the constantly expanding literature on ever-accelerating strategic budgets to ignore this increasing divergence between doctrine and reality?

[43] Programme I refers to Strategic Forces. Programme II refers to General Purposes Forces. We have used unpublished computer tabulations dated 24 July 1975, available from the Office of the Asst. Secretary of Defence, Comptroller (Programs and Budget) of Total Obligational Authority by Program, which were extended back beyond FY 1956 only recently.

[44] The decreasing exponential fit is rather good. The r^2 for the period 1952 is ·75 and the r^2 for the period FY 1961–76 is ·88.

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First, exponents using the doctrine as a weapon in budget battles, handle rather carelessly the familiar distinction between real and inflated dollar costs. This can hide somewhat the drastic extent of the decline, but not the decline itself. Even in current, depreciating dollars the budget dropped from generally high levels in the 1950s and a peak of $12·1 billion in 1961 to $7·7 billion in 1976.[45]

Secondly, the curves show minor local peaks and dips. Men concentrating on the immediate budget fight may easily take an ant's eye view. Looking forward from the bottom of a shallow local dip, the future looks all uphill. This opportune but myopic focus has tended to obscure the very trends that any arms race doctrine would have to confront. Such doctrines after all do not pretend to be concerned only with the brief rise, say, from 1960 to 1961. An intense focus on the current year's budget battle also leads to a related confusion: comparing the new budget request not with last year's request, but with the actual amount approved by Congress in the prior year—which can be considerably less. For example, for the defence budget as a whole, the total obligational authority approved in 1973 was $3·6 billion less, and in 1972, $4·1 billion less than the amount requested. For the FY 1974 strategic programme the net difference between the requested and total obligational authority appears to be about $0·5 billion.

Thirdly, the drastic fall in strategic budgets measured in Programme I may be partially obscured by adding in a rising but quite arbitrary "overhead" figure.[46] The programme budgets for strategic or for general purpose forces aim to include all the cost of equipment, *matériel*, and personnel that can be directly attributed to the programme mission, including all support costs that "follow directly from the number of combat units."[47] Overhead allocations, whatever their accounting uses, are by definition arbitrary, and those now current have little or no causal relation to past or future reductions in the number of strategic combat vehicles. These arbitrarily allocated costs have tended to remain the same or to rise even though the strategic forces and their direct costs have been greatly reduced.

The formula for budgets that the Brookings Institution uses, which we call Method I," would assign to the strategic forces an amount of overhead equal to less than half their direct costs during the 1950s, and over one-and-a-half times their direct costs in 1974.[48] Meanwhile, direct costs of general-purpose forces have varied in size from less than one-and-two-thirds to nearly five times the direct costs of the strategic forces, and the formula, year after year, splits the Intelligence and

[45] Recent Department of Defence computer tabulations have revised upward the 1961 current dollar estimate from its earlier-reported level of $11·5 billion.

[46] See, for example, "The Advocates," WETA-TV, Washington, D.C., 14 Feb. 1974.

[47] Martin Binkin, "Support Costs in the Defense Budget," Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Staff Paper, 1972, pp. 45–46.

[48] The Brookings Institution uses a different method, which we call "Method II," when estimating the effects on overhead of future reductions in the strategic combat forces. We are indebted to Barry Blechman for generous help in explaining Brookings' methods.

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Communications budgets evenly between them. Of course, it has always been clear that some of these "overhead" costs may vary inversely with direct costs. Take Intelligence for example. Large SALT (or unilateral) reductions might call for greatly increased national means of monitoring variations in adversary forces, since marginal absolute changes make a larger proportional difference in small forces. (Dr Wiesner in the past has suggested that inspection might have to double if the forces were halved, and so on linearly.) But then one should expect future cuts in the direct costs of strategic forces to be partly offset by increases in Intelligence costs.

If one considers not merely what causes changes in "overhead," but also what the effects are of increases in overhead on an adversary, it is hard to see how these programmes, many of which could well be classified under Human Resources or Social Welfare, would strike terror in the heart of an enemy. For example, CHAMPUS (Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services) includes such items as medical care for retirees, their dependents, and survivors. A drastic cut in the number of strategic combat vehicles would hardly decrease these costs and their increase should hardly seem menacing to the Soviet Union.

Nonetheless, even if these arbitrary costs are added on, they can only partially obscure the drastic decline. Using the formula Brookings applies to past budgets, the FY 1962 budget was nearly double that in FY 1976 (this is displayed in the dashed line in Figure 12). The method Brookings applies to future projected budgets is less reducible to formula and involves more subjective judgment and even larger uncertainties.[49]

If that method were applied to determine past trends, however, the decrease would be more drastic. Still other allocation methods, all necessarily arbitrary, show declines from a peak more than double the present budget. So for example, a method used by the Department of Defence shows a decline in FY 1976 dollars of over $2 billion in the late 1950s from a peak 2·5 times as high as the FY 1976 budget including overhead. With recently improved deflators the decline would be even larger.[50] Overhead allocations have their uses, but they are limited. All of them distribute some unallocatable costs. When added to programme costs without any breakdown, they obscure more than they

[49] If I were to suggest changes to Brookings, one would be to display separately, in past and future budgets, the overhead fraction. For future budgets especially this would help. It is easy to expect greater overhead savings from direct programme cuts than are likely: total overhead and the direct programme budgets have moved in opposite directions. Yet Brookings' overhead formula for past budgets, like most such allocations, assumes that overhead costs vary in a straight line with direct or operating costs without any time lag. And it loads an increasing proportion of total overhead onto the strategic budget. For such reasons I present figures on the strategic budget *with and without* Brookings' overhead allocation.

[50] Recent improvements in deflators for Total Obligational Authority take into account the fact that a substantial fraction of the funds authorized in a given year are spent in later years.

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illuminate change. Nonetheless, no overhead allocation with which I am familiar can hide the sharp declines in strategic budgets. Whether the decline is from a peak over four or two-and-a-half or twice recent levels, that should be fatal to the dogma about "ever-accelerating spending."

Nonetheless that dogma does die hard. Paul Warnke, for example, has agreed that some facts do damage the arms race figure of speech. But he talks of our continuing tendency "to spend these steadily increasing billions" and of our "formula for endless escalation in defense costs." Indeed, Warnke is so seized by the idea that the US strategic budget and the defence budget as a whole have been steadily climbing that he can read a long document devoted to showing that both budgets have been sinking for years, with plunging graphs to illustrate, and not notice.[51] He did not, for example, notice the point of the article which painstakingly showed evidence of the drastic fall in the strategic programme budget in real terms over the preceding 14 years. (The defence budget as a whole had been declining for a shorter time—since 1968.) He understands it to be saying that the United States and the Soviet Union have both been increasing strategic spending, but at different rates. Running at different speeds, he thinks, might still be a race. However, we have been moving not only at different speeds, but in opposite directions. If that doesn't do lethal damage to the arms race metaphor, nothing will.[52]

Fourth, in spite of the fact that arms race theorists take strategic defence along with counterforce as the villain in the piece and the principal force driving the race, they sometimes look for exponential increases in strategic budgets that cover only offence and allow for no compensating decreases in strategic defence. However, in 1962 the budget for offence taken alone was over three times its 1976 level.[53]

Fifth, I suspect the major reason for failure to observe the decline is that public debate usually concentrates intensely on the initial decision

[51] Paul C. Warnke, "Apes on a Treadmill," *Foreign Policy* 18, Spring 1975, pp. 12–29.

[52] Maybe nothing will. As an even more striking example of how hard the dogma dies, consider the following statement by Bernard Brodie written after I had assured Mr Warnke that I was indeed saying that the total cost of our strategic force has gone down, not up. "We should note here Albert Wohlstetter's denial that there is an arms race between the two superpowers, though he concedes there is an arms competition which raises costs on both sides." Mr Brodie cites not only my original paper which documented the decline in US strategic costs, but also a reply to Mr Warnke in which I said again that US strategic costs had not "escalated" but had gone down. "On Clarifying Objectives of Arms Control," ACIS Working Paper No. 1, Programme in Arms Control and International Security, University of California at Los Angeles, April 1976, p. 22.

[53] Arms race theorists, faced recently with the divergence of strategic budgets from their theory of how they should behave, have suggested that the decline in the total strategic budget since it includes defensive forces merely displays the benefit of SALT I, which limited ABM. But the May 1972 agreements could hardly have affected anything before FY 1973, and the strategic defences declined drastically many years before that. See, for example, "The Advocates," WETA-TV programme cited above.

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to buy and deploy a new system; much less on the operation and maintenance of the system once in; and hardly at all on its phasing out. In particular, the present exponents of arms race doctrines have had their gaze focused on the introduction of new systems—in line with their dominant preoccupation with innovation. As advocates they have been very much in on the beginnings, in favour of the new systems in the 1950s and generally against them in the 1960s. But the phasing out seems to escape their attention.

Systems starting from zero or near it are likely to grow very rapidly in the initial phases; they can scarcely go down. It is easy apparently to slip into the belief that there has been an "across-the-board growth of our own strategic forces." [54] However, an examination of the components of the strategic budget and an analysis of the entry into the force and the exit of various combat vehicles suggests the broad solution to the puzzle as to how this popular impressionistic doctrine can fit the facts so poorly.

US strategic forces have not grown "across the board." On the contrary, as new systems were brought in, many others, including some very expensive ones, were taken out. At the end of FY 1956, for example, the strategic force included nearly 1,500 B-47 and RB-47 medium bombers, some 270 B-36 and RB-36 heavy bombers, a remnant of the B-50s and B-29s, and nearly 850 KC 97 and KC 29 tanker aircraft, all of which have since made their exit, along with or preceded by a drastic reduction in overseas strategic operating bases and a multi-billion dollar cut in overseas stocks for strategic forces. Between 1956 and the late 1960s the B-58 supersonic bomber, the Snark intercontinental cruise missile, the Atlas ICBM and the Titan I ICBM have come and gone. So also have the Bomarc area defence missile and most of the Nike-Hercules and fighter interceptors. In fact, air defence vehicles, promoted so vigorously in the 1950s by many who oppose them today as destabilizing, show an exponential decline from a peak of over 8,000 in 1959 to a force less than one-seventh as large in 1972; and to less than that now.

The terms of the public debate have been scandalously loose and they have received very little critical attention from the media. SALT rhetoric and headlines linking new strategic programmes to "Record Defense Spending" help the impression that strategic budgets especially must be out of control, since they are spotted as the main culprit in the general increase. In real terms, however, there has been no general increase in defence spending since 1968. Witness Figure 13. Picking on the strategic budget as the guilty party in the non-existent general increase in the defence budget as a whole seems particularly absurd, since the strategic decline has been larger, more consistent, and more durable. But guilt by association has its effect, because the smaller

[54] Nancy Lipton and L. S. Rodberg, "The Missile Race—The Contest with Ourselves," in *The Pentagon Watchers* (New York, 1970), p. 301.

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Figure 12
Strategic Forces Costs that Follow from the Number of Combat Units and the Brookings Method I Direct plus Arbitrarily Allocated Costs


Billions of US dollars
Year
Brookings Method I direct plus arbitrarily allocated costs for strategic forces
Strategic forces costs that follow from the number of combat units

Figure 13
Total Defence Obligational Authority (Sum of Programmes I-X) (in Constant FY 1976 Dollars—Billions)



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LOS ANGELES TIMES FEBRUARY 5, 1974

Record Defense Spending Plan Includes New Nuclear Systems

BY RUDY ABRAMSON
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—President Nixon Monday sent Congress a defense budget surpassing the peak spending period of World War II and laying the foundation for a new generation of nuclear weapons as insurance against the failure of strategic arms talks with the Soviet Union.

"If negotiations fail and the Soviet Union seeks military advantage," Mr. Nixon said in his budget message, "the United States must be prepared to increase its forces quickly and effectively."

"Because the time required for development and deployment of major weapons systems is long, decisions made today will shape the ability of the United States to maintain its strength 5 to 10 years from now."

In asking a record defense outlay of $87.7 billion in the year beginning next July 1, the Administration proposed an $8.4 billion Pentagon research and development program plus more than $1 billion for the Atomic Energy Commission's nuclear weapons and propulsion projects.

Besides continuing work on the new B-1 strategic bomber and the giant Trident missile-firing submarine, the Defense Department asked Congress for $249 million for research and development on:

—Larger warheads for intercontinental ballistic missiles.

—Improved accuracy for ICBMs.

—A new missile-firing submarine smaller than those in the current Polaris-Poseidon fleet.

—Mobile ICBMs, which would be

Please Turn to Page 21, Col. 1





Times charts by Russell Arasmith

Figure 14

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decline in total defence budgets is more easily obscured by neglecting inflation.

It is hard to fault the media when academics and politicians who specialize in defence and arms control matters themselves make such blunders, but even so the media handling of the defence budget in recent years needs some comment. Take the distinction between real and inflated changes in dollar amounts. Although there are some sophisticated questions about methods of allowing for inflation, the gross sense of the distinction is not at all arcane. Newsmen handle it all the time without stumbling. When in a recession year, 1970, the American gross national product neared $1 trillion ($970·1 billion) by comparison with $930·3 billion the preceding year, no headline greeted the news by announcing a record advance in production. On the contrary, the press observed that the GNP in 1970 was lower in real terms than it had been the year before. But year after year of Defense Department requests for budgets lower in "real" terms than the 1968 peak have been announced as "record budgets," apparently because in this case the media regard the distinction as unreal. And a press that with some justice prides itself on its energetic factual investigations is considerably weaker on analysis and reflection about even moderately complex matters. There, predisposition is more likely to hold sway.

The sloppiness is suggested in the largely unconscious predispositions implicit in the way the data are described or pictured. One can find examples among good journalists and excellent newspapers. Take the following case shown in Figure 14 of the Los Angeles *Times* announcing the new defence budget request in February 1974. The article headlines "Record Defense Spending" and suggests the primary cause for the increase in new strategic nuclear weapons of the kind that SALT is supposed to limit. Thus the lead paragraph states "... a defense budget surpassing the peak spending period of World War II and laying the foundation for a new generation of nuclear weapons...." Only later in the article is it acknowledged that inflation might have something to do with the budget increases, and even then in wording that suggests this may just be a Pentagon claim—"While the research on new nuclear weapons systems could portend massive new spending several years hence, the $6·3 billion increase in the Pentagon's new budget largely was attributed to pay increases and in higher costs across the board for hardware and supplies."

The graph, "Ten Year Trend of Federal Spending" accompanying the article, not only reinforces the impression that National Defence expenditures have been steadily climbing; it also suggests to the casual reader that they are the primary reason for the growth in the total federal budget. This effect results from piling the "National Defence" expenditures on top of those for "Human Resources."

Figure 15 is a redrawing of this chart for clarity, and Figure 16 shows

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Figure 15
Ten-Year Trend of Federal Spending



Source: *L A Times* Chart, 5 February 1974.

Figure 16
Trend of Federal Spending—With National Defence Rather Than Human Resources on Bottom



Source: *L A Times* Chart, 5 February 1974.

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Figure 17
Trend of Federal Spending—Adjusted for Inflation
(Constant FY 1974 Dollars)



Source: *L A Times* Chart, 5 February 1974.

Figure 18
Brookings' Historical versus Brookings' Projected Strategic Costs
(including "Overhead")



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exactly the same data as Figure 15 at exactly the same scale.[55] The only change is that National Defence is now presented on the bottom rather than Human Resources. The resulting chart gives quite a different and more accurate impression than that in the article. It shows that the major source of the increase in federal spending has been due to increases in Human Resources, not National Defence.

But even Figure 16 is misleading, since it is in current dollars and hence ignores the effects of inflation. Figure 17 presents the data of Figure 16 adjusted for inflation, i.e. in dollars of constant purchasing power. We now see a *downward* trend in National Defence spending that is more than overcome by an *upward* trend in spending for Human Resources. (In fact, more authoritative results indicate a sharper downward trend for National Defence expenditures than is shown in Figure 16. The data in the original article contain some anomalies. Retirement pay seems to have been included in the " National Defence " category, and this would help to explain the slower decline shown.)

Belief in an exploding arms race is so ingrained by now in the way the media look at things that it seems even the chartmakers and layout men make their own *trompe l'œil* contribution to its existence.

However, the regular annual alarms in the press about an upward trend in the strategic budget can often point to economic projections *for several future years*, based on gleanings from testimony before Congress on Defence Department and service plans. Such indications of plans can mislead in the same way as comparing this year's budget request with the last enacted budget, but even more so, since the long-term plans are even more tentative and subject to attrition than requests formally submitted to Congress. They must run a recurring gauntlet through many stages of bargaining and review within Defence, Budget, the White House, and Congress. It is appropriate to study the uncertain long-term costs implicit in various defence plans, but not to treat them as if they reflected the likely course of defence spending. Brookings says as much: " A note of warning must be emphasized. The projections should not be taken as predictions of future defense budgets. . . ." [56] As with drugs and cigarettes, however, users may ignore the warning label. (Even Brookings, normally more careful than its readers, sometimes forgets its own warning.) In any case, Figure 18 shows vividly that year after year Brookings' projections of strategic cost have sloped steeply upward, as year after year the actual budgets have continued to decline.

[55] Figures 15 and 16 were drawn by first reading the data points on the graphs in the original article as carefully as possible using a ruler and set square. I do not know the source of the data used or kinds of budget moneys employed (e.g. obligational authority, expenditures, or other); or what definitions were used for the three categories displayed, and I have made no attempt to justify the data or explain the anomalies in it. In particular, I am at a loss to explain why National Defence expenditures show a decline from 1974 to 1975, even though the article talks about a $6·3 billion increase.

[56] B. M. Blechman, E. M. Gramlich, R. W. Hartman, *Setting National Priorities: the 1975 Budget* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 306.

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This perpetual picture, so useful in budget battles, of a strategic budget on the point of exploding, sticks in our mind rather than any glimpse of actual history.

There is an amusing paradox, intelligible only in political debating terms, about the one-eyed vision displayed by exponents of arms race doctrines. On the one hand they fail to observe the increasingly obvious fact that in spite of their theory of invariable American overestimation of the size of Russian strategic forces, these forces have for many years systematically exceeded our expectation. Their one good eye in this case is focused on any momentary pause in the continuing deployment and expansion of existing strategic weapons systems. They turn a blind eye when the Russians start new systems. They see the Russians stopping, seldom starting. On the other hand, when it comes to US strategic forces, they can barely preserve their belief that the American strategic budget is rising at an accelerating rate by fixing their gaze narrowly on the phasing in of new systems or their continuance and by neglecting the phasing out of the old. For the Americans, it seems, they notice the the starts, not the stops. If they cannot find a trend of increase in the plunging figures of the last 24 years, they find it in rosy service visions of the future, undampened by Executive or Congressional budget considerations.

However one explains the failure of arms race theorists to note the deviation of reality from their theory, it is quite plain that reality has diverged massively—not only in the facts of *under*estimation that destroy a principal element of the supposed dynamics of the arms race, but also in the plain fact that the United States has not been running a quantitative strategic race.

It would be possible to present similar results for many other measures: for example, while strategic defence vehicles have declined for a decade and a half from a peak more than *seven* times their present number, offence vehicles have remained roughly the same for many years. The total of strategic vehicles therefore has gone down. The point should be very clear. There is no serious evidence of a quantitative strategic spiral.

That is quite a different point from saying that as a result of these declines, we are uniformly worse off. While I have differed with many specific development and deployment decisions, on the whole my view is that the net effect of changes over this long period, from the mid-1950s through the 1960s to the present time, has been an improvement in our force in key respects. *My view is indeed the opposite of the commonplace about the exponential arms race which has it that as we have spent more and more on our strategic forces, our security has steadily declined.* To evaluate the commonplace we need to consider the nature of the major qualitative innovations in strategic forces and their net effect.

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IV

The Net Effect of Qualitative Change

Theories of the quantitative strategic race are an extraordinary muddle of errors and self-deceptions. Yet notions about "qualitative races" may be even worse off. In fact the Secretary of State recently expressed a longing for a "conceptual breakthrough" that would bring our understanding of qualitative races up to the present standard on the quantitative strategic race. Heaven forfend! the modesty of this desire, however, may measure the current confusion about qualitative competition.

Though discussion is far from rigorous, the kinds of changes usually thought of as "qualitative" are alterations in some relevant unit performance characteristic. The most obvious historical example is the thousand-fold increase in the average unit explosive yield accomplished by the first A-bombs. A second, almost equally famous example is the introduction of the H-bomb in the 1950s which, as originally envisaged, was expected to multiply the yield of a single A-bomb again a thousand-fold. Another equally crucial case is the increase in the average speed of a strategic vehicle from about 500 to 13,000 miles per hour, made possible by the development of intercontinental rockets. Other unit performance characteristics affected by innovation have been mentioned earlier—blast resistance, concealability, accuracy, reliability, and controllability, or resistance to "accidental" or unauthorized use.

Some technical changes, it seems obvious, might worsen the position of everybody. Indeed, many now think that not rare but typical even of civilian technology, which is increasingly assigned all the hyperbolic traits recently attributed by the Secretary of State to military technology: it has "developed a momentum of its own," is "at odds with the human capacity to comprehend it," is, in brief, "out of control." Shades of Friedrich Juenger. Or Jacques Ellul who holds: "Technique itself . . . selects among the means to be employed. The human being is no longer in any sense the agent of choice," and "everything which is technique is necessarily used as soon as it is available, without distinction of good or evil. This is the principal law of our age." [57] The use of the A-bomb for Ellul only illustrates this law and is a symbol of "technical evolution" in general. Such symbols recall the cloudy determinism of Oswald Spengler's portentous "that which is a possibility is a necessity."

For environmentalists today, as for Juenger, a civilian technology out of control is the source more typically for polluting than humanizing the environment. We owe the environmental movement a debt for stressing that it is important in choosing among technologies to take into careful account the indirect, long-term, and public costs as well as the direct, immediate, and private costs of technical change. It has unfortunately also encouraged the revival of a more general Luddite view

[57] *The Technological Society* (New York, 1964), pp. 80, 99. Cf. Friedrich Juenger, *The Failure of Technology* (Chicago, 1956), pp. 163–4.

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of technology as a threat to us all. The Luddite view moreover is particularly tempting when it comes to military technology. Most of us have little affection for weapons; and weapons improvements are likely to arouse a good deal less enthusiasm than technical advances in general. It is easy to believe that such "improvements" might make things worse all around.

However, just as in the civilian case one can only choose *among* technologies and it is highly unlikely that existing technologies are ideal, so also in the military case it is extremely implausible that current technologies are optimal, that they fit our political purposes beyond any possibility of improvement. We have to choose and we do. But the conditions of thoughtful choice are only obscured by the immoderate rhetoric, characteristic of Ellul, and also typical of the arms debate in the post-Sputnik era. So Lipton and Rodberg talk of the "mystique of technological progress within the defense establishment, where feasibility *is equated with obligation, where if we can build it, we must.*" [58] A purple passage of that sort is expressive. But what is its meaning? It has no plain application to the real world in which a very long list of development projects were cancelled after much spending, but before deployment.[59] And many more development ideas were stillborn before any substantial money had been spent in their pursuit.

Moreover, it is clear that qualitative changes need not affect both sides badly. Some changes might benefit one side primarily as radar favoured the British more than the Germans in the second world war). Still others might conceivably help both, since the two sides have some objectives in common. So, for example, fail-safe techniques that prevent a war from starting by mistake through a failure of communication or a false alarm, or Permissive Action Links that prevent local arming of weapons without a release from a remote responsible command centre, and modes of protection that make it possible to ride out an attack and depend less on hair-trigger response. Neither side would like to see a nuclear war start by "accident" or through some unauthorized act.

The problem of judging the effect of a specific qualitative change in key performance parameters is complicated by the fact that it may be ambiguous. It may serve the interests of just one adversary in some particular respect and in another respect the interests of both. For example, improvements in reconnaissance may permit more precise location and destruction of a target, but also may reduce collateral damage and serve as a key national means of verifying that alterations

[58] Op. cit. p. 302. Cf. Richard Barnet, "The National Security Bureaucracy and Military Intervention," delivered at Adlai Stevenson Institution, 3 June 1968, p. 27.

[59] Nuclear propelled aircraft, started in 1951 and cancelled 10 years later; the XB-70 bomber started in 1958 and cancelled in 1967; the Hard Rock Silo project, started in 1968 and cancelled in 1970; the SCAD Armed Decoys begun in 1968 and cancelled in 1973; the Navajo ramjet intercontinental missile begun in 1954, cancelled in 1957; the Rascal, the Skybolt, the mobile medium range ballistic missile, Regulus II, the Manned Orbiting Lab, and so on.

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in an adversary's force are no more menacing than is permitted by an arms treaty. The SALT agreements would be infeasible without precise national means of surveillance other than ground inspection. No case-by-case analysis of qualitative changes since the mid-1950s can be given. However, it is unnecessary for the purpose of evaluating the Luddite stereotype in the contemporary debate. According to that stereotype, major innovations (1) lead to new and higher levels of strategic expenditure, (2) make strategic forces more destructive, (3) make them less secure, and (4) make them harder to control politically. To test this familiar view, it is important to look broadly at the net outcome of such major technological innovations as the development of fusion weapons and strategic rocketry.

Before forming some judgment on this subject, it may provide perspective to observe that the view of innovation as generating an unstable arms race, though widespread in recent times, is by no means universal. One of the few serious studies of arms races, that by Samuel P. Huntington, held that military innovation was fundamentally benign, among other reasons because it enabled the redeployment rather than the increase of arms budgets.[60] Moreover, since it did not increase the share of national resources devoted to defence, it did not produce the strains leading to war, but in fact made war less likely.

Huntington's hypothesis about the effect of technological change, though it runs counter to the present fashion, is by no means implausible. A qualitative improvement has to do with some relevant performance characteristics of a weapon. Painting bombs blue, for example, would not generally qualify as an improvement. Increasing the explosive yield for a given weight or the accuracy of delivery would. Such changes mean that effectiveness per unit or per dollar is increased and this implies in turn that a given task might be done with fewer units or at less expense.

To meet an adverse change in a potential enemy's force, then, a government has the alternative, through qualitative change, to redeploy resources, just as Huntington asserts, rather than simply to multiply them. He also points out that a self-imposed or a treaty constraint on improving qualitative performance may impel a simple multiplication of units—that is, it may generate a quantitative race. Moreover, though it is possible that opposing governments may blindly introduce changes that worsen the position of both sides, and though it is surely true that governments make a lot of bad choices, they have plenty of incentives for looking beyond the immediate consequences of a procurement decision. And not all of their choices have been grossly wrong. It is not hard to dig up governmental analyses, good and bad, that look well beyond the next immediate step.

[60] Samuel P. Huntington, "Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results," *Public Policy*, Vol. 8, Carl J. Friedrich and Seymour E. Harris, eds. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958).

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Conventional arms race theory presupposes a totally mechanical or instinctual behaviour, that reacts only to the immediate move, never looking forward. But it is by no means clear that governments are as fatally concentrated on the immediate as arms race theorists debating the current budget. Both the US and the Russians introduced (in good part independently) the revolutionary technologies of rocketry and fusion weapons. But we made adaptations in our force that exploited these technologies precisely to avoid the kind of deterioration the dogma suggests is automatic.

The main methods worked out in the early 1950s for protecting the strategic force based in the United States for the rest of the decade depended on tactical warning and a rapid, safely repeatable response by our force that did not commit it to war on the basis of substantially uncertain warning. These methods could work reasonably well, so long as the speed of attacking vehicles was that typical of manned aircraft. But it soon became clear that strategic rockets were likely to be a feasible operational component of strategic forces in the 1960s.

Rockets, because of their speed, might, in current jargon, have been described as "intrinsically destabilizing." However, no single performance characteristic taken in isolation, whether speed or accuracy or whatever, can be so established. If one had believed that speed was intrinsically destabilizing, one might conceivably have tried to get an agreement banning rockets altogether; or tried to increase their travel time by getting agreements to use extreme lofted trajectories; or—still more far-fetched—an agreement to orbit them several times before landing; or (as in the 1958 Surprise Attack Conference) to construct an elaborate international warning system shared with adversaries in order to preserve the possibility of timely, secure response. Instead of trying simply to stop or slow down technology, the tack taken to maintain an improved second strike capability was to make unilateral adaptations that exploited both the initial limitations of the new rockets, specifically their great inaccuracy, and also their substantial advantages for defence penetration and for developing new, cheaper, and better modes of protection against attack, including mobility. Useful adaptations of the new techniques were feasible, even though our understanding of them was only partial and uncertain. Our adjustments to them did not have to be made all at once. They were made incrementally as various pitfalls and opportunities presented by these techniques became plainer.

In short, in spite of the recent as well as the age-old romantic antagonism to technology and the belief expressed by such critics of technology as Jacques Ellul, we are not slaves to technique. We can and do make technical choices, and in doing so sometimes improve matters. The alternative is an indiscriminate hostility to innovation *per se*, but that rests on the implicit assumption that the point at which we have arrived cannot possibly be improved—a rather odd view for the critics of technology to hold, who otherwise stress the arbitrary and irrational

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process by which past decisions on development have been made. In effect, an antagonism to all innovation amounts to a sentimental attachment to older technology rather than a hostility to technique in general.

A study of the major changes in technologies from the 1950s to the present and their effects on the strategic force supports the view that whatever the false starts and mistakes in detail, on the whole the outcome was exactly the reverse of the stereotype in the four respects listed above.

Much of this is implicit in the analysis of quantitative changes already offered. So I can be brief. First, strategic spending did not rise to new levels. From the late-1950s it fell almost by two-thirds. Second, the relative destructiveness of our strategic forces as measured by EMT declined. Moreover, in precise contradiction to the standard view, this decline responded in good part to the increased size and effectiveness of actual and anticipated Soviet active defences. On the whole, the shifts in the American force from gravity bombs to air-to-surface missiles carried on strategic aircraft and to ICBMs and SLBMs themselves were in the first instance basically a response to the formidable growth of Russian air defences. But these as well as later developments meant a drastic reduction in total and average explosive yield and in EMT. Third, through such devices as placing rockets on submarines moving continuously underwater or in highly blast-resistant complex silos, the strategic forces became less vulnerable than they had been in the 1950s—with a resultant increase in stability. In the mid-1950s our strategic forces were concentrated at a few points, were soft, slow to respond, inadequately warned, and inadequately protected by active defence.[61] The Soviet forces were even more vulnerable, and remained so much longer, but greatly improved in this respect in the mid-1960s. Fourth, the controllability of the force was improved by the very methods of protection adopted, which made hair-trigger response unnecessary; also by a variety of fail-safe devices and arrangements permitting positive control and by improving the protection of the command and control arrangements themselves.

Finally, many of the measures that so improved the strategic force were adopted self-consciously as alternatives to simply multiplying the force and increasing budgets. They did not undertake the hopeless task of stopping qualitative change. Rather, they adapted qualitative change roughly to our purposes, not all of which are incompatible with those of potential adversaries.

The combination of fusion weapons and missiles that enabled us to choose cheaper, safer, less destructive and better-controlled strategic forces were some of the very technologies that were thought at the time

[61] For a contemporary analysis of the vulnerability of strategic forces in 1956, see, for example, Wohlstetter, Hoffman, Rowen, *Protecting US Power to Strike Back in the 1950s and 1960s* (RAND, R-290, September 1956), pp. 30, 41. For earlier analyses by the same authors see *The Selection of Strategic Bases* (R-244S, April 1953) and *The Selection and Use of Strategic Air Base Systems* (R-266, March 1954).

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inevitably to have the opposite effects. Fusion warheads and the vastly increased speed of strategic rockets in particular made obsolete existing methods of protecting strategic forces, but they opened up new opportunities to increase the stability of the force. The principal effect of fusion technology was not so much to make weapons higher in yield, but to make low- and medium-yield weapons smaller, lighter and cheaper. This in turn made it possible to put them in rockets more easily protected by blast shelters or in constantly moving submarines. An attempt simply to stop or slow this technology would have reduced the survivability of deterrent forces and therefore diminished international stability.

Increasing the Choices

Perverse current dogmas centre most of all on an attempt to stop or slow technologies of discrimination and control. However, the remarkable improvements in accuracy and control in prospect will permit non-nuclear weapons to replace nuclear ones in a wide range of contingencies. Moreover, such improvements will permit new forms of mobility for strategic forces, making it easier for deterrent forces to survive. More important, they will also increase the range of choice to include more discriminate, less brutal, less suicidal responses to attack—responses that are more believable. And only a politically believable response will deter.

Some technologies reduce the range of political choice; some increase it. If our concern about technology getting beyond political control is genuine rather than rhetorical, then we should actively encourage the development of techniques that increase the possibilities of political control. There will be a continuing need for the exercise of thought to make strategic forces secure and discriminatingly responsive to our aims, and to do this as economically as we can. Agreements with adversaries can play a useful role, but they cannot replace national choice. And neither the agreements nor the national choices are aided by the sort of hysteria implicit in theories of a strategic race always on the point of exploding.

Language and the Present Political Chaos

> Political language—and with variations this is true of all political parties, from Conservatives to Anarchists—is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind.

Orwell, who said that, prescribed never using a metaphor you are used to seeing in print as his very first rule for reducing the decay. That would cut the vast clutter of images about racing and uncapped volcanoes that we use in order to hide from ourselves what has been happening and what the issues are. In the chaotic "debate" about Vladivostok, the proponents claimed it would put a "cap" or "lid"

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on the explosive increase. Opponents, from Senator Jackson to the Left, said it wouldn't: like SALT I, it would only force the continuing of the spiral in strategic spending. But before and after SALT I, the spiral was pure wind; and it will be wind in the present political circumstance with or without SALT II. For the United States, one might conceivably talk about a "shoe" or a "floor," but hardly a "cap." Vladivostok also illustrates the absurdity of the exaggerated threat/"worst case" dynamic. Here, overblown estimates of future Russian programmes may lend a specious urgency to rapid agreement—another "miracle" for the Secretary.

And when Secretary Kissinger asks, "What in the name of God is strategic superiority . . . at these levels?" he seems to be saying that it does not make any difference how many more missiles the Russians have than we—in which case it is hard to see any urgency in agreement. He sometimes explicitly means that it makes no difference, because each side now can—in the stereotype—kill every man, woman, and child several times over. But that is an example of exactly the use of language Orwell had in mind. For it implies in fine moral tones that we should measure the adequacy of our weapons in terms of the number of civilians they can kill. The Secretary, however, does not believe that. He has also said that attacks on population are a "political impossibility, not to say a moral impossibility." I am all for probing the premises of thought on arms and arms-control which the Secretary is said to want. But that can only start when we face up to evasions making "murder respectable" in such chaste phrases as "counter-value attacks" and in all the unreflective vocabulary of the arms race. This is an important part of rethinking policy about our relations with allies and adversaries, long overdue and essential for reducing the present chaos.

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The Puzzle of European Defence: The Issue of Arms Procurement

Elliot R. Goodman

IT is finally beginning to dawn on members of the Atlantic Alliance that the existing pattern of arms procurement for the defence of Europe is heading for disaster.

At present, nearly a dozen European states are attempting to produce military goods in small or medium-sized national markets that are highly protected and highly inefficient. These military markets have continued to receive national subsidies and other forms of protection and therefore have not been subjected to the healthy erosion of economic barriers which has affected the civilian economy of the European Community. The European arms industries consequently have relatively limited funds for research and development, and for the actual production of military equipment. The small scale of their operations means short production runs and high unit costs.

The United States, on the other hand, has relatively large funds available for R and D and it produces on a large scale, which permits long production runs and lower unit costs. Moreover, the high quality of American management usually means that American weapons have a shorter development time than comparable European systems. As Alastair Buchan had noted: "The dilemma that haunts any European government which commits R and D funds to a defence project is that it may get a certain distance, find a broadly equivalent American project being developed at greater speed, and discover that its European neighbours who have not committed R and D funds would rather buy the cheaper American product." [1] Other factors, such as aggressive American sales tactics and the German practice of buying American equipment to offset the US balance of payments on military account in Europe, have aggravated the disparities that exist between the US and European arms industries.

The result of all these factors is an enormous imbalance between the arms Europe purchases from the US as opposed to those the US purchases from Europe. Strangely, precise data are lacking on this subject, but informed estimates run from a 10:1 to a 15:1 ratio in favour of America. And, in the absence of fundamental structural reforms of the European arms industries, the situation is only likely to deteriorate further. Technologically complex, sophisticated equipment tends to become obsolescent at an alarmingly fast pace, and each new generation of sophisticated weapons costs increasingly large, sometimes immensely

[1] Alastair Buchan, "The Implications of a European System for Defence Technology," in *The United States and Europe: Defence, Technology and the Western Alliance*. The Institute for Strategic Studies (London, 1967), p. 4.

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large, sums. While there will be some exceptions in the development of isolated European weapons, generally speaking the prospect is for Europe progressively to drop out of the technology race and to become an industrial backwater, relegated to a position of technological inferiority.

SOME observers look hopefully to a new arms technology that promises to provide inexpensive but extremely effective weapons. Their general adoption might make it possible for Europe to avoid being priced out of the weapons market, while also reducing the US defence bill. The dramatically increased accuracy of precision-guided munitions, operated by radar, electro-optical, laser and infra-red homing, and correlation guidance, makes highly probable a one shot—one kill ratio. Moreover, their use introduces a new flexibility and control over combat operations that guarantees target destruction at increasingly long ranges, while minimizing collateral damage. Thus even if in some cases the unit cost of "smart" bombs is higher than the old "dumb" bombs, their enhanced accuracy makes them many times more cost-effective. The Yom Kippur War left no doubt about the devastating effect of new anti-aircraft and anti-tank guided weapons. Moreover the development of remotely piloted vehicles, which would replace aeroplanes flown by human pilots, could make major savings. The advantage the Warsaw Pact forces have over the NATO forces in Central Europe in terms of tanks and strike aircraft might be nullified by the new technology which makes weapons with greatly increased accuracy and firepower available to small defensive units. This might permit the defence to overwhelm the offensive.

While all these substantial advantages are in the offing, we should nevertheless not look upon the new technology as the panacea for all of NATO's ills. While the new weapons systems are likely to be available in abundance and at low cost for the shorter-range battlefield systems, "both long-range and all-weather precision-guided munitions now under development," a weapons specialist testifies, "will cost far more than present-generation systems."[2] Nor does the new weapons technology basically alter the argument for economy of scale in arms production, so as to provide an efficient return on the defence investment. The comparative advantage of producing arms in the United States over the smaller European markets would make it likely that the Europeans would buy much of the new weapons technology from America, thereby perpetuating the imbalance in arms trade across the Atlantic. And should the separate European countries supply themselves with these new weapons, there is the possibility of ending up equipping NATO forces with several incompatible national weapons models. In short, while the new technology is important, and should be employed where possible,

[2] Richard Burt, "New Weapons Technologies and European Security," *Orbis*, Summer, 1975, p. 526. See also all of the Burt article, ibid. pp. 514–32, and John H. Morse, "New Weapons Technologies: Implications for NATO," ibid. pp. 497–513.

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in itself technology cannot solve the basic structural problems of the Atlantic Alliance, which are economic and political in nature.

THE prospect of a continued lop-sided dependence of Europe upon America is obviously unhealthy for Europe. But it is also unhealthy for the United States as well, since such an unequal relationship can only breed resentment and apathy in Europe and accentuate the factors that are divisive in the Alliance. Moreover, to the extent that Europe continues to fall behind in the production of expensive, high-technology equipment, it is by no means certain that the United States can by itself carry the whole NATO burden for sophisticated arms procurement. While the US defence budget has risen steadily, the increases have been almost entirely eaten up by higher personnel pay and other operating expenses. As a result, the proportion of the budget spent on R and D and arms procurement has fallen from 48·4 per cent of the budget in the fiscal year 1954 to 29·8 per cent in 1974. During this same period R and D costs have shot up, with the consequence that the number of weapons systems under development as well as the number of units actually procured has fallen rapidly. The Warsaw Pact, on the other hand, has seen no such increase in personnel pay, while the dramatic rise in the Soviet defence budget has meant that by the fiscal year 1976 the Soviet Union outspent the United States by 20 per cent in R and D and by 25 per cent in procurement.[3] It should be obvious in this competition that the United States, and NATO, face a bleak future if the West continues to rely primarily upon America, which is already pressing the limits of its resources. It is only by a rational reorganization of the resources of all of the NATO allies that this challenge can be met, and this can only be accomplished by restructuring the arms trade on both sides of the Atlantic.

The present irrational use of resources that is the consequence of fragmented and competing national efforts has resulted in an enormous waste of economic resources and manpower in all the NATO countries. At a time when there is increasing pressure on all defence expenditures, there is also a huge, uneconomic duplication of effort. This takes the form not only of waste in the procurement of weapons, but also of the equally costly expenses for the maintenance of spares and of separate national systems of logistical support. In a careful study by Thomas A. Callaghan, Jr, undertaken for the US State and Defence Departments, it is concluded that the NATO allies annually waste more than 10 thousand million dollars in their needlessly duplicative defence efforts.[4]

Beyond an intolerable waste of money, the fragmented national arms programmes have also presented NATO with an intolerable incom-

[3] Thomas A. Callaghan, Jr, *U.S.-European Economic Cooperation in Military and Civil Technology*, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University (Washington, D.C., 2nd rev. ed., Sept. 1975), pp. 84–85. The author gladly acknowledges his indebtedness for the general line of his argument to Mr Callaghan's excellent monograph.

[4] Ibid., p. 37.

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patibility in weapons systems and equipment. On the Central European front, for example, the NATO forces are equipped with 23 different types of fighter aircraft, 23 different types of anti-tank missiles, 8 different types of light tanks, and 7 different types of main battle tanks.[5] Even in the ACE Mobile Force, which is the showpiece of allied cooperation in Europe, units of seven NATO countries which constantly train and operate together are prevented from becoming a truly cohesive force by virtue of their lack of standardized equipment. Each of the seven national units must maintain its own logistics personnel and its own separate logistic support system. The commander of this combined force has determined that if his troops used standardized arms and equipment, he could make them combat-ready in half the time, as well as cutting his logistic personnel and his airlift requirements in half.[6] Needless to say, these improved forces would also cost much less to maintain.

Not only are NATO logistics a nightmare, but the inability of allied forces to operate effectively side by side could be crucial in time of emergency. A recent NATO exercise showed that the lack of common frequencies and codes for data transmission and of standard systems for identification of friend or foe caused the NATO forces to shoot down large numbers of *their own* aircraft. Of the planes theoretically destroyed, more than half were of NATO origin.[7]

ONE possible effort to remedy the dependent position of Europe as well as take a large step towards arms standardization would be the creation of a European Defence Community, somewhat along the lines of the EDC that met with defeat in 1954. Some European federalists argue that while it is not possible for the defence industries of the European states to survive individually, they could prosper if they would only pool their resources and produce equipment for an assured Europe-wide market. As in the case of the European Economic Community, the European arms market would be protected by a common tariff barrier both to encourage Europeans to buy from one another and to achieve in large measure a Europe that was self-sufficient in arms.

Second thoughts would suggest major drawbacks to this scheme. Discrimination against defence purchases from the United States might incite American discrimination against European exports, not only in defence equipment but in closely-related fields such as aerospace. Furthermore this approach, which would aim at Europe-wide standardization, would not solve the standardization problem on a NATO-wide basis. Instead of drawing the two sides of the Atlantic together, it would drive them apart, and conceivably could have a disintegrative impact

[5] Report of Senator John Culver to the Senate Armed Services Committee, June 1975; quoted in Assembly, Western European Union, Document 689, 1 Dec. 1975, Appendix I, p. 16.

[6] Gardiner L. Tucker, "Standardization and the Joint Defence," *NATO Review*, Jan. 1975, pp. 11–12.

[7] Ibid., p. 12.

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on NATO. In so far as an EDC could not, by itself, provide for all of Europe's security needs—and presumably it could not—NATO would still be necessary. Finally, an attempt to create a fully supranational European Defence Community would be politically too demanding, in the foreseeable future at any rate. While Europe may be taking hesitant steps towards union, full union in defence affairs will doubtless be not one of its next but one of its last major achievements.

A MORE attractive option that could overcome these objections would be the creation of a European Arms Procurement Organization operating within the context of an Atlantic Common Arms Market. Such an organization would differ basically in purpose and structure from a complete military union, such as was envisaged by an EDC. Its powers would be limited to planning, financing and managing the procurement of arms in Europe by aggregating, or joining together, the separate national arms producers in Europe into a single European arms market. This market would not, however, seek to produce arms primarily for European needs nor aim at European self-sufficiency in arms. Rather it would be the European half of an Atlantic Common Arms Market, which would compete with the United States and Canada on the other side of the ocean, to produce arms on a NATO-wide basis. This would not only provide the necessary economies of scale for producers on both sides of the Atlantic, but it would also substantially solve the problem of arms standardization for NATO, since the arms purchased would be used to supply all NATO forces. Operating under those conditions, a European arms agency would not be divisive, but would preserve and indeed strengthen the trans-Atlantic NATO bond. A true interdependence of each side of the Atlantic on the other in the realm of military equipment would unavoidably bring in its wake stronger political interdependence.

The details of constituting a European Arms Procurement Organization should, of course, be left to the Europeans. In general terms, this should consist of an arrangement whereby the participating states would fund the arms agency, which, in turn, would award contracts and make the actual purchase of equipment on behalf of its members. The basic decision about establishing military requirements, however, should not be left to the European Arms Procurement Organization, any more than it should be left to the Pentagon. Since both would be purchasing equipment for NATO-wide use, the determination of military requirements should be a NATO function and be entrusted to a NATO body. Perhaps this could be a function of the NATO Military Committee, or in view of the esteem with which the Supreme Allied Commander Europe has traditionally been held, perhaps this determination could be worked up by his staff at SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe). This could be a matter for negotiation among the NATO partners.

Once the decision had been made about what military equipment

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would be required, the determination of actual specifications and production standards would be a matter to be worked out between the European Arms Procurement Organization and the Pentagon, in consultation with appropriate Canadian officials. It is only at this point that the two sides of the Atlantic would enter into competition to produce arms and equipment within the agreed standardized guidelines. The result would be a more balanced trans-Atlantic trade in military goods that would eliminate the unhealthy dependence of one side on the other.

While the formation of a European arms agency along these lines would not be as politically ambitious as a fully fledged EDC, it would none the less represent a significant evolution in the building of Europe, and would have latent supranational implications. Moreover, the participation in the creation of an Atlantic Common Arms Market would represent a significant restructuring of trans-Atlantic arms trade. The question arises as to whether exertions even on this scale are necessary. Could we not, instead, simply search out more piecemeal, cooperative efforts at arms production among the NATO allies and move in a gradual, incremental manner toward more standardization? Essentially this is a "more-of-the-same" option, and we already know that more of the same is not good enough.

FOR a number of years various NATO allies have entered into separate co-production arrangements to create one type or another of military equipment. In each case the participating European countries realized that the production of the equipment in question would be beyond their financial and technological means if they undertook to "go it alone." While these considerations also applied in some degree to the United States, the American aims in collaborating with different European states in such co-production schemes also included the desire to transfer to Europe advanced weapons technology and to stimulate wider industrial integration in Europe. Some success was achieved towards these goals. "By means of these projects," Professor Jack Behrman noted, "Europe was brought through 15 years of technological development in missiles and aircraft within five years, it was provided a base for continuing industrial production, and its aircraft industry was restructured." [8] There was, however, no effective follow-on programme, which might have capitalized on such collaborative efforts. Instead of creating a permanent multinational arms procurement organization that could continue to guide joint weapons development, each project became simply an *ad hoc* effort which expired once the project had been completed. It would appear that such co-production projects, however laudable, are simply not capable of sustaining the progress needed to transform Europe into an equal and independent partner of the United States in the field of arms production.

[8] Jack N. Behrman, *Multinational Production Consortia: Lessons from NATO Experience*, Department of State Publication 8593 (Washington, D.C., 1971), p. 2.

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Moreover, such co-production projects generally involved no more than two or three partners. While this would standardize equipment for the partners involved, very often it did little more than that, and never did it result in standardization of equipment on a NATO-wide basis. As Callaghan rightly commented: "Standardization is a macro-economic problem." It is "not a problem that will yield to micro-economic methods—to the occasional, *ad hoc*, project-by-project approach." [9] The popular, presumedly realistic way of attacking the standardization problem has been precisely through the *ad hoc*, project-by-project approach. But it should be evident that it is anything but realistic. The true dimensions of the standardization problem amount to more than 27 thousand million dollars a year as a result of the combined NATO expenditures for the development, production and procurement of conventional weapons and equipment.[10] Occasional collaborative efforts scarcely make a dent in this figure.

One reason that the co-production efforts with which we are familiar will continue to have only a limited impact on the over-all allied military budgets is that such production consortia are extremely complicated to set up. Because of the complex nature of their negotiations they always take a long time to put in motion, and once in operation progress is often halted by interminable arguments as to which country does what. One of the traditional bones of contention revolves around the principle of *juste retour* (just return) under which each country wants to get out of the project exactly as much as it puts in. This involves not only finances, but technological and industrial advantages as well. When all of this must be accomplished within the confines of a single project there is constant juggling and balancing of interests in the name of equity, but without fail this drives up the operating costs so that the efficiency of the project suffers. It is generally conceded that the elaborate arrangements made in the name of *juste retour* cause a co-production scheme to cost from 20 to 30 per cent more than a purely national project.[11]

There is nothing wrong with the concept of *juste retour*, which seeks to be equitable, so long as it does not involve being inefficient. But, as we have seen, this is impossible when it is applied within the confines of a single project. If *juste retour* is conceived of as a balancing of inputs and rewards which arises from many transactions over an extended period of years, then it does become feasible. Such an arrangement is possible within a common arms market.

LIVING proof of this is the common market in arms which has existed between the United States and Canada ever since the second world war. Under the terms of the Hyde Park Agreement signed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mackenzie King on 20 April

[9] Callaghan, op. cit., p. 64.
[10] Ibid., p. 64.
[11] Ibid., pp. 53–56, 63. See also the entire Behrman monograph, op. cit., for a description of the complexities of co-production projects.

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1941, economic cooperation between the two countries was extended to a North American common market in defence. As this arrangement worked out in practice, military trade between the two became a genuine two-way street. The figures for the years 1958–74, for example, showed that more than 6 thousand million dollars of arms and military equipment flowed across the US-Canadian border, with about 3 thousand million dollars going in each direction. There was no effort to balance out this trade on a project or even on an annual basis, but rather to allow for the normal rise and fall of trade common to ordinary commercial goods, while seeking only to arrive at a general balance between the two partners within a long time frame. Even though Canada was economically weaker, Canadian industry was allowed to compete freely with US suppliers for defence contracts on a continuing basis. This production for each other's use also effectively standardized military equipment between the two countries. Moreover, both countries agreed upon sharing R and D projects. The United States also agreed not to duplicate any R and D work undertaken in Canada, unless the Defence Department considered such R and D to be vital for US interests. And even then, it was agreed that both parties would promptly consult each other before the United States would proceed. The result has been an effective sharing of R and D, and almost without any duplication of effort. US-Canadian defence industries operate upon a rational, interdependent basis as a result of being merged in a single common arms market.[12]

This very considerable accomplishment is, strangely, little known and appreciated, even in North America. Wider understanding about how it operates would help convince sceptics that a similar arrangement would be possible across the Atlantic. The US-Canadian precedent would not, however, serve as an exact model for a US-European arrangement, by virtue of the differences in the nature of the Canadian and European markets. The Canadians decided that they would procure their major weapons systems from the United States, where they could be produced more economically than in Canada. For its part, Canada has supplied the United States with smaller systems or weapons components. Europe, however, would certainly not want to be cast in the role of a sub-contractor to the United States. This would be neither desirable nor necessary. Once Europe has aggregated its separate, small, national arms markets, it would have the size, strength and resources to become a supplier of large, sophisticated, high unit cost weapons systems, like the United States, and it could trade with the United States on equal terms. Both would be producing for a NATO-wide market, with the consequent standardization of NATO military equipment. And their mutual dependence would necessarily foster trans-Atlantic political solidarity.

THE obstacles to these goals are fairly well known. Everywhere there are traditional vested interests in national defence industries, which have been carefully protected by national economic barriers. The small,

[12] Callaghan, op. cit., pp. 57–63.

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uneconomic arms markets in the separate European states are only kept limping along by such artificial protectionist practices. It is now becoming increasingly apparent that the mounting cost of the arms race is making these high cost, inefficient industries a luxury that the Europeans can no longer afford. It is just conceivable that these extravagant, no longer bearable economic costs may finally cause the Europeans to do something sensible, namely, draw together in a European arms market under the direction of a European Arms Procurement Organization.

Even the vast US market has been artificially sheltered behind the "Buy American" act, which applied to all its NATO allies except Canada. In October 1975 Congress adopted a "sense of the Congress" resolution stating that US forces in Europe should have equipment that is standardized or made interoperable to the maximum extent feasible with NATO allies. But Congress deleted the original language of this legislation, sponsored by Senators Culver and Nunn, which would have authorized the Secretary of Defence to procure *abroad* arms and equipment if this would help achieve standardization. This key operational clause was struck down, leaving the Buy American principle essentially intact. Our European allies have naturally long responded by requiring where possible that their own defence establishments buy at home before resorting to buying in America. Everyone has paid a high price for these arrangements, but especially the United States. If America were to buy on a large scale in Europe it would help to undermine the defensive rationale of the Europeans buying only in Europe where possible, and it would give Europeans the money to buy in America. This would greatly expand the US market, which is strong and highly competitive in any event, especially with its emphasis on technology-intensive products, and which does not need protection in the first place. In sum, both sides of the Atlantic must permit open government procurement policies if an Atlantic Common Arms Market is to be established.

A major step in this direction was finally taken when the Congress passed and on 14 July 1976 the President signed into law a revised and strengthened Culver-Nunn Amendment. In place of the previous "sense of the Congress" resolution, the new law specifically holds that NATO standardization is a matter of US *government policy*. Section 802 of the Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, fiscal year 1977, reads in part:

> It is the policy of the United States that equipment procured for the personnel of the Armed Forces of the United States stationed in Europe under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty should be standardized or at least interoperable with equipment of other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In carrying out such policy the Secretary of Defense shall, to the maximum feasible extent, initiate and carry out procurement procedures that provide for the acquisition of equipment which is standardized or interoperable with equipment of other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization whenever such equipment is to be

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> used by personnel of the Armed Forces of the United States stationed in Europe under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty. . . . Whenever the Secretary of Defense determines that it is necessary . . . to procure equipment manufactured outside of the United States, he is authorized to determine . . . that the acquisition of such equipment manufactured in the United States is inconsistent with the public interest.

As Senator Sam Nunn explained: "This section expressly, in law, authorizes the Secretary of Defense to waive the 'Buy American Act' for purposes of carrying out the policy of NATO standardization." From now on, he continued, "the Defense Department is meant to take NATO standardization seriously. . . . In the day to day procurement and acquisition processes . . . NATO standardization should be a major consideration and not just an afterthought." As to the economic impact of open government procurement policies on both sides of the Atlantic operating within a common arms market, Senator Nunn correctly pointed out:

> If we can get this "two-way street" working between Europe and the United States, both the United States and Europe will benefit economically in terms of business and jobs, since the total market for military equipment of all the NATO Allies is much greater than the individual market any one of the NATO Allies can offer.[13]

THE task, then, is to get on with the business of building an Atlantic Common Arms Market. It has been suggested that it could be established by treaty, and like the Treaty of Rome, have a built-in timetable for the achievement of various stages of integration.[14] The assurance of a treaty commitment would be required, among other reasons, to provide the Europeans with the certainty that once they had restructured their arms industries they could have free access to the American market by making trans-Atlantic arms trade into a genuine "two-way street."

Europeans had long complained about trans-Atlantic arms trade being essentially a one-way street, and argued that it would have to be transformed into a two-way street if this relationship were to be put on a healthy basis. This idea finally found expression in official alliance documents in the spring of 1975. On 7 May the Defence Ministers of the Eurogroup (the European members of NATO, minus France, Iceland and Portugal) met in London and issued a communiqué which emphasized the importance

[13] *Congressional Record*, 1 July 1976, pp. S11322–23.

[14] Callaghan, op. cit., p. 117, has offered the following timetable: "An initial three-year goal of $2.0 billion of defense procurement orders from one another. A three year goal for harmonizing all defense basic research. An initial three-year goal of $4.0 billion of complementary development projects underway on each side of the Atlantic. A four year goal for common logistic support of all common weapons and equipment. A 12-year goal for achieving complete military industrial interdependence in the development, production and support of general purpose forces."

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> they attach to maintaining a strong European technological and industrial base in the defence field and to increasing the degree of standardization in defence equipment. Ministers also agreed on the need to develop a constructive dialogue between Europe and the United States on these matters; this dialogue will be prepared by very wide consultation between all the countries concerned.[15]

Following the London meeting the British Defence Minister Roy Mason, who was then Eurogroup chairman, wrote on behalf of his Eurogroup colleagues to US Secretary of Defence James Schlesinger. He appealed for " arms purchases within the Alliance no longer to be regarded as a one-way street. In placing its own orders the United States ought to take European output into account." At the subsequent gathering of NATO Defence Ministers in Brussels on 22–23 May 1975, " Mr Schlesinger was confronted by closed European ranks on this issue and consented to a mention of cooperation as a two-way street in the communiqué." [16] Consequently the NATO Ministers, meeting in the Defence Planning Committee declared:

> Ministers heard with interest a statement by Mr Roy Mason, this year's Chairman of the Eurogroup Ministers, on current activities in the Eurogroup, and agree to pursue within the appropriate machinery the establishment of a two-way street between Europe and North America in defence equipment procurement, in order to promote a more cost-effective use of resources and increase standardization of weapon systems.[17]

These encouraging developments left to one side the anomalous position of France. If Valéry Giscard d'Estaing had been President of France in 1966, instead of Charles de Gaulle, the situation today would doubtless be considerably better. It is unlikely that someone like Giscard d'Estaing would have expelled NATO from France and withdrawn French forces from the NATO integrated command structure. Similarly, when the Eurogroup was formed in 1968 it is conceivable that France would have responded favourably to the invitation of its European allies and taken part in the work of the Eurogroup. But alas, de Gaulle was in power, and today Giscard d'Estaing must step carefully in dealing with the Gaullist legacy of antipathy towards any aspect of NATO. This policy is still emotionally defended not only by the Gaullists on the right but also by the French Communists on the left. The combination of their strength sharply circumscribes Giscard's area of manoeuvre. Even from the French point of view, however, logic points to the association of

[15] Eurogroup Communiqué, 7 May 1975, *NATO Review*, No. 3, June 1975, pp. 30–31.

[16] Carl A. Ehrhardt, " Lessons of the Brussels NATO Summit," *Aussenpolitik* (English ed.), No. 3, 1975, p. 275.

[17] Defence Planning Committee Communiqué, 22–23 May, 1975, *NATO Review*, No. 3, June 1975, p. 28. This idea was reaffirmed in the Ministerial Guidance of the same date issued by the same body: " Cooperation in the development and production of military equipment is a particular form of standardization which can exploit the benefits of scale and reduce unit costs. Cooperation between North America and Europe in this field should become a two-way street." (Ibid., p. 30.)

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Paris with the Eurogroup effort, since France is the major European producer of military material, and all Europeans agree that there can be no genuine European arms policy without French participation. The problem, then, was to find some acceptable formula for the association of France with the other members of NATO Europe which would not injure French sensibilities.

When the Eurogroup Defence Ministers met again, this time in the Hague on 5 November 1975, they sought to develop their May initiatives in a manner that would specifically take France into account. The Ministers at first reaffirmed that " it is of the greatest importance to increase the interoperability and standardization of military equipment within the Alliance, while maintaining an effective and viable European defence industry." As a means to this end,

> they decided to explore further the potential for extending co-operation in European armaments collaboration in an independent forum open to all European members of the Alliance. They agree in principle to establish a European Defence Procurement Secretariat. With a view to the longer term, Ministers commissioned a study into the tasks which a European Defence Procurement Organization might undertake.[18]

Formally, France remained a European member of the Atlantic Alliance, since de Gaulle only withdrew from the NATO integrated command structure, but did not denounce the North Atlantic Treaty. This distinction permitted the Eurogroup Ministers to appeal to France to join " an independent forum open to all European members of the Alliance." It was clear that this body would carry neither a NATO nor a Eurogroup label. The success in establishing this " independent forum " would also help determine the fate of the European Defence Procurement Secretariat, which would service it. What became of these agencies would also heavily influence the possibility of founding a European Defence Procurement Organization, whose creation had long been urged from many quarters, but had never before been promised in an official ministerial communiqué.

Some Europeans remained tentative in their response to these potentially momentous initiatives, in part because they were uncertain about the attitude that Washington would take towards them. Unfortunately, President Ford chose to fire Schlesinger as Secretary of Defence on the very eve of the Hague meeting. While Schlesinger had not, perhaps, shown unbounded enthusiasm for the Eurogroup efforts, he had thoroughly acquainted himself with European attitudes, had understood what was at stake and had clearly and accurately articulated the issues.[19]

[18] Eurogroup Communiqué, 5 Nov. 1975, *Atlantic News*, No. 774, 7 Nov. 1975, p. 1.

[19] In his press conference in Paris on 30 Sept. 1975, for example, Secretary Schlesinger said with regard to the " two-way street ": " I think that the fundamental consideration will have to be the cost-effectiveness of the weapons systems produced by the various national R and D and arms industries. What we should move in the direction of is a provision of competing national prototypes or multination prototypes. In the event that the European competitor proves to be more cost-effective and more

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His successor, Donald Rumsfeld, has shown no such awareness, nor demonstrated the public support which is so evidently required. There has, instead, been a directionless drift in US policy at a time when an affirmative response is badly needed.

At the semi-annual NATO Ministerial meeting, which took place in Brussels in December 1975, British Defence Minister Roy Mason reported that France had given the Eurogroup offer a timid but generally favourable response. German Defence Minister Georg Leber explained that " France is ready to sit down at one table with the other European countries as long as it is not a NATO table. We will not quarrel about the shape of this table. We are interested in the effectiveness and the success of cooperation." It was evident, however, that the process of negotiation with the French had already affected, at least temporarily, the workings of the Eurogroup. Leber added that while further progress had been made towards weapons standardization, " specific decisions were avoided in order not to prejudice the discussions with Paris." [20] Furthermore, Mason indicated that the creation of a European Defence Procurement Secretariat was not discussed, since it was first necessary to establish the " independent forum " that would include France. For their part, the French asserted that they would refuse to participate in the formation of such a European Secretariat, since they thought the " independent forum " would not need such institutional support. If the French do prevent the creation of this Secretariat, it would be much more difficult to lay the foundation for a genuine European Defence Procurement Organization in the future.[21] The French also let it be known that the " independent forum " should ideally consist only of France, Britain and Germany, and just possible Italy. The smaller Eurogroup members understandably complained that the only time France put on a European face in military matters was when it was trying to sell them something. France further held that the headquarters for the new organization should be in Paris; the Eurogroup members preferred Brussels.[22]

The Foreign Ministers of the Atlantic Alliance, likewise meeting in Brussels in December 1975, also undertook to engage France in discussions on the arms procurement issue. Since France had always retained its seat on the political forum of the North Atlantic Council, the Foreign Ministers " agreed to form for a limited time an Ad Hoc Committee under the Council to prepare a specific programme of action

appropriate for standardization, I do not think that the United States should hesitate in the name of standardization to acquire that European-designed system." He added that before Europe could fully play its role as a competitor, the European countries must develop greater cooperation on arms among themselves and embark from a common position on a dialogue with the United States on arms procurement and standardization. (Ibid., No. 765, 8 Oct. 1975, p. 2.)

[20] *Relay from Bonn*, German Information Centre, New York, 9 Dec. 1975, p. 1.

[21] *Atlantic News*, No. 782, 8 Dec. 1975, p. 1; ibid., No. 783, 10 Dec. 1975, p. 1; ibid., No. 789, 24 Dec. 1975, p. 4.

[22] " Will France Sneak Back into Europe's Defence Fold? " *The Economist*, 13 Dec. 1975, p. 39.

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covering the interoperability of military equipment." [23] The terms of reference for this committee deserve attention. The committee was to have a limited life (a trial period of one year), and was instructed to consider the interoperability, but not the standardization, of military equipment. It was the French who insisted upon drawing this distinction and giving the committee only this more limited task. James Callaghan, who was then British Foreign Minister, expressed amazement that standardization should thus be cast aside, but this was necessary in order to obtain French participation.[24] France was determined to retain its own distinctive national arms industry to the maximum extent possible, both for its own use and for Third World sales. Its arms, the French argued, could be made interoperable for use by Atlantic Alliance countries through various devices that would permit them to be adapted and then adopted by its allies. This is surely the hard way to do things. Standardization from the ground up is the simplest and cheapest way to increase the efficiency of allied forces. To make non-standardized arms and equipment interoperable almost always involves a considerable expense of creating some new and sometimes cumbersome piece of apparatus. Despite these limitations, it was hoped that this initiative at the reasonably high level of the North Atlantic Council would help bring France back into the allied fold in the areas of arms procurement.[25]

The Eurogroup initiative, meanwhile, was coming to fruition. On 2 February 1976, the ten Eurogroup countries plus France met in Rome and created the European Programme Group.[26] Its mission, at least as initially defined, concentrated upon the need to develop a strong European technological and industrial base for arms production, while the question of the "two-way street" was not even put on the agenda. This turn of events was again at French insistence. To the extent that Gaullist paranoia about the US "domination" of Europe continues to permeate French thinking, it will be difficult to discuss a rational trans-Atlantic relationship, since any tie with America, in this view, automatically implies US domination. The only meanings the French seem capable of imputing to the "two-way street" is that Europe will be reduced to the role of subcontractor to US arms industries or that there will be an increase in the production of American weapons in Europe under licence.[27]

IN the case of the European Programme Group it would seem that the convoy will have to move at the speed of the slowest ship. Moreover, there was the fear in some quarters that this movement might be in an anti-NATO direction. NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns publicly

[23] North Atlantic Council Final Communiqué, 11–12 Dec. 1975, *NATO Review*, No. 1, Feb. 1976, p. 24. [24] *Atlantic News*, No. 785, 12 Dec. 1975, p. 2.

[25] For the composition and tasks of the Ad Hoc Committee, see ibid., No. 795, 24 Jan. 1976, p. 4; ibid., No. 807, 5 Mar. 1976, pp. 1–2.

[26] On the formation of the European Programme Group, see ibid., No. 798, 4 Feb. 1976, p. 1; ibid., No. 799, 6 Feb. 1976, pp. 1–2.

[27] Ibid., No. 789, 24 Dec. 1975, p. 4; ibid., No. 793, 16 Jan. 1976, p. 1.

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expressed his disquiet on this account.[28] It is doubtful if the original Eurogroup 10 would allow this to happen, but they may be called upon repeatedly to repel French initiatives along this line.

Some of these fears have apparently been dispelled by the subsequent quiet but substantial work that has been accomplished by the European Programme Group. Moreover, after the countries of the EPG have successfully organized themselves on a European level, it is inevitable that they will have to deal with the trans-Atlantic aspects of the arms trade. The two processes, of course, are intertwined. Only if the European members of the Alliance effectively organize themselves on an all-European basis can they be in a position to work effectively with their trans-Atlantic Alliance partners. Section 803 of the revised, 1976 Culver-Nunn Amendment specifically recognizes this problem when it states:

> It is the sense of the Congress that standardization of weapons and equipment within the North Atlantic Alliance on the basis of a "two-way street" concept of cooperation in defense procurement between Europe and North America could only work in a realistic sense if the European nations operated on a united and collective basis. Accordingly, the Congress encourages the governments of Europe to accelerate their present efforts to achieve European armaments collaboration among all European members of the Alliance.[29]

For the moment, the Congress has put the ball back in the European court; the Europeans must now work out a coherent and adequate response.

The challenge of the arms procurement issue in the Atlantic Alliance seems clear enough. The human capacity to meet this challenge, however is still in doubt. It will require determined political leadership and goodwill on both sides of the Atlantic.

[28] Secretary General Luns was "asked what he thought about the 'independent body' proposed to France by the Eurogroup," following a speech to the Assembly of Western European Union on 1 Dec. 1975. To this Luns replied that "if the honourable member were to reread what I have just said, he would realize that the Secretary General expressed a certain reservation regarding this development." (*Europe Documents*, No. 875, 18 Dec. 1975, p. 1.) Luns argued that the deliberations of this proposed group might develop tactical concepts and standardization procedures that would introduce an element of division within NATO, which should remain the principal forum for dealing with political and security matters.

[29] The key sentence here is taken almost verbatim from the Congressional testimony of the West German parliament member Carl Damm, Chairman of the Subcommittee on European Defence Cooperation of the Military Committee, North Atlantic Assembly, who said that "the 'two-way street' concept could only work in a realistic sense if the European nations operated on a united and collective basis." *Hearings before the Subcommittee on Research and Development and the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate*, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, 31 Mar. 1976 (US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1976), p. 9.

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Alexander Solzhenitsyn and European "Leftism"

Raymond Aron

SOME time ago I read three articles in the *Nouvel Observateur* in which Jean-Paul Sartre gave what seemed to be a self-portrait in the form of answers to questions put by his friend Contat; I also read, more or less simultaneously, Solzhenitsyn's *The Calf Kept Butting the Oak.*[1] On page 134 Solzhenitsyn refers to an encounter, which in the event did not take place, between the greatest contemporary Russian writer and the man whom he calls the "ruler of minds" in the West. I trust that the reader will forgive me for reproducing Solzhenitsyn's account of this episode word for word:

> Some six months later the man who managed to get this [Nobel] prize awarded to Sholokhov and thereby insulted Russian literature as cruelly as it was possible to do, Jean-Paul Sartre, was staying in Moscow and expressed a desire through his interpreter to meet with me. She and I met in Mayakovsky Square, while the Sartres were "expecting us for supper" in the Peking Hotel. On the face of it, it was very much to my advantage to see him: here he was, the "ruler of minds" in France and Europe, an independent writer with a worldwide reputation; there was nothing to stop us—within 10 minutes we could be sitting round a table, I could complain about everything I had to put up with, and this troubadour of humanity would have all Europe up in arms about it.
>
> But if only it weren't Sartre. Sartre needed me partly out of curiosity, partly to entitle him to talk about our meeting afterwards, perhaps in a hostile way, and there would be nowhere for me to justify myself then. I said to the interpreter:
>
> "How can writers meet and talk when one of them is gagged and bound hand and foot?"
>
> "So you're not interested in meeting him?"
>
> "It would be painful, unendurable. I can barely keep my head above water. First let him help us get our works published."
>
> I quoted the example of the deformed little boy in *Cancer Ward.* That's how bent and lopsided Russian literature looks from Europe. Over there they are utterly ignorant of the undeveloped potential of our great literature.
>
> Did Sartre understand from my refusal to meet him how profoundly unacceptable he is to us?

* From Wolfgang Kraus, ed., *Schreiben in dieser Zeit: Für Manès Sperber* (Austria, 1976).

[1] For want of an English edition the original has here been used: Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *Bodalsya telenok s dubom: ocherki literaturnoi zhizni* (Paris, 1975). [Translator.]

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For an answer to this question we have only to open Simone de Beauvoir's latest book. Lena reports to the "Sartres" that Solzhenitsyn does not wish to meet them. "Why not?" asks Simone de Beauvoir. Solzhenitsyn had not made himself clear. And she adds: "We are surprised at his reaction. There can be no doubt that Sartre knew him better than he knew Sartre."

Which of them knew the other better? Sartre, who leads the life of a student loafer in Paris, drifting from café to café, and who travels the world unhindered and esteemed? Or Solzhenitsyn, hounded by the police, after years in camp, years of exile? The one has at his disposal all the information which press and radio deliver to Western homes. The other used to be hard pressed to hear the broadcasts of the BBC or Voice of America. In Moscow Solzhenitsyn saw in Sartre, who was a guest of the Writers' Union, the accomplice of his persecutors. When Solzhenitsyn reached Switzerland it may well be that he became, in Sartre's eyes, an ally of the hated enemy. Beyond their mutual non-comprehension we can discern two quite alien worlds—the world of the Russian dissident and the world of the "European Leftist."

A Western writer who is officially received by an authoritarian or totalitarian regime finds himself in an awkward position—a fact of which he cannot but be aware if he has the slightest intelligence and capacity for self-criticism. I for my part have never been disconcerted by this. In Moscow I took part in a congress organized by UNESCO where in the course of the sessions, and to the considerable delight of the younger Soviet delegates, I several times clashed with an old Stalinist, the Vice-President of the Academy of Sciences. In Spain I consistently refused to lecture whenever my hosts demanded to see a synopsis of my speech in advance. Incidentally, in my conversations with Spanish intellectuals and with bank officials too I more than once ran up against the Marxist "Vulgate." The higher the positions which these dissidents occupied in the present system, the more radical their views tended to be. In Mexico my main discussions were with intellectuals sympathetic to Fidel Castro but who conformed to the regime in their country. When I went to Brazil, President Goulart had not yet been overthrown by the military. It was in my journalistic capacity that I travelled to Cuba: I was not received by Fidel Castro, but had a long talk with Rafael Carlos Rodriguez, Head of the Cuban Communist Party, who explained to me in Marxist Spanish how a proletarian revolution could have been brought about by members of the petty bourgeoisie.

Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir enjoyed privileges of quite a different order. Their fame has allowed them to pass the frontiers even of counties ruled by rightist military regimes. In Cuba they were able to approach that historic hero who was to remain friendly towards Sartre as long as he sang the praises of Castroism and remained ignorant of the fate of the dissidents (already present in their thousands in Cuban

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prisons at the time he made friends with Castro). The day that Sartre signed a document in support of an imprisoned Cuban writer (who, incidentally, was set free after acknowledging the error of his ways, if my memory serves me well), the Supremo thundered out against these petty bourgeois and their scrupulous consciences. The Sartres lost interest in Cuba and the Cubans.

The Sartres really do have something of a gay-Parisian background: they are *littérateurs* first and foremost and for them their works are just as important as people are. Sometimes they bring off the difficult trick—he in spite of his genius, she in spite of her education and intelligence—of seeming simple-minded. How can Simone de Beauvoir possibly fail to understand Solzhenitsyn's rebuff? How can she possibly fail to envisage the anger or hilarity with which Soviet dissidents greet a statement such as the following, from *Critique of Dialectical Reason*: "Marxism is the unsurpassable philosophy of our era"? A statement, by the way, which one could not but describe as plain stupid if it stemmed from the pen of a lesser figure than Jean-Paul Sartre. A more temperate Western author might perhaps have said that Marxism remains at the centre of philosophical enquiry, while Solzhenitsyn calmly writes that: "Marxist has fallen so low that it can now arouse only contempt. No one in our country who wishes to be taken seriously, not even a schoolboy, can talk about Marxism today without a smile."

Marxism (and Solzhenitsyn is not interested in distinguishing between Marxism and Marxism-Leninism, between ordinary Marxism and subtle Marxism) is quite simply the doctrine in whose name the Bolsheviks seized power, destroyed first political parties, then the peasantry, set up concentration camps and murdered millions upon millions of ordinary citizens. More than this: in Solzhenitsyn's eyes Marxism as an ideology is the root of all ill, the source of falsehood, the principle of evil:

> The nature of man is fortunately such that he must seek a *justification* for his actions.
>
> Macbeth's justifications were feeble and his conscience tormented him. Iago too was a mere lamb. The imagination and spiritual resources of Shakespeare's villains did not carry them beyond the first dozen corpses. For they lacked *Ideology*.
>
> Ideology! This is what gives the evil deed its sought-for justification and the villain the lasting callousness he needs. This is the social theory which helps him vindicate his deeds in his own eyes and those of others, to hear not reproaches and curses, but praise and honour. Thus did the inquisitors draw strength from Christianity, the conquerors from the exaltation of the motherland, the colonizers from civilization, the National Socialists from race, the Jacobins (both early and late) from equality, fraternity and the happiness of future generations.
>
> Thanks to Ideology it was given to the twentieth century to experience atrocity to the millionth power.[2]

[2] Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *Arkhipelag GULag*, I–II (Paris, 1973), p. 181.

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I have chosen this passage from *The Gulag Archipelago* for two reasons: firstly because it goes to the very heart of the question, to the ideology which alone can give the criminal a clear conscience. In addition it mentions other doctrines besides Marxism—those of Hitler, of the colonists, of the nationalists. Nor does Solzhenitsyn, a Christian himself, forget that Christianity can serve to bolster up the inquisitors. He tends to afford Marxists, if not Marxism itself, a special place, rather as if the quantitative difference brought with it a corresponding modification in quality (he will, I trust, forgive this reference to one of the laws of Engels' and Hegel's dialectic). During the 80 years preceding the Revolution of 1917 there were 17 executions a year. When the Spanish Inquisition was in full swing the figure was 10 per month. In the first years of Bolshevik rule it ran at 1,000 a month. At the height of Stalin's Terror the monthly total of executions reached 40,000. Evil needs an ideology before it can operate in millions. And this need is all the more urgent if the Terror is to remain unrecognized or even acclaimed. But the Sartres, more than other Western writers, justify Evil by justifying the justification of it. They are not Marxists—they have no wish to give up any of *their* freedom—but by philosophical means they justify other men's deprivation of liberty at the hands of totalitarianism and Terror. Sartre is the philosopher of ideological thinking.

I DO not wish to trace Sartre's political and philosophical career, beginning with *Nausea* in which he makes of the humanist a figure of fun, through to his dialogues with Left extremists. Favourably disposed towards the Munich agreement before 1938 because of his pacifism, after the liberation he adopted positions which can be reconciled only with the greatest difficulty. Among this long series of attitudes, however, certain postulates and maxims are to be found which one would be inclined to ascribe to a somewhat degenerate practical sense. The most important ones are: that anti-communists are blackguards; that the only people who have the right to criticize communism are those who become involved in the movement; that it is impossible not to be a Marxist since Marxism sets its indelible stamp upon our age. These postulates have consequences which Sartre has strictly observed. At a time when people in the West were discussing the fact that there were concentration camps in the Soviet Union, he directed his anger not so much against the Soviet authorities who had established these camps, nor against the communists who had denied their existence, but against the anti-communists and the so-called Rightists who were suspected of rejoicing in the fact.

At no time did the philosopher of peace stand closer to the communists than in the period of the peace movement, in other words in the Stalin era. Indefatigable defender of the persecuted, so long as their hangmen did not appeal to Marx or other acceptable doctrines, actively,

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passionately interceding for the release of Henry Martin (does anyone still remember that sailor?), or against the execution of the Rosenbergs, he belonged to the front organizations along with communists and fellow-travellers, and without any perceptible conflict with his conscience. In a word, he provides the perfect example of that Western "Leftism" which Solzhenitsyn repeatedly pillories in his book. "Leftism" is, so to speak, the elaboration of the principle according to which everything is measured by two different scales. It matters little what a man of the Right actually says, his views will be rejected in advance. If he mentions Soviet concentration camps, then it is not because he loves freedom and loathes the repression of one man by his fellows, but because for reasons which he cannot admit he has chosen the camp of the "Rightists" (or the conservatives, or the reactionaries); he is looking for reasons which he *can* own to for a choice to which he cannot own. A Rightist, authoritarian or moderate regime without any concentration camps must be condemned by the same token, and more fiercely than a Soviet regime which bears the responsibility for tens of millions of deaths within the space of 60 years.

Nor does it help to appeal to those texts in which Sartre at long last comes to grips with Stalinism. After the suppression of the Hungarian revolution he wrote *The Ghost of Stalin*, but without expressing the slightest regret for his former views and activities. Nor did he question the fundamentals of "Leftism," for this bloody monster was once again none other than Socialism. In other words he disavowed neither his "Leftism" nor his affiliation with the communists. Nor did he come any nearer to doing so in his *Socialism That Came In from the Cold*: in between the lines he foisted the blame for "inhuman socialism" upon the Russian influence, upon fortuitous factors. The Czechs' humane socialism lay in the camp of the Left and of Marxism. The ideology was intact.

The *Critique of Dialectical Reason* lends itself both to a Marxist-Leninist and a Leftist (*gauchiste*) interpretation. According to Maurice Merleau-Ponty ultra-Bolshevism expresses itself in a breakdown, in a revolt, in action, but doubts remain. Is it really the Party which with its merciless discipline (*fraternité-terreur*) takes it upon itself to wrench men locked in "*practico-inertia*" out of this state? Or is it rather the spontaneity of the group symbolized by the masses in the exalted days of Revolution, the fusion of the individual's consciousness with that of the others, which furnishes the model for the future society, for the truly liberated consciousness, transparent to all? Whatever the answer may turn out to be, Leftism remains, remains intact and, one may say, is still gaining in intensity. Ultra-Bolshevism demands revolt or, to put it more clearly, the categorical imperative of violence.

After 1968 Sartre discovered that ultimately his philosophy was more likely to culminate in anarchy than in Sovietism. But why hesitate between the one and the other? Why justify that total power, that

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cruellest of powers in our century, the power which enables us to do anything at all out of revulsion at the power of the state? Marxism itself explains nothing.

Much as Sartre may have busied himself with the writings of Marx, there is barely a trace of this reading to be found. Sartre alludes to the first volume of *Capital* and the theory of overvalue, but this is grist to his mill since it seems to show that the entrepreneur exploits the employee and the capitalist the wage-earner. There are no grounds for suspecting that he is even remotely interested in the relations between Ricardo and Marx or in Marx's place in the history of political economy. As for the unsurpassable philosophy of our epoch, which has incidentally been essentially sterile for more than half a century now, Sartre summarizes it in vague, indeed almost meaningless phrases, such as: Men make their own history but on the basis of the given material conditions. Putting it differently; it was not Marxism which brought this, by nature anarchistic, man to the point of sympathizing with Stalin's Terror, but, on the contrary, his inclination towards anarchy induced him to accept Marxism, which remains alien to him or of which he retains only the negations and the utopia.

What has produced the vacillation between the two extremes of anarchy and totalitarianism, what has made of Sartre a philosopher of ideology instead of a mere ideologist, is the cult of violence turned moralism, the sternness of a protestant moralism swung round into rejection of the social order. But what is staggering is that on this long path Sartre expresses a moral condemnation of those who think differently from himself. Who accords him the right to mount the throne of Jupiter or Jehovah, to sound the hearts of men?

How, one may ask, are we to know since after all there is no possibility of distinguishing between Good and Evil, between good and evil conduct, except within history, and since after all we must wait for a social order free from exploitation and repression before we can begin to write our ethics? It is enough to call for the categorical imperative of Revolt (or even the categorical imperative of violence) and the game is won. How quickly it goes! A few thousand students occupy the Sorbonne, rebuild the University and the world from scratch, sleep with one another and talk, talk, talk. . . .

Since neither Sartre's Marxism nor his Existentialism has a clearly delineated political content, he can pass from the *Rassemblement démocratique révolutionnaire* to fraternizing with Stalinism, can admit that there are millions of labour-camp prisoners in the Soviet Union without this causing him to break with the communists, can condemn the suppression of the Hungarian revolution as if it were separate from the whole of that which he approves of or puts up with; he can write that the dictatorship of the proletariat is a contradictory concept while simultaneously describing himself as a Marxist, and that without his conscience experiencing the slightest trouble; and finally he can distance

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himself from the communists because a few thousand students or workers have had the experience of his "*groupe en fusion*" and have dreamed of his anarchy. He can even muster a degree of sympathy for the left-wing extremists of the Baader-Meinhof gang, and he who loses no sleep over millions of concentration camp inmates, holds press-conferences to expose the misery and loneliness to which Baader and his companions are condemned (he probably does not know that Ulrike Meinhof originally received money from the East German Secret Service).

The fact that he has pilgrimaged in undiscriminating succession to Belgrade, Havana, Moscow or Peking (bothers him not at all; evidently, he feels responsible for all men, but not for his previous conduct. It may be that he feels more at ease in the company of Victor [3] than of Stalin (whom he has probably never seen) or even Fidel Castro (in whom he believed he had found a friend). Nevertheless, he has not dissociated himself from his earlier positions. Here is the Right and here the Left. Here are the concentration camps which one does not accept and here the ones which one does. There are good murderers and evil ones. Marxism remains the unsurpassable philosophy of our epoch, and those who base themselves upon it are always on the right side, while those who defend freedom against the advocates of that philosophy are in the wrong.

In a certain sense Simone de Beauvoir is right in saying that Alexander Solzhenitsyn does not know Sartre well (although he knows him better than Sartre knows Solzhenitsyn). And yet she is wrong about the main point: if the *zek* had known the "ruler of minds" better, he would have still seen no sense in talking to him. As a personality Sartre embodies everything which Solzhenitsyn loathes: the rejection of moral guidelines, the refusal to accept the age-old distinction between good and evil, the sacrifice of men's lives and the justification of crimes by appeals to an indefinite future ("indefinite" in all its senses), in short, the evil of ideology—a kind of evil which in Sartre's case takes on a pure form—indirect, delegated evil. He kills nobody; he would not hurt a fly and his only participation in history is through his pen. Now he gives Stalin his half-hearted applause, now Castro his unreserved, though short-lived, greeting, but never does he condemn the practice which Solzhenitsyn finds detestable: the practice of committing crimes in the name of ideology. "Ruler of minds" in the West, Solzhenitsyn writes. Although even in his own lifetime Sartre's only place is in the past, he is still, if not the "ruler," then at least the most representative figure (if only in caricature) of the European intelligentsia, or of the intellectual Left, whichever description is preferable. It matters little that nowadays few of them still read *Being and Nothingness* or *The Critique of Dialectical Reason*, or that Foucault, Deleuze or Althusser have supplanted him; he is the one who more than any other has made

[3] A left-wing worker.

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"Leftism" respectable, indeed obligatory. To a Solzhenitsyn and to other Soviet dissidents none of the rightist authoritarian regimes, neither the Greek military junta nor Franco in Spain, seemed comparable with the tyranny which weighs upon the peoples of the Soviet Union. Not one of them has perpetrated so many crimes, not one has so enslaved free thought. But the Sartres and all their disciples forbid us to condemn the Soviet Union unless we first embrace Leftism and join the Socialist movement.

WHAT would have come of a dialogue between Solzhenitsyn and Sartre? Nothing. Each of them would have rejected any comparison of respective number of victims under one form of despotism or another, albeit for quite different reasons: Sartre—because under certain kinds of despotism men were ostensibly liberated, whereas under others hereditary injustice and disorder were upheld; Solzhenitsyn—because, over and above the number of victims, the Soviet regime seems of its very nature perverse, for it lies and compels others to lie. The Greek Colonels "saved" Greece; Franco "saved" Christian Spain; neither of them created a world of mandatory falsehood. In Spain censorship was called censorship, not "the leading role of the Party." In the universities and in the streets everyone could speak his own language; all books, or nearly all, could be translated and published. The regime, born in a brutal revolution, remained brutal till the end; it was neither democratic, nor liberal; but it was not totalitarian, and crimes there were not sanctified by ideology.

Compared with Stalin's regime, that of Franco may justly have been regarded as liberal. A pious man of the Left holds such a view to be scandalous and montrous. Solzhenitsyn holds it to be true and evident. It takes the whole "Leftism" of the Western intelligentsia to doubt it.

My friend Manès Sperber joined the Communist Party in Vienna after the first world war. Had I, like him, witnessed the collapse of a world, I might perhaps have succumbed to the same temptation. But never since the day in the mid-thirties when I first met him in André Malraux's home have I seen his disillusionment cloud the sobriety of his judgment. We have not always agreed in our assessment of this or that event; no one can claim the truth for his own. If the past can of its very nature be subjected to legitimate reinterpretation, how then can history as it evolves and shapes itself in the present lend itself to unerring diagnosis?

Our friendship has survived 40 years without a setback; this is due not only to the fact that he broke with a revolution betrayed, with a totalitarian regime, with an ideology which henceforth served to justify the unjustifiable, but also to the fact that his view of the Marxist tragedy coincided both with my own instinctive liberalism and with the faith of the Soviet dissidents.

Solzhenitsyn's message can be summarized, it seems to me, in two

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fundamental sentences: There is something worse than poverty and repression—and that something is the Lie; the lesson this century teaches us is to recognize the deadly snare of ideology, the illusion that men and social organizations can be transformed at a stroke.

Solzhenitsyn does not call for a crusade against Soviet totalitarianism, he does not wish upon his country a revolution which could cause chaos and bring bloodshed. The writer, his country's greatest and perhaps the greatest of our time, takes, and will continue to take, offence at the conspiracy of unrepentant ideologues which more than ever dominates the press, radio and television of the West. But he will gather about him in a vast silent mass all those who see no other defence against the raging of fanaticism and who have no other hope for the future than in respect for moral laws and the rejection of ideological knavery. He had nothing to say to Sartre and his like; in Manès Sperber he encountered a brother.

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The Cliché of the Sick Society

Manes Sperber

MANICHAEANS, both believers and atheists, have produced a cliché: the cliche of the sick society, which is apparently the one in which we live. Why sick? And if it is sick, which society known to history has ever been healthy? When and where?

A furious, frenetic tendency to denigrate our society, which repeatedly rises to the level of hysteria, is at work: very few dare to speak of our age without first contributing at least a bit to this self-deprecation. This almost never takes the form of analysis or of constructive criticism but is the kind of veiled self-justification which one so often encounters among the pessimistic *bons viveurs* who, after an over-elaborate meal, take refuge from their digestive problems in a verbose fit of melancholy, lamenting the evils of the world.

This total and totalitarian denigration of our age, which today calls itself social revolt, corresponds in reality to a recurrent, characteristic stance of the extreme Right. It is thus an old, unpleasant and—as we shall see—an essentially dishonest song, which has not improved with time nor become more credible with the shift of emphasis. In line with their creed, the Left fights against existing circumstances with the steady determination to improve them continuously and thus change the social order. The Left believes in progress—as one would say ironically today—for it is convinced that man is a social being and, in general, prefers to do good when circumstances permit, while the Right considers him hopelessly lost unless he is granted the salvation which can lead him out of this sick world into a better world beyond.

WE all know the tendency of old people to link their hopeless longing for their irretrievable youth with a belief in paradise lost, in the form of the good old days. They think, and the Right thinks, that a social order based on a hierarchical subordination and an unalterable relationship between the generations existed in the past and that the corrupt present threatens to destroy all that is sacred including the "natural" order and belief in authority. This nostalgia is alien to the Left, for their paradise belongs not to the past, but to the future, in so far as they consider Utopian conditions not only possible but desirable. It is therefore quite remarkable that young people today who purport to belong to the extreme Left should share common ground with the lost paradise of the extreme Right.

In order to know how sick this society really is, we must compare it with the societies which preceded it, not with some ideal image—nor with some hypothetical paradise of the future. That would be just as absurd and destructive as if one were to judge people according to whether they are angels, or at least saints, in spirit and soul.

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Social, spiritual and physical degradation was, throughout the world, the inescapable fate of all those who did not belong to the ruling classes. That was the case for thousands of years and is still true in many countries. The oppressed and exploited found it natural that exploiters exploited, and in their boldest hours they dreamt that they, or at least their descendants, might one day be rich themselves; yet they submitted to the will of the oppressor. Power characterized every relationship, between parents and children, between the sexes, between the rulers and the ruled. In Christian Europe—and not only there—houses, markets, churches and taverns emptied every time a man was publicly humiliated, maimed, quartered, dismembered, burnt, killed in the most barbarous way possible in the centre of the town. In the good old days these proceedings were the most alluring spectacle, to which absolutely everyone was irresistibly drawn.

Frequent famines, epidemics and wars guaranteed demographic balance by preventing significant population growth, for which there would not have been enough food.

Innumerable comparisons of this sort can be found in every country and every past social order, yet we don't need them in the present context. Let us return to the problem which is our particular concern here; in the image which every former society carefully passed on to posterity and in which it hoped to portray itself to a certain degree, those who lived in the shadow hardly ever appeared and if they did they appeared on a stage as boors or servants but not as heroes nor as lovers, and only so that one might laugh at them . . .

Let us think of " La Belle Epoque "—the 20 years or so before the first world war. Books, pictures, plays and countless other pieces of evidence of that era reflect an uninhibited *joie de vivre*, a bourgeois style, and an indisputably clear conscience among the rich. All this was based on the certainty that for them this favourable state of affairs would never come to an end. During the same period the class-conscious proletariat was fighting for freedom of association and universal suffrage; in their struggles they were aiming at an eight-hour day in the not too distant future. It was common practice for governments to set troops against strikers and sometimes even to give orders to shoot. At the end of the last century, in *Germinal*, Emile Zola depicted with naturalist accuracy the plight of the working class, of the proletarians and their families, in a country as progressive as France: it was hardly to change during " La Belle Epoque."

Leading authors of the nineteenth century and of " La Belle Epoque " —Charles Dickens, Zola, Gerhart Hauptmann, Gorky, Upton Sinclair— have exposed the flattering self-portrait of the age by describing realistically the existence of working people who struggled to change the situation and to cease being the victims. Whoever reads these still remarkable books can appreciate just how much the living conditions of all those who live by their work have changed in the industrialized

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countries not only in terms of quantity, as some maintain, but also in terms of quality. An indirect proof of this, *ex contrario* so to speak, was that Stalinist propaganda used the films based on *David Copperfield* and *Oliver Twist* to suggest to Soviet audiences that the conditions described by Dickens still existed in contemporary England.

IN contrast to the false happiness of those first pre-war years, our time is not one Hegelian unhappy consciousness "of life . . . as existence and activity, as that very pain of existence and activity," but simply that of the loss of No Man's Land in which the often quoted ivory tower rose high above the miserable reality, so high that the latter became inconspicuous and finally invisible. This No Man's Land, so well kept and provided for, disappeared as—with a calendar delay of 14 years—our century began.

With the outbreak of the first world war, day-to-day world history invaded the lives of thinking men, especially intellectuals. Since that time, nobody has been able to avoid responsibility for relevant events, no one can any longer remain a detached bystander, and one is forced to become either a guilty accomplice or an active opponent. An opponent of what? Of everything which serves to cloud the mind and deceive. We know how many of those intellectuals, at least during the first few years of the war, committed or justified the rape of truth. And how few there were who dared swim against the current.

When the deluge of blood and filth subsided, when the first world war, the most senseless of all wars, finally came to an end, there grew not only the belated realization of the futility of the mass slaughter in European civil wars, as Napoleon would have called them; people also began to hope for the imminent realization of the most daring Utopias. Millions of people were prepared to stake their recently spared lives yet again for ideas—so that peace, eternal peace, might finally reign.

I speak of the self-denigrating fury of our age, over the cinders of those Utopian ideologies, considering the immeasurable devastation which was caused not so much by the downfall of those Utopias as by their triumph.

HOWEVER one cares to define cause, motive, pretext and aim of the warring powers in 1914–18, one thing is certain: triumph shamefully deceived the victors. They had gone forth, they said, to fight this "war to end all wars," to "make the world safe for democracy." They were determined to settle the imperialist conflict once and for all. Whatever the true or supposedly noble aims of the struggle, hardly any of them had come to stay. Instead of democratic regimes, dictatorships spread throughout the whole continent of Europe. Nationalism, whose final decline not only Marxists had phophesied, became more and more bound up with that narrow, backward-looking fascist Utopia which set

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ever-increasing masses in motion and finally culminated in the quite unlimited power of National Socialism. In October 1917 the names of the Utopian victors were Lenin and Trotsky; between 1918 and 1939 they were Mussolini, Stalin and Hitler. There have probably been few world historical individuals, to use Hegel's expression, who have been so dreadfully betrayed by the consequences of their victory as Lenin and Trotsky were.

Let us think of the unconditional allegiance which countless Germans vowed to Hitler; let us consider the millions of sincere revolutionaries who tirelessly and unconditionally praised everything that Stalin and his clique did, proclaiming their leader's lies as absolute truths, always ready to slander, persecute and destroy wherever possible anyone who dared to say out loud what are considered today the uncontestable truths about the Stalinist regime and which so many people are only too ready to forget.

Can it be that what happened in 1945 after Hitler's suicide happened also when, after Stalin's death, as a result of Khrushchev's speech, it was forced upon every communist and every "freedom-loving" individual as the only correct, the only permissible judgment of the deified Djugashvili? Can it be that this running amok of the totalitarian dictators and their subsequent exposure and total collapse have caused their supporters and hangers-on to use all kinds of devices to alienate themselves from their recent past and thus from themselves? This refers not only to the former fanatical nazis or equally fanatical Stalinists, since in reality the conscious and unconscious complicity of those who were not formally involved was enormous: they were accomplices by conviction and hatred against rulers who engaged in merciless persecution, or because of their admiration for the apparently unbreakable chain of successes, or through fear of finding themselves on the side of the weaker, the suspect and the persecuted of today and the dead of tomorrow. The half-hearted and the indifferent at least understood one thing: it was preferable not to say a word against those who might one day prove unpleasant and even dangerous to them.

I am recalling these facts because we ought now to answer the question; what became of all these people, the fanatics, and the hangers-on, after their idols had been smashed? What went on in their minds? What confidence in their own judgment, their courage, their spiritual integrity can they have preserved?

I believe that the current phenomenon of frenetically denigrating our society might be very closely linked with the answer that can be given to that question. This tendency which has advanced from the far Left and the far Right as far as the centre represents, depending on the generation, a direct or indirect consequence of the totalitarian regimes, a hang-over from the traumatic exposure of deeply held beliefs, an abortive development of hopes which they no longer dare to acknowledge, even to themselves. We all know that a post-war period is not a

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period of peace; in the same way, we are living in a post-totalitarian era, yet are still infected by totalitarianism.

The total and unremitting condemnation of our "sick" society almost always gives unconscious rather than conscious expression to the desire for negative equation: present conditions are so bad that those other, totalitarian conditions cannot have been any worse. It's all much of a muchness, and one is as evil as the other—or is said to have been according to the young, who are unable to draw comparisons from their own experience.

I really cannot recall anyone speaking of a sick society when Hitler and Stalin were in power. We, the enemies of these corrupters, all had good reason to emphasize the difference between the dictatorial regimes and the others which were, it is true, by no means perfect, but in which an all but adequate measure of personal and social freedom could be preserved and publicly defended. We knew that total opposition is only defensible—and indeed essential—against a totalitarian regime. It is therefore easy to understand why today's systematic and frenzied denigration of conditions in the democratic countries reminds us above all of our experience that only he who wishes to gain absolute power begins by voicing absolute and total criticism. Even in the most minor speech, Hitler could not help but denounce the *system* of the Weimar Republic—the system which was responsible for everything, to blame for everything and which had to be unscrupulously fought until it was utterly destroyed. Exactly the same is true of today's extremist, totalitarian critics, whether they represent left- or right-wing concepts. They all speak continuously of the "system"; they allow for no nuances, they give us no details, they write in a totalitarian way. Anyone who doesn't agree with them on every point is not a person with different views but an enemy who is subservient to the system for reprehensible reasons.

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Stanislaw Brzozowski: Marxism as Historical Subjectivism[1]

Leszek Kolakowski

THE work of Stanisław Brzozowski is scarcely known outside his own country; yet the intellectual history of twentieth-century Poland cannot be understood without reference to the bizarre and disparate effects of his writings and personality. A philosopher, critic and novelist who died of tuberculosis before he was 33 and whose activity covered a span of barely 10 years, he remains a controversial and painful subject as regards both the value of his work, concerning which opinions are fiercely divided, and the more mysterious elements of his life-story, which are still a puzzle to historians. A provocative writer who was regarded for a time as a prophet of the youthful intelligentsia in revolt against both positivism and romanticism, he found himself at odds with all the political forces of his day—conservatives, socialists and national democrats. His style is violent and appears to be constantly at boiling-point: whatever the object of his attention, he seems to be capable only of fervent admiration or unqualified contempt. Some critics thought the explosiveness of his manner was a mask for dilettantism, a want of originality or the power to discipline his mind and digest his thoughts—the more so as he changed his opinions with dizzying swiftness, evidently as the result of hasty writing, wide but superficial reading and self-identification with the latest philosopher or writer who came within his ken. More attentive readers, however, detected a certain logic in all these changes, and an imprint of personality which gave an individual stamp to all his borrowings from the intellectual store of West European, Russian and Polish thinkers. In passing on the ideas of others he paraphrased them and tinged them with his own style to such an extent that they sometimes appeared unrecognizable: this was the case with Kant and Spencer, Hegel and Marx, Avenarius and Nietzsche, Proudhon and Sorel, Bergson and Newman, Dostoevsky, Loisy and many others. The ambiguity and variability of Brzozowski's influence extended beyond the grave. Young people of the Left were brought up on his novels and other writings (*Płomienie—The Flames*), a story of the heroic conspirators of the *Narodnaya Volya*, was required reading for each generation of revolutionaries), yet before and during the second world war he was successfully claimed as a prophet by the radical nationalist camp. In this respect Brzozowski resembled Sorel, who in fact influenced him greatly.

Was he a Marxist, and, if so, to what extent? He wrote of himself that he had never been orthodox and that when he joined the Marxists it

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was in the capacity of a dissident. He believed, however, that the "philosophy of labour" which he professed in 1906–9 was a development of Marx's ideas, and he contrasted Marxism as it had figured in his life with the evolutionism of the orthodox and, above all, the whole tradition stemming from Engels. He was one of the first to contrast Marx and Engels as minds of a completely opposite stamp. Marxism, it may be said, was only one phase in his highly complicated intellectual history, but it was the phase of his maximum intellectual independence and influence on Polish culture. Marxism cannot be treated as the main line of his biography but only as a section of it, unintelligible without some reference to the remainder. His most important work from the standpoint of the history of Marxism is *Idee* (*Ideas*), a volume of essays published in 1910.

It is almost impossible to summarize Brzozowski's views without distortion. He believed that philosophy was not merely a process of reflecting on life but an enhancement of it, and that the meaning of philosophy was determined by its social effectiveness. Hence to describe the content of his writings irrespective of their personal and social genesis and function is to turn them into something they were meant not to be, namely an abstract doctrine. On the other hand, a philosopher who believes that philosophizing is an entirely immanent part of history has no right to complain that his ideas are "distorted" by critics: for if meaning is always created and not extracted from something ready-made, there can be no question of "distortion" when he proclaims his vision of the world or when others comment upon it.

Brzozowski's thought may be defined negatively in relation to certain intellectual positions which he opposed. In the first group of these are positivism, evolutionism, naturalism and the theory of progress, all of which purport to interpret human life and make it intelligible as a function or extension of a natural process. Secondly, he opposed the romantic tradition which contrasts the independent "interior" of man with nature, alien to him and governed by its own laws. Brzozowski was, it is true, the most active exponent in Poland of modernist or "neo-romantic" thought, but he would have nothing to do with that aspect of it which he regarded as a continuation of the "bad side" of romanticism, i.e. the view that art should be completely free and unfettered by any consciousness of its social functions. He was equally opposed to the positivist, utilitarian approach and to the doctrine of "art for art's sake." He wished to preserve a place for artistic creation which was not determined by the laws of "progress" and did not owe its significance to other than human powers, yet at the same time did not represent a breach of historical continuity or claim to be exempt from social responsibility.

Biographical note

Stanisław Brzozowski (1878–1911), the son of minor gentry, was born in the village of Maziarnia in south-eastern Poland. After a high school

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education he entered the Science Faculty of Warsaw University in 1896, but was expelled a year later for helping to organize a patriotic demonstration of students. Arrested in autumn 1898 for underground educational activities, he was released a few weeks later but kept under police supervision. Next year he contracted tuberculosis, and from then till 1905 he lived partly in Warsaw and partly at the nearby resort of Otwock. From 1901 he was extremely active as a writer of books and articles on subjects of popular philosophy, novels, plays, literary criticism and drama reviews. In the first few years he published pamphlets on the philosophy of Taine, essays on Amiel, Śniadecki, Kremer, Avenarius and Żeromski, and polemics against Sienkiewicz and Miriam-Przesmicki. At the beginning of 1905 he went to Zakopane in the Tatras and spent a year in Galicia, giving lectures at Zakopane and Cracow. At this time he wrote a pamphlet (published in 1924) on the philosophy of Polish romanticism, essays on Norwid and Dostoevsky and a course of logic. At the beginning of 1906 he went for a cure to Nervi near Genoa, then to Lausanne, Germany and Lwów (Lemberg); during that year he published several articles and a book, *Współczesna powieść polska* (*The Modern Polish Novel*). He returned to Nervi at the beginning of 1907 and then spent six months in Florence. While in Italy he wrote a study of Nietzsche and an essay on historical materialism; he met Gorky and Lunacharsky and published two books, *Kultura i życie* (*Culture and Life*) and *Wspolczesna krytyka literacka w Polsce* (*Modern Polish Literary Criticism*). He also took up the intensive study of Marxism and read the works of Sorel.

The following year was that of the "Brzozowski affair," which shook the Polish intelligentsia to its foundations and clouded the philosopher's last years. In April 1908 a former Okhrana agent named Mikhail Bakay gave to Vladimir Burtsev, a Russian *émigré* in Paris and the editor of a socialist journal, a list of informers for the Okhrana which included Brzozowski's name. The heinous charge was repeated in *Czerwony Sztandar* (*Red Flag*), the organ of the SDKPiL, and both the socialist and the National Democratic (right-wing) press unleashed a campaign against the "spy." Brzozowski at once issued a denial and demanded that the charge be investigated by a "citizens' court" representing all the socialist parties. After much preparation the court was constituted: it met at Cracow in February and again in March 1909, but Brzozowski was struck down by illness before the next session. The only witness against him was Bakay, who gave confused evidence. The court passed no sentence; controversy raged meanwhile, with many eminent writers defending Brzozowski against the charge of treason. After his death the matter was reopened many times with inconclusive results. Feliks Kon, a Polish communist and a member of the Cracow court, investigated the Okhrana archives after the October revolution and found no evidence that Brzozowski had been a traitor. The general opinion today is that either there was a confusion of identity (both his Christian name

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and surname are very common in Poland) or the charge was a " plant " by the Russian police. In any case, it had a catastrophic effect on Brzozowski's personal fortunes and those of his writings. (During the affair it came to light that Yevno Azev, the leader of a terrorist organization of the Russian Social Revolutionaries, was an Okhrana agent; his name had also been on Bakay's list, but the ins and outs of this discovery are not clear either.)

Despite persecution, poverty and illness, Brzozowski did not cease to work. In 1908 he published *Płomienie* (*The Flames*), in 1909 *Legenda młodej Polski* (*The Legend of Young Poland*), perhaps his best-known work of philosphical criticism, and in 1910 *Idee* (*Ideas*), a summing-up of his philosophical reflections. He died in Florence. Many of his writings appeared posthumously, including memoirs written in the last months of his life, an unfinished novel and an essay on Newman prefaced to a Polish translation of the *Grammar of Assent.*

Philosophical development

Like most of his contemporaries, Brzozowski was infected for a time by the positivist outlook of Darwin and Spencer. Soon, however, he not only abandoned evolutionism, determinism and " scientific " optimism, but made them the chief target of his attack. For his own part he adopted an individualist philosophy of " action " which dispensed with objective criteria of cognitive, aesthetic and moral values, relating them exclusively to the self-assertion of the individual in his uniqueness, and sought to preserve the idea of creativity as a challenge to all forms of naturalist determinism. He articulated this philosophy with the aid of the same sources as most of his contemporaries drew upon—Fichte, Nietzsche, Avenarius—and also of traditional Polish romanticism, in which the cult of " action " afforded an ideological compensation for the country's enslavement.

At this time Brzozowski's chief masters were Avenarius and Nietzsche. The former was one of those who had drawn unexpected, and in Brzozowski's view, tragic, conclusions from evolutionist positivism. The Darwinists interpreted the whole of civilization and all intellectual activity as a weapon in the struggle of the human race for survival. This view facilitated, if it did not necessitate, a pragmatic attitude towards knowledge: since cognition, and its results preserved and codified in the form of science, were " nothing but " the response of the species to its natural environment, the notion of truth, like that of goodness or beauty, ceased to have any transcendental meaning; things were valuable in the cognitive, aesthetic or moral sense in so far as they helped to prolong and strengthen the life of the species. In the same way no scientific opinions, including the theory of evolution itself, could be regarded as " true " in the everyday sense: they were merely organs of " life," which in itself is neither good nor bad, true nor false, but simply exists through time. Yet this argument was based on a biological theory which

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claimed to be "true" in the transcendental sense of everyday usage. The whole structure of "scientific philosophy" turned out to be a vicious circle.

Empiriocritical philosophy did not overcome these difficulties, and Brzozowski, who for a time attached great weight to this philosophy, took the view that any theory of knowledge was bound to involve a vicious circle, as the general rules of its evaluation could not be formulated without prior assumptions. He accepted the empiriocritical negation of the concept of truth, while believing that it entailed the once-and-for-all abandonment of any claim to discover "objective" values in the rationalist sense of the term. In Avenarius's view the predicate "true," like "good" or "beautiful," did not denote a quality found in experience but merely a certain interpretation given by men to their perceptions and thoughts: truth was a "character," not an "element." The epistemological question as to the nature of truth, regarded as an attribute of human judgments irrespective of the biological function of those judgments or the circumstances in which they were formed, was not a question that could be meaningfully put. There were no valid questions outside the sphere of empirical description, and no such thing as "reason" considered as a power fundamentally different from organic reactions and designed to form a picture of the world as it is "in itself." The task of philosophy was not to investigate the attributes of being, but to generalize the data of experience while taking care not to endow its abstractions with any but a purely instrumental significance. It was for man to systematize experience in scientific form, not as the passive recipient of pre-existing reality but as its active organizer.

Brzozowski held at this time that we are obliged to accept these conclusions and abandon any claim to discover the "truth." What we regard as valuable is not so because it gives us a true picture of the world but because it is useful to us in the fight with nature, and the question why it is useful is the fruit of an addiction to metaphysics and has no real meaning. The world as we know it is our own creation, cut to our measure. We cannot intelligibly put questions about any other world or invent, as Spencer did, a category of the Unknowable, for the existence of such a category implies, absurdly, that we have knowledge of what we cannot know.

However, Brzozowski's biological relativism at this time was conceived in terms of the individual and not the species, and was thus ultimately closer to Nietzsche than to Avenarius. All that is true, good or beautiful is referred not to the interests of the community but to the irreducible subjectivity of each human being. It is each one's business to create the world for himself, and he is entitled to apply the term "good" or "true" to whatever he regards as favourable to his own development. In science, art and morality there are no universal criteria, only that of the individual who designs his own world in an act of unfettered creation.

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In this phase Brzozowski's thought did not go beyond the stereotypes of neo-romanticism, except for the dramatic rhetoric in which he clothed them. In 1906–7, however, without apparently quite realizing the extent of the change, he moved away from the solipsistic theory of value and the Nietzschean slogan of creativity, towards an anthropocentric viewpoint which he called the " philosophy of labour," and in which he was most influenced by Marx, Sorel and Bergson.

Although he never expressly unfolded the reasons for this change, they may be tentatively reconstructed by comparing his early views on the romantic philosophy with his later criticism of it. It would seem that he perceived the contradiction between his own critique of modernist art, which proclaimed its independence of society and thereby rejected social responsibility, and, on the other hand, a philosophy which postulated the freedom of the individual to create a world for himself as his own will or caprice dictated. If creativeness is defined by the lack of any connexion with existing culture or responsibility for it, and if the mind proclaims itself as creative in so far as it breaks off continuity with the universe, then we are back to the romantic vision that opposed the " internal " and spiritual (to which alone it attached importance), to the indifferent world of objectivized nature and civilization, the realm of natural or sociological determinism. A philosophy based on this assumption is not a creation forming part of the world, but a flight from its imperatives. If, as Nietzsche contended, the existing world has no meaning for us, then the freedom of the creative subject is mere contingency, an irresponsible refusal to enquire what social conditions make creativity possible, how far and in what circumstances we can be masters of our fate.

The ontology of culture which Brzozowski adumbrated at this stage was opposed both to evolutionist positivism and to romanticism: these appeared diametrically opposed to each other but, in his opinion, shared a common base. Both believed that external reality does not have a meaning of its own but is subject to its own laws, irrespective of mankind: to the positivists it was something to be manipulated for technical purposes, to the romantics it was an insensible world of necessity possessing no interest for us. But in either case the idea of man as a creative being could not be saved: in the former because creativity was only an adaptation to the demands of the natural environment and was determined by the general laws of " progress " in the same way as changes in that environment, in the latter because creativity was not supposed to apply itself to the external world but to reject it in favour of the illusory autarky of a human monad. The " philosophy of labour " transcended both the evolutionist faith in progress and the romantic cult of the self-sufficient ego: it regarded the world as existing only by virtue of the significance conferred on it by collective human effort, and sought in this way to preserve the dignity of man as the initiator of the world, as unconditionally responsible for himself and for external reality—as a collective absolute, to whom no ready-made laws afford a

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promise of triumph over destiny. This is a kind of Marxist version of Kantianism: nature as we know it and can meaningfully speak of it proves to be the creation of man, but its human coefficient derives from labour and not from transcendental conditions of experience.

The philosophy of labour was not the end of Brzozowski's spiritual evolution. The last years of his life were largely filled with religious speculation and a growing interest in Catholicism as presented by Newman and the modernists. To be sure, Brzozowski had never been a "progressive freethinker" or a militant atheist in the old-fashioned positivist or Marxist style. He never set out to "fight religious superstition," as he took seriously all forms of the spiritual life and saw in Catholicism an important and fruitful source of cultural values. In a certain undefined sense he regarded himself as a religious man: shortly before his death he wrote in a letter that he had never lost faith in the immortality of the soul. But for a long time Catholicism was to him only an historical creation, a concentration of values and a seed-bed of philosophical, artistic and literary production: he interpreted it in an immanent fashion, within the limits of self-contained human history. He did not believe at any time that cultural values could be wholly detached from their historical roots, the form and manner in which they had come to be, or that everything of value in Christianity could be simply taken over, without its Christian integument, into secular civilization. But in his last years his thoughts took a different turn; he was attracted by Christianity not only as an important cultural factor and a transmitter of values, but also as a means of intercourse with the supernatural. One can hardly speak of an outright conversion, nor can the nature of the change be exactly determined from the notes and letters dating from the last months of Brzozowski's life. It would seem, however, that there was no breach of continuity with his previous ideas but that he was still preoccupied, as he had been all his life, with the question: How can man give an absolute meaning to that which he himself creates? He appears to have decided that this absolute meaning, on which depends also man's faith in his own absolute dignity, can only come from the belief that our endeavours are capable of reaching the divine, timeless foundations of all being. Any realistic metaphysic of Christianity, or attempt at rationalizing faith, was alien to his mind. If he died as a Catholic it was the continuation of his philosophical pilgrimage, not a break with what had gone before.

The philosophy of labour

Looking more closely at the variant of Marxism outlined by Brzozowski, we see first of all that it is based on opposition to the then-dominant evolutionist version popularized by Engels and Kautsky. In Brzozowski's view all the Marxist writings of his day, except those of Labriola and Sorel, were a successful attempt to distract attention from the essential problems that Marx had raised.

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> There was not a single concept, vision or method which, in the transfer from Marx's head to Engels's, did not become completely different, and indeed diametrically opposite as far as the philosophical nature of concepts is concerned.[2]

Engels shared with the positivists a belief in the natural evolution of the world, of which human history was one aspect: history could be explained by the laws of nature, and there was an objective law of progress, independent of human will, which ensured that man would sooner or later attain a blessed state on earth. This positivist optimism, said Brzozowski, was not only a gratuitous invention but was degrading to man, as it signified that he was not the real master of his fate but was being steered by the "law of progress" towards an earthly paradise which already had a sort of quasi-existence: it robbed man of the sense that he was the active subject of his own destiny, and of the will to be so. Engels's theory thus maintained the essential alienness of man vis-à-vis the world, just as all the conservative metaphysics of the positivists had done.

> To Marx the victory of the working class was necessary because he had convinced himself that he knew how to create and construct that victory, that he was laying its foundations and taking part in the work of achievement. To Engels the whole of this construction, including Marx's will animating it from the inside, was a matter of knowledge, a cognitive complex that maintained itself in his mind because it satisfied his demands, covered all the facts known to him and had an answer to every objection. The workers' victory was a necessity because it took shape in his mind as a logical inference from what he knew... We are back at the same stage as though Marx had never existed.[3]
>
> To Engels it sufficed to feel that he represented, logically and intellectually, a form of life that was worthy of victory and power. He saw the world as a theatre of errors out of which there would finally emerge, necessarily and by the nature of things, that error which dominated his own mind.[4]...
>
> Basically he regards human beings as insignificant creatures, whose function is to be happy and free and not cause any logical perturbation in Engels's mind... He loved the working class because it furnished him with a necessary argument; apart from this he had no spiritual attachment except to Marx.[5]

Marx by contrast, according to Brzozowski, had no doctrine that made it possible to predict historical events on the basis of ascertained "natural" laws, valid alike for human affairs and for inanimate nature. This does not mean, however—and the point is worth stressing—that Brzozowski opposed the "determinism" of Engels to the "voluntarism" of Marx. He ascribed to Marx, not a voluntarist doctrine as the nega-

[2] *Idee*, p. 264.
[3] Op. cit. pp. 348–9.
[4] Ibid. p. 384.
[5] Ibid. p. 389.

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tion of determinism, but a philosophy that conceived itself as historical praxis. That is to say, Marxism was not a theory about praxis but was a form of social activity comprehending both history and itself as an historical factor, or, to put it otherwise, contemplating the historical process from the inside. In this way Brzozowski's interpretation is more radical than the collective subjectivism of the Russian empiriocritical Marxists: he not only regards the world as a meaning created by the collective effort of human beings, but relativizes his own meaning in the same manner. Brzozowski was perhaps the first who, anticipating Lukács and Gramsci, rejected the dispute among Marxists between determinists and followers of Kant. Both sides in this dispute regarded Marxism as a sociological attempt to ascertain social laws; but to Brzozowski the sense of Marxism consisted not in what it described or predicted, but in what it brought about.

Brzozowski had few grounds for taking this view, except the *Theses on Feuerbach*: he relied more on intuition than on Marx's writings. He believed firmly, however, that he had rediscovered the basic philosophical impulse which Marx himself had, as it were, forgotten when he came to concentrate on the problem of attaining power.

The first target of attack by the philosophy of praxis as thus understood was the idea of a "ready-made world" subject to laws of its own which mankind was capable of ascertaining in so far as it could exploit them for its own use. Such a world was an intellectualist delusion, a means of evading responsibility for the fate of humanity. What we know as nature, he argues, is not being in itself but is, at each particular stage of our knowledge, the degree of the power we exercise over being. He expresses this idea in different variants in several places.

> From the point of view of the critique of knowledge, nature in the scientific sense of the term is the power achieved by human technical ability over the outside world.[6]...
> Nature, as an idea, is experience envisaged in categories created by our real power over the surrounding universe... Nature, as an idea, is experience envisaged as the work of man, the world as a possible object of technical activity.[7]...
> Man does not acquaint himself with a ready-made world, but first unconsciously creates various forms of activity and later becomes aware of them.[8]...
> The reality encountered by human thought is nothing but human activity and human life. What lies beyond humanity is something against which only human labour can assert itself... Man has no resources other than himself and that which he deliberately creates. Science is the awareness, the plan and method of our activity and there are no boundaries to it, as human life and labour endure and develop.[9]

[6] Op. cit. p. 7.
[7] Ibid. p. 119.
[8] Ibid. p. 154.
[9] Ibid. p. 164.

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In other words, man's contact with reality is primarily active contact, i.e. labour: all the rest, including the perception and understanding of the world, is secondary. We know the world, from the beginning and at every successive stage, as that upon which our labour is directed, as a focus of resistance and effort. This practical dialogue with our environment is the absolute, intransgressible reality. There is no way of passing beyond it to discover the "real" face of being, nor can the external world, unaffected by us, come within the range of our conscious perception and create a subjective image there; nor is there any pure self-knowledge in which we arrive at an unclouded, substantive ego that is perfectly transparent to itself. The world, Brzozowski maintains, is "coextensive with labour." In the same way we cannot, in our intellectual activity, separate perception from evaluation: for there is no perception or theoretical reflection that does not have a human, partial evaluative slant, working within a horizon which is limited from the outset by man's practical need to control the world. Labour is an "absolute" for human beings in the sense that no theoretical reflection can go beyond the realities created by labour and organized according to its requirements. In the most general sense Kant is right: objects conform to our concepts, because the very presence of an object presupposes a human faculty of organizing experience. But this faculty does not consist in a set of *a priori* forms, nor is it due to any transcendental rationality: it is simply the practical ability to transform the environment in accordance with our needs.

Humanity, therefore, cannot itself be explained. We cannot interpret man by referring his origin, existence and perceptions to pre-human conditions (such as a body without consciousness, or the history of species), since these conditions can only be known to us within the practical perspective brought about by the totality of human efforts to maintain life and enhance its quality. We know things as the counterpart of our practical activity, and our own selves in the same state of interlocking tension. Neither the self nor the object is at any time "given" in the form of a separate "image": both are inescapably relativized vis-à-vis each other, and this interrelation is the final, unanalyzable basis of all our knowledge of the history of men and nature and the laws of the universe.

This, in Brzozowski's view, is not simply another attempt to solve epistemological questions, but involves a radically new conception of our relation to the world. To believe that we find a "ready-made world" obeying its own laws and waiting for us to observe or exploit it is to accept, as it were, the consolidated results of human activity ("dead labour," in Marxian terms) as an inescapable necessity, and thereby to accept that human labour must be enslaved for ever. To believe that man is, in a radical sense, the creator of the universe is to accept responsibility for the future, rejecting the domination of the results of past labour over the world that our own efforts are bringing to birth.

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The whole of the past—the necessities of cause and effect as we know them, the world organized into objects by a particular system of connexions, is nothing but " dead labour," a deposit created by past human activity.

> What we know as reality is no more than the result of past history. When we say, then, that reality imposes certain bounds on our historical activity, we should say that past history does so, or existing reality, or the ideas occasioned by that reality, which at any given time set limits to our thinking... For any philosophy of history, or metaphysic of being, or theory of knowledge that purports to abstract from history, is only possible on the basis of labour that has not recognized itself as the sole human activity that has the consequences in the realm of being.[10]

It is easy to see that if we take the view that there is nothing which is not immanent in human history the dispute between materialism and idealism falls to the ground, since both are based on a false assumption.

> Both these opinions regard the content of the mind as constituting the essence of the universe. Idealism tells us how the world is created by what is in our minds, while materialism accepts the result and tries to forget the " process." Bergson, quite rightly, points out that evolutionism *à la* Spencer is essentially the same thing as evolutionism *à la* Fichte.[11]

> History is the creator of what we call our minds and nature: it is the ground on which we stand and which prevents us from falling into the abyss; we are from it, and only through it have we any contact with what is not human.[12]

All the attributes that ignorant conservatism, with its eyes fixed on the past, would have us regard as features of a ready-made world are, from the point of view of the philosophy of labour, secretions of human effort, and this radically alters their significance. This applies in particular to the notion of time, which is neither a " natural " frame within which events occur, nor a relationship between them independent of ourselves. We create the category of time in order to make ourselves aware of the possibility of controlling our own destiny, by opposing the human effort crystallized in past history to the energy which is free to project itself as it chooses: the past is what we have already done, the future is the open realm of our hopes and intentions. To the conservative way of thinking which dominates the evolutionist version of Marxism, time is not a reality: the future, in some mysterious way, already exists and is determined; human happiness and contentment are already inscribed on some future part of the unwinding scroll of progress. But this optimistic philosophy is a self-delusion and a flight from reality in the eyes of those who have learnt from Bergson that the future does not exist in any form and that only duration is real, i.e. nothing is real that has not

[10] Op. cit. p. 131.
[11] Ibid. pp. 202–3.
[12] Ibid. p. 207.

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appeared in actual duration. It is absurd, Brzozowski says, to attribute to Marx a belief in time as something that only actualizes eternal " laws " and thus entrusts human fate to higher powers of which men are the compliant instruments. " Teach me to feel myself the tree, And not the withered leaf "—the quotation from Meredith prefaced to Brzozowski's *Idee* is central to his understanding of Marxism. To him it was above all a way in which men could comprehend the dependence of all forms of culture, including science and nature itself, on labour conceived as an original datum, not analyzable into independent elements; and at the same time it signified the acceptance by men of responsibility for their own collective lot.

The understanding of culture must therefore be both genetic and functional. There are no transcendental or pre-existing rules determining the value of what men produce in the way of knowledge, religious myths, works of art or systems of philosophy. Forms of civilization cannot be discussed without a knowledge of their origin. The question of truth, again, is not that of a connexion, independent of ourselves, between the content of certain ideas and a self-existing object: truth is whatever strengthens society and aids it in the fight for survival. This, of course, is close to the pragmatist approach; but Brzozowski differs from James, whose philosophy he knew, in that he does not derive the meaning and truth of the products of culture and knowledge from particular situations or individual needs, but always relates them to the community. Only the whole labouring people can impart the dignity of " truth " to anything they produce, in so far as it proves able to survive in their world and serves to further its development. In the same way Brzozowski, in accordance with his argument, refuses to accept the category of " use " or " life-value " in relation to pre-cultural, biological needs or instincts: for as humanity cannot be defined, or its origin explained, in terms of pre-human factors, so it cannot be treated as a complex of instincts or animal needs to which consciousness is superadded at a later stage. Needs and the demands of " life " are historical, human categories, and the pragmatic significance of civilization relates to man as the creator of himself, not as a creature who grafts cultural institutions on to his animal existence. However, Brzozowski shares with pragmatism the fundamental conviction that the same value-criterion applies to scientific knowledge as to art, morals, social systems, religious sentiments and institutions: viz. their utility to humanity as the master of its own destiny.

This view does away with the traditional dichotomies of rationalism, positivism and free thought as between religion and science, fact and value, art and knowledge, cognition and creation. If " life " is the sole touchstone of value, no branch of culture can claim supremacy over another or set up universal criteria, but all deserve equally to be judged as instruments of the human struggle to survive and create a more abundant life; they are good if they enhance energy, and bad if they dissipate it in backward-looking delusions.

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Since humanity is its own final basis and there is nothing beyond it to which we can appeal, it is no good looking for any guarantee in the shape of historical necessity or a pre-established order.

> The present state of humanity is the profoundest metaphysical work of man; it is reality *par excellence*. Our towns, factories, wars, arts and sciences are not a dream behind which something more profound waits to liberate us: they are absolute reality, irreducible to anything else.[13]...
>
> There is no such thing as relations "to the world," "to nature," "to logic"; there are only intra-historical, intra-social relations between different efforts, tensions and directions of the will. What we call the world is a certain property of the human will: we take it for the world because we do not so much create it as find it.[14]

But what we find is brittle and uncertain: we can and do preserve ourselves daily by fresh efforts: nothing is truly ours, no satisfaction is permanent, no gain is everlasting. The meaning and value accumulated by centuries of human effort has to be maintained by an effort constantly renewed. The human condition is not a steady progress towards final satisfaction, happiness or the enjoyment of benefits acquired once and for all: it is an unceasing struggle, the result of which is not and never will be certain. All we can hope to do in that struggle is to preserve our own dignity. We have no "calling" other than what we actually decide our "calling" to be.

If there is no criterion of truth and value outside "life" itself, rationalism stands revealed as a conservative illusion. For, in Brzozowski's view, rationalism is the belief that actual forms of culture can be evaluated by criteria independent of the cultural process and can be explained by factors that are not the work of man. But such criteria and explanations do not in fact exist. There is no such thing as pure thought or pure aesthetic sensibility which can then be applied to real life.

> Social existence is not the application of thought and perception, but is itself the reality which creates the faculty and the content of perception. Each and every mental phenomenon is only a phase in the history of a particular social group, and the life of the group is its essential content.[15]

Once again, the meaning and cognitive value of any product of culture can only be judged by its origin and functions and not by extra-historical criteria. Moreover, if the organic crystallization of a culture can be expressed in rational form, this signifies that it has already lost its creative force and belongs to the lifeless accumulation of the past. Live cultural tendencies can never be confined in perfectly rational and convincing forms. Rationalism is the attitude of those who wish to entrench

[13] Op. cit. p. 215.
[14] Ibid. p. 443.
[15] Op. cit. p. 419.

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themselves in ready-made positions and persuade others that these positions cannot be questioned. But thought and artistic creation, in its formative stage, is characterized by lack of self-confidence and by the imperfect logic of its forms.

Socialism, the proletariat and the nation

The philosophy of labour is, in Brzozowski's view, a kind of metaphysic of socialism and a motivation, or rationalization, of his adherence to the idea. He was not an active party worker at any time, partly because he disapproved of socialist particularism and current versions of Marxism, but also because he believed, especially in his last years, that all political forms that derived organically from the life of a nation were in some way necessary to it, and none of them could claim a monopoly of the truth. He declared himself to be a socialist in the sense of holding that the workers would conquer if they could show that the mass of free labour could outweigh the mass that was possible with enslaved labour. This highly vague form of socialism was expressly neutral with regard to current ideas of the nature of the future order. He believed that as the whole of civilization must be interpreted as the self-organization of the working community, and as it was only from the point of view of labour that men could understand the meaning of their own efforts, it was from the class of direct producers that humanity must learn to understand itself and be imbued with the necessary hope and confidence to manage its own destiny. In this general sense Brzozowski believed in the special mission of the proletariat, and his Prometheanism on its behalf was expressed in formulae close to the syndicalism of Sorel.

> The class separatism of the proletariat is the only way to bring about a moral atmosphere among mankind, to rediscover the meaning of the word "humanity." The proletariat's increasing class consciousness is the one great, metaphysically genuine spiritual reality of our time. This is the point at which man's tragic dilemma is decided. We do not demand justice—no one knows what it is—nor do we promise or look for happiness: mankind never will be happy. Suffering has its absolute values which we do not want to lose. But we believe that man must exist because he has loved and valued his existence—because he creates himself as that reality whose existence he desires, as his own absolute meaning and as the purpose of the world.[16]

Socialism is thus expressed not in terms of welfare, security and contentment, but of human dignity. The struggle for dignity is a struggle for "free labour," defined as the opposite of labour "controlled from above," or as a state in which the labourer, while at work, is not subject to any higher authority. Like Sorel, Brzozowski did not go beyond this general formulation, which is, of course, in accordance with Marxist

[16] Op. cit. p. 222.

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tradition as far as it goes. He was not interested in the question of the seizure of political power by the proletariat, or of economic organization. What was needed was for the "mind and will of the working class" to rise to a level at which the workers were in full control of the vital processes of society based on the productivity of labour. Political and economic changes that did not lead to the spiritual transformation of the workers, or increase their readiness and ability to take control of the productive process, were of no account. From this point of view Brzozowski, like Sorel and the anarcho-syndicalists, distinguished the socialism of the intelligentsia from that of the proletariat. The intelligentsia was merely a consuming class that produced nothing; but, as its activity took place in the mental sphere, it was naturally inclined to believe that forms of life are produced by consciousness and not the other way round. What the intelligentsia called socialism was only an attempt to secure for itself a dominant place in society, using the workers as an instrument to maintain its privileges. The hegemony of intellectuals in the socialist movement was a result of the spiritual immaturity of the proletariat. Brzozowski dreamt of a mass struggle of the proletariat, not led by the intellectuals but fully capable of fighting for itself.

No historical law guaranteed the success of socialism. If "free labour" showed itself to be more productive, socialism would be possible; if not, not. The productivity of labour was to be the final criterion of social progress, but not—and this is a particular feature of Brzozowski's thought—because increased productivity would make possible an increase of consumption. The advance of technology and increased productivity meant the growth of man's power over his environment: this was to Brzozowski an end in itself, not simply the means to a more comfortable life. His whole conception of socialism was heroic and adventurous: man's conquest of nature needed no material gain to justify it; production was not a means to consumption, but to the maintenance of man's position as the independent lord of creation. The proletariat, in his eyes, was a collective warrior with the traits of a Nietzschean hero, the idealized embodiment of humanity as a metaphysical entity. Human ideals and values made sense and were historically momentous in so far as they helped man to wrestle with refractory nature, but that wrestling itself was in the last resort justified on spiritual grounds, as a self-assertion of the will.

To critics brought up on Marxist orthodoxy, this Prometheanism with its metaphysical and prophetic tone appeared highly suspect. Faced with the popularity of Brzozowski's writings amongst left-wing youth, Polish communist intellectuals attached importance to destroying his influence and, in effect, wrote him off as an ideologist of the Right. Andrzej Stawar, for instance, declared that the undifferentiated cult of labour belonged to the ideology of class solidarity. This was an exaggeration in that Brzozowski strongly emphasized the separate cultural identity of the proletariat and its special role in social development. It was true,

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however, that unlike the Marxists he defined the proletariat by the fact that it performed physical labour, and not by its place in the scheme of production or, especially, that it sold its labour as a commodity. In general Brzozowski did not pay attention to the class division of society and the social conditions of production. In the last resort we cannot say exactly what he meant by the proletariat, " free labour " or socialism. He used these terms as metaphysical categories to aid in the description of man as the conqueror of nature: labour, and the struggle itself, were their own reward. " By means of labour the ideal becomes a fact. Labour is the divine element in which nature—for labour is a fact of nature—becomes the body of an ideal. Labour is the fruit of the will, the basis of its domination over the world." (Letter to Salomea Perlmutter, March 1906). In this sense the reproach that Brzozowski levelled against the socialist parties—that they treated the proletariat as a means to the conquest of power by intellectuals who were professional politicians—can, *mutatis mutandis*, be directed against himself: to him the proletariat was the instrument of a Promethean ideal derived from metaphysical reflection and not from observation of the actual tendency of the workers' movement. He was not concerned with what the workers actually wanted, but with what they must become in order that the conquistador's vision of human destiny might be fulfilled.

Another point of contention with Polish Marxists was Brzozowski's attitude to the national question. As time went on the ideas of " nation " and " fatherland " became more prominent in his writing, as did the role of traditional culture. Moreover he used biological metaphors which, vague as they were, became increasingly suspect when radical-nationalist movements of a more or less fascist type began to use similar metaphors in defence of national values. On such grounds Pawel Hoffman, another orthodox communist, denounced Brzozowski as a forerunner of fascism.

Brzozowski gave no thought to the tensions that might arise from an attempt to reconcile the national and the class point of view in social philosophy. It seemed clear to him that his loyalty to the workers' cause in no way conflicted with his belief in Poland as a source of national and cultural values; on this subject he wrote:

> People have been at pains to show that the workers' movement can be, and is, a national movement. I do not know that their efforts were necessary. Poland is the field of action of the motive forces in Polish life and the resources which sustain it. To argue that the workers' movement can be independent of the nation's life and destiny is to say that it does not matter what range of forces and means of action it has at its disposal. As long as the Polish community is deprived of its rights, so long will our working class be an amorphous body of degraded paupers—not occupying the fourth rank in the social order, but the fifth, sixth or even lower. What is the issue here? To renounce one's national existence is to give up hope of influencing human reality: it means destroying one's own

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> soul, for the soul lives and acts only through the nation. The so-called question of nationality does not arise, for it is the same as to ask whether we wish to lose our human dignity. There are no opinions, interests or values that can dispense us from loyalty to this supreme value. A man without a country is a soul without substance—he is lukewarm, dangerous and harmful. For the human soul is the result of a long collective struggle, a long process of creation, and all its significance is due to the length of time that has gone into making it. The older our soul is, the more creative it will be. That is why the workers must consciously arouse themselves to love their country and remember its history.[17]

If this argument had simply meant that the liberation of the working class could not take place in conditions of national oppression, it would have been commonplace enough and would have been endorsed by Polish socialists in general. But it is clear that Brzozowski meant more than this, and in his discussion of Sorel and Bergson he developed his thought more fully. His point was that there could be no approach to culture except through national tradition, and "culture" here included all forms of knowledge. Our relationship to the world is such that we perceive everything not only in terms of human history but also of national history, and we delude ourselves if we think we can step outside this. Summarizing Sorel's views, with which he evidently agrees, Brzozowski writes:

> The idea of knowledge as the contemplation of some reality above or beyond human life is a fiction: in no circumstances can thought be independent of the community in which it comes to birth, or express anything but a certain sum of human activity... Metaphysics came into being as a surrogate for patriotism, as its destruction; today the mother-country comes into its own again... We cannot communicate with anyone except through the nation: there is no road to life except through that body-spirit by which we are sustained and exalted... Knowledge is international only inasmuch as it affects the conditions of life of every nation; it cannot be attained by any shallow mind, or by anyone who has not been involved in the stern and tragic features of the life of his own people... Poland, our language and our soul are not accidental figures of inanimate, uncaring nature: they are a great reality in their own right, a fundamental aspect of being, and will remain so long as there are Poles on this earth. There are things that are even older and more profound than nations, but man as such can only know himself through the nation, for there are no non-national, international organs of spiritual life.[18]

This passage clearly goes far beyond what would have been accepted by even the least orthodox of Marxists, suggesting as it does that even science, not to speak of other forms of culture, depends on the national

[17] Op. cit. p. 225.
[18] Ibid. pp. 248–51.

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tradition as a necessary medium. To Brzozowski these thoughts were simply an expression of his belief in the value of the nation as a continuous, irreducible reality in which all its members participated. It is hard to deny, however, that his views gave a handle to nationalist radicalism with all its dangerous consequences. The attempts of extreme Rightists to claim him for their own cannot be dismissed as simply mistaken, and it is not easy to acquit him of all blame for this. On the other hand none of the Marxists were able, either in theory or in practical politics, to resolve the conflict between the internationalism of the workers' movement and the intrinsic value of the national community, except by arbitrarily denying the latter as Rosa Luxemburg did. Nor did any of them apparently suspect that history might have thrown up social forms which were not necessarily reducible to a single pattern.

Brzozowski's Marxism

There is no need to demonstrate that Brzozowski's ideas of the proletariat and of socialism were very different from Marx's. Moreover he was certainly wide of the mark in interpreting Marx's intention as follows:

> Nobody can understand Marx's thought who does not feel that he identifies himself with certain constructions of his own such as "productive forces," the "concentration of capitalism" etc. These cognitive concepts are really myths that Marx uses in the first place to represent to himself the trend and content of his own will; he then endeavours to impose this will on others, to build it up and sustain it in them.[19]

However, irrespective of the later reception of Brzozowski's ideas and the many arbitrary features in his interpretation of Marxism, it can be said that he was the first to attempt to divert Marxist thought from the channel in which it had been flowing without arousing any alarm, and to impel it in the direction that was afterwards followed in different ways by Gramsci and Lukács. Both the evolutionists and the Kantians accepted as axiomatic that Marxism was an account of the social reality of capitalism and its future, as "objective" as any other scientific theory. Almost all were likewise agreed that Marxism was based on a kind of common-sense realistic metaphysic and that it interpreted human existence and perception in the way generally assumed in evolutionist theories. Brzozowski, arguing from a shaky factual basis, challenged both these axioms and proposed an interpretation of his own which is remarkably close to the philosophic outlook of Marx's early writings that have since come to light. He contended that Marxism could not in principle treat the social process as "natural" reality independent of the act of perceiving it. The understanding of the world was itself a factor in changing it, and therefore the determinist explanation of social phenomena, as usually understood, could not be maintained. From the

[19] Op. cit. pp. 347–8.

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Marxist point of view the social universe and the knowledge of that universe were one and the same, and therefore the course of history could not be " predicted " like the weather.

In addition, Brzozowski argued, Marxism was incompatible with the idea of a world that preceded and produced human reality and was then able to imprint its own image, together with that of human existence, upon human minds. Man perceived the world from a human angle and could not impartially observe himself as a part of it, for this would mean casting off his human skin and his whole dependence on history. There was no knowledge independent of the human situation in which it was acquired, and we could not so much as form a concept of the world " in itself." The subjection of our perceptions to historical and social conditions was irrevocable, and we must reconcile ourselves to this as to an absolute reality.

However, Brzozowski's religious " conversion " threw doubt on the possibility of consistently maintaining this strictly anthropocentric viewpoint. It was not, as we have mentioned, a conversion in the usual sense, or a commonplace instance of mental stress in a man close to death. In a letter of 2 May 1910 to Witold Klinger he wrote that he felt no need for revelation, as Catholicism satisfied him intellectually. However, in another letter to Klinger on 19 April 1911, a few days before his death, he wrote: " My Catholicism includes many important aspects of my Marxism, not to speak of Darwinism, Nietzscheanism and all the other isms." Brzozowski did not leave a detailed account of the last phase of his philosophical evolution, but if we regard his conversion as part of this and not merely a psychological phenomenon, we may perhaps explain the background to it as follows.

The leitmotiv of Brzozowski's thought was the desire to safeguard the absolute value of humanity and endow it with absolute meaning. He expressed this desire first in the Fichtean-Nietzschean category of creativeness and " action," which appeared to provide a basis for asserting the absolute independence of the creative individual spirit. He abandoned this viewpoint after coming to the conclusion that creativeness was self-contradictory if it did not spring from a sense of obligation towards existing tradition and the centres of social energy that have arisen in the course of history. To defend the subjective, lyrical autarky of the personal " interior " as an absolute value meant abandoning the world to the indifferent laws of nature: creativity would no longer signify making one's mark on the world, but running away from it. The answer to this was the Marxist vision of man as a collective creator, asserting his own absolute significance in and through his struggle with the external world, and treating the whole of reality as a factor in his own situation. The meaning of the universe was referred wholly to human existence, which took on the role of Atlas and would not, indeed could not, know or perceive anything unrelated to its own self-regarding determination to endure as a species.

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It turned out, however, that even this point of view did not suffice to vindicate the absolute meaning of human existence, simply because it was a meaning arbitrarily asserted by a being who could regard himself as absolute only in his manner of envisaging the world and not in Being itself. Since man is condemned to fight for mastery over nature and affirms his dignity in conflict with the non-human world, so that his existence is neither necessary nor independent, his ascription to himself of an absolute position in the scale of values may appear to be no more than a caprice, and may be cancelled by irrational forces if ever they should prove stronger. Faith in the absolute meaning of human existence can only be preserved if it is based on the non-contingent existence of God. Radical anthropocentrism is impossible and self-contradictory because it implies that human existence is at the same time both contingent and absolute.

This hypothetical reconstruction may indicate the road which led Brzozowski from activistic Narcissism, via the collective solipsism of Marxist doctrine, to the Church as an historical organism through which humanity is in touch with unconditional Being and is able, in the only possible way, to maintain its own unconditional significance.

Translated from Polish by P. S. Falla.

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The New Evolutionism

Adam Michnik

THE historical events of 1956 which we call " The Polish October " have been the principal source of hope for the evolution of the communist system in Poland. This hope expressed itself in two visions or concepts of evolution. We will call one of these concepts " revisionist," the other " neopositivist."

The revisionist concept recognized a certain possibility of evolution within the Party. Although never formulated as a political programme, the concept implied not only a possibility of humanizing and democratizing the system of the exercise of power, but also the possibility that the official Marxist doctrine was capable of assimilating some of today's ideas in the humanities and social sciences. The revisionists wanted to act within the framework of the Communist Party and of the Marxist doctrine. They sought to participate in the evolution of this doctrine and of this Party " from the inside," working towards democratization and the victory of common sense. In the longer term, their action so conceived was supposed to establish inside the party the domination of enlightened men and progressive ideas. Wladislaw Bienkowski, one of the most typical representatives of this orientation, called it " enlightened socialist absolutism."

The other concept of evolution was christened by Stanislaw Stomma, who was one of its most distinguished representatives, " neopositivism." This was an attempt to apply the strategy already formulated by Roman Dmowski in the early twentieth century to new political conditions. In directing the Roman Catholic group " *Znak*," Stanislaw Stomma took into consideration Poland's geographical factors as well as its Catholicism, the unifying and indispensable part of the country's public life. He wanted to repeat the manoeuvre of the leader and ideologist of the National Democratic Party who in 1906 in Tsarist Russia entered the Duma: in January 1957, Stomma and his party colleagues entered the Polish *Sejm* (Parliament). The main aim of this group of militant Catholics around Stanislaw Stomma was to create the nucleus of a political movement which at the right moment could place itself at the head of the Polish nation. Such an opportunity had presented itself to Roman Dmowski when the first world war broke out. Stanislaw Stomma thought that this moment might come with the break-up of the Eastern bloc. In the years 1956–59 Stomma's ideas received moderate support from the Church hierarchy, at this period favourably disposed towards Gomulka's regime because of the not insignificant concessions made by him to the Church.

Stomma's evolutionist ideas differed considerably from revisionism. His neopositivism implied above all continued loyalty to the USSR,

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regarded as the same old Russia, while rejecting the Marxist doctrine and socialist ideology. By contrast, the revisionists' attitude was anti-Soviet (for example, vis-à-vis the problem of the Hungarian 1956 events), rather than anti-Marxist. Using the metaphor of the USSR as the Church and its Marxist ideological doctrine as the scriptures, one could say that revisionism remained faithful to the scriptures, while interpreting them in its own way, and neopositivism remained faithful to the Church, while hoping for its more or less speedy disappearance.

Revisionists and neopositivists were at one in counting on changes from above as a way leading to the achievement of their goals. Both were expecting a favourable outcome of the Party's evolution resulting from realistic policies implemented by intelligent leaders. Neither of them even considered reinforcing the likelihood of this evolution by means of constant organized social pressure. They relied on the reason of a communist Prince rather than on the struggle to establish sovereign institutions which could control power.

In the absence of these options, public activity by revisionists and neopositivists would probably have proved impossible, but the same options also inevitably caused their political and intellectual defeat. This defeat was shared equally by the revisionists criticizing the Church and by the revisionists opposing the scriptures.

THE revisionist attitude did, however, possess some clearly positive traits; we know that in this period the revisionists' intellectual output stimulated the political activity of a considerable proportion of the intelligentsia—we need only mention the remarkable writings of Leszek Kolakowski, Oskar Lange, Edward Lipinski, Maria Hirszowicz, Wlodzimierz Brus, Krzysztof Pomain, Bronislaw Baczko and Witold Kula. One can find the literary expression of revisionism in its widest sense in the works of K. Brandys, A. Wazyk, W. Woroszylski and J. Bochenski. In addition to their scientific or literary merits, all these works were propagating persecuted ideas and defending truth and humanistic values. Such books soon become political acts: also, revisionism favoured political activity. It demonstrated that it was necessary to have critical participation in social life and it opposed passivity and the phenomenon of "internal emigration."

The necessary prerequisite of such political activity is faith in the possibility of an effective influence over the destiny of society. For the revisionists, this faith was pinned on the idea of reforming the Party. Even if nowadays one can see (so very clearly) how shaky the basis of this confidence was, its real and positive effect then was not only a great deal of civic activity but also the articulation of the ideas of the opposition which were expressed openly in the years 1956–68. Most of the challenges to the regime of this period came from this milieu and not from the intransigent anti-communists. Whatever the responsibility of the left-wing Polish intelligentsia for Stalinism may have been, it does not change the fact that it was these same revisionist ex-Stalinists who

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created and spread amongst the intelligentsia the attitude and pattern of opposition which permitted the rebirth of civic life in the difficult conditions of Poland. However, revisionism has been bedevilled by the belief in the identity of the aspirations and objectives of the "liberal" wing of the Party and of the revisionist intelligentsia. It seems to me that the chief failing of the revisionists is not that they have suffered defeat in their struggle for power inside the Party—a struggle which anyway was lost before it started—it was more the defeat of personalities who one by one lost power and influence; it was not a defeat of the programme of the democratic left, because the revisionists had never formulated one.

THE events of March 1968 marked the limit of revisionism. At that time the bond tying the revisionist intelligentsia to the Party was definitely severed. After March 1968 one could no longer count on the existence of a democratic tendency in the ruling bodies of the Party. It is true that Wladislaw Bienkowski was to formulate a little later a political hope of the same type: his position was, however, judged by public opinion—whether rightly or wrongly—more as tactics than a real hope. Bienkowski did, however, break with the old revisionist style of thinking, whose unwritten law allowed only action within the Party and by the same token ruled out all appeals to public opinion. Bienkowski transformed a revisionism based on faith in the possible emergence in the future of an intelligent leadership of the Party, into a programme for an indomitable struggle against the stupidity of the leaders actually ruling. But even when formulating a programme of opposition and expressing ideas hostile to those in power, he was still addressing himself to that power rather than to society. Someone who was not a member of the Party could not learn by reading his works how to act and what to do in order to participate in democratic transformations.

HOWEVER, in the course of that same year, 1968, which saw the death of revisionism, one could hear the protesting students chanting the slogan "All Poland is waiting for her own Dubček"; the leader of the Czech and Slovak communists became, for a time, the symbol of hope. And even today the myth of Dubček and the "Prague Spring" has not ceased to have an influence, even though its significance is far from unambiguous. It justifies shining optimism as much as black despair. It furnishes arguments just as much for conformism as for heroism. What can the explanation of this phenomenon be?

The threat of Soviet intervention in Poland in October 1956 has elevated to the rank of national hero a man who in winter 1970 had to quit the political scene in disgrace. This example demonstrates all the ambiguity in the heroic myth of the Party leader, whoever he is. One may be allowed the supposition that, had there been no intervention in Czechoslovakia, a struggle would have broken out between the progressive faction of the Party and the opposition groups outside the

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Party (the KAN, the students' movement etc.). It may be difficult to make such conjectures, but it is not unreasonable to suppose that many supporters of Dubček would have been able to transform themselves into detractors of a turbulent opposition.

The myth of a "good" leader of the Party is by its very nature ambiguous. Many members of the PUWP gave the following reason for joining the Party: "Only in this way can we serve the cause of democracy in Poland, only in this way can we add our efforts to the eventual rise of a Polish Dubček." Even today a desire to serve the cause of democracy is at the root of the motives of many serving the totalitarian power.

The Czech example is also cited by those who do not belong to the Party, who declare themselves completely anti-communist, yet carefully avoid any gestures of opposition. These people think of the opposition as political adventurers and see in the history of Czechoslovakia and Dubček irrefutable proof of the fact that "nothing can change."

For me the lesson of Czechoslovakia is the proof of the possibility of change as well as the demonstration of its limitations. It demonstrates at one and the same time the fragility of the totalitarian *status quo* and the hopelessly brutal reaction of the threatened empire.

THE experience of the neopositivists is also worth examining in detail. Undoubtedly this movement had the merit of creating a certain section of public opinion that was independent, and of spreading a way of thinking that was different from the official style in culture, science and Party propaganda. The Znak movement departed in 1956 from the principle (already mentioned) of geographical realism, by rejecting, because of the tragic experience of the Warsaw Uprising in 1944, the "rebellious thinking" of the Poles. The Znak movement managed to obtain important political concessions in exchange for supporting Gomulka and the new leadership of the Party. As a result, one could witness the appearance of clubs created by the Catholic intelligentsia, the resuscitation of the weekly magazine *Tygodnik Powszechny* and the founding of the monthly magazine *Znak*, as well as the publishing house of the same name. The Znak movement reached the point where it could talk in its own terms and formulate its own model of national culture. In this domain, the merits of Znak are enormous. One cannot overestimate the importance of the assimilation of contemporary Christian thought into Polish intellectual life; nor can one overestimate the role played by the writings of Stefan Kisielewski, Hanna Malewska, Jerzy Turowicz, Jerzy Zawiejski, Stanislaw Stomma, Antoni Golubiew or Jacek Wozniakowski. Thanks to the activities in the *Sejm* of Stefan Kisielewski, Jerzy Zawiejski and Stanislaw Stomma, the young people of Poland have been able to have at least an example of political pluralism. And this was so in spite of the fact that the group had to follow its principles and play only the minimal part in a drama in which

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they were cast as a realistic and pragmatic Catholic opposition to "his Royal Socialist Highness." Znak's support for Gomulka was linked to a certain political orientation; broadening of the sovereignty of the Polish state in relation to the USSR (the revision of commercial treaties, the dismissal of Soviet advisers) and an extension of civil liberties. Within this framework one could see a progressive normalization in the relations between state and Church (the freeing of Cardinal Wyszynski, the abandonment of administrative harassment, the legalization of the teaching of the catechism etc.). In this domain, Znak has felt it necessary to give, with reserve and dignity, its support to the regime. Like the revisionists, the Catholics counted on concessions coming from above rather than on the organization of social pressure. They sought out understandings rather than conflicts, looked for an agreement with the Party and were careful not to let themselves be considered as an opposition.

If the leaders of Znak have never committed the cardinal error of the revisionists, if they have always underlined their attachment to different political ideas, nevertheless their mode of action inspires critical reflection. A policy of *entente* makes sense only in so far as it is taken seriously by both sides. In relations with a communist power which has no place even for the word *entente* in its political vocabulary, such a policy is not justified unless it is led from a position of strength. If this is not the case, *entente* becomes capitulation, and the policy of *entente* turns into a march towards political self-destruction. And this was exactly the evolution undergone by the parliamentary circle of Znak. The approval it gave to successive replacements of its members forced by the regime, compromised the party's political line. The concessions on principles cost the Znak deputies their authority in the eyes of the regime, for whom only strength counts, as well as in the eyes of society which, in spite of its own impotence, admires courage and constancy. The Znak deputies started on the road which led them from compromise to discredit. These are severe words, but it is difficult to find any others to describe the recent voting by all the Znak deputies (except for Stanislaw Stomma) in favour of the changes in the constitution, changes which had been emphatically rejected by the whole of independent public opinion in Poland. This was the last chapter and final consequence of the concessions which they made over their principles in order to obtain immediate (and how illusory) advantages.

AMONG the paradoxes which abound in the history of Poland, there is now one more: Stanislaw Stomma, the politician who aimed to follow the example of Alexander Wielopolski and his *Realpolitik*, has in fact made his political mark in People's Poland by a romantic gesture worthy of Rejtan.[1]

[1] Rejtan was a deputy in the Polish *Sejm* who made the celebrated protest against the acceptance of the partitions of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century.—Ed.

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THE ideas of the revisionists and the neopositivists were a response to the particular situation of the years 1957–64, a period of both social normalization and of a political thaw in which the standard of living rose and civil liberties were extended. Both conceptions largely reflected the atmosphere of political truce and socio-psychological stability. The task of realism in the revisionists and neopositivists (with the latter wanting to be so realistic) became apparent in the period of growing social conflict which came in the late sixties and the seventies. The movement of students and intellectuals in March 1968, the workers' revolt in December 1970, the recent protests of intellectuals against the constitutional legitimization of Poland's dependence of the USSR—similar to that of the nation vis-à-vis the Party—and finally the workers' strikes in June 1976: the very spontaneity of all these demonstrations tends to confirm the failure of the revisionists and the neopositivists. Confronted by reality, the abstract historiosophical schemes underlying the tactics of these two currents of thought revealed their futility.

The open conflict between society and the regime proved the illusory character of the hopes of the revisionists and the neopositivists and forced those who held these hopes to face, on each occasion, a dramatic choice.

If one does not believe that all popular manifestations are just a product of police provocation (this lugubrious notion is unfortunately part of the currently expressed suspicions of the intelligentsia in totalitarian countries) one must clearly define one's own attitude towards the conflict which is taking place. One must choose between the point of view of the oppressor and that of the oppressed. When the crunch comes, both revisionism or neopositivism, applied consistently, must inevitably lead to taking up the point of view of the regime. In effect, any solidarity with workers on strike, with demonstrating students or dissident intellectuals, puts into question the revisionists' strategies of seeking to act from within the Party, and the neopositivists' tactic of seeking *entente* with the Party. When the conflict becomes open, both these groups find themselves swiftly deprived of one essential factor: influence on power.

THE dilemma of the Left in the nineteenth century—"reform or revolution"—is no dilemma for the Polish opposition. To think of a revolution turning out the dictatorship of the Party, or to organize attempts towards that end, would be as unrealistic as it would be dangerous. It is unrealistic in Poland today to think of a change in the government while the political structure of the USSR remains what it is, and it is dangerous to organize conspiratorial activities. In a country where civilized politics and democratic institutions are almost completely missing, conspiracies can only aggravate society's ills, without bringing any benefits. Revolutionary programmes and conspiratorial activities can only help the police to fan hysteria and to facilitate provocation.

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In my opinion the only policy for dissidents in Eastern Europe is an unceasing struggle for reforms, in favour of evolution which will extend civil liberties and guarantee a respect for human rights. The example of Poland shows that pressure brought to bear on the government can bring not insignificant concessions. The Polish opposition, one can perhaps say, has chosen the Spanish rather than the Portuguese road. It looks for progressive and partial changes rather than for the violent overthrow of the existing regime.

The limitations of this potential revolution are, and probably will be for a long time to come, set by the political and military presence of the USSR in Poland. The spectre of Soviet intervention, of Soviet tanks in Warsaw streets, often paralyses the will to resist. The memories of Budapest and of Prague reinforce the widespread conviction that the rulers of the USSR will prevent any change. But the problem is much more complicated than that.

Let us remember the past: Gomulka's enormous popularity in 1956—was it not based on his frequent raising of the "Soviet question"? Following him, others have also been able to gain support and an audience by playing on fear and the need for security inherent in this question. Mieczyslaw Moczar wanted to play this game, and it was similar sentiments to which Franciszek Szlachcic appealed when he formulated his *bon mot* (circulating in Warsaw) that "Polish-Soviet friendship should be like good tea: strong, hot, but not too sugary." The march towards power of these two leaders in search of popularity was brutally cut short, but the "Soviet question" has none the less remained a favourable picking-ground for political exploitation.

The analysis of Polish-Soviet relations as a whole reveals certain areas of common interest between the Soviet leaders and the Polish opposition: for all three, Soviet military intervention in Poland would have been, and remains, a disastrous prospect. As for the Polish domestic opposition, its sense of responsibility and its patriotism make it firmly opposed to policies of the "the worse it is—the better it is" type. For the Polish leaders, Soviet military intervention would mean reducing their role to that of mere guardians of the Soviet empire, whereas at present they are still rulers, even though only with limited sovereignty, but they are none the less governing a country of 34 million inhabitants. For the Soviet leaders, the memory of the international repercussions of their interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia is far from having faded. They also remember the determination of the Polish workers in December 1970 and in June 1976. If on top of this, one takes into account the traditionally anti-Russian bias of the Poles and of their capacity for undertaking desperate fights against all odds, one may conclude that for the Soviets, the decision to intervene militarily in Poland would literally mean a war with her.

Militarily, the Poles would lose such a war, but it would bring no political victory to the Soviet Union. It would be a national massacre for Poland but also a political defeat for the Soviet Union. That is why

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it is possible to imagine that the leaders of the USSR and Poland will try everything to avoid such a conflict.

This state of affairs determines the possible political manoeuvres; this configuration of interests also limits the scope of a possible compromise. I do not say that Soviet intervention in Poland is impossible. On the contrary; I think that it could become inevitable if on the one hand the governments in Moscow and Warsaw, and on the other hand the Polish people, were to lose their sense of reality and their grasp of good sense. The Polish democratic opposition should admit that transformations in Poland have to be made at least in their first stage, in line with the " Brezhnev doctrine."

THE revisionists and the neopositivists did in fact set out a programme of evolutionary changes in the framework of the " Brezhnev doctrine." What distinguishes the opposition today from the two movements discussed above is the conviction that such a programme of evolution should be addressed to independent public opinion and not just to the totalitarian authorities. Instead of acting as a prompter to the government, telling it how to improve itself, this programme should tell society how to act. As far as the government is concerned, it can have no clearer counsel than that provided by the social pressure from below.

The essential element in the conception of the new evolutionism is the realization of the power of the workers who, by their firm and resolute attitude, have already wrested some spectacular concessions from the government. It is difficult to foresee the evolution of attitudes among the workers, but without any doubt it is of them that the government is really afraid; it is the pressure of this social class which is the *sine qua non* of the evolution of national life towards democratization. This will not be a simple process, nor one easy to foresee happening. It implies that every time one breaks down the barrier of fear, one formulates a new political consciousness. The fact that workers' institutions and unions have been destroyed threatens to slow down this process. But the first sign of the workers' new consciousness was revealed on the day that one saw the rebirth of the first independent organization for workers' defence, the day one saw the strike committees formed in the shipyards at Szczecin and Gdansk. It is difficult to foretell when and how other—more durable—workers' institutions will see the light of day and what their shape will be: workers' commissions on the Spanish model, independent trade unions, solidarity funds? It is certain however that at the moment of their creation, " new evolutionism " will take shape and will cease to be a spiritual construction in search of hope.

THE role actually played by the Roman Catholic Church of Poland is an essential element in the situation. The Church embraces the majority of the population and its clergy's attitudes often carry political

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weight. The development of the line of conduct of the Polish Church hierarchy deserves close examination. To follow this development, one has only to read the succession of official documents. The anti-communist attitude to the hierarchy manifested in the rejection of all social and political changes imposed after 1945 is changing more and more into an attitude of anti-totalitarianism. The jeremiads against the impieties have disappeared, giving way to affirmations of the principles of human rights. The Polish bishops in their pastoral letters defended the right to the truth, to liberty and human dignity. They likewise defended the rights of workers, above all the right to strike and the right to be represented by independent unions. A Church which in this way resists the pressures of the government, which defends the principles of Christian ethics and the Declaration of the Rights of Man, whether it likes it or not, affirms a nonconformist and dignified attitude and stimulates the aspirations for greater and greater civil liberties.

"THE new evolutionism" implies slow, progressive changes. This does not mean however that this movement will always be peaceful, nor that it will be able to avoid situations in which there will be victims.

This movement will be able to continue expressing itself by means of mass demonstrations of workers and students. The problem of how to react to such demonstrations is one which continues to fuel disagreements among members of the elite in power. Let us therefore try to formulate those questions, which are important to us: are there, in the Party and among its leaders, forces capable of starting a programme of reforms? Is the rebirth of revisionism inside the Party possible? Or again: Can the democratic opposition find an ally in one of the Party factions?

"Revisionism" understood as a movement of inner renovation of the Party, as conceived during the mid-fifties, has ceased to exist. Another observation prompts one to reflect that a movement which would base itself on Marxism-Leninism or on some of its elements to produce a reform in the existing system is hardly conceivable: in Poland today the Marxist-Leninist doctrine is nothing but an empty shell, its gestures nothing but an official rite. It no longer provokes controversies, no longer excites emotions. It is thus incapable of being the source of tensions, incapable of dividing or of ruling. In spite of this, it seems to me that changes inside the Party are inevitable. Among the tens of thousands of its members who have lost all interest in the mysteries of dialectical materialism, there are many for whom belonging to the PUWP is quite simply the essential precondition for their participation in public life. Amongst these, there are, for example, the proponents of *Realpolitik*, pragmatists, believers in economic reforms, whose opinions and decisions reflect the imperatives of economic efficiency. Their pragmatism impels them to support the development of science, to

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advocate technical contacts with capitalist countries, to prefer professional competence to high-flown ideological criteria.

This evidently does not constitute an aspiration towards democracy. A Party "pragmatist" has no reason to wish for democratic changes, to hope for political pluralism or for workers' self-government. But the same pragmatists have reason to think that a compromise with the forces struggling for political pluralism can be more effective than brutal repression. The pragmatist knows full well that instead of solving the problem, repression simply forms the basis of further outbreaks of popular discontent, with unforeseeable consequences. And this is why he may become the *partner* in a political compromise with the democratic opposition, but never its *ally*: the distinction is important. To renounce distinguishing between different tendencies manifesting themselves inside the regime leads members of the democratic opposition to ignore the realities of the situation, to fall into extremism, to engage in political adventurism. By confusing its own aims with those of the pragmatic elements in the Party, the democratic opposition would risk repeating the mistake of the revisionists, entering into false alliances and losing its ideological identity. The democratic opposition should not place too much hope on the intelligent "leaders" of the Party, any more than it should succumb to the specious argument that one must not make life too hard for the existing leaders in case their successors prove to be even worse. The democratic opposition should first of all set out clearly its own political objectives so that it can make any compromises only on this basis. When the government answers the workers' revolt by saying that it means to "consult the working class" rather than by organizing a bloody repression, the democratic opposition should not consider this either as a sufficient concession ("at least they didn't shoot") nor as a meaningless fiction. The duty of the opposition is to participate continually and systematically in public life, to create political facts through collective action, and to propose alternatives. All the rest is just literature.

TO formulate alternatives and to defend their values is the task of the intelligentsia, or those among them who wish to follow the tradition of the "unbowed" intelligentsia of the early twentieth century, the tradition of Brzozowski and Wyspianski, of Zeromski and Nalkowski. I feel linked to this tradition and to those who continue it today. If their voices are still faint, it is they who create independent public opinion and develop nonconformist attitudes. The synchronization of their voices with those of the workers will shape the political aspirations of young people and thus the character of political changes both in Poland and in Eastern Europe. In the absence of a free Press or free organizations, the moral and political responsibility of these intellectuals is enormous. It calls for an attitude whose logical consequence is to renounce material advantages and official honours in order to live in truth.

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To aspire to the truth or, as Kolakowski put it, " to live in dignity," is to struggle not only for a better future but also for a better today. Each act of resistance saves a portion of liberty and preserves the values without which a nation cannot survive. Each act of resistance is a step towards democratic socialism which should be more than just an institutional and legal structure: it should be a community of free men, a real community, which is re-created anew each day.

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"I" and "they"

An essay on extreme forms of communication under conditions of human isolation

Andrei Sinyavsky (Abram Tertz)

FOR simplicity's sake, I shall begin with an anecdote. In a hostel for women workers where there are eight or 12 beds to a room, a puzzled Klava says to her friend Nina: "Guess what, Nina! Just now, while I was sitting here on my own, Vaska suddenly came running in, threw me down, used me, and ran off." After a moment's thought, she adds: "*I wonder what he was trying to tell me by all that*?!"

An absurd, uncouth tale. However, if we approach the incident seriously, we have to acknowledge that, by his sudden and motiveless act, or rather, by his wordless and yet eloquent gesture, the rapist Vaska really was trying to express something, to say something.

Many of our actions and impulses, especially those of an extreme and absurd nature, are original means of non-verbal communication by which we attempt to explain ourselves to people and to reality. When our most impassioned and expressive speeches fail to penetrate reality, or when we lack the words or cannot find them, we turn to gestures and actions in order to say something. Thus, for instance, an argument develops into a fight, and the fight becomes a substitute for dialogue . . .

However, I do not intend to go into the abstract sphere of "communication as such" which looks upon man's life-style and the life of society in many respects simply as an attempt to explain oneself to one's neighbour, that is to say, upon the entire history of man as a form of language. I should like to take the less complicated and more familiar ground of prison and labour camp, and to try to examine the problem using the example of these extreme conditions of human existence, human intercourse and human solitude. Even here, though, in prison and camp practice, the field is so rich and so varied that I shall only take as my model a few rare and unusual episodes in the conversation between the individual and society, between "*me*" and "*them*," episodes where the individual is placed in a desperate situation in which language, communication and existence itself are of no avail. To explain and express himself he sometimes resorts to a quite extraordinary and at first sight unintelligible "jargon."

I apologize in advance for bringing up matters and providing illustrations which my readers will probably find unseemly, terrifying or disgusting. But they are not of my own invention. I have taken them from the reality of camp life. All of these facts are, theoretically, public

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knowledge; to those who pay close attention to camp memoirs coming out of Russia they will be well known. The problem is *how* one is to understand and interpret them.

FIRSTLY, there is the fairly widespread custom whereby prisoners serving a second or third term, or life imprisonment, do all kinds of monstrous, unnatural things to themselves such as swallowing spoons and other rigid objects and prison utensils, fitting themselves with a so-called "anchor" which is driven into the penis, or drinking their own blood and eating their own flesh. This "cannibalism" is most easily explained as perversion or psychopathic illness, and those who indulge in it are usually written off as half-witted rabble who no longer rank as human beings. This arrogant view sometimes even creeps into our camp literature. These people are regarded as *non*-people who have been reduced by the system to a bestial and even sub-bestial state; and the question is asked, what should be done with them? Should they really be destroyed all over again? Or isolated afresh?!

I cannot agree with this opinion. I have met people like these, talked with them, and satisfied myself that the majority of them are not beasts, degenerates or lunatics at all, but entirely normal people—indeed, some are endowed with exceptional intelligence and talent. Let me, therefore, in the face of these facts, put the naïve question that Klava asked about Vaska's odd behaviour; "I wonder what he was trying to tell me by all that?"

Let us imagine a man who has spent 10, 15 or even 20 years in prisons and camps and who has nothing to look forward to except another term of the same; a man who belongs to the criminal world, reads no books and has no such elevated thoughts, who has been reduced to a state of despair, to the uttermost degree of human wretchedness and isolation. The only thing he has left at his disposal is his own body. He is on the brink, but he has not yet died or gone mad. What is he supposed to do to prove that he is still alive, in possession of his reason and in control of something? In this case he uses his body (for nothing else is left to him) in order to switch into some final, total language and to tell society, in that language, roughly the following: "You have taken everything away from me, liberty, life, the earth and the sky. But this body is *mine*, *my* property, *I* am the master here!" Sometimes this speech, unuttered and even unconscious, finds unwitting expression in the shape of a peculiar spectacle which is performed in front of the guards, the prison authorities, the other prisoners in the cell, or—more abstractly—in front of the whole world. "Cannibalism" becomes a form of theatrical activity, a show.

Picture the following situation: an old criminal prisoner who has gone through fire and water and every possible tribulation, who is ill, consumptive and has had half his stomach cut out, who realizes that he won't live to see his freedom, is sitting in his prison cell together

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with one other prisoner whom he has taken under his wing, so to speak, and before whom he rather likes to strike a pose. We shall call the second man by his camp nickname, "Fly," which he earned on account of his diminutive stature and exceptional mobility. "Fly" is a man, yet, at the same time, in those conditions, he is also the lover and wife of the old ex-thief. In short, they are a married couple, a family. It is New Year's Eve, and they have no means of celebrating the New Year. There they are in the same old cell for two, the old thief and the "Fly" sitting there in front of him. The only thing the older man has at his disposal for a celebration, a spectacle, a treat, is his own body. So, with a splendid gesture, he orders "wine and ice-cream" for himself. Once again I beg you to forgive me for going into unpleasant details, but they cannot be left out. He picks up an iron mug (prison issue) and fills it not with cream but with his own sperm. Then he slits one of his veins and pours "wine" over the "ice-cream." And both of them drink to a happy New Year.

May I ask what we have here? And may I reply: art. Art, and more; what we have, in a way, is the enactment of a myth going back, perhaps unconsciously, to certain ritual gestures and sacrifices (blood and sperm as the first principles of life) but turned inside out in the shape of a horrifying, farcical caricature.

Even under normal conditions people have difficulty in understanding other people, if even the same stock phrases ring differently in each person's ear; words like "freedom" and "democracy" are sometimes given contrary, diametrically opposed interpretations, and this contradiction leads to the commission of murder to establish and perpetuate this and not that particular sense or symbol. But it is even more difficult and impossible to move towards a language of communication and mutual understanding from a situation of many years of prison solitude and conflict with the whole world. In attempts to start a dialogue here, the natural interaction of "I" and "you" is replaced by the relationship "I" and "they." "They" are the people to whom "you" are not "you" (and not "I") but simply another cipher from the impersonal, alien category "they." Communication takes the form of challenge, insult, mockery and ridicule. What happens is that some part of one's own human "I" splits off and becomes alienated, and a struggle begins which threatens the personality with disintegration: "I" am going to make a spectacle of "him" (that is, of myself) for the benefit of "them" (again, for the benefit of myself, but a self viewed distantly and with hostility) a spectacle in the form of an experiment verging on mockery and blasphemy!

Possibly the prisoner who produced ice-cream and wine from his own self on New Year's Eve was staging the spectacle for the benefit both of his beloved "Fly" and, simultaneously, of all of "them," while "they," as well as being guards or prison authorities, had become to a certain extent an emanation of his own self translated outward into

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prison walls and playing the part of hostile spectator in this monodrama. The prison environment tends to promote the projection, the transference of our "I" onto "them." A man has the sensation of disappearing within the close confines of the prison walls, and, because of this, his need for communication and his linguistic activity increase. Instead of banging his head against the walls, he starts conversing with them as though with his own personal shell, and treats them to a display which has a nightmarish, unspoken aggressive quality: "So you have surrounded me, have you? You hold me prisoner? You refuse to speak? Then just listen to what I'm going to say to you!"

The simplest case of such playing with fire is when a prisoner, driven to extremity and speechlessness, swallows a spoon or something of the sort. Naturally, like any artist who relies on theatrical effect and counts on his trick reaching a successful conclusion, the prisoner hopes that the spoon he swallows will later be extracted by surgical operation. (As a matter of fact, prison authorities, weary of such demonstrations, have of late become less prompt at rendering medical aid and sometimes allow the experiment to drag on to a fatal outcome for the edification of other prisoners.) But what we are seeing is not simply a stunt, a *pont*, as camp slang has it; the artist is risking a great deal by swallowing the spoon, and he takes that risk in order to show by way of exaggeration and parody just how hungry he is and how extreme is his state of exhaustion if he is prepared to express it symbolically by eating an iron spoon! We should not think that he has eaten the spoon literally out of starvation; we must realize that he can no longer tolerate the all-pervading silence and that his unnatural act is a way of saying so outright.

Incidentally, inflicting violence on his sexual organs—nailing his scrotum to a wooden bunk, using an "anchor" and so forth—is also a way of demonstrating his obsession with the ending of his life, a man's final argument that he no longer has the strength to endure this concentrated pressure and has no further need of the organs with which nature endowed him—he spits upon them and simultaneously upon life and upon the society that has locked him away in this cage. What further proof can he offer?

Other, more considered, as it were, more intellectual forms of visual provocation include prisoners tattooing their foreheads with anti-state slogans such as "Slave of the CPSU," "Slave of the KGB" or "Slave of Khrushchev" (these and similar inscriptions were in common use at the time of Khrushchev). It is said that in response to these attempts by prisoners to speak their mind to him, Khrushchev issued a secret order decreeing that all such slogan-writers were to be summarily shot. I do not know if it is true about the order, but I do know that people who had tattooed these poignant characters on their faces were indeed executed. The state simply did not know what else to do with these people who had turned themselves into indelible propaganda, their

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foreheads and brows permanently emblazoned with the frenzied message of man to mankind.

The secret order concerning the execution of all the tattooers and the tattooed, most of whom came from the ranks of criminal prisoners who had despaired of ever being released and regaining their liberty, was evidently read out in all the special camps. Amazingly, however, the execution of the first "caption-writers" initially provoked a new wave of equally criminal captions. Only after a second round of executions did the authorities succeed in restraining the movement and turning the tide.

WHAT I have described here is infinitely sad. It is, however, worthwhile to try not to view the facts simply in the context of local colour, as indications of the savage way of life exclusive to the camps. They are also the products of certain basic human stimuli which even have a distant connexion with the writer's work and with art as such. Not art in its entirety, perhaps, but certain aspects and forms of artistic activity, especially in our time, when the creative author stands sharply aloof from society and regards it with suspicion, in a situation, as it were, of extreme solitude and extreme want of understanding and contact. Here too, confronted by a public or a readership which, as well as the friendly "you," also bears the stamp of the hostile, blank "they," art too sometimes resorts to extreme methods to obtain its effect—*épatage*, the grotesque, the absurd, the fantastic and various kinds of eccentricity, which may be generally described as forms of intensely expressive, aggressive and at the same time communicative "speech." This is not simply a rupture with people, a rejection of the listener and the spectator. Odd though it may seem, this break in communications sometimes leads to the appearance of a language of heightened communicative significance, heightened precisely because of its creator's solitariness and estrangement. As an example we may cite the poetic language in which many so-called left-wing ideas are couched.

However, even leaving aside these formal extremes, the very process of creation is to a large extent psychologically linked with the need to reach the boundaries of life, or even to overstep those boundaries in the interests of creating something. This expression, emanating from within as an artistic statement, need not necessarily be conveyed in the form of external trappings of style. The style may appear outwardly calm, simple, toned-down and even create a generally pleasant impression. Nevertheless, by virtue of its hidden undercurrent, it is still a total, prison-defying language, in which the author dies in order to rise again in it, or be dissolved, reduce himself to nothing and bury himself in his work. Is this not the reason why art perpetually tries to leap outside the encirclement of ordinary life, the state, the land and art itself? To cross the boundaries of style, genre and his own life: is this not, very often, the artist's path and his mission?

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Returning to the subject of the camps, may I say that all the examples I have described of man's extreme and apparently final appeal to man ("cannibalism," forehead-tattooing, etc.) lead us inevitably into the next stage or phase of these assaults and, correspondingly, of language: suicide. I shall not dwell on this theme since it is a specialized, delicate and intimate sphere ill befitting a lengthy discourse. Suicide in the camps is a comparatively rare occurrence. Evidently man's biological instinct for self-preservation becomes keener there, and under threat of death he strives against all odds to survive. Life assumes the character of resistance and confrontation, and wins—as far as victory lies within the individual's physical strength, of course. When suicides do nevertheless happen in these circumstances, more often they are not indicative of capitulation but, like acts of public self-immolation, become a way of making some extremely forcible and extremely relevant statement to society.

However, in the prison and camp habitat, suicide—an exceptional measure—is surrounded by a multitude of half-measures which also testify, for the authorities' benefit, to a man's readiness to stand firm to the end and to present those authorities with an ultimatum on some important score, the most important score of all. It is meaningless to attempt a classification of this experience on the basis of any formal features. A profound experience is always integral and specific; it is unique. Although part of a recurring phenomenon, each separate instance speaks for itself. To take an example, there exists a universally known form of individual and collective protest, the hunger-strike. But if, instead of approaching it as a traditional, time-honoured practice, we examine its content—which, moreover, is unique and intrinsically psychological—we realise that it is not simply a widely-used method of obtaining certain rights and concessions (like a work-strike), but a far more sinister symbol, a symbol proclaimed from the rooftops. The hunger-strike is a symbol of death, paraded banner-like before the prison authorities, to whom the bearer is announcing his unwillingness to participate in the system of relationships into which he has been coerced and that he rejects the loathsome mode of existence forced upon him by the regime. When he begins his hunger-strike, a man severs his lifeline, as it were, with the world, with "them," and retreats into isolation under the canopy of death, represented symbolically—and sometimes even in fact—by his refusal to take food. At the same time, though, this rupture in communication is evidently itself a peculiar variety of communication and, moreover, a heightened form in the semantic and communicative respects, albeit with a minus sign. It is not the generally accepted and customary mass hunger-strikes, where the number of days is fixed in advance and counter-demands are made of the camp administration, that testify most vividly to this. The most striking indications of the significance of a hunger-strike as a symbolic language are those strange and entirely individual cases when a man

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renounces any form of nourishment for an indefinite period of time—for ever—thereby transforming the rest of his life into a cry to society, to mankind and to heaven.

These facts are little known in the West, but one does occasionally come across such things in Soviet camps although, as I have already said, they are the exceptions and extremely rare at that. A man declares a *hunger-strike in perpetuity*. Of course, at some point, on the 12th or 17th day, they begin to feed him artificially, through the nose, resorting to a very painful form of physical coercion. But the man refuses to take food of his own free will. Since he is forcibly fed, he remains alive but bedridden, for some time yet, perhaps several years (legend has it that some hunger-strikers have lasted for five to 10 years); but he is nevertheless doomed from the start, because with the passage of time the physical result of his self-deprivation is the onset of an irreversible paralysis of the legs, which is followed by the gradual atrophying of other parts and functions of his organism. It is this final hunger-strike, this continuous appeal by a man to people who refuse to heed him and who have become, in his eyes, eternally and categorically "they," that most profoundly and fully demonstrates the true meaning of such ventures, even in their ordinary, general form of mass hunger-strikes.

This is why, in particular, it is morally impermissible and intolerable to engage in the social organization of hunger-strikes and to incite other people to something you yourself in the final analysis must repay with your full measure of responsibility. To "stage" hunger-strikes artificially is tantamount to persuading your friends to commit suicide as you go to your death . . .

However, there is another way of "hunger-striking," "hunger-striking" in a metaphorical sense, and it is no less effective as a means of communication, the final communication, in conditions of isolation. It is: silence. Silence as the only possible reaction to the soul-destroying system that surrounds you. It sometimes happens that a prisoner (again, though, these are exceptional cases) ceases absolutely to speak to the authorities, to reply to questions and to say anything at all, although he continues to go out to work and to obey all commands except one: speak when you are spoken to. A man answers the mute walls with muteness of his own.

Silence, they say, is a mark of consent. In this case it is a mark of final, total non-acceptance, contempt, refusal to recognize his fellows as fellows. Retreat from language is a mark of denial. For some reason the authorities are especially sensitive, especially alive to this refusal to speak, this ban on communication with "them" (and sometimes with the whole world). Their reasoning is approximately along the lines of: "so he doesn't consider us people?! . . ." Worse than hunger-strikes and more terrible than suicide, silence is an insult. Silence arouses suspicions so evil that they cannot be put into words . . .

One may question whether silence contains any communication and

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ask how it can possibly be seen as a language. Since I regard all these "departures from language" as a language in their own right, admittedly, one that sometimes lacks a normal speech structure, but which on the other hand fills this gap with other, hyperbolized forms of linguistic capability, let me cite a specific example—for in such matters it is always best to be specific. There was a case of a certain hardened criminal (whom we shall call Nikolai) who, in the course of his long ordeal in prisons and camps, became a political "dissident." This man was arrested a fourth time. He already knew backwards everything about the Cheka, trials, procurators, and defence counsels, and so this time, when they took him in for making statements against the Soviet military occupation of Czechoslovakia, he made up his mind to respond with extreme measures. During the investigation he refused to answer questions or to sign a single record of the proceedings, and from the very outset he went on a hunger-strike. He was brought to his trial several months later on a stretcher because he could no longer walk unassisted. He answered all the charges and the court's questions with silence, which greatly displeased the court. Only occasionally during the proceedings, when he could no longer endure the court's hyperbole, did Nikolai raise himself a little on his stretcher and fill the courtroom (the trial was naturally a closed one) with choice obscenities on the subject of justice (for which he received an additional sentence); he would then fall back onto the stretcher and relapse into silence. When he was sentenced to seven years in labour camps (he had already served a total of somewhere around 18 years) did he slit his veins and try to hang himself. None of this helped him. Let us ask ourselves the question: where is there a language here? Where is there more language? When he was silent? When he was on hunger-strike? When he tried to hang himself? Or when he uttered his explicit words to the court? More probably, he was switching throughout from one language into another (in the hope that perhaps one, at least, would prove effective). Possibly his muteness, his silence at his trial and during the investigation was the most complete and eloquent statement he ever made to "*them*" . . .

I WOULD not want your final impression of the prisons and the camps, where my own experience has provided me with the basis for my material, to be simply a sensation of some kind of indescribable horror, society and solitude congealed into a single bloody, inarticulate mass. The same silence of which I have spoken, not necessarily a demonstrative or shocking silence, but inner silence as an indication of the degree of solitude of a man who feels anathematized by society and apparently even abandoned by God Himself, can sometimes give rise to the purest and most uplifting impulses of the soul and the tongue. By these I mean above all poetry and religion. There are very many poets in our prisons and camps. Not only those people who were sent

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to the camps for their poetry and the verses they had written, but those who became poets after their arrival in the camps, who previously had no notions whatsoever of rhyme or rhythm. Evidently, in the torture-chamber, the need for a form of communication surpassing ordinary, everyday contact becomes unbelievably intense. Because of their authors' illiteracy, camp poems are mostly rather weak and pitiful from a literary point of view. But even these feeble verses occasionally contain amazing, resonant stanzas and images which would be the envy of professionals. I am not talking about the real writers and poets who were formed and nurtured by the camps—we already know some of *their* names. I am taking this sphere, this element on a lower and, as it were, "general-camp," "popular" level, where it gushes forth like a well-spring of life, into, among other things, the "underworld ballad," the supreme achievement of Russian folklore this century.

However, moving on to a deeper and higher level (where the concepts of "depth" and "height" somehow fuse), we encounter a religious experience before which all of us who live lives of freedom can only kneel in admiration. There, in the camps, Orthodox Christians, Catholics, Protestants, Moslems, Jews, Buddhists and even those of pagan faiths believe in God three times as staunchly as we do, and excel by four times at the art of human communication through religious communion.

Since I have continually referred to the existence of certain extreme factors which transcend the framework of ordinary behavioural norms, let me conclude by illustrating this with an account of the "Pentecostalists," one of the many sects and churches which are exposed to persecution and whose members regularly end up in the camps, sometimes for 10 years, or even, punctuated by short intervals of freedom, for 20 or 25. I must stress that I personally feel no attachment to this particular religious movement. It is only my experience of the camps and my endeavour to find some extreme formulations of language that make me turn to the example of the Pentecostalists. They are Christians who believe in baptism by the Holy Spirit: as it happened with the Apostles, the Holy Spirit descends and enters the souls of believers and teaches them other tongues, including the tongues of angels, and their speech is thus an audible, tangible testimony to their successful baptism.

Pentecostalists are scattered throughout the world; there are many in America and apparently also in Australia, but it is probably only in Russia that their prayers in strange tongues acquire a universal human meaningfulness and power—prayers in tongues which they themselves have never understood and in which they do not know what they are saying, believing that grace has descended upon them and the Holy Spirit itself is speaking through their lips. Within the confines of a camp, this direct communication with God and with all the peoples of the world, including the unattainable angelic spheres, can be interpreted

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as a strange, incomprehensible and yet *total* language, the most solitary and therefore the fullest *communication.*

When, one day, I asked my new Pentecostalist friends in the camp in embarrassment if I could possibly sit in on their prayers "in strange tongues" *in order to hear for myself what happened at these occasions,* to my surprise they readily agreed. They led me to the camp bath-house, where one of them worked as a stoker, which meant that when the damp bath-room was unoccupied it could be used as a house of prayer, hidden from the sharp eyes of guards and informers. There were three of us, myself and two Pentecostalists. We locked the bath-room door and knelt down on the wet stone floor. To my relief they began with a simple, familiar prayer in Russian, "Our Father." Suddenly, one of the praying Pentecostalists, followed soon afterwards by the other, kneeling on either side of me, switched into a language I did not know. It was a smooth, calm transition into another language without a trace of ecstasy or hysteria, or rather, into different, unrelated languages, one of them sounding Northern European and the other reminiscent of some Eastern dialect. They themselves did not know what languages they were praying in, and I felt ashamed at my philological intrusion, unspoken though it was, into their pure mysticism: I was listening in. What was it? The gift of tongues? Mumbo-jumbo? Incoherent gibberish which they took for the speech of angels? If I had known any foreign languages I might have been able to make sense of those speech patterns. But my knowledge of languages is poor and I am no linguist. The only thing I was fortunate enough to detect was that their speech possessed a *structure* and had the harmonious rhythm of a language, whether that of the angels or some other, I do not know. But it was meaningful, intelligent speech—an ultimate speech . . .

I wanted to get up and leave. I had the impression that the lightning flashes, the powerful electrical discharges travelling down those two lightning-conductors and striking the stone floor of the bath-house only a few inches from me to my right and left would at any moment converge upon me and strike the crown of my head with this beautiful, blasphemous cascade of speech which I had done nothing to deserve, which I had scorned . . .

They were proclaiming, telling the whole world, in all languages at once, the meaning of communication in conditions of solitude . . .

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The Bolsheviks and the Bantu: from the October Revolution to the Angolan Civil War*

Ali A. Mazrui

IN a curious manner Africa's relations with the Soviet Union have quite often been part of Africa's relations with the Western world. Contacts between African nationalists and Russia have often been in response to disaffection with the Western world. Temporary flirtations with the communist world have been basically flirtations on the rebound, a response to a fundamental cleavage between the colonized African and the colonizing Westerner. It is in this sense that Afro-Soviet relations until relatively recently have in fact been in part Afro-Western relations.

Taking the last 50 years of Africa's history, it might be said that there has been a transition from the influence of western ideas to the influence of Russia's example. In the earlier decades of this century western ideas provided much of the new stimulus for African aspirations and motivations. For a while, the most influential western ideas were those which promoted conformity with the colonial status and acceptance of the imperial order. Among Africans ruled by France these bonds of empathy included pride in French culture and the French language, a sense of participation in what they regarded as a world civilization, a sense of identification with the basic historical traditions of France. Among Africans ruled by Britain similar tendencies were discernible, with some reduced pride in the British cultural heritage as such, but with an increased identification with Britain through the concept of loyalty to the British monarchy. Just as there were many French-speaking Africans who identified so closely with France that they were capable of saying, "Our ancestors, the Gauls," so there were many English-speaking Africans who identified so closely with the old imperial order that they talked of "Our beloved king, His Majesty King George VI."

But later on, it was those western ideas which legitimized rebellion against the West that captured the imagination of the new African intellectuals and politicians. The revolutionary tradition of France, going back to 1789, was now converted into a basis of legitimacy for anti-colonialism in Africa. The American intellectual tradition of distrust of imperialism also, as we have indicated elsewhere, played a part in the general African ferment and the quest for self-determination.

* In one sense the term "Bantu" means more than "Africans"—it literally means *people*. But in another sense it is narrower and refers to a family of black races dispersed widely in Africa. In this paper we use the term "Bantu" loosely to mean Africans.

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But then this move from western ideas favourable to the imperial order to western concepts of rebellion against that order culminated in a new interest in western heresies, with special reference to Marxism. Marxism is, after all, part of the western intellectual tradition, and provides an important school of western dissent. African fascination with revolutionary and liberating ideas in the western tradition inevitably led to fascination with Marxism as well.

As we indicated elsewhere, Marxist ideas became a major source of intellectual stimulation in French-speaking Africa much earlier than they did in English-speaking Africa. The large size of the French Communist Party at home, the philosophical tradition of the French educational system, the policy of cultural assimilation pursued by the imperial power, the policy of political integration which facilitated participation by colonial peoples in national institutions in Paris, and the influence of left-wing French intellectuals in the whole domain of theorizing in politics, all contributed towards giving Marxism considerable intellectual attractiveness among French-speaking Africans.

With this interest in Marxist ideology came inevitably an interest in the Russian example. The connecting link between the power of western ideas on the African mind, on one side, and the power of the Russian example in the Third World generally, on another side, was indeed that system of thought which bears the name of a radical western revolutionary of the nineteenth century, Karl Marx.

Among black people outside there was often a strong link between Marxism and pan-Africanism. Black Americans and West Indians who were pan-Africanists were disproportionately left of centre in their political ideologies, and often explicitly Marxian in commitment. Several of the founding fathers of the pan-African movement, drawn from outside Africa, were either constantly Marxists or at any rate started as Marxists. Such founding fathers include the black American intellectual giant, W. E. B. Du Bois, the energetic West Indian intellectual George Padmore, and his fellow West Indian ideological luminary, C. L. R. James. These three people are probably in a class by themselves as founding fathers of pan-Africanism drawn from the Black Diaspora. Du Bois and Padmore became citizens of the first black African country to attain independence, Ghana, and both died there.

Since then, there has persisted a correlation between left-wing views among Diaspora Blacks and the commitment to pan-Africanism. The correlation is not, of course, neat, since there have been many Black pan-Africanists who have at the same time denounced Marxism and the whole attempt by white radicals to influence black nationalism. But, on the whole, it is still true to say that pan-Africanism as a Diaspora movement has had strong links with Marxism as a language of protest. Even the sixth pan-African congress held in Dar es Salaam in June 1974, dominated as it was by representatives of relatively cautious governments in the black world, manifested all the same con-

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siderable leaning towards a left-wing language of dissent and protest. There was even a distrust of protest based on colour. The final resolutions of the sixth pan-African congress affirmed the need for liberation, but in a manner which rejected the uniqueness of black experience, and which emphasized instead the shared predicament of exploitation and poverty in the Third World as a whole. Because many of the representatives of the congress were of governments which at home pursued their own local Marxists and often locked them up, the final resolutions of the sixth pan-African congress were not as explicit in their left-wing commitment as they might have been had more of the private individual black pan-Africanists come from the Black Diaspora. Certainly many black nationalists from the West Indies were either discouraged or prevented from going to the pan-African congress by their more cautious governments. Their presence in Dar es Salaam would have revealed more clearly than ever an enduring link between Diaspora pan-Africanism and Marxist orientation.

But George Padmore might well have been merely among the first Black nationalists to have first flirted with communism, and then groped for ways of Africanizing socialism. Padmore was once a communist, complete with party activism. But by the late 1950s Padmore stood for a form of socialism more compatible with the uniqueness of the black experience. His book, *Pan-Africanism or Communism? The Coming Struggle in Africa*, even envisaged a profound tension between a form of international communism with an external leadership in Moscow, on the one hand, and a commitment to the principle of unified African autonomy, on the other.

Yet, in a fundamental way, Padmore could at once reduce his love for Marxism and increase his admiration for Russia. This is what constituted the difference between fascination with a particular school of western revolutionary thought and positive response to Russia's innovative example. To the question of whether Africans had a lot to learn from Marxism-Leninism, Padmore argued that the first principle which Africans should learn from Lenin was Lenin's pragmatism. As Padmore put it:

> Lenin, the architect of the first socialist state, and his party, did not blindly follow Marxism in creating the instruments best suited to Russian conditions. Similarly, the African approach to socialism must be based on a policy of adaptation, while keeping constantly in mind our goal—the peaceful advance of African socialism.[1]

Padmore argued that Africans must be free to Africanize Marxism, if they wish, just as Lenin had Russianized it. In fact, Marxism in a particular African country like Ghana should not only be Africanized

[1] George Padmore, "A Guide to Pan-African Socialism," written in 1959, just before his death, and published as Appendix 1, *African Socialism*, edited by William H. Friedland and Carl G. Roseberg Jr., Hoover Publication (Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 230.

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but should further be adapted to suit the peculiar *Ghanaian* conditions. As Padmore put it:

> It is for us, Africans, to subject Marxism to our own critical examination and see what there is in it which can be usefully applied to the conditions facing us in Africa in general and Ghana in particular. The great mistake which so many so-called Marxists have made is to turn their masters' teachings into dogma, instead of using it as an intellectual instrument for understanding the evolution of human society and a guide to chart the course of future social development.[2]

But what is the relationship between this approach to Marxism on the one hand and *revolution* on the other? So far the revolutionary fervour of Africans has been an anti-colonial fervour. And, according to Padmore, it is precisely this kind of fervour that Marx did *not* allow for. What Padmore describes as the "Orthodox Marxist strategy" was based on the assumption that "the proletarian revolution which was to usher in Communism would first occur in the highly developed countries of Europe and America, where there existed the economic and social prerequisites as well as an educated and cultured industrial working class who would be the architects of socialism.

Padmore asserted that never for one moment "had Marx conceived that the colonial peoples in the backward countries of Asia and Africa would be more revolutionary than the white workers in Europe. . . ."[3]

Padmore and other black radicals who had interacted with the international communist movement in the 1920s and the 1930s knew all too well how hard it had been in the days of Stalin to be taken seriously as revolutionaries. The anti-colonial movement was regarded by far as secondary to the struggle of the workers in Europe. Indian radical nationalists encountered similar difficulties in their relationship with communist movements like the Comintern. M. N. Roy received short shrift in 1920 at the second congress of the Comintern on the subject of the Report of the Commission on the National and Colonial Question when Lenin was still alive. Lenin's successors remained insensitive for a while to the militant potentialities of the colonized peoples in Asia and Africa. The constraints of Marxism, with its emphasis on class rather than on race, and its distrust of "bourgeois nationalism," had all blunted the sensibilities of many otherwise sympathetic Russians to the role of the developing countries in the twentieth century.

But while the ideas and rhetoric emanating from Russia did not always inspire African nationalists, the actual example of Russia's rapid development and emergence as a world power came to be significantly influential. To some extent it was less the doctrine of "socialist internationalism" than the practice of "socialism in one country"

[2] Ibid. p. 227.
[3] Ibid. p. 225.

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which inspired many African observers. The Russian commitment to "socialist internationalism" did indeed play a part in this whole ferment of defiance and rebellion, but the accomplishment of the Soviet Union when it focused on its own industrial and structural development was even more compelling. Once again it appeared to be a case of western ideas and Russia's example jointly exerting a shared influence on the minds of ambitious Africans.

Nonalignment and Ideological Competition

But although Russian ideas *per se*, as distinct from western Marxism, did not have a direct impact to any significant degree on the fortunes of the African continent, the very fact that Russia became the champion of Marxist communism and sought to spread the ideology to other parts of the world was an important factor in the history of African liberation. A revolutionary ideology with a powerful advocate became something which the western powers were increasingly fearful of. A period of ideological conflict between the West and the communist bloc provided part of the setting for African liberation. The ideological and political competition for the control of the world between the Soviet Union and the western world gathered momentum after the second world war, and the colonies benefited precisely from the tensions of the competition between the giants.

Yet it was precisely that competition which was in turn responsible for the birth of the nonaligned movement in world politics. As we indicated elsewhere, India under Nehru was particularly important in the history of nonalignment. Given the competition between the giants, and a reluctance on the part of a newly independent country to be tied to either of the two blocs, a doctrine emerged asserting at once the right to remain outside military entanglements and the right of diplomatic experimentation for those who are newly initiated into international politics. Nonalignment was an assertion of both rights. A combination of nationalism and pragmatism was at the heart of the new Third World doctrine.

On balance it could be argued that the Soviet Union has so far always been at least a decade ahead of the United States in understanding the forces at work in the Third World. Complete sympathy with Third World nationalism has never been a major feature of Soviet calculations and ideological analysis. Nationalism among Third World leaders has always been treated with some degree of reserve by Soviet analysts and policy-makers. Such nationalism was, after all, "bourgeois nationalism," characteristic of a stage in social evolution well before socialism proper. And yet, on balance, there has been on the part of Soviet governments a greater sensitivity to the aspirations of nationalists than has been the case among policy-makers in Washington.

Paradoxically, the western world has prided itself all along on being

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more pragmatic and less ideological than the Soviet Union which conceded toleration of the doctrine of non-alignment sooner.

In Africa, the pragmatism and nationalism implicit in nonalignment quite often merged. African nationalism prided itself for a while on a readiness to experiment with different ideas and institutions. There was also a readiness to attempt a synthesis of elements borrowed from different sources. Many of the leaders of Africa genuinely believed that it was premature at best to be dogmatic about answers and solutions for their problems. There was, at least for a while, no self-assurance at having arrived at "the truth." Preparedness to experiment with institutions, or borrow ideas from diverse sources, was itself an assertion of realism and pragmatic responsiveness. In the words of Leopold Senghor of Senegal:

> To build a nation, to erect a new civilization which can lay claim to existence because it is humane, we shall try to employ not only enlightened reason but also dynamic imagination. . . . In the first, we shall go back to the sources of African-Negro and European civilization in order to grasp what is essential in both—their spirit, their ferment. . . . Thus inspired, we shall seek to create new forms and institutions—cultural, political, social and economic—suited to our present situation.[4]

American distrust of nonalignment in Africa was aggravated for a while precisely by trends within Africa towards a one-party system and the espousal of socialism at least rhetorically. On the socialistic rhetoric, we should note that much of the enthusiasm in Africa arose out of a distrust of imperialism. Imperialism had, after all, been linked to international capitalism, and for a while after independence there was a feeling in many parts of Africa that only domestic socialism was compatible with international opposition to imperialism. Again the equation of socialism with anti-imperialism was to some extent an outcome of African nationalism. If imperialism was, as Lenin came to affirm, the highest stage of capitalism, the first revolution against western capitalism was a revolution against its highest stage. We have already drawn attention to this equation before. What follows from this kind of analysis is that a revolution by Africa and Asia against the imperial manifestation of capitalism might be regarded as a fundamental stage towards socialism. After all, a revolution against the highest form of capitalism should be at least the equivalent of the lowest stage of socialism. For an African to be anti-imperialist is itself a preparation for socialistic horizons.

Khrushchev grasped this factor quite early. Analysts in the Soviet Union in the days of Khrushchev could therefore defend these nationalistic eruptions. In the words of the late I. I. Potekhin:

> Pan-Africanism as an ideology contains much that is alien to our (Soviet) ideology. But Pan-Africanism aims at uniting all the

[4] Senghor, "West Africa in Evolution," *Foreign Affairs* (Jan. 1961).

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> peoples of Africa for the struggle against colonialism and imperialism, and for their national liberation. And from this point of view Pan-Africanism deserves the support of all people of goodwill who are striving for the ideals of progress and democracy.[5]

Much of the motivation behind Pan-Africanism at that stage had a good deal to do with the motivation sustaining the spirit of nonalignment. But whereas the Soviet Union was capable of sympathizing with the spirit, John Foster Dulles and the Eisenhower administration in the United States were still singularly oblivious of the meaning of these forces. For Dulles the choice between communism and western capitalism was a choice between the devil and God. In such a choice, according to Dulles, no neutrality could conceivably be legitimate. Those who exhibited the banner of nonalignment were therefore guilty of moral abdication.

It was not until 1960 that the Soviet Union and the United States began to move towards the same level of interpreting Third World intentions. It was in 1960 that John F. Kennedy was elected president of the United States. For less than three years while he lived he established a relationship with the Third World which narrowed the gap between American and Russian sensibilities. The Soviet Union under Nikita Khrushchev was under the rule of a peasant; the United States under John F. Kennedy was under the rule of a dynastic American millionaire. Khrushchev had already shown sympathy and support for Third World leaders, ranging from Nasser to Nehru, from Sukarno to Nkrumah. John F. Kennedy, considerably more polished and affluent than his Russian political counterpart, showed also in addition a capacity to share the Russians' more developed international sensibility. By that time the Soviet Union was already committed to the building of the Aswan Dam, destined to be Gamal Abdul Nasser's most enduring monument. Kennedy moved in the direction of building the Volta Dam in Ghana, perhaps similarly destined to be Kwame Nkrumah's most concrete monument in his own country. Kennedy ignored the complaints of even the most liberal of his own supporters who had argued against Nkrumah's domestic policies and regarded those as a reason for withholding American participation in the financing of the Volta Dam. Kennedy decided otherwise.

Kennedy was of course killed in 1963. Khrushchev was replaced in 1964. In many ways, the brief period of congruence between Kennedy and Khrushchev in their interpretation of the Third World constituted the heyday of Africa's centrality in world politics.

This was not because Khrushchev and Kennedy saw eye to eye on fundamental issues. On the contrary, this was a period of the most acute ideological tension between the two countries, in actual competitiveness in attempting to control the rest of the world. In the Congo

[5] Cited by Mary Holdsworth. "Soviet Writings on Africa," *Contact* (Summer, 1961), p. 15.

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the two giants were immersed in high rivalry, pushing the Congo to the centre of world politics, and threatening to some extent another Korean situation. Patrice Lumumba lost his life, partly at the hands of his own countrymen but also because his country had become a competitive arena for the major powers in 1960 and early 1961.

In Cuba too, a confrontation took place. In fact, the Cuban contest was even more perilous for mankind. The missile crisis precipitated a confrontation between Kennedy and Khrushchev capable of pushing the world as a whole over the precipice of nuclear war.

What all this means is that the brief period between the election of Kennedy in 1960 and his assassination in 1963 was by no means a period of political cordiality between the Soviet Union and the United States. What it was, from Africa's point of view, was nevertheless a period when the two most powerful men in the world agreed for a change that Africa and the Third World mattered.

By contrast, under Nixon and Brezhnev, the enormous ideological gap between the two powers narrowed. There was less ideological tension than there had been in the days of Kennedy. On the contrary, the missionary clarion call by both the White House and the Kremlin was the call of détente. But although the super-powers agreed, it was not an agreement that augured well for Africa. On the contrary, both the giants, as compared with the administrations of their predecessors, invested Africa with less importance than it had enjoyed in the early 1960s.

On balance, however, it could still be said that the Soviet Union was a decade ahead of the United States in understanding some of the forces at work. The Soviet Union spent far less money on Africa than the United States did. There was less Soviet commitment to the alleviation of African problems of poverty and underdevelopment than was exhibited by the United States. Yet, in spite of the more cautious financial commitments by the Soviet Union, Russia nevertheless displayed in the Third World as a whole more of an awareness about the trends of the future than the United States was capable of showing.

In some ways the days of Lyndon B. Johnson were particularly bad for Africa. President Johnson was, in some respects, a great president from the point of view of the African continent. He was a great president for black Americans partly because of the considerable body of civil rights legislation which his administration managed to get through Congress, and thereby lay the foundations of greater political amelioration of the black predicament in the United States. Related to this legislation were the institutions which were set up by the Johnson administration in America, ranging from those which promoted minority enterprise and attempted to enhance economic effectiveness among black people to those institutions more narrowly defined in the direction of ending obvious discrimination in the country.

But while the Johnson era in recent American history was one of

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black achievement domestically, it was certainly one of drastically declining interest in Africa.

> While Lyndon Baines Johnson was president the level of the AID programme fell by almost 50 per cent. The burden fell most heavily on the states of Tropical Africa. . . . That this cutback should have occurred in spite of the dire implications of the 1966 " McNamara Poverty Thesis " and the rising incidence of military coups and other form of political instability in Tropical Africa, provided ample indication that American attention was becoming increasingly inner-directed.[6]

After Johnson, Nixon reduced Washington's commitment to domestic black welfare without increasing Washington's commitment to Africa's economic development. Détente between the Soviet Union and the United States reduced even the competitive motive behind the favours bestowed by the super-powers on the smaller countries of the world. Yet perhaps this is an oversimplification. The legacy of ideological competition had gone too far to be totally reversed either by Lyndon B. Johnson or by the Nixon-Brezhnev flirtation.

The Soviet Union and African Development

Because the first few years of Asian and African independence had been characterized by such considerable ideological and political rivalry, a new ethos had grown up in the world as a whole. The ethos had originally been no more than a moral rationalization for the competitive ideological crusades. The rationalization hinged on the proposition that the richer and more developed countries of the world had a duty to support the less advantaged nations. In the earlier days of the Cold War, such a commitment to international development was legitimized at home in the capitals of the developed world in terms of " enlightened self-interest," defined in Cold War terms.

But what started as little more than a cynical exercise in competitive diplomacy did provide a basis for a new economic morality in the world. In reality none of the rich countries have as yet shown adequate interest in changing the economic order of the world. Only such a change could fundamentally ameliorate the lot of the underdeveloped. In any case, charity internationally has its weaknesses, including a propensity to consolidate a dependency complex among those who receive such charity.

But when all is said and done, and allowances have been made for the basically inegalitarian relationship which exists between an aid-donor and an aid-recipient, the fact nevertheless remains that the Cold War helped to create the beginnings of a new international

[6] Helen Desfosses Cohn, " Soviet-American Relations and of the African Arena," *Survey*, No. 86, p. 160. The McNamara Poverty Thesis was: " There's a direct and constant relationship between the incidence of violence and the economic status of the countries concerned."

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economic morality. While a new economic morality is far from a new economic order and simply indicates a shift in ethical sensibilities on the world stage, that morality might nevertheless be an indispensable precondition for the structural transformation of global arrangements. The world could not conceivably move towards changing the pattern of distribution of the planet's resources without a major change in international ethics.

A distinction has sometimes been made between Soviet and American motives for extending economic aid to the less developed countries. It has been suggested that while the Russian assistance programmes were primarily concerned with political considerations, the concerns of the United States were more purely economic. The Russians were attributed with the commitment to change the ideological orientation of African regimes, while Americans were inspired either by a desire genuinely to ensure economic development in the poorer countries or by a desire to facilitate American economic interests in those countries. At their more altruistic, Americans would thus be champions of realistic programmes for the improvement of the standards of living of the people of each of these countries. At their less altruistic, Americans would be committed to the preservation of American sources of energy and raw materials, and American markets, as well as the operations of American multinational corporations.

On the basis of this analysis, American involvement in aid programmes could be deemed to be economically determined; while Russian participation in such ventures has been primarily inspired by political motives.

Such a distinction, while explaining certain aspects of the behaviour of the two super-powers, is still inadequate. Much of American commitment to aid in the days of John Foster Dulles, and even in the days of John F. Kennedy, included a high political and ideological component. The commitment to promote liberal democratic and capitalist ideas, and keep out the temptations of communism, was often at least as political as anything promoted by the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, some of the programmes of aid operated by the Soviet Union in Africa were often geared in part to the economic national interests of the Soviet Union. Considerations of Soviet trade, and acquisition by Russia of foreign reserves, have never been absent in the broad diplomatic interaction between Russia and the African states.

But even if there was a balance in motivation on the American side which made economic considerations more relevant than they were on the part of the Russians, this precise balance of mixed calculations must have now become more blurred. Both Russia and the United States have now become more circumspect in their aid commitments on all fronts, and less influenced by a desire merely to win ideological converts in Africa. And just as there are many American voices which say the United States can no longer afford large-scale external

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charity while domestic problems in the cities are mounting, so there have been Russian voices arguing that the nature of socialism itself in the Soviet Union cannot yield "surplus capital" to export on a large scale to other countries. As the communist writer, S. I. Tyulpanov, put it:

> The creation of the material and technical base of socialism and Communism demands colossal capital investments. . . . Here there is not and cannot be "surplus capital" by the very economic nature of socialism. The socialist countries have never entered into competition with capitalism in the volume of capital resources they export to the developing countries and in the existing stage of development they cannot do so.[7]

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have been encouraging African countries to be more self-reliant; and both have even invoked the profit motive in some form as a basis for economic reciprocity between the donor countries and the receiving countries. In the words of one Soviet writer, a socialist country engaged in economic assistance to a developing country should be guaranteed "not only a recovery of its actual expenditure but also a definite return on the resources invested." [8]

But while on balance Russian aid to African economic development has been only a fraction of western aid, Russia's support to African liberation movements has been more substantial than western aid. Many western countries, because of their special economic and political relations with the minority regimes of Southern Africa, have all along been reluctant to extend even moral support to those movements. For as long as Lisbon was under fascist rule, and was reluctant to liberate Africa, the United States was strongly loyal to Portugal. Even when 100 other countries were prepared to recognize the independence of Guinea-Bissau in 1973, the United States could still veto the possibility of Guinea-Bissau's admission to the United Nations without permission from Portugal. The Soviet Union and its allies, on the other hand, have remained strong champions of African liberation in Southern Africa and have often extended considerable financial and material support to the movements engaged in that liberation.

In reality, there were private contributions to liberation movements from western organizations and western individuals, including the International Council of Churches. The West has never been monolithic in its approach to African problems. While western investors have poured money into South Africa in pursuit of profit, western humanitarians and radicals have, at the same time, been

[7] Tyulpanov, *Notes on Political Economy: The Developing Countries* (Moscow: Mysl, 1969—published in Russian), p. 135. Cited in translation by Cohn, "Soviet-American Relations and the African Arena," op. cit. p. 162.

[8] Iu. F. Shamrai, "Problems of the Realisation of the Economic Cooperation Between Socialist and Developing Countries," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 4 (1968), p. 13. Cited by Cohn, ibid. p. 163. See also "Tanzania: Soviet Views on the Arusha Programme," *Mizan*, Vol. 9, No. 5 (Sept.–Oct., 1967), pp. 197–202.

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extending support to the freedom fighters and their organizations. Periodically, the black movements in Southern Africa would send delegations all over the world to raise funds, and these delegations would not only go to Moscow and Peking, but also to Stockholm, Paris, Washington and London.

What was happening was that the private sector in western society was quite capable of supporting liberation movements directly, but western governments shrank from such activities. It was because of this that Russian and Chinese official material support to liberation movements was so conspicuous, while western aid was only decentralized and unofficial.

In addition, aid from the communist countries included in some cases offers of training facilities for the liberation soldiers. Sometimes instructors went to Africa from the communist world to impart their skills of guerrilla warfare in jungle strategy. There were also occasions when Africans went to countries ranging from Russia to North Korea as part of the military preparation for the struggle in Southern Africa.[9]

Finally, there is Russia's role in maintaining the territorial integrity of independent African states. The boundaries of all of these states were imposed upon the continent by western powers, and yet the Soviet Union, among the major powers, has been more consistent than anybody else in assuring the security of those boundaries.

Among the major powers, France has the worst record with regard to the issue of the territorial integrity of African states. When both the Congo (now Zaire) and Nigeria were endangered by a strong secessionist movement, French resources were basically employed to support either by propaganda or in direct material equipment the side which wanted to break away. Both Moise Tshombe, when he was trying to detach Katanga from Zaire, and Ojukwu, when he was trying to create a Biafran state carved out of Nigeria, found a sympathetic ear in France. In the case of survival of Zaïre, the French position was simply that the United Nations had no business trying to save the territorial integrity of the newly independent country. President de Gaulle, by disputing the credentials of the United Nations to intervene on behalf of the territorial integrity of the country, endangered the territorial integrity at that stage of Zaïre's history.

In the case of the Nigerian civil war, the French became increasingly more partisan on the side of Biafra, but fell short of outright recognition of Biafra as an independent state. Instead, the French encouraged at least two of their former colonies—the Ivory Coast and Gabon—to extend that recognition to the secessionist state.

[9] For a perceptive analysis of the interplay between ideological and strategic factors in this interaction between African liberation movements and the communist world consult Kenneth W. Grundy, *Guerrilla Struggle in Africa: An Analysis and Preview*, (New York, 1971). Grundy's analysis is not as deeply rooted in empirical evidence as one might have preferred, but the very nature of guerrilla movements reduces receptivity to direct and comprehensive research for as long as the war continues.

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Britain's position with regard to the bid by Katanga to secede from Zaire was, curiously enough, substantially similar to France's position. By contrast, Britain became an active supporter of the Federal Government in the Nigerian civil war, maintaining military supplies for Nigeria in spite of heavy political agitation and protest at home in Britain. The British did not attempt to influence the Federal Government towards alternative solutions to the crisis, and the British were at times reluctant to give the range of equipment needed by the Federal Government. But, on balance, it was clear that the British Government supported the territorial integrity of Nigeria and continued to strengthen the Federal Government's capacity to thwart the secessionist bid.

With regard to the Russians, they were actively engaged on the side of the territorial integrity of both Zaïre and Nigeria. It should be remembered that these two countries constituted potentially the most economically powerful countries in black Africa. But this potential economic power rested on their remaining intact, as well as independent. The Russians flirted neither with Moise Tshombe nor with Ojukwu. They remained solidly for both Lumumba and Gowon, although in both cases relations between Africans and their Russian supporters were not always smooth. A good deal of irritation was sometimes caused to both sides. But what was clear was that the Russian involvement was on the side of maintaining the territorial integrity of these two potential African giants.

With regard to the Sudanese civil war, again the main changes were in relations between Northern Sudan and Russia from one Sudanese government to another but there were few changes in relations between Russia and Southern Sudan. In the latter fact, the Russians remained distrustful of the separatist movement in the south, and the distrust was substantially reciprocated by the southerners. The very fact that the southerners had western missionaries among their most enthusiastic champions helped to create political distance between the southern insurrectionists and Moscow. This cool or hostile relationship was fairly constant throughout the 17 years of the Sudanese civil war, and certainly constant within the concluding 10 years of the war.

In contrast, relations between Moscow and Khartoum were never adequately constant. They varied substantially according to which regime was in power in Khartoum. Their relations were at one time quite cold, especially before Aboud's coup in 1958. After Aboud's takeover, Moscow began to take greater interest in Khartoum, in the mistaken belief at the time that the Khartoum coup would turn out to be as "progressive" as had the Egyptian coup of 1952 and the Iraqi coup of 1958. It turned out that Aboud was quite conservative, though not militantly anti-communist.

Aboud was overthrown in 1964, and civilian politics resumed in the Sudan. Moscow continued to make the Sudan part of its broad Arab world strategy of courtship wherever possible. But it was not

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until the radical coup in the Sudan in 1969 that relations with Moscow became particularly intimate. Sudanese communists threw in their lot with the Sudanese soldiers, and established a new ideological "condominium" of the Sudan.

This honeymoon between Moscow and Khartoum ended tragically in 1971, when the Sudanese Marxists overthrew Numiery briefly, were then defeated, and many of their leaders executed. Among those executed was a distinguished black Marxist from Southern Sudan. Like other Sudanese radicals, he had conceded that the south had a grievance, but saw the solution to that grievance in terms of a totally transformed revolutionary Sudan, rather than two separate countries under conservative rulers.

Since the end of the civil war in the Sudan in 1972, relations between Khartoum and Moscow, though still not yet restored to their original cordiality before 1971, have begun to take a turn for the better. But the main point to grasp is that in the Sudan, as in the old Congo and in the Nigerian civil war, the Soviet position remained that of maintaining the territorial boundaries bequeathed to Africa by western colonial powers. In the defence of those boundaries, the Soviet Union has, as we indicated, been more consistent than the western powers themselves.

Angola and Afro-Soviet Relations

But more significant than Soviet involvement in the Sudan over the years was the dramatic phase of Soviet participation in the Angolan civil war after the collapse of the Portuguese Empire. Even before the military coup in Lisbon in April 1974, the Russians had been giving support to liberation fighters against Portuguese rule in Angola. By the time of the coup it was already clear that the Russian favourites were the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), led by Augustinho Neto. Soviet rivals in global terms were the United States, on one side, and the People's Republic of China, on the other. American support went in the main to the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) under Holden Roberto. American aid to Roberto's movement came either directly through the Central Intelligence Agency or indirectly through the government of Zaïre. The Chinese, on the other hand, preferred the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) under Jonas Savimbi.

An attempt at forming a government of national unity involving all three movements was made with the assistance of the Portuguese after they had decided to give independence to Angola, and with the mediating efforts of President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya and his government. This experiment in a tripartite regime for Angola collapsed, and a painful civil war ensued. When the time came for the Portuguese government to hand over power in November 1975 no

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single faction was as yet in control of Angola. The Portuguese therefore handed over symbolically to the people of Angola, and departed. The MPLA captured Luanda, the capital city, and formed a government of its own, the People's Republic of Angola. The two rival movements, the FNLA and UNITA, entered into a marriage of convenience and formed a government for what they called the Democratic Republic of Angola with a provisional capital at Huando (formerly known as Nova Lisboa).

The civil war got worse in scale, and for a short while it appeared as if the agonies of the former Belgian Congo in the early 1960s would be repeated as super-powers ruthlessly decided to exploit domestic African tensions and drift towards a major international confrontation of their own.

But before long a number of decisions made by some of the external participants in the Angolan civil war tilted the balance in favour of MPLA. The Chinese decided that with a major African civil war under way they did not want to be directly involved in militarily supporting one faction. This would be potentially expensive both economically in terms of how much money the Chinese would have to spend, and also diplomatically in terms of alienating "progressive" African governments who were themselves leaning towards the MPLA.

The United States Congress also took steps which, by default, dramatically improved MPLA's chances of victory. The Congress explicitly forbade any use of funds by the Ford administration for covert activities in the Angolan crisis. The decision by Congress spelt the end, at least temporarily, of effective American military support to either FNLA or UNITA.

South Africa got involved, partly in order to avert the triumph of a left-wing regime in Angola, partly to protect its colonial control of Namibia, and partly to protect the expensive hydro-electric project on the Cunene river in Angola near the Namibian border, which South Africa had financed.

But when it became clear that the western world was not prepared to move decisively in support of FNLA and UNITA, South Africa's own involvement became more visible and conspicuous than ever. That involvement in turn succeeded in swinging a substantial number of African states on to the side of the MPLA, not necessarily because they shared MPLA ideology, but more because their opponents had chosen racists for allies.

It was against this background that Soviet support for the MPLA briefly struggled for legitimacy in African eyes. The fact that Americans were not participating in any effective way in the war should normally have made Soviet intervention less justified to African opinion. After all, why should the Soviet Union choose one faction in an African civil war and promote it towards victory when the other super-power was being forced by its Congress to remain neutral in that war?

When the Chairman of the Organization of African Unity at the

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time, President Idi Amin of Uganda, resisted Soviet pressure on him to recognize the MPLA, his stand appeared for a while truly nationalist, pan-African, and heroic. Amin's reactions even forced the Soviet Union to interrupt diplomatic relations with Uganda for a while.

But the entry of South Africa more conspicuously on the side of FNLA and UNITA helped to legitimize further Russia's involvement on the side of the MPLA. As one African government after another recognized the government of MPLA, Russia's technical presence in the war seemed to be widely forgiven.

Then there was the involvement of the Cubans. According to calculations, the number of Cuban troops involved in the Angolan war went upwards to 12,000. By African standards, this constituted the importation of a whole army from outside. With Russia's equipment and Cuban manpower, the MPLA became the most externally dependent of all the three movements.

Most liberation movements in the Third World since the second world war have depended heavily on the outside world for arms and equipment. Certainly the Vietnamese in their war against first the French and later the Americans utilized overwhelmingly Vietnamese fighters, even if the weapons came from outside.

The Algerians in their war against France needed external funds, equipment, and diplomatic support. But the warriors in this struggle were predominantly Algerians. Outsiders, like the immortal Franz Fanon, who came as a volunteer, were a tiny minority in the fighting force.

Perhaps the most self-reliant of all major African guerrilla movements since the second world war was the Mau Mau movement in Kenya. The fighters were not in a position to obtain either sophisticated modern weapons from sympathizers outside or even any substantial amounts of external capital. Indeed, the Mau Mau movement had hardly any external diplomatic arm of the kind which enabled people like Ferhat Abbas to speak for the National Liberation Front of Algeria in external capitals of the world. Indeed, Neto, Roberto and Savimbi of Angola were able to serve both as direct leaders of their movement and international spokesmen in diplomatic circles. They could negotiate for arms, equipment and capital from external sources, while directing operations in the war in Angola.

The Mau Mau movement in Kenya in the 1950s had no equivalent diplomatic arm to promote the cause outside and negotiate for weapons and equipment. Forest fighters had only the most rudimentary forms of military technology, creating rough and ready rifles, and often only the ordinary rural blade of East Africa, the *panga*.

Militarily the Mau Mau movement was defeated, but politically it was triumphant to the extent that it broke Britain's will to continue ruling in Kenya for the interests of a white minority and firmly laid the foundation for African self-rule in the country. The forest fighters were not necessarily the direct beneficiaries of their own war, but with-

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out them the era of Kenya under the domination of white settlers would have been substantially prolonged. What is significant from our point of view was that the Mau Mau movement had neither massive Soviet or Chinese equipment or capital nor did it have an imported army to wage its battles.

The MPLA in Angola can make no such claims. Of all the major liberation forces in Africa's experience since the second world war, only the MPLA went to the extent of importing more than 10,000 fighters to wage its war against fellow Angolans.

But why did the Cubans do it? Were they simply obeying Russian orders? Was the Cuban factor in Angola simply an extension of the Soviet factor?

Such an analysis would grossly oversimplify the issues. Cuba under Castro has aspired to be a major revolutionary force in its own right in the politics of the Third World. The mission to export revolution in Latin America was vigorously attempted by Castro's Cuba in the 1960s, but the commitment to that particular exercise declined partly because the other governments in Latin America were getting more ruthless in dealing with some of their dissidents, partly because Cuba became more interested in improving relations with other Latin American governments, partly because the Soviet Union had entered a period of détente with the United States and did not want to encourage Cuba to upset the Americans too much in Latin America, and perhaps also partly because Cuba was getting more interested in promoting its own détente with the United States if the revolutionary cost was not too high.

Africa provided an alternative venue for a major revolutionary role by Castro's Cuba in other countries. Sometimes the Cuban role has been to maintain a particular regime in power. A Cuban presence in Congo (Brazzaville) and even the Cuban presence in Sierra Leone were supposed to be elements for stability in the countries rather than for real social transformation.

But Cuba's involvement in other African countries diminishes in importance against the scale of their involvement in Angola. And because of the success of Angolan involvement, Cuba's sense of vindication in fostering liberation, if not exporting revolution, may well increase its self-confidence as a Third World force.

But in addition to fostering its own image as a revolutionary country, Cuba has wanted to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that there were favours that Cuba could render to Russia in international politics in exchange for Russian favours to Cuba over the years. There were roles that the Cubans could play to promote Soviet goals that the Soviet Union could not adequately play in its own right. After all, the Angolan war would have been of a dramatically different kind if there were 12,000 Russian troops in the war, instead of Cuban soldiers. A large scale importation of Russian manpower would have alarmed the western world much more effectively, and might well have made an essential difference in Congress about whether or not America should

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be involved in turn. South Africa's will to fight in Angola may have been strengthened rather than weakened by a direct Russian threat. And the western world's interest in saving South Africa might well have created a global crisis. The Cubans could conduct themselves in a manner to achieve the purpose of an MPLA victory in Angola without arousing quite the same scale of global anxieties. Castro was therefore in a position to demonstrate that the relationship between the Soviet Union and Cuba was one of interdependency, rather than mere dependence of Cuba on her senior partner. Russians needed Cuba in some ventures, just as Cubans needed Russians in others.

As for the longer term consequences of the MPLA victory in Angola, the immediate ones could be ominous for Namibia and Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), but the longer term implications may be more hopeful. Towards the end of 1974 and early 1975 South Africa was already considering the possibility of Namibia's independence in some form, probably divided into Bantustans and presumably intended to be under puppet African regimes. But whatever the precise intentions of Pretoria, there was a chance that Namibia would enjoy at least the level of autonomy already experienced by Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland.

The victory of MPLA in Angola may well harden South Africa's attitude now towards the question of independence for Namibia. South Africa may feel it needs Namibia as a buffer state more than ever, and could not gamble on the possibility of a Namibia under an independent African authority in a political alliance with the MPLA.

The immediate consequences of the MPLA victory may also make South Africa reluctant now to put too much pressure on Ian Smith for concessions to African nationalists. South Africa may well decide that it wants to avert its own isolation, surrounded by African regimes which are either already radical or potentially radicalizable. The previous drive by the Prime Minister to pressurize Ian Smith in the direction of a constitutional settlement with black nationalists had inevitably to come under close reconsideration in the face of the turn of events in Angola.

But while the immediate consequences of those Angolan events for Namibia and Zimbabwe may thus be negative, the longer term repercussions were more hopeful. With a radical Angola on its border, and potentially with continuing Soviet and Cuban support, the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) of Namibia could indeed gain a new lease of life and become a more effective fighting force in the coming years than it has been so far. The liberation of Namibia in the longer term could thus be more assured as a result of the triumph of MPLA.

Will Zambia in turn become radicalized as it faces Mozambique under Frelimo on its eastern flank and Angola under MPLA on its western? Will Kaunda either have to become radical or leave the seat of power in Lusaka? Are the pressures for the total liberation of southern Africa

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gathering momentum as a result of the collapse of the Portuguese empire and the arrival of the Cubans and the Russians?

Whatever the answers to these questions it is clear that the Soviet Union's relationship with the African continent, and its influence on the course of African history, may well have entered a new phase in the Angolan civil war and its aftermath.

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Correspondent in Moscow and Peking

David Bonavia

BERNARD LEVIN, on learning that my wife and I were planning to take up a posting with *The Times* in Peking less than six months after being expelled from Moscow in 1972*, commented: "You must be gluttons for punishment."

We didn't, at the time, see it in that light. To have studied Chinese academically, spent two years in Hong Kong and three in Moscow, and then pass up the chance of a posting in Peking, would have seemed asinine to a professional correspondent. So we went.

We exchanged Igor (the Moscow driver) for Ho, and Tamara (the maid) for Comrade Chou, and subsequently Comrade Wang, and for the last year and a half we had no house-cleaning comrade at all, because they were more trouble than they were worth. In both Moscow and Peking, we considered it essential to employ drivers to minimize the risk of traffic accidents, though we did both drive in both postings when necessary.

The first year in Peking, by comparison with Moscow, was like living in a warm bath. China was in the middle of its most intense be-friendly-to-foreigners period, and I largely saw eye-to-eye with the Chinese in their analysis of the general decadence and underlying nastiness of the Soviet Union. There was plenty to learn, travel facilities were opening up (even for Inner Mongolia), and of course the Chinese can be so extraordinarily agreeable when they want to. There were no *provokatsii*, no hassles with the security organs, no foul-ups of the type which Intourist and Aeroflot seem to specialize in. I was well used to dealing with a reporting situation in which normal Western techniques were not fully applicable, and on the whole I found officialdom reasonably frank on certain subjects. Almost the only times I lost my temper in the first year were when the Peking Railway Station Customs Bureau tried to charge me 102 per cent import duty on cat-litter, and when a China Travel Service representative at the Chien Men Hotel advised me to approach the Foreign Ministry for a ticket to the cinema.

But if there were no clashes with the KGB and the *Literaturnaya Gazyeta*, there were also none of the informal contacts with dissidents and ordinary people which made Moscow such a lively and fascinating post. In Peking, diplomats and correspondents live in fenced-off "ghettos," as they do in Moscow. The difference is that, in Moscow, the *militsiya* guard at the ghetto gate kept tabs on one's movements and guests; whereas in Peking, the security guards—both plain-clothed and in Army uniform—showed little interest in our own movements, but would have prevented any Chinese foolish enough to try and enter the compound without a written pass.

* Cf. "Technology of an Expulsion," *Survey*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (85), p. 1.

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There is, in short, virtually no informal contact with the Chinese people—the closest approach to it being a chat with one's driver or Chinese language teacher, or, more rarely, a chance conversation in a park with some young Chinese who might be too eccentric or too desperate to worry about the consequences.

The foreign students at the various institutes and universities where they are allowed to study in China were beginning to "warm up" some of their Chinese room-mates in 1975–76, but the future of the student exchange programme is somewhat doubtful following the political crises and earthquakes of 1976. We lived in a psychological cage in Peking: unable to penetrate the surface of Chinese society to any extent remotely comparable to the penetration which correspondents continue to pursue and develop in Moscow.

At least in Moscow one could subscribe to an almost unlimited number of periodicals: a dozen Moscow newspapers, principal organs of all the union republics, learned and literary journals, and so on. You could do a perfectly useful job of Russia-watching by sitting in your Moscow office all day and just reading.

In Peking, we were forbidden to purchase the *Peking Daily* (the local city newspaper) or the *Reference News* (the Chinese-language tabloid which reprints material from foreign sources, but without the deliberate inaccuracies and distortions of *Za Rubezhom*). Even a delegation of British newspaper editors and proprietors who were taken round the offices of the Shanghai newspaper *Wen Hui Pao* in 1975 were not allowed to have souvenir copies—"because they reflect only local conditions." We were allowed to subscribe to the *People's Daily*, the *Kuang Ming Daily* and *Red Flag*, certain learned journals, a few political journals put out by various universities (including the notorious *Study and Criticism* from Shanghai), and the normal foreign-language propaganda materials such as *Peking Review* and *China Pictorial*. The bookshops, even by Moscow standards, were a desert, as were the music shops. The only theatrical entertainment was childish in its intellectual level, as was most of the television (3–4 hours an evening, one channel only).

On the plus side, we were regularly invited (without our wives) to banquets at the Great Hall of the People, and to welcome and farewell ceremonies at the airport and the railway station, at which it was possible to see, photograph and very occasionally pass a word with Chinese leaders. No comparable contact has existed in Moscow since the days of Khrushchev.

Another useful feature of these formal occasions was that they gave us correspondents almost our only real chance to have long conversations with the officials of the Information Department of the Foreign Ministry (the equivalent of the Soviet Press Department). Two or three of these people were communicative enough to be worth plying with questions about recent political campaigns or other important events. At least if they had been given a line from above, they would seize

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that opportunity to shoot it, and it is important to know what the line is, whether one believes it or not.

ONE of the most rewarding aspects of life in China for the correspondent is the chance to travel quite widely in the Eastern half of the country, and now, indeed, for a selected few writers from outside, in Tibet. Sinkiang is being slowly opened. The main areas which remain almost totally banned to foreigners are the south-eastern coastline opposite Taiwan, Kweichow, Anhui, Hainan and the Hsisha Islands, Kansu, Ninghsia and Chinghai. Szechwan is usually closed.

Of course, as in the Soviet Union, access to part of a province/union republic does not necessarily mean access to all of it—indeed it never does. But the Chinese score in their willingness, nay their eagerness, to take foreigners out of the principal cities and show them the surrounding countryside and production brigades. On the whole, the Russians are proud of their cities and ashamed of their *kolkhozes*; the Chinese are somewhat ashamed of the dilapidated state of their cities, and relatively proud of their undeniable achievements in rural irrigation and general agricultural development.

The other great pleasure of travelling in China is that one is usually well looked after, comfortably and efficiently housed, and superbly well fed. There is no question, as there is in Kiev or Khabarovsk, of spending a whole day trying to get one's return tickets out of a surly and incompetent Intourist organisation. China Travel Service treats its guests like precious packages, and one may well be received to dinner and briefed by a group of senior cadres immediately on arrival at a provincial centre.

Of course all this efficiency and courtesy in China (which can, by the way, wear thin sometimes) is really intended to control the foreigner as much as to please and impress him. The Chinese authorities simply cannot let a bunch of big-nosed foreign devils run around their cities untended: for one thing, it causes problems of crowd control because of the curiosity of the masses. In Russia, when we travelled outside Moscow, we refused official programmes because we usually found they were simply an excuse to waste our time or hoodwink us; we just walked round and used our eyes and picked up stray acquaintances. In China, it is an upset for one's hosts if one so much as leaves the guesthouse unaccompanied, except in such relatively sophisticated places as Peking, Shanghai and Canton. The reward for knuckling under to all this velvet-glove control is to be taken to a commune or a factory and given the chance to grill the Revolutionary Committee on their income, production techniques, work-point system, social problems, etc. On subjects of that kind, commune officials are usually fairly frank: they have little to hide. But it would of course be a waste of time to ask how much premarital sex went on in the hay-ricks after dark.

All this jollying around the country picking up bits and pieces of

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background knowledge is stimulating and rewarding for the first year or two, but after that a certain sense of diminishing returns sets in. One begins to become unduly irritated by the long-winded " introduction " given by whatever Revolutionary Committee official one is visiting; the ritual tributes to the effects of the Cultural Revolution, the Thought of Mao, etc. One may argue, or seek less superficial information, and then the hosts may become very upset, even angry. I was told in Shanghai that the Number One Machine Tool Plant was " very dissatisfied " with me because I had argued with their concept that practice is always superior to theory. The fact that one by now knows enough to ask more penetrating questions acts *against* the possibility of getting meaningful answers. That is why I believe that for a correspondent who is seriously interested in China, the sanity threshold is about two years, though of course, it depends on the individual. After that, one might as well pursue further studies from Hong Kong, with the hope of occasionally visiting the mainland again to refresh one's view.

BEFORE we left for China, many people asked us—with more than a hint of irony—" how many dissidents are you expecting to find there? " The entire question of dissidence in China, and Western attitudes towards it, is an extremely vexed one. Amnesty International is now getting round to tackling the question of political prisoners in China. The most important reference work on the subject of labour camps and political coercion is Jean Pasqualini's definitive book *Prisoner of Mao,* but it is now more than a decade out of date.

Clearly there is political opposition in China, both organized and spontaneous, private and collective. That was the message of the Cultural Revolution. But in that case, it was opposition sanctioned from the highest possible level against " revisionist " tendencies in slightly lower and intermediate levels of the party and government. The 1975 Constitution institutionalized the people's right to put up wall posters criticizing their rulers if they wish, but anyone who has studied China is aware that such posters are generally put up in large numbers as an expression of a high-level power struggle, and are a weapon used in such struggles. During 1974, we witnessed in Peking the use of wall posters to air individual grievances—some of them very personal and quite reminiscent of Moscow *samizdat.* But once again the keystone of all protest was an expression of loyalty to the ultimate authority—Mao—and an accusation that his subordinates had betrayed his principles. I have never come across any authenticable expression of opposition to the whole system, though there are plenty of forged materials of Soviet or Taiwan provenance purporting to be such.

To understand this difference between the Soviet phenomenon of dissidence and the very different form it takes in China, we must look at the respective historical backgrounds of the two cultures. Since Peter the Great, Russia has looked to Western Europe for intellectual stimu-

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lation and political ideas. Not even Stalin was able to stamp out completely the seed of the concept of individual protest within, and at the same time against, the prevailing state order. And Soviet dissidence is taken very much to heart by people in Western Europe and the countries which have been decisively influenced by European culture, especially America. This is because we feel Russia as being close to us, almost a part of us, and we feel a sense of involvement or even responsibility when we are presented with evidence of violation of human rights there.

Over the centuries, on the other hand, the European/Christian cultures have been schooled in the belief that the Oriental civilizations are despotic. Wittfogelism aside, I believe this is a generally accurate assessment, and it is hardly original to suggest that Stalinism itself is a modern form of Tsarist autocracy which in itself was heavily influenced by Oriental despotism.

In China specifically, political opposition has taken several historical forms: court intrigue, lone protest by loyal courtiers, feudal centrifugalism, armed rebellion, alliances with neighbouring polities, eremitism, suicide and literary allegory. Until the Cultural Revolution, there barely existed in China a tradition of "loyal opposition" (which certain sectors of the Soviet dissident movement profess to represent, if only for reasons of survival). Further, China has tended in the past, and still tends, to see itself as a world rather than a country, and to many Chinese the idea of having to live (or be buried) anywhere outside China or a Chinese community is barely tolerable. True, in the early modern revolutionary period, Sun Yat-sen and others sought refuge and inspiration abroad, just as Lenin did. But the heart of the Chinese revolution is in the bowels of the country itself—one reason why Marxism in China keeps feeling the magnetic tug of traditional Chinese ideas, and those parts of the political spectrum generally referred to as "radical" can arguably be shown to be representing merely a new form of Chinese conservatism.

Thus it would not seem natural for a Chinese intellectual with a grievance to seek out a Westerner in order to put it across to world opinion and hear it played back. The very act would tend to discredit his protest in the eyes of most other Chinese—one reason why Taiwan and Soviet broadcast propaganda makes so little apparent impact in China. In China it is considered stoical to lock one's grievances in one's heart for the good of the family (or nowadays out of patriotism or ideological motivation). Even among refugees in Hong Kong, who had come to find life in the mainland intolerable, one may still find a strong Chinese patriotism and a support for much of what the regime there is trying to do.

Dissidence in China is more inclined to take the form of passive resistance to unpopular policies propagated from above, or to break out in mass movements which are prone to manipulation in the course of power struggles.

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For these reasons, I do not think it " racist " to say that we need not look for *samizdat* in China because the Chinese are different from the Russians—any more than I consider it racist to say that most Chinese have black hair. One must also take into account the relatively enormous difficulties which a Chinese dissident would have in contacting a foreigner in China, because of the physical conspicuousness of foreigners and the way they are fenced off from the population by " mass vigilance." None of this means that I think China to be a monolithic society, or even a society governed by consensus, as it has become fashionable to assume in certain Western circles.

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The Arrest and Trial of I. M. Maisky

Alexander Nekrich

DURING the last years of his life, Stalin was more and more possessed by mistrust and suspicion. How, indeed, could a man who had committed so many crimes be anything but suspicious? According to one unconfirmed, private report, Stalin kept at his Kuntsevo *dacha*—the "nearer *dacha*"—a map of Moscow's Red Square, on which he circled the spots where he would have liked to erect gallows, and under each gallows area wrote the names of the people who were to be strung up.

There is, however, no doubt whatsoever that by the end of the war Stalin had already set in train a series of measures which were to lead to a new and grandiose "purge." These included the deportation of the peoples of the Caucasus and the Crimea, the "Leningrad case," the disbandment of the Anti-Fascist Jewish Committee and the physical liquidation of its presidium, a series of secret trials of young people on charges of plotting terrorist acts, and, to crown it all, the arrest of the "doctor-assassins" and the preparations to deport Jews from large industrial centres in the USSR. Nor, at the same time, did he forget about the people who had served out the 10-year terms to which they had been sentenced in 1937. They were re-arrested and sent to Siberia, this time for good, never to return. Now Stalin set about ridding himself of his former comrades-in-arms who had served him faithfully for 30 years and shared with him the responsibility for the crimes that had been committed. The preparation for this was conducted with great single-mindedness. At the 19th Party congress the Politbureau was abolished and the Central Committee Presidium created in its place, with twice as many members. Naturally, they were all Stalin's protégés, most of them people who had risen on the tide of 1937. There were more "intellectuals" among them than there had been among the membership of the old Politbureau—the economist A. M. Rumyantsev, for instance, and the philosopher D. Chesnokov. The Party workers included some young ones who had risen from the ranks during the war. One of these was Leonid Brezhnev.

In this secret speech at the 20th Party congress, Khrushchev told how K. Voroshilov, V. Molotov and even A. Mikoyan lost Stalin's confidence. One must suppose that mentioning this was part of a compromise agreed upon by Khrushchev on the eve of, and even during, the Party congress with the most pro-Stalinist members of the Presidium, the former Politbureau members. Reference to them as potential victims of Stalin to a certain extent lessened their responsibility in the eyes of the populace for the lawlessness and arbitrariness of the Stalinist dictatorship. It was the bone that Khrushchev threw to Voro-

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shilov (who was mortally and unashamedly afraid of the prospect of being called to account), to Kaganovich and finally to Molotov, who, although more discreetly, was voicing the same fears and apprehensions.

During the years of Stalin's rule dossiers were compiled on all Party workers of any importance. Not even members of the Politbureau escaped this fate; they were kept under especially close observation in all respects. These dossiers were kept, according to the official version, by Beria, but it is well known that even back at the height of the *Yezhovshchina*, people who were arrested were questioned about very highly-placed persons who were and had remained at liberty. Such dossiers unquestionably existed on all Central Committee members, and must have been preserved in archives to this day; they were enlarged not only by Beria but by all the other officials who were responsible at various times for the security of the state—Abakumov, Merkulov and Ignatiev, whom Stalin evidently intended to fill the role of a new Yezhov.

The arrest of M. I. Kalinin's wife, then of Molotov's wife and the wife of Stalin's secretary Poskrebyshchev indicated that Stalin not only demanded constant confirmation of his comrades-in-arms' unconditional loyalty to the Leader of the Peoples (and devised and executed the most refined forms of moral torture to that end, experiencing as he did so the hangman's voluptuous pleasure as he gazes upon the agonies of his victim), but also that he was depriving them of the chance to defend themselves in the future, for the arrest of their wives or other close relatives was enough in itself to serve as a grave political charge.

Nevertheless the question still remains as to why Stalin was so sure that his closest comrades-in-arms, who were the leaders of the Party and members of the Russian revolutionary movement ever since their youth, should be bent on treason and on making a compact with foreign "imperialists." For these were the kind of charges brought at all the open and secret trials against former high-ranking Party and state officials arrested with the sanction of the "Leader of the Peoples."

How low must Stalin's opinion of the moral qualities of his closest associates have been if he could regard Voroshilov, for instance, as a spy because Voroshilov had headed the Soviet delegation which had held talks with England and France in 1939 on the possibility of a military agreement! His suspicions regarding Molotov were of roughly the same ilk. However, more about that later.

AT the end of February 1953 Ivan Mikhailovich Maisky was arrested. His name was well known in the West. Maisky (Lyakhovetsky) had begun engaging in professional revolutionary activity in Russia at the turn of the century, had been arrested, had been in exile, had emigrated abroad and then returned to Russia after

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the February revolution. He had sided with the Mensheviks and was one of the few members of that party to take part in the struggle against Soviet power: he was a member of the government of the Committee of the Constituent Assembly where he held the post of Vice-Minister of Labour. When the "*uchredilka*" government (as the Bolsheviks contemptuously referred to it) moved to Omsk, where Admiral Kolchak had supreme power, Maisky's political career came to an abrupt halt. Politically disillusioned, he turned to the Bolsheviks, composed a dramatic poem "The Peaks" [*Vershiny*], and sent it to Lunacharsky with a letter asking him to help him onto the right path. Soon, with the backing of Emelyan Yaroslavsky, then editor of *Sovetskaya Sibir*, Maisky was recruited to work on the Commission for Economic Planning for Siberia by the chairman of the Siberian revolutionary committee, Ivan Nikitich Smirnov, a remarkable man in many respects, first and foremost of which was his independent mind; he was known as the "Siberian Lenin."

After a public show of repentance (first in a letter to *Pravda*, then in a book: *Democratic Counter-revolution*) Maisky was pardoned, accepted into the Bolshevik Party, appointed director of the Commission for Economic Planning for Siberia (Sibplan) and soon afterwards, in 1922, at the suggestion of his good friend M. M. Litvinov, whom he had known in London in the pre-war emigration and who was then highly placed in the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, was sent to work as a diplomat. Until mid-1943 Maisky represented the Soviet Union abroad. From 1931 he was Ambassador in London.

Like Litvinov, Maisky was regarded as a proponent of the policy of collective security, but, unlike his former chief, who was sacked from his post as Minister of Foreign Affairs in May 1939 (a date which some historians, not without reason, are inclined to consider as the starting-point of the Soviet Union's about-turn towards Hitler's Germany) Maisky remained at his post in London, making desperate efforts to conclude an Anglo-Soviet alliance and completely unaware of the double game Stalin was playing. From June 1941 Maisky played no small part in the fight against Hitler's Germany and in organizing effective British aid to the Soviet Union (Lend-Lease, the Second Front etc.).

Maisky was one of the few older-generation Soviet diplomats who escaped the repressions of the 1930s. For a time, like all other Soviet diplomats abroad, he was not allowed to meet officials of the country in which he was accredited (in Maisky's case, Britain) unless he was accompanied by his own adviser (Maisky's was Kiril Novikov). Tête-à-têtes between Soviet representatives and, say, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of another state were strictly forbidden. Later, as Maisky told me, the Politbureau made an exception for Soviet ambassadors in London and Washington and allowed them to present themselves without an escorting official. For all other ambassadors the prohibition remained in force for many years.

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Many historians, and other people too, have wondered how it was that such people survived, when their past was dubious from the orthodox Soviet point of view. The explanation is, to my mind, quite simple: in the first place, Stalin always kept among his representatives some people from the past, and, in the second place, he preferred to keep precisely those people who had once been at odds with the Bolsheviks and were now therefore his most loyal servants and would do anything for him. Maisky was not the only one. A. Ya. Vyshinsky, once an active Menshevik, rose to a high position and achieved particular notoriety at the trials of the 1930s as the procurator of death. Another man who rose to prominence was the former active Menshevik publicist D. Zaslavsky. There were others too. Maisky was versatile enough and his cultured, intelligent style made him a man of great potential for contact with the outside world. He was well regarded, liked and respected in the West, and in England in particular.

In 1946, however, when Stalin switched to the "Cold War," he had no more need of Maisky's services. Together with Litvinov, Maisky lost his post in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was, however, made a full member of the Academy of Sciences, which guaranteed him a secure material and social position to the end of his days as well as a number of attendant privileges.

It is curious that M. M. Litvinov, one of the most senior figures in the Party (which was one of the reasons Stalin disliked him) was retired on a pension of 1,000 old rubles a month; his pension was nine times less than the salary Maisky received as an Academician. "Smiling Maisky," as the English used to call him, could therefore consider himself fortunate.

Litvinov died in 1950 and his death was announced in a small notice in *Izvestiya* on the day of the funeral. Maisky, however, was fated to undergo a severe ordeal.

At the end of February 1953, two weeks before the death of Stalin, Maisky was arrested. At the age of 69, he was put in solitary confinement, where he spent two and a half years. As he later told me, it was he himself who had asked for solitary confinement because he feared provocateurs and did not wish to be disturbed in his thoughts. He had plenty to think about . . .

Even here Maisky was in luck. Hardly had his investigator had time to "attend" properly to his case when Stalin died. For this reason, Maisky was neither beaten, tortured nor starved. He was, however—and for a man who all his life had been engaged in literary and publicistic work this must have been a severe trial—deprived of paper and ink, except for the purposes of submitting official statements to the authorities.

Such, though, is the strength of the human intellect that, for want of an occupation as he languished in prison, Maisky took to composing in his head a story for children about the adventures of a group of Soviet people during the second world war. Three months after his

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release, the story (entitled *Blizko-Daleko*, [*Near–Far*]) had been put down on paper, was submitted to a publisher, ran to two editions in Moscow and was translated abroad.

MAISKY was released from prison in the summer of 1955. Many people wondered, and still wonder, why Maisky was kept so long in prison even after Stalin's death. I must admit that I have found the question very intriguing myself. In my many conversations with Maisky (I was his first ever graduate student and later his first Doctor of Historical Sciences) I often returned to the subject of that time. The last occasion on which we talked about it was a few months before his death (he died in 1975 at the age of 91). Maisky always disliked reminiscing about anything that happened after 1943. He was particularly loath to talk about his stay in prison. This was perhaps an expression of his instinct for self-preservation, but it is possible there were other reasons too.

From what Maisky *did* tell me about his confinement in prison (much of it immediately after his release in 1955, and then again shortly before his death), and also from information I have gleaned from other sources, I now have weighty reasons to suppose that the length of his sojourn in prison after Stalin's death was the result of an unlucky combination of circumstances of an objective and personal nature. Maisky was by nature very much inclined to compromise. This quality in his character, perhaps a positive trait in some circumstances, played a negative role here in prison. Something else which had a negative influence on the progress of Maisky's affairs was the case of Lavrenty Beria.

IN a letter on the Beria case sent out by the Central Committee to all party organizations in the Soviet Union immediately after his arrest, in July 1953, the implication was made that Beria had wished to overthrow the Soviet government and set up his own dictatorship. Amongst the evidence adduced to back up this charge was Beria's intention, soon after he became once again head of state security, to release the "English spy" Maisky from jail, and not only to release him but to make him his Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Central Committee letter also contained extracts from Maisky's testimony. They are rather interesting: what Maisky said in essence was that, having spent long years working abroad, he had allegedly lost his feeling for his native land and no longer knew which was his real home, the USSR or England. To all intents and purposes, England had become closer to him than the Soviet Union.

Those who knew Ivan Mikhailovich well will easily be able to imagine him speaking in this fashion, thinking that if he went a little way towards meeting his investigator and thus mollified him, the investigator would himself go a little way towards meeting him, and a compromise would thus be achieved. Confined to his cell, Maisky did

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not know that Stalin had died although, as he later told me, certain almost imperceptible signs made him think that something important had happened. Apparently Maisky made his statement rather hastily, and it was thus that he fell into the snares not so much of the investigator as of his own penchant for compromise.

Meanwhile Beria, probably even before he had personally acquainted himself with the charges brought against Maisky, had no doubts as to the latter's innocence of espionage, treason or anything else of the kind. According to some sources, Beria actually did propose to release him, but was prevented from doing so by his own arrest.

From then onwards events took a very simple course: since Beria had wanted Maisky released, Maisky must have been sympathetic to Beria. The Central Committee's letter on Beria was compiled with all speed, and, as Khrushchev later testified in his memoirs, it was convenient at the time to blame Beria for everything at once. Maisky was not the only person to figure in the letter as an " agent."

Some people mentioned in the letter as " agents " not only were not arrested but even remained members of the Communist Party.

Beria himself was undoubtedly a criminal, but he was far from being the only member of the Politbureau whose arms were, so to say, up to the elbows in blood. This was made abundantly clear in the material published in the Soviet press in connection with the 22nd congress of the CPSU.

Since Maisky's name had figured, however briefly, in the Beria case, the new leadership felt that to release him straight away would be an embarrassment to them, especially as the case materials probably contained his own " confessions." The return to " normal " judicial procedures following the death of Stalin applied to Maisky's case too. The decision was made to have him tried.

Maisky was not the only one, however, to have been arrested. Zinchenko, Korzh and other former employees of the Soviet Embassy in London had suffered the same fate. Others arrested included the former wartime London editor, of *Soviet War News*, S. N. Rostovsky, better known under his pseudonyms Ernst Genri and N. Leonidov. Each was charged with espionage, and some even, in accordance with established tradition, with being simultaneous agents of several foreign intelligence services.

Maisky's arrest would have raised no eyebrows, considering his past and Stalin's dislike for him personally. However, the fact that employees of the London Embassy were arrested at the same time indicated that there was a more specific case and that it was probably related to the wartime years, since Maisky had left London in 1943.

There is some basis for such a supposition.

IN May 1942 the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Molotov, arrived in London to conclude negotiations and sign the Military Alliance Treaty. Molotov then went on to the USA, where he was

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given a ceremonial reception by President Roosevelt, returned to London, then flew back to Moscow.

Naturally, every step Molotov took, whether in England or the United States, was watched by the appropriate intelligence or counter-intelligence organs, whose reports were then sent on right up to the highest authorities.

A certain person whom I shall call Ivanov, or X, and who had a certain connexion with the trial of Maisky, told me that the investigator led some of the accused on to the subject of Molotov's visit to England and the United States in the summer of 1942. Gradually, the following picture emerged: Stalin personally acquainted himself with the material on Molotov's trip and his attention was drawn to the fact that Molotov had travelled one part of his journey in the USA in a separate saloon-carriage. In Stalin's mind the suspicion flared up, and was never to die down thereafter, that Molotov had had an ulterior motive for travelling separately, the reason surely being that it was a more convenient means of coming to some agreement with the Americans about something behind Stalin's back.

Thenceforth Stalin's trust in Molotov was apparently shaken, and to the end of his life Stalin was gripped by a suspiciousness intensified by the tyrant's disease. Stalin ordered that the circumstances of this episode be investigated in the most thorough fashion; but the result was in Molotov's favour. Nevertheless Stalin's suspicions never left him.

I asked Maisky about this episode and he told me that the investigator had not questioned him personally on that score; other people arrested before Maisky had, however, been interrogated about Molotov's visit.

It may be assumed that the projected trial of Maisky and the staff of the London Embassy was a prelude, a phase in the build-up to a more important trial—Molotov's.

MAISKY was tried in the summer of 1955. Basically he was charged with state treason and anti-Soviet activity. The main prosecution witness at the trial was a Doctor of Economic Sciences, professor and retired colonel Grigory Abramovich Deborin, the elder son of the famous philosopher and "Menshevik idealist" Abram Moiseevich Deborin.

Exactly why the investigation's choice fell upon G. A. Deborin is easily explained. Immediately after his release Maisky told me the following story: he, Maisky, had once been chairman of the Soviet of the Academicians' village Mozzhinka near Zvenígorod, about 70 kilometres from Moscow. G. A. Deborin, who had settled in his father's *dacha*, was Maisky's deputy on the Soviet. Both were interested in political problems and often went walking together and chatted on various topics. At the trial, Deborin testified that these conversations, on Maisky's part, had been of an anti-Soviet character.

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Maisky declined the services of an advocate at his trial and defended himself. "I destroyed Deborin morally during the trial," he told me, "and proved that he was lying." [1]

The charges of espionage and treason were dropped. However, since Maisky had been held under investigation for two and a half years, it would have been undesirable simply to have him found not guilty. Instead he was charged with some trivial mistakes committed in the course of his duties while Ambassador in London and he was sentenced to a fairly severe (by Western standards) term: six years' imprisonment. But the whole procedure had been thought out in advance: Maisky appealed to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet for a pardon and his petition was accepted forthwith. He was released immediately after his trial. But the most surprising thing was to come later: Maisky was reinstated in the Communist Party *before* he had been given full civil rehabilitation: that is to say, before the sentence was revoked, a quite astonishing case in Soviet practice.

According to Maisky, Bulganin and Voroshilov played a positive part in his case.

I once asked Ivan Mikhailovich (he had just celebrated this 90th birthday and I was writing an article about him to mark the occasion) [2]: "Tell me, Ivan Mikhailovich, several times in your life you have literally found yourself on the brink of an abyss—during the civil war, probably in 1937, and then in 1953. By what miracle did you survive?"

The old man looked at me with his large and still very lively dark brown eyes, smiled slightly and replied: "My head always worked well."

I thought to myself: "If Stalin had lived a month or two longer, probably nothing would have been of any help to Ivan Mikhailovich, or to Vyacheslav Mikhailovich [Molotov] for that matter, even a head that worked well."

[1] Many years later I was in Mozzhinka and accidentally witnessed the following scene: Maisky drove up to the club, got out of his car and began to go up the steps. Suddenly Deborin appeared, coming the other way. Seeing Maisky, he panicked like a hare caught in the light of the car headlamps and finally came down the steps at a run. Maisky, for his part, frowned and, without slackening his pace, continued walking up the steps.

[2] Personally, Maisky was a good, even-tempered man. He was very helpful to his many students and assistants. During the years when I was acquainted with him, I do not know of a single case of his doing harm to anybody.

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Dissent Through Western Eyes

Abraham Brumberg

Dissent in the USSR—Politics, Ideology, and People. Edited by Rudolf L. Tokes, The Johns Hopkins University Press (Baltimore and London, 1975).

IT would be pleasant to report unreservedly that the volume under review, all 452 pages of it, represents a signal contribution to our knowledge and understanding of political ferment in the USSR. Unhappily, no such statement seems to be warranted. This is not to say that this ambitious collection of 12 essays by Western specialists on Soviet dissent is wholly unrewarding. Frederick C. Barghoorn's account of "The Post-Khrushchev Campaign to Suppress Dissent" offers a wealth of carefully documented data and is, moreover, distinguished by sound judgment and analysis. Theodore Friedgut's "The Democratic Movement: Dimensions and Perspectives," is straightforward, balanced, and well-written. A composite profile, it is distilled not, as is usually the case, from the massive *samizdat* literature, but from the author's discussions with 40 ex-Soviet citizens, all of them members of the intelligentsia, some erstwhile dissidents, others sufficiently close to the "Democratic Movement" to act as enlightened, sympathetic, if also critical informants. Peter Dornan's painstaking review of the career of Andrei Sakharov must surely be the definitive word on the political and intellectual evolution of this remarkable man. "History and the Democratic Opposition," by Robert Slusser, contains valuable information on the *samizdat* works (including *belles-lettres*) dealing with historical subjects that official Soviet historiography either distorts or ignores. His discussion of Roy Medvedev's *Let History Judge* sheds fascinating light not only on the sources used by Medvedev in compiling his impressive indictment of Stalin and Stalinism, but on the vicissitudes of anyone attempting to do respectable historical research in a country in which each change of leadership produces a new palimpsest version of the country's political past. George Kline's detailed analysis of the writings of Alexander Yesenin-Volpin, Valery Chalidze, and Grigory Pomerants is thorough and penetrating, and especially welcome for its exposition of the works of Pomerants, one of the most gifted, original, yet unfortunately least-known thinkers to have emerged in Russia over the past decade or so. Special mention must also be made of Gene Sosin's excellent essay on Russia's contemporary troubadours—Bulat Okudzhava, Mikhail Nozhkin, Yuli Kim, Vladimir Vysotsky, and, above all, Alexander Galitch. These are the men who have revived a genre which perhaps more than any other expresses all the painful traumas of Soviet life, the grief, the bitterness, the longings and the hopes not only of a segment of the Soviet intelligentsia, but of the nation as a whole. The value of the essay is enhanced by the English-language versions of many of the "uncensored songs of dissent," some of them translated by the author, some by others.

With so much praise, why the reservations? There are several reasons.

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First, the title of the book would seem to suggest that it offers a fairly comprehensive, if compact, survey of political dissent in the USSR; yet the contents turn out to be a pasticcio of themes rather tenuously connected and revealing, moreover, some inexplicable gaps. Some of the essays can, to be sure, be savoured by themselves; taken together, they leave one with a sense of insufficiency and incompleteness. Why, for instance, devote a long chapter to religious dissent (by Barbara Wolfe Jancar), and leave out what is surely an equally important subject—dissent among nationalities (including the curious phenomenon of *Russian* nationalist dissent)? Andrei Sakharov no doubt merits separate treatment; but so, it would seem, do Roy Medvedev, Andrei Amalrik and Alexander Solzhenitsyn. Mr Peter B. Magg's discussion of how the Soviet Union's accession to the Universal Copyright Convention might endow Soviet censorship with control over Western publication of unauthorized writings was justifiable four years ago, when Moscow announced its decision. By now it is clear that Soviet judicial authorities are not eager to get involved in lawsuits presided over by foreign courts, and that their attempts to control and suppress "*tamizdat*" (unofficial writings published abroad) will continue along the usual lines—e.g. severely restricting the writers' royalties, threats, intimidations, and—occasionally—criminal proceedings. A solid chapter on *belles-lettres* that no longer need to repose in the traditional drawer but (as much a result of a certain relaxation of controls as of the increased fearlessness of Soviet authors) find their way to publishing houses in Western Europe and the United States would be far more relevant and interesting. For that matter, why did Mr Kline chose to dissect the works of Yesenin-Volpin, not one of Russia's most accessible thinkers, instead of subjecting the writings of, say, Igor Shafarevich, Mikhail Agursky, or Lev Kopelev to the same professional scrutiny? "Volpin insists," Mr Kline notes gravely, that "in the sphere of deontic modalities we must ... distinguish between the impossibility of act A and the obligatoriness of not-A." Possibly so. But (and I hope both Mr Volpin and Mr Kline will forgive me) it is even more necessary to distinguish between what *is* important, and what is not-so.

At this point it might be objected that the book, after all, does not pretend to be all-inclusive or even mildly comprehensive. "No single volume," says the Editor in his Introduction, "however broadly conceived, can possibly do justice to more than a few aspects of [contemporary Soviet dissent]." Further, *Dissent in the USSR* "is no more than a beginning," a "collection of studies" which, he hopes, will eventually "be expanded into other still-uncharted areas of Soviet society and politics." If so, then why—and here is where my second reservation comes in—go over so much already-charted territory? If the book is not for the uninformed novice (also for reasons on which I shall comment below) but for the student of Soviet affairs, why had not some (some!) of the contributors resisted the temptation to provide information of which anyone familiar with the literature on this subject is already aware? Much as I admire, for instance, Professor Barghoorn's essay—and however useful a compact description of the confrontation between the dissidents and the authorities may be—there is little in it that had not been said before. The same holds true of the chapter on religious

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dissent—a subject which, it sometimes seems to me, has already received more attention than it perhaps deserves. (Unfortunately Professor Jancar's study is not much improved by statements such as "religion is very much a concern of all segments of the Soviet population," or by including the Jewish emigration movement in the category of religious dissent. The latter is patently either a *sui generis* case, or at most has its parallels in the Ukrainian, Tatar and Lithuanian movements, religion as such being of negligible concern to the vast majority of Soviet Jews. And while the efforts of the schismatic Baptists and Orthodox believers have been sympathetically reviewed in publications such as *The Chronicle of Current Events*, it is doubtful whether they have succeeded in arousing support from the population at large. Rather, the activities of the Orthodox or Baptist dissidents—as well as of the Lithuanian Catholics—have benefited from *localized* public support, and their achievements, remarkable as they are, are testimony to the extraordinary persistence of these groups, the tactics they have adopted—as Professor Jancar rightly notes—and the decreasing ability, in psychological and political terms, of the KGB to deal ruthlessly and decisively with group discontent.)

Now my final reservation. Contemporary social and political science —so we are told by many of its practitioners—is infinitely superior either to history or even the best of journalism, not necessarily because it offers more information *qua* information, but because of its sophisticated approaches, its rigorous use of new "conceptual" and "methodological" tools. By applying "models," theories, "paradigms" to given social and political phenomena, and by scrupulously defining the subjects under investigation, an imperfectly perceived reality becomes transformed into something resembling scientific truth. Instead of random impressions, we get illuminating insights, instead of vague generalizations—empirically verifiable data.

Now, my (admittedly imperfect, yet fairly arduous) reading of the works of contemporary social and political scientists in the field of Soviet affairs has convinced me that such claims have some justification. Occasionally one does indeed find in the works of the "new" social scientists perceptions and observations not yielded by the methods of their more orthodox colleagues. Frequently, however, what we are treated to are, upon close examination, little more than old and familiar pieces of information and commonplace observations—all rearranged under dazzlingly new terminological categories, all couched in a language for which I can find no reasonable justification, either on intrinsic or on literary grounds.

Unfortunately, some of the contributions to *Dissent in the USSR* fall in this category. They are not bad, unperceptive or unenlightening. In fact, there is something to be gained from all of them. But to a lesser or greater extent their authors are so preoccupied with definitions, with fitting every phenomenon they describe into some kind of a "conceptual" mould that the texture of the phenomena tends to become obscured and dissipated. Mr Howard L. Biddulph's "Protest Strategies of the Soviet Intellectual Opposition" is a particularly galling case in point. It deals with the evolution of Soviet dissent, from its first timorous attempts to its more open and defiant manifestations. In the early and mid-1960s, Soviet dissidents could logically assume that the Soviet

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leaders would take cognizance of their protests; after all, they were not objecting to the Soviet system as such, to Marxist-Leninist *obiter dicta* or to the principles of Soviet legislation (including the Constitution), but only to flagrant miscarriages of justice. Hence the moderate language of the protests, hence the appeal to reason and, hopefully, to the enlightened self-interest of the regime (the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial, said one petition, "creates an extremely dangerous precedent and could impede the progress of Soviet culture"). Hence, too, the attempts to avoid any publicity whatsoever. It took a succession of trials in the late 1960s to shake the dissidents' confidence in the goodwill of the Soviet leadership, to realize that "violations of legality" have something to do with the very nature of "socialist legality", and to abandon their cautious tactics in favour of open protests and efforts to mobilize public support both within the country and from the outside.

The story of how and why the struggle for human rights in the USSR has evolved over the past 10 years has been told before, but it is worth telling again, and Mr Biddulph does it with a fine grasp of details and sources. Yet I confess I see no reason to be told, in a succession of tortuous paragraphs, that social and political scientists all agree that there is a difference between "the concept of political protest" and that of "revolution or insurrection." I find it irrelevant to learn that Professor Michael Lipsky's "paradigm" shows that "a group undertaking public protest faces three problems," among which is that of presenting "the message in a manner sufficiently appealing to the perceived values of the receivers to impel them to intervene on behalf of the protest group." Mr Biddulph's chapter is evidently aimed at the student of Soviet affairs, not at the average reader. The latter is surely not interested in theoretical disquisitions, but in facts and interpretations. Yet a student of Soviet affairs need not be told that "formal interest group politics, like factionalism within the Communist Party, has long been explicitly rejected by the dominant political culture of the USSR as illicit behavior." He knows, in short, that the Soviet Union is a totalitarian dictatorship, and not a democracy.

Again, Professor Tokes's introductory essay, "Varieties of Soviet Dissent: An Overview" is an excellent review of the nature of political dissent in the USSR, of its aims, its development, and above all of the various (and contradictory) ideological and programmatic trends that have emerged since dissent first burst on the scene in the 1960s. But I wish Mr Tokes had not taxed us with formulations such as "the scholarly literature on the taxonomy of the ideational components of dissident thought," and that his useful discussion of dissident thought had spared us terms such as "moral-absolutist" dissident ideologies on the one hand, and "anomic-militant" on the other. The American sociologist Walter Connor has written wisely and interestingly about social *mores* and institutions in the USSR, and his contribution to the book, "Differentiation, Integration, and Dissent," is no exception. Among other things, he warns against ascribing too much influence to the dissidents, not merely because their number is small and their effectiveness severely circumscribed, but because of their "failure to strike a responsive chord among the masses." The latter are far more preoccupied with economic demands—food, housing, wages, etc.—and while progress in those areas has been slow, it has been noticeable

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enough by Soviet standards—enough, that is, to give the average man a sense of being "better off" than ever before. Nonetheless, the aspirations and grievances persist, and should "the Soviet intelligentsia, or its dissident sections, ever find a common cause with the workers, one may expect surprising and perhaps revolutionary events." All this is worth saying—more so than that dissent has emerged "from an interplay of growing societal complexity and the polity's resistance to demands for autonomy based on various facets of that complexity"—to cite but one turgid example.

Similarly, in her "Political Communication and Dissent in the Soviet Union," Gail Durham Hollander offers a meticulously documented account of the ways in which dissidents communicate their views among themselves, to the rest of the Soviet population, and to the outside world. The various examples she cites, taken either from dissident writings or personal interviews, help to endow her narrative with a refreshing sense of reality. Yet even these tend to be marred by the author's attempt to fit them into abstract terminological categories. There is, for instance, much to be learned from her analysis of the contents of *samizdat* (p. 265), or the description of how the *samizdat* network is organized, or the role of word-of-mouth communication in the Soviet Union. There is little utility, however, in the discussion of the theoretical differences between the official media (the 'legitimate system of political communication") on the one hand, and the "dissent network of communication" on the other—little, that is, if we are to be informed that the "official system is monopolistic and highly controlled," while "the alternative is pluralistic." Or that the first is "patterned with a massive top-to-bottom flow of contents," while the other "operates on a horizontal plane."

These strictures, to repeat, pertain to only some of the chapters. Yet since they are precisely the ones that give the book the character of a study aimed at the scholar rather than the general reader, it is all the more regrettable that the scholarship is often abstruse or superfluous. The single admittedly non-scholarly contribution is the final essay, by Mr George Feifer, called "No Protest: The Case of the Passive Minority." It merits a few observations, albeit of a different nature. Mr Feifer, a journalist who has lived in, visited, and written extensively about the Soviet Union for many years, takes Western scholars to task for exaggerating the noble qualities of many Soviet dissidents, for ascribing to them non-existent virtues, for jettisoning objectivity in favour of political considerations, for fostering illusions that only tend to be vitiated by reality (he cites the case of Peter Yakir, whose uncritical acclaim in the past made it so difficult "to explain his fall as a hero"). Most of all, he pleads for more attention and sympathy for the "passive dissenters," who for a variety of reasons refuse to join the ranks of the *enragées*, but whose profound revulsion with Soviet life may yet, under certain circumstances, and especially if they become convinced of their chances of success, turn them into determined and active opponents of the Soviet regime.

There is much to be said for Mr Feifer's observations. In recent years Western scholars have indeed tended to ignore tensions and conflicts other than those between the Soviet authorities and their *open* opponents. Excessive probing into the frailties and the ambivalent

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motives of Soviet dissidents, however, can be as pointless and as harmful as the penchant for crediting them with only selfless and high-minded aspirations. Valorous deeds may be spawned by a bewildering and not necessarily most laudable array of motives; they remain valorous nevertheless. Most important, the impact of specific actions on history may be quite unrelated to the personal motives of those responsible for them. Many Western observers have been so impressed (and rightly) by the extraordinary rise of political opposition in the Soviet Union, that they have tended to overestimate its significance and to romanticize its actors. A sober approach would surely have to avoid both these pitfalls.

In sum, then, *Dissent in the USSR* is an important work, though not without faults. If I have dwelt so much on the latter, it is because I hope Mr Tokes will treat us to an even better book next time. He is likely to succeed, provided he resists the allurments of taxonomical differentiation.

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Survey Crostic No. 3

William Petersen

Instructions

Decipher clues. Fill in answers on dashes over numbers alongside. Transfer letters to individually-numbered squares on diagram, where words form between black blanks to become a quotation. Letters printed in squares refer back to clues. First letters of answers over dashes become a vertical crostic giving author and source of quotation.

Answer in next issue.



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Clues		Answers
A.	Russian statesman (1849–1915), responsible for stimulating industry	162 119 25 98 48
B.	See Word C (3 wds.)	115 24 202 99 12 77 183 139 156
C.	With Word B, a Blanquist party to which Marx belonged	118 150 62 46 78 192
D.	Organization that Marx transfered to America in order to evade Bakunin's influence (2 wds.)	42 105 86 140 151 171 58 2 71 200 128 187 158 114 31 21 49 96
E.	The 1919 congress of the CPSU, immediately after the founding of the Comintern .	33 122 80 11 208 177
F.	Technical unit through which the Party controls a Kolkhoz (acronym)	64 50 185
G.	Major Russian novelist (1883–1945), received three Stalin prizes (initials and last name)	145 40 203 19 166 76 104 92 59
H.	Ruffian	193 23 130 70 167
I.	Typical attitude towards foreigners of Soviet and especially Chinese Communists	67 81 107 8 147 196 127 168 41 57

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J. One of the Soviet technical or administrative elite 20 116 153 172 195 75 43 53 100 205 126

K. Bound securely; beaten 184 141 52 117 32 18 134 82

L. —— overcomes right—French proverb 56 186 136 154 22

M. German-British Sovietologist: *World Communism* ... 138 207 3 44 102 83 26 194 170

N. Whether 87 35

O. Chekhov play (3 wds.) 93 112 63 4 188 79 176 30 157 125

P. Following "The," the European Communist bloc 27 160 109 90

Q. With "buro," the former executive of the CPSU Central Committee 36 132 189

R. Town on the Nile, site of an "incident" that brought France and England to the brink of war in 1898 ..... 6 197 120 209 143 45 103

S. Collectively, the professionals of a Communist Party 155 144 181 38 66 15 113

T. Fails to follow the Party line 198 131 173 28 65 121 74 108

U. US Secret Service of second world war 106 13 81

V. Type of Chinese tea 123 148 178

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W. Marx's notes as edited by Kautsky, issued as "Volume 4" of *Capital* (4 German wds.) 14 84 169 97 47 1 129 111

39 190 206 54 182 164 137

69 146 174 61 29 199 133

7 179

X. In the mid-1930s, a supporter of the Bukharin-Rykov group 101 201 73 89 10 124 152 60

Y. Lenin's mistress (full name) . 163 135 85 34 5 180 94 55

9 68 191 175

Z. Soviet magazine (translated into 2 English wds.) 72 165 159 142 110 37 95 17

ZZ. Rail town and port on the Volga, formerly Pokrovsk ... 51 16 88 204 149 161

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Answer to SURVEY Crostic No. 2

[Alexander I.] Solzhenitsyn, [*The*] *Gulag Archipelago*: In one household on the day the Head Murderer died they spread out photographs of those who were shot and who died in camps—several dozen of them. Friends come to visit, talk softly, and leave without saying goodbye. And that is how it ought to be.

A. Shaposhnikov
B. Of the Poor
C. Led
D. Zhdanov
E. Heath
F. Eddy
G. New
H. I. Howe
I. Trofim Denisovich
J. Show
K. Youth
L. North Ossetian
M. God That Failed
N. Unwashed
O. Lethe
P. Aped
Q. Great
R. Arty
S. Roy
T. Committee
U. High
V. In Dubious Battle
W. Peter the
X. Edo
Y. Left Notes
Z. Add
YY. Go Down, Moses
ZZ. Our Days

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

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

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